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ABSTRACT 
The economic activities of multinational corporations (MNCs) in the extractive 
industries of developing countries produce a myriad of immediate negative social, 
economic and environmental impacts on communities hosting their operations. 
Consequently, stakeholders have increasingly called for (greater) accountability of these 
corporations for the impacts of their operations on stakeholders and the wider society. 
The extent to which these MNCs are accountable for their operations’ negative 
environmental impacts in the developing countries is underexplored as prior studies 
have primarily focused on corporate social responsibility rather than accountability of 
these corporations. However, accountability apparently means different things to 
different parties, and especially in a non-Western context. This thesis primarily seeks to 
explore the concept of accountability in a developing country context and how it is 
understood and practised within the Nigerian oil industry. More specifically, it seeks to 
understand the extent to which oil MNCs in Nigeria discharge accountability in the 
context of gas flaring and oil spills environmental pollution emanating from their 
operations. The study utilises a mixed methods approach to generate data to provide 
understanding on stakeholders’ conceptions of accountability, the nature of accounts 
constructed by the MNCs on gas flaring and oil spills environmental incidents, and the 
plausible corporate sense-making embedded within those accounts. The empirical data 
produce both general and nuanced conceptions of accountability between the MNCs and 
stakeholders. An account-giving heuristic highlights four broad and further nuanced 
accounts the corporations provide on these negative environmental incidents which are 
largely in conflict with stakeholders’ narratives. Moreover, the sense-making analysis of 
the MNCs’ accounts suggests that those accounts apparently serve corporate self-
interest rather than the discharge of accountability. However, organisational, 
institutional, relational, and national contextual factors apparently encourage the un-
accountability of the MNCs. Accountability in the Nigerian oil industry will remain 
elusive without critical institutional and regulatory reforms. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
The principal concern of this thesis is the exploration of accountability in a particular 
geographic location (Nigeria) and with a particular focus on the oil and gas upstream 
industry. More specifically, the thesis seeks to understand how accountability is 
manifested, and understood and reacted to in the context of Nigerian oil and gas 
companies’ oil spill and gas flaring. This focus inevitably draws our gaze to the 
relationships between the companies and the communities in whose sphere the spills 
and flares occur. On the basis of these relationships, I provide a narrative around the 
various accounts which the companies construct and communicate (which they also 
perceive as discharging their accountability) and the related narratives given by the 
communities. In addition, I also include in my examination the actions and attitudes of a 
number of the influential institutions that encourage, discourage, support or deflect the 
accounts and their construction – mostly obviously government agencies, non-
governmental organisations, and the media (Tregidga, Milne, & Lehman, 2012). 
Importantly, whilst it is apparent that this is a complex and “noisy” environment (Allen, 
2011) in which to derive clear narratives, it is this very complexity that commends the 
enquiry.     
 
In recognition of the foregoing, this thesis categorically explores the conceptions of 
accountability by oil and gas
1
 multinational corporations (hereafter, MNCs) in Nigeria 
and the industry stakeholders and the nature of ‘accounts’ the MNCs give on 
environmental incidents involving, particularly, gas flaring and oil spills, as well as the 
corporate sense-making embedded within those accounts. It also explores stakeholders’ 
narratives about these environmental incidents. Essentially, the thesis explores the 
extent to which major oil MNCs in Nigeria render accounts on environmental incidents 
involving gas flaring and oil spills and the extent to which those accounts discharge 
accountability. Commentators have contended that oil spills and gas flaring create 
negative environmental impacts on communities located close to oil facilities from 
which these environmental incidents result (Bassey, 2012; DFID, 2011; Emoyon, 
                                                 
1 Hereafter, ‘oil’.  
2 
 
Akpoborie, & Akporhonor, 2008; Ojakorotu & Olawale, 2009; UNDP, 2006; UNEP, 
2011). Whilst these environmental incidents have closely drawn the attention and gaze 
of local and international stakeholders to the relationships between these MNCs and the 
Niger Delta communities for over the past two decades or so, no studies (as far as I am 
aware) have explored how accountability manifests within these relationships. Focusing 
this thesis on the accountability relationship between these MNCs and communities vis-
à-vis negative environmental incidents will help us enrich our understanding of 
accountability in that context. For example, O’Dwyer and Unerman (2008: 819) argue 
that: “the complex nature of accountability necessitates its examination in context in 
order to illuminate the multi-faceted ways it is experienced and enacted in specific 
organisational settings.” The manner in which the MNCs in the Nigerian oil industry 
conceptualise accountability in their relationships with communities regarding the 
alleged ramifications of negative environmental incidents and how such accountability 
manifests will help to further our understanding of accountability in the context of a 
non-Western setting.   
 
There are a number of justifications for my choice of Nigeria, the Nigerian oil industry 
and the MNCs. First, Nigeria currently is both the largest economy and most populous 
country in Africa (Bloomberg. 7 April 2014; The Economist. 7 April 2014). Second, 
Nigeria is the largest producer of oil in Africa with its attendant high incidence of gas 
flaring and oil spills (OPEC, 2011). Third, the oil industry is important to Nigeria as it is 
the mainstay of the country’s economy (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2010; Idemudia & Ite, 
2006). Fourth, like other extractive industries, the oil industry is highly secretive 
(Lauwo & Otusanya, 2014; Newenham-Kahindi, 2011; Olayinka, 2012; Otusanya, 
Lauwo, & Bakre, 2014). Fifth, the focus on the MNCs in the industry is vital because 
they account for over 90% of oil reserve and production in Nigeria (NNPC Statistical 
Bulletins, 2000-2012; NAPIMS website)
2
. Sixth, the activities of these oil companies 
produce negative environmental, social and economic ramifications for the communities 
hosting their operations. Last but not the least, the social context in which oil operations 
take place in Nigeria is tense, charged and sensitive, which has given rise to or, has been 
the result of, mutual mistrust/suspicion between the corporations and stakeholders 
                                                 
2
 NNPC: Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (state-owned company representing Nigerian 
Government’s interest in Joint Ventures with MNCs); NAPIMS: National Petroleum Investment 
Management Services is a subsidiary of NNPC that manages NNPC’s investments in the JVs.  
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(especially the host communities). Essentially, the last justification alone merits call for 
accountability, which is necessary where trust is in doubt (Swift, 2001). Moreover, as 
for corporations operating in high-polluting industries, the literature argues that they 
make more social and environmental disclosures than those in less pollution-intensive 
industries as noted in Chapters two and three. This resonates with the MNCs operating 
in the Nigerian oil industry. However, the provision of greater information by a 
corporation, according to Guthrie & Parker (1990), will apparently make such 
corporation a subject of further scrutiny (see Garsten & de Montoya, 2008). Given this 
situation, organisations in high-polluting industries will likely employ defensive 
accountability in resonance with Scott & Lyman’s (1968) argument that actors will 
mobilise defensive accountability when called upon to account for their unethical 
behaviours.   
 
In order to have in-depth understanding of accountability and the nature of accounts the 
MNCs provide on gas flaring and oil spills environmental incidents that emanate from 
their operations, I find it increasingly helpful to focus this study within the context of 
these environmental incidents. The benefit of focusing the study on only these issues 
rather than the entire disclosures or entire issues for which the corporations are to be 
held accountable is to enable us get deeper insights into the various nuances of accounts 
and the extent to which the corporations discharge accountability.  
1.2 Justification for the study 
As Gray (2000) contends, although organisations’ social accounts could serve other 
purposes, the discharge of accountability is the major criterion upon which such 
accounts should be judged. However, given the contextual differences between Western 
and developing countries (Belal, Cooper, & Roberts, 2013; Belal & Owen, 2007; Dar, 
2014; Idemudia, 2007), it is increasingly important to understand how accountability is 
understood in a developing country context and the extent to which it is discharged. 
Contextualising accountability in a given setting is important (O’Dwyer & Unerman, 
2008) as accountability is perceived as a widely misused and misunderstood concept 
(Gray, 2001). It is quite apparent in almost every setting that accountability is 
understood differently by different parties (Bovens, 2007; Mulgan, 2000; Newell, 2005; 
Sinclair, 1995) and those understandings often bear only a distant relationship with 
more formal articulations of what accountability actually entails (see Dar, 2014). 
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Furthermore, it is also apparent that the range of “accounts” constructed and manifested 
in complex relationships varies immensely (see, for example, Cooper & Owen, 2007; 
Killian, 2010; Oakes & Young, 2010; Rossingh, 2012). Particularly such accounts are 
as likely to be informal as formal, as likely to be constructed for purposes other than 
accountability than for the proper discharge of accountability itself (Gray, 2013; Samkin 
& Schneider, 2010), and as likely to accounts constructed verbally and/or through 
(in)action as they are to be written or communicated in more observable settings. By 
implication, as Gray (2013: 460) argues: “the nature of giving and receiving accounts is 
not set in stones; is not part of a natural law.” The potential differences in the way 
accountability can be understood within different contexts commend the exploratory 
approach adopted by this study.   
 
This study is situated within the Nigerian context to contribute to the literature of 
corporate social reporting and accountability in the context of developing countries to 
complement our understanding of accountability in the Western context. The concern 
for greater corporate accountability and transparency in less developed countries 
(LDCs) has been expressed by Belal, et al. (2013) based on the impacts of corporations 
on these vulnerable countries. Belal, et al. (2013) also acknowledge the rarity of social 
and environmental accounting research in developing countries with the exception of 
India and Bangladesh and recommend more research in this area in order to broaden our 
understanding of such practices in developing economies. The jusfications for situating 
the study to Nigeria and its oil industry have been mentioned in Section 1.1.  
 
The increase in the number of Western MNCs in the primary industries in developing 
countries for the purpose of seeking economic rent has been well documented in the 
literature (Chapter Two). As will be discussed in Chapter two, those economic 
advantages that accrue to the MNCs often have negative implications for labour rights, 
human rights, environmental integrity as well as other social and economic 
consequences that stakeholders and the wider society are exposed to. Given the growing 
power and impacts of MNCs on global society in general and developing countries in 
particular (whilst the latter has relatively little or no power/will to control the MNCs), 
there has been increasing calls for (greater) accountability of these corporations 
(Chapters Two and Three). In Nigeria, the visibility of the MNCs is very profound in 
the oil industry where the MNCs undertake over 90% of oil and gas operations. The 
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need to study the extent to which these MNCs are accountable is necessitated not just by 
their size (Bowen, 2000)
3
, but by their environmental impacts on their Niger Delta host 
communities living near those pollution sites (Post, 1991). Belal, et al. (2013: 85) also 
commend the exploration of accountability in developing countries because they are 
exploited and vulnerable:   
Given the apparent vulnerability and exploitability it is even more important that, in 
these economies, organisations act responsibly and ethically. It is in this light that the 
social and environmental accounting and reporting of organisations operating within 
these economies should be considered. Time and again we find that accountability and 
transparency are recommended in order to provide a countervailing check against the 
possibility of exploitation and for sustainable development particularly in emerging and 
less developed economies.   
 
However, whilst the MNCs have been providing reports and disclosures about gas 
flaring and oil spills environmental incidents, no studies (as far as I am aware) have 
studied the nature of these accounts and the sense-making embedded within them. 
Whilst public discourses suggest that gas flaring and oil spills create social, economic 
and environmental impacts on communities living near oil facilities, the public and 
corporate narratives constructed around these incidents apparently have several 
underlying subjectivities (Hines, 1988; 1992) based on the frame of reference of the 
narrators (O’Leary & Chia, 2007; Oakes and Young, 2010; Shafer, 2006). Furthermore, 
Mattessich (1995, 2009) argues that narratives about objectified realities and their 
implications are constructed through some subjective lenses, and this latter can be 
understood, according to Parker (2008: 911-912), by “capturing multiple constructed 
realities” of the social actors.   Parker’s view equally commends the concern of this 
thesis to examine the different narratives from the companies and stakeholders. 
Moreover, Tregidga, et al. (2012) also commend the need to explore how stakeholders 
interpret, counter or dispute corporations’ accounts through the lens of shadow 
accounts. The need to use counter narratives by stakeholders in juxtaposition with 
corporate accounts is apropos in this study given the confused and charged context from 
which those narratives derive (Allen, 2011).  However, this thesis does not seek to 
determine what is ‘truth’ from the accounts/narratives or privilege the voice of any 
group as representing the ‘truth’ as “truth” is exceptionally difficult to establish. The 
incidence of flaring, the level of spills, the impacts of these, the causes of these, the 
rights of the companies in the country and the actual incidents that have or have not 
                                                 
3 Section 2.5 discusses the visibility of MNCs.  
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taken place (for example) are all shrouded in claims, counter-claims and secrecy. The 
notion that accounts might construct “truths” rather than tell truth is by no means unique 
to this research setting (Livesey, 2001; Spence, 2009) but it is especially acute here. 
This helps us focus on the roles and understandings of both accountability and the 
associated accounts in a manner which seeks not to privilege unsubstantiated claims to 
“better truth”.    
 
In terms of methodological contribution, this study pragmatically adopts mixed methods 
to gather evidence to extend our understanding of accountability in a non-Western 
context. Whilst many studies on corporate social reporting and accountability in 
developing countries have largely used content analysis (see Belal & Momin, 2009), 
this thesis equally responds to Tregidga, et al.’s (2012: 223) recommendation stating 
that:  
We argue for a move away from the ‘safety’ of quantitative based content analysis 
toward the more unfamiliar territory of interpretive and qualitative methodologies (e.g., 
narrative, rhetorical, visual and discursive methods). 
 
In this regard, after using account-giving heuristic framework to explore the nature and 
constellations of the MNCs’ accounts vis-à-vis gas flaring and oil spills environmental 
incidents (Chapters Three and Seven), O’Leary & Chia’s (2007) episteme of sense-
making is used to theorise and explore the underlying corporate sense-making 
embedded within those accounts (Chapters Three & Nine).  
1.3 Objectives of the research 
This thesis primarily seeks to explore the concept of accountability in a developing 
country context and how it is understood and practised within the Nigerian oil industry. 
More specifically, it seeks to understand the extent to which oil MNCs in Nigeria 
discharge accountability in the context of gas flaring and oil spills environmental 
pollution emanating from their operations. As accountability means different things to 
different parties and in different contexts, it is expected that this will be more acute in a 
non-Western setting like Nigeria. However, whilst this thesis relies on the literature to 
theorise about accountability, it nonetheless finds it necessary to commence the 
empirical work by first exploring the kind of conceptions these Western corporations 
and the indigenous stakeholders have of accountability (see Dar, 2014). In order to 
focus this study to realise its objective, the following research questions are developed:  
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1. To what extent do MNCs in the Nigerian oil industry and stakeholders 
understand the MNCs’ accountability to stakeholders with especial reference to 
communities? 
2. How do the oil and gas MNCs in Nigeria manifest accountability with respect to 
gas flaring and oil spill environmental incidents? 
3. What is the corporate sense-making underlying the MNCs’ accounts? 
1.4 The organisation and structure of the thesis 
Whilst this section provides a brief structure and organisation of this thesis, it does not 
in any way suggest that the thesis was done in the sequential order of the Chapters 
(Chapter Five). This thesis is therefore organised as follows.  
 
Chapter one provides an introductory background to this thesis by situating it to the 
social context of the Nigerian oil industry and articulating the objectives this thesis 
seeks to achieve in the light of the research questions.  
 
Chapter two reviews the literature on multinational corporations in relation to their 
rising prominence, roles, visibility and influence in developing countries. It discusses 
how the economic, social and political influences of these corporations and their social 
and environmental impacts have increasingly engendered stakeholders’ call for the need 
to hold these corporations to account. It considers how corporate influence and impacts 
necessitate the need for corporate social responsibility (CSR). The Chapter thus 
discusses some notions of CSR as well as the relationship between the MNCs, the state 
and communities in which the MNCs operate. As these corporations apparently wield 
enormous economic influence compared to their host developing countries and 
communities, the literature argues for their greater social responsibility and 
accountability. 
 
Chapter three examines the nature of accountability as a conceptual foundation for this 
thesis. It also explores the relationship between accountability and CSR. In order to 
articulate the extent to which the accounts corporations provide discharge 
accountability, this Chapter discusses the relationship between corporate social 
reporting and the discharge of accountability. For the purpose of providing a balanced 
perspective to corporate accounts, this Chapter discusses stakeholders’ alternative 
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accounts or external social audits in the context of accountability discharge. Moreover, 
the Chapter provides an overview of accountability in the Nigerian context. Lastly, the 
Chapter provides a nuanced theorisation for exploring the nature of accounts provided 
by corporations to explain and justify (in)actions as well as the corporate sense-making 
embedded within those accounts.  
 
Furthermore, Chapter four provides a brief background review to the geographic and 
social setting of this study. It briefly discusses the oil and gas economy of Nigeria and 
the regulatory environment. This Chapter also discusses the relationship between the 
Niger Delta communities and the oil industry as well as highlighting the negative 
consequences of oil operations on the communities. Lastly, it examines the visibility of 
MNCs in the Nigerian oil industry both in terms of their operational size and 
environmental impacts.  
 
The research methods and methodology followed in this study are explained in Chapter 
five. It discusses the ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions that 
underpinned this thesis. Moreover, it discusses the influence of those assumptions on 
the pragmatic choice of the research methods and the justification for their adoption.  
The Chapter equally discusses a case study research approach and why the approach is 
adopted in this study.  
 
Chapter six begins the empirical part of this thesis and explores the conceptions of 
accountability by corporations and stakeholders using data from questionnaires, 
interviews and corporate social reports. It uses two sets of questionnaires to explore the 
extent to which the respondents agree with the literature and one another on what 
generally constitutes accountability and the specific conceptions of accountability as a 
moral obligation to provide accounts to those affected by the accountor’s actions. The 
data from interviews and corporate reports provide more nuanced insights into the 
conceptions of accountability within the context of corporate-community relationship.  
 
Chapter seven presents the accounts the MNCs give with respect to gas flaring and oil 
spills environmental incidents which are analytically organised into four categories of 
account-giving heuristic namely, denial, excuse, justification, and concession. This 
Chapter uses this heuristic as a framework to understand how the MNCs’ accountability 
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manifests through the accounts they provide on issues relating to gas flaring and oil 
spills environmental incidents. However, the Chapter does not claim that the MNCs 
discharge their accountability by the rendering of those accounts as the Chapter points 
out that the framework was only helpful to provide understanding about the nature of 
accounts the MNCs rendered in relation to these adverse environmental incidents. It 
draws on data from accessible corporate publications to present only corporate 
narratives on these two environmental incidents.  
 
Alternative narratives that stakeholders provided on gas flaring and oil spills incidents
4
 
are presented in Chapter eight. These narratives, as the Chapter explains, serve as a 
form of shadow or counter accounts to balance the MNCs’ views in order to illustrate 
the extent to which such narratives and MNCs’ accounts on gas flaring and oil spills 
incidents are parallel. Chapter eight provides justifications for stakeholders’ alternative 
narratives in relation to the MNCs’ accounts because of the negative nature of the 
environmental incidents, the degree of secrecy in the Nigerian oil industry and it 
provides the basis to present composite narratives and voices of both stakeholders and 
MNCs. Such multiple voices also provide useful insights that Chapter nine partly draws 
on to explore corporate sense-making.   
 
Chapter nine explores the corporate sense-making embedded within the MNCs’ 
accounts which equally provides the basis to draw conclusions on the extent to which 
those accounts discharge accountability. It provides a recap of sense-making as a lens of 
theorising about the empirical data based on the dominant social-historical paradigm 
which shapes, and is shaped by, the modern corporation. It also relates the findings to 
the social contexts of the study in order to link the texts to the social context from which 
those texts originated, thus providing useful material to assess the extent to which the 
accounts rendered by the MNCs discharge accountability.  
 
Finally, Chapter ten provides a summary of findings and draws conclusions in relation 
to the findings and objectives of the study. It also briefly highlights some limitations of 
this study and suggests some areas of future research. In addition, the Chapter highlights 
areas this research has contributed to social and environmental accounting literature.   
                                                 
4 Including their impacts 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Multinational corporations 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter one introduced the social context of this thesis and the rationale behind the 
study, the empirical questions it sought to answer and the structure of the thesis. 
Moreover, the introductory Chapter briefly set the tone for the kind of background 
theoretical reviews that will facilitate cohesion between the literature and theoretical 
backgrounds and the empirical aspects of this thesis. In order to contextually situate this 
study in the literature, this Chapter is one of two Chapters that provide literature and 
theoretical backgrounds for this thesis. Whilst this Chapter will provide a background 
review on MNCs in the context of CSR and accountability, Chapter three focuses on the 
broad nature of accountability and other theoretical lenses that might help in 
understanding it in a given social context. As the thesis suggests, MNCs and 
accountability are relevant to this study; however, accountability rather than MNCs is 
the foundation upon which the thesis is developed. With accountability being a 
relational concept (Chapter Three), the empirical conceptions of accountability and how 
the corporations manifest accountability will be explored principally in connection with 
gas flaring and oil spill environmental incidents vis-à-vis the MNCs’ relationships with 
Niger Delta communities as mentioned in Chapter one (cf. Chapters Six to Nine). The 
literature suggests that relationships are strengthened on the basis of trust while trust is 
built through accountability – the giving and receiving of account (Dar, 2014; Seal & 
Vincent-Jones, 1997; Swift, 2001), which further suggests that accountability is an 
integral part of maintaining relationships.  
Unlike corporations that are located within a single national locale, MNCs are located in 
more than one national boundary which also has implications for the number of 
relationships they have to maintain. The remainder of this Chapter is organised as 
follows. Section 2.2 provides a general overview of MNCs with more emphasis on 
developing countries for two reasons. First, this study is situated within the context of a 
developing nation, i.e., Nigeria. Second, several untoward practices of the MNCs for 
which they have been criticised across a number of industries are very profound in 
developing countries. The economic influence of the MNCs as modern institutions in a 
contemporary modern society is explored in Section 2.3. As the economic influence and 
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activities of the MNCs are producing consequences (whether anticipated or incidental) 
on stakeholders and the environment, they have also adopted several social 
responsibility practices or strategies to benefit stakeholders within society. To this end, 
Section 2.4 briefly discusses the nature and some notions of CSR.  In addition, the 
relationships between MNCs, the state and communities hosting their operations are 
reviewed in Section 2.5, while Section 2.6 provides a background review to the 
visibility of MNCs and how it warrants corporate accountability. The last section 
provides concluding remarks.    
2.2 An overview of multinational corporations 
From the past few decades or so globalisation
5
 and the concept of the world as a global 
village have permeated virtually all political, economic, social, and technology 
discourses. On the politico-economic front, such discourses have in one way or the 
other brought about several international organisations, e.g., International Monetary 
Fund, World Bank, World Business Council for Sustainable Development, World Trade 
Organisation, and United Nations (Gibbins & Newton, 1994). These institutions have in 
one way or another encouraged the flow of resources from one region to another, which 
afforded many corporations the opportunity to extend their operations beyond their 
home countries. The literature has generally referred to such corporations as 
multinational corporations or companies (Cooper & Ezzamel, 2013; Frynas, 2005, 
2009; Goldstein, 2009; Heidenreich, 2012; Kostova & Roth, 2002; Tan, 2009), 
transnational corporations (Kell & Ruggie, 1999; Koenig-Archibugi, 2005; Omeje, 
2006; Shearer, 2002; Shinsato, 2005; UNCTAD, 2010), or multinational enterprises 
(Crilly, 2011; Husted and Allen, 2006; OECD, 2005, 2008; Scherer & Smid, 2000). 
Despite these varied terminologies used in the literature, Amao (2011) contends that 
they convey the same meaning and so can be used interchangeably. However, the term 
multinational corporation is adopted in this thesis.  
The literature provides some definitions of MNCs. For example, Shinsato (2005: 189) 
defines an MNC as “a national company in two or more countries operating in 
association, with one controlling the other in whole or in part.” Within the same line of 
                                                 
5
 Globalisation is described by Scherer and Smid (2000: 353) as the “process of movement toward the 
creation of a global economy, which enables entrepreneurs to raise money anywhere in the world, to 
use technology, supplies, labor, and management from different locations, and to produce and sell 
products or to create services anyplace” 
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thought, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) broadly 
describes MNCs as: 
[C]ompanies or other entities established in more than one country and so linked that 
they may co-ordinate their operations in various ways. While one or more of these 
entities may be able to exercise a significant influence over the activities of others, their 
degree of autonomy within the enterprise may vary widely from one multinational 
enterprise to another. Ownership may be private, state or mixed (OECD, 2008: 12). 
The above definitions suggest that MNCs have their headquarters in their home 
countries and have one or more fully- or partly-owned subsidiaries in another country. 
Kostova & Roth (2002) emphasise that these MNCs operate in complex multi-
institutional environments which also compels them to evolve and articulate strategies 
to deal with those complexities. They further contend that the subsidiaries of these 
MNCs face a high degree of complexity because of numerous institutional pulls they 
have to respond to – i.e., having to respond to the adoption of parent companies’ 
practices and local environmental factors and pressures. They referred to these dual 
pressures faced by foreign subsidiaries as ‘institutional duality.’ Despite the complex 
environments or institutional duality MNCs’ subsidiaries have to face, the expansion of 
MNCs’ operations across countries has steadily increased over the years.    
According to the literature, there has been a worldwide rise in the number of MNCs 
(Jamali, 2010; Kell & Ruggie, 1999; Korten, 1995; Rwabizambuga, 2007; UN, 1973; 
UNCTAD, 2010) and their volume of output (UNCTAD, 2010, 2012, 2014). As 
reported by UNCTAD (2010; 2012)
6
, the number of MNCs has risen with the global 
rise in foreign direct investment (FDI)
7
 . Based on UNCTAD (2012) report, developing 
economies accounted for inflow of 45% of global FDI in 2011.  FDI has been regarded 
as a large source of external investment finance for developing countries (Aitken & 
Harrison, 1999)
8
, which, according to Haddad & Harrison (1993) and Koenig-Archibugi 
                                                 
6 UNCTAD reported in 2010 and 2005 that there were 82,000 and 70,000 multinational corporations in 
2008 and 2004 respectively.  This represents a significant rise from the UN (1973) reported figure of 
7,300 MNCs. 
7 All FDIs do not emanate from MNCs. This clarification was made in the UN (1973) pioneer report on 
MNCs where it suggests that studies of FDIs should not be confused with those of MNCs even though 
most FDIs come from the MNCs. Consequently, the review in this Chapter only makes reference to FDIs 
where the cited studies make explicit connection between FDIs and MNCs, that is, FDIs provided by 
MNCs.  
8
 However, Goldstein (2009) provides evidence that considerable amounts of FDIs have been flowing 
from developing countries of Asia to developed countries. Moreover, UNCTAD’s (2010) World 
Investment Report states that developing and transition economies also accounted for about 25% of FDI 
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(2005), has compelled many developing countries to adopt concessionary regulations to 
attract FDI from MNCs. As the literature also suggests, such regulatory lax or 
concession (Crane & Matten, 2010, Seidman, 2003) are driven by competition as 
different nations compete to lure MNCs for their investment power (Scherer & Smid, 
2000). It has also been argued that a number of these MNCs privilege moving to those 
countries with lax in regulatory environment (Christmann & Taylor, 2006; Koenig-
Archibugi, 2005; Lauwo & Otusanya, 2014; Scherer & Smid, 2000; Scherer, Palazzo, & 
Baumann, 2006), which, according to Heidenreich (2012) ratchets into a ‘race to the 
bottom’. Heidenreich  states that ‘race to the bottom’ connotes unhealthy competition 
among nation states leading to regulatory lax on taxes, wages, labour rights, 
environmental protection and so on to attract FDI from MNCs. Heidenreich further 
suggests that MNCs have been criticised for this herding behaviour among developing 
countries.  
Although the MNCs have been criticised for promoting ‘race to the bottom’ competition 
in developing countries, the positive advantages that developing countries derive from 
such financial inflows from the MNCs are well documented in the literature. For 
example, it is documented that FDI provides job opportunities  for local citizens 
(Hadded & Harrison, 1993; Newenham-Kahindi, 2011; UNCTAD, 2010) and transfer 
of technology to developing countries which local firms can benefit from through 
learning (Blomstrom, 2014; Haddad & Harrison, 1993). However, there are mixed 
findings in the literature as to whether the presence of MNCs in any economies creates 
some spillovers or demonstration effects
9
 on the host economies, local competitors and 
unrelated industries (Aitken & Harrison, 1999; Globerman, 1979; Haddad & Harrison, 
1993; Liu, 2002; Liu, Siler, Wang, & Wei, 2000; Sinani & Meyer, 2004). For example, 
Aitken & Harrison (1999) find that local companies benefited in terms of productivity 
because of FDI or foreign ownership. Their findings suggest that only the plants that 
receive the foreign investment achieved productivity advantage, whereas domestically 
owned firms were negatively affected by FDI. Moreover, they could not find any 
positive technology spillover effects from foreign corporations  to locally owned firms.  
                                                                                                                                               
outflows and 50% inflows in the period under review, which make them both active destinations and 
sources of FDI (see also UNTAD, 2014).  
9 This connotes the adoption of MNCs’ practices and behaviours by local firms of the host countries. 
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Blomstrom & Kokko (1998) also suggest that MNCs produce spillover effects on local 
companies but that the evidence available on the spillover effects in terms of 
productivity effect arising from advanced technological knowledge and access to a 
larger market (market spillover effect) are not comprehensive. They suggest that MNCs 
could bring about productivity spillovers to local firms as their presence motivates local 
firms to adapt themselves to compete with the MNCs and also be able to access foreign 
markets for their products due to high quality products achieved through competition. 
Blomstrom & Kokko (1998) further argue that the extent local firms benefit from these 
spillovers depend on the degree of local capability and competition. In similar vein, 
Sinani & Meyer (2004) posit that the level of technology spillover depends on the 
characteristics of both the FDI and the recipient domestic firm. Hadded & Harrison 
(1993) find that FDI does not bring about growth in productivity for domestic firms 
except for firms in joint venture with the MNCs. On technology spillovers, Hadded and 
Harrison find no benefit to domestic firms. One reason they advanced for the absense of 
technology spillover is that the foreign firms prefer to enter into protected domestic 
markets. In contrast, Liu (2002) finds a positive productivity and technology spillovers 
in China which benefits the manufacturing industries and domestic sectors.   
In spite of positive and negative spillover implications the MNCs’ operations have on 
the host developing countries in the areas of employment, technology transfer and 
economic growth, the negative environmental impacts or spillovers due to pollution 
from their operations are profound. Health and environmental hazards have been 
reportedly linked with the operations of MNCs in developing countries. For example, 
Matilal & Hopfl (2009) report the huge investment of Union Carbide (a chemical 
company) in Bhopal (in India) with the attendant employment of local people, but the 
gas explosion from its operation reportedly led to the death and injuries of thousands of 
people (see also Bowman & Kunreuther, 1988). Matilal & Hopfl also reported attempts 
by the company to dissemble and blame the incident on sabotage rather than operational 
failure. Bowman & Kunreuther (1988) state that significant hazard such as the Bhopal 
disaster triggers regulations. However, as Scherer & Smid (2000) note, many countries 
are not interested in tightening their regulatory nooses because they want to lure 
investment from the MNCs. But Blowfield (2005) points out that economic rather than 
development motive underlies why MNCs engage with developing countries. As the 
literature documented, profit-seeking MNCs like to extend their operations to countries 
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with low corporate tax regime (Azemar & Delios, 2008; Sikka, 2010, 2013) and weak 
environmental regulations (Cole & Fredriksson, 2009; Dam & Scholtens, 2008, 2012; 
Naughton, 2014; Rezza, 2013). Whilst the need to maximize profit motivates MNCs to 
tax lax countries as Azemar & Delios (2008), Otusanya (2011) and Sikka (2010, 2013) 
suggest, low environmental regulations have been found as strong drivers for capital 
flows of MNCs especially in natural-resource countries (Belal, et al., 2013).   
Rezza (2013) finds that MNCs privilege investing more resources in their subsidiaries 
(with vertical integration) in jurisdictions with lenient environmental regulations. 
However, Rezza does not find such effect in parents-subsidiaries with horizontal 
integration. Dam & Scholtens (2008) also confirm the pollution havan hypothesis 
(PHH) which suggests that MNCs transfer their operations to countries or jurisdictions 
with more lenient environmental regulations, although they acknowledge that there are 
mixed empirical findings vis-à-vis PHH studies.  Nonetheless, their findings suggest 
that only corporations with poor CSR behaviour move into countries with weak 
environmental regulations to seek comparative advantage and they argue that was not 
the case with companies with good CSR behaviour. As what is good or poor CSR 
behaviour is normatively subjective, Dam & Scholtens’ (2008) conclusions raise serious 
concerns given their adopted notions of CSR. According to them: (i) “CSR generally 
refers to actions taken by firms with respect to their employees, communities, and the 
environment, which go beyond what is legally required of a firm” (2008: 55); (ii) “we 
regard corporate social responsibility as the extent to which a firm internalizes market 
costs” (p. 64). Environmental costs are usually not market costs, but they are 
externalities because they are not consistent with market values or they are what 
Thielemann (2000) will refer to as ‘market-alien values’ (see also Gray, 2013). Dam & 
Scholtens’ (2012) findings suggest that MNCs that exhibit poor environmental 
responsibility are more likely to move to natural resource-rich countries with weak 
environmental regulations whilst similar evidence was absent in countries with little or 
no natural resources. Moreover, they find that these countries’ weak institutions are the 
drivers for their status as pollution havens.  
As part of the PHH argument, Naughton (2014) draws a distinction between pollution 
haven effect (PHE) and shut down effect (SDE). She argues that PHE occurs when an 
MNC shifts away some of its investment from a host country tightening its 
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environmental regulations, while SDE occurs when the company completely shuts 
down its operation in the host country in response to stricter environmental regulations. 
Naughton also argues that these notions of PHE and SDE also work in the opposite 
direction, that is, when the MNC’s home country’s environmental regulations become 
increasingly tighter. This pollution haven thesis is consistent with the notion of ‘race to 
the bottom’ which is driven by regulatory lax in different aspects of business life. In 
general, this review suggests that whilst MNCs could generate some economic benefits 
to host countries via FDIs which these countries usually use lax regulations to attract, 
the MNCs’ operations also generate negative social, economic and environmental 
consequences/spillovers for those host countries. Due to the negative consequences of 
corporate activities on the host countries and communities, MNCs have been criticised 
by stakeholders for not being accountable for the full consequences of their operations. 
The adoption of CSR by corporations are in part a strategic response to manage 
stakeholders’ expectations regarding their social, economic and environmental impacts 
(Gilberthorpe & Bank, 2012).  
2.3 Corporate influence and CSR  
2.3.1 Corporate influence 
As the review in Section 2.2 suggests, the number of MNCs has been on the increase 
since the 1970s. Moreover, the capital and revenue sizes of these corporations are 
overwhelming compared to the financial strength of many of their host countries 
(Ciepley, 2013; Jamali, 2010; Kell & Ruggie, 1999; Korten, 1995; Rwabizambuga, 
2007; Scherer & Smid, 2000).  According to Scherer & Smid (2000), the turnover of 
some MNCs is higher than the gross domestic product of many countries which thus 
confers some degree of economic influence and power on the MNCs to control the 
economy of their host countries. Madeley (1999), Scherer, et al. (2006) and Stephen 
(2002), for example, argue that corporations exert influence over government economic 
policies and negotiations because of their corporate power. It is acknowledged in the 
literature that corporations have enormous economic and political powers even though 
they are not natural citizens (Bakan, 2004; Crane & Matten, 2010; Garvey & Newell, 
2005). Nye (1974) argues that MNCs play prominent roles in world politics both 
directly and indirectly. Nye argues that they involve themselves in the political process 
to influence policies of host nations through lobbying, whilst at other times they lobby 
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their home government for certain actions towards their host countries. This suggests 
that they use their power to influence the way society is shaped. On a benign side, 
Amaeshi & Amao (2009) state that MNCs are not only passive institutions that are 
influenced by the environments in which they operate, but also are influential agents 
that shape those  environments by their strategic deployment of codes of conduct.  
Over five decades ago, Davis (1960, p. 71) refers to the power business possesses to 
influence the social space or community as ‘social power.’ According to Gray (2006a), 
the economic influence of MNCs has in part led to stakeholders’ increasing demand for 
accountability from them (see also Bendell, 2004; Koenig-Archibugi, 2005; Hess, 
2008). This view is consistent with Davis (1960, 1967) and Gray (2000) who argue that 
the responsibility of a business should be commensurate with its power and it should be 
held to account accordingly. Based on Davis’ argument, greater power should give rise 
to greater social responsibility. However, there has been normative debates in the past 
four decades or so on whether the social responsibility of business is to meet the 
objective of profit maximization for capital providers (Friedman, 1970; Jensen, 2002), 
society expectations (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975) and needs of multi-stakeholders 
(Clarkson, 1995; Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984; Freeman, Harrison, 
Wicks, Palmer, & de Colle, 2010). These debates have been articulated around the 
concept of CSR which has evolved into different areas of interests (Blowfield & 
Murray, 2008; Matten & Moon, 2004; Reich, 2008).   
2.3.2 Some contributions to CSR debate 
The definition of CSR has remained a contentious issue over a number of decades 
(Crane & Matten, 2010; Davis, 1960; Frederick, 1994; Husted & Allen, 2006), whilst 
several terms have been used to refer to CSR (Garriga & Melé, 2004; Matten & Moon, 
2004, 2008). Several discourses on and contributions to CSR have featured widely in 
the literature; however, a few of these discourses will be highlighted in this Chapter as 
CSR is not the focus of this study.   
2.3.2.1 William Frederick’ notions of CSR 
The calls on business to adopt CSR arise from the normative nature and understanding 
of the relationship between business and society. According to Frederick (1986, 1994), 
the initial construct of CSR was underpinned by philosophical idea and the vague nature 
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of such philosophy prompted scholars to try to operationalize the meaning of CSR. He 
argues that normative imperatives occur when business has interaction with some part 
of the society which causes parties to exert an influence on the fortunes of each other in 
some way. Such influence could produce stress and tension on the norms governing the 
relationships between the parties which could prompt a change. He claims that social 
norms require that business (or corporations) do not allow their economic interest to 
override the social norms of protecting public interest by avoiding actions that might 
produce adverse consequences for present and future generations. He thus makes 
distinctions between three forms of CSR namely, CSR1, CSR2 and CSR3.    
CSR1 (Corporate Social Responsibility) centres on the interface between business and 
the society where the former as part of the latter is to act in the interest of the society 
(see also Ciepley, 2013; Moore, 2003). Frederick suggests that the advocacy of CSR1 
blossoms from 1950s to mid-1970s when business was under intense criticism for 
overbalancing economic imperatives over its social responsibilities. However, CSR1 
was criticised for its vague philosophical notions difficult to operationalize. He 
contends that this vagueness arouses debates among scholars on a number of issues. 
First, lack of clarity as to whether CSR covers only obligations prescribed by law, or 
voluntary corporate actions beyond the law, or current and/or future public expectations. 
Whilst the second relates to the institutional and pragmatic mechanisms to put CSR to 
work, the third focuses on cost-benefit analysis. A final and most important one is the 
inability to agree on specific moral principles that would underpin CSR obligations. 
Consequently, CSR1 was seen to be formulated on a vague notion of social 
responsibility (Clarkson, 1995; Frederick, 1986; O’Dwyer, 2003) such that emphasis 
was shifted to CSR2 with the expectation that it would be driven by corporate managers.  
CSR2 is termed Corporate Social Responsiveness, which means “the capacity of a 
corporation to respond to social pressures” (Frederick, 1994: 154) or “the ability to 
manage the company's relations with various social groups” (p. 156). This concept 
evolved from the scholarly attention directed at ways business should respond to the 
social/environmental pressures it was facing. The social responsiveness imperative 
requires that business incorporates social issues into its corporate strategies and be 
involved in the social processes that will influence expected corporate behaviours and 
enable it to more effectively respond to external social pressures.  Frederick argues that 
this notion encourages business to abandon the philosophical questions (normative 
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values) relating to social responsibility, that is, “tangible activities” prized above “moral 
standing” (1994: 159). The downside of this, he argues, is that CSR2 promotes the 
dominant corporate culture and defensive strategies aimed at maintaining the status quo 
as it is manager-led. It is apparent that CSR2 resonates with contemporary CSR practice. 
Frederick argues further that: 
Even in the best cases, though, the great likelihood is that the social response, 
particularly when the directive force of the reform movement is partially or even largely 
controlled by the corporation that is under social attack, will still be made well within 
the established framework of traditional enterprise where economizing is dominant over 
other social values (Frederick, 1986: 132) 
The involvement of the corporation in processes such as influencing government 
policies, lobbying campaigns, and subtle reporting means to forestall (stringent) 
regulations - if achieved - makes corporation’s response to social pressures easy or be 
undermined. He regards this as the unintended downside of responsiveness. However, 
he submits that the positive side of CSR2 is that a responsive corporation tends to pursue 
socially desirable objectives than one that has no such policy in place. However, 
Clarkson (1995: 98) criticises both CSR1 and CSR2 because: 
They have normative connotations lacking clarity and specificity … sounding like 
jargons. “Socially responsible to whom?”, “Socially responsible about what?”, “Social 
performance judged by whom and by what standard?” 
However, not satisfied that CSR1 and CSR2 reflect the true business-society relation, 
Frederick develops a third variant of responsibility called CSR3 (i.e., Corporate Social 
Rectitude). Corporate social rectitude, according to Frederick (1986: 135), “embodies 
the notion of moral correctness in actions taken and policies formulated.” He argues that 
corporations should imbibe fundamental (moral) principle that engenders respect for all 
mankind and preciousness of life. In observing this principle it is expected that the 
corporation will not do those things that will harm stakeholders within society. The 
logic underlying Frederick’s CSR3 resonates with Kant’s categorical imperative (see 
Mansell, 2013), imputing human conscience on corporation (Goodpaster & Matthews 
Jr, 1982), and the UN Global Compact if it were mandatory (cf. Section 2.3.2.3).     
2.3.2.2 A.B. Carroll’s notions of CSR 
Having looked at Frederick’s three notions of CSR, this section focuses on the work of 
Carroll, specifically on his pyramid of CSR (Carroll, 1979, 1991, 1999). Carroll’s CSR 
papers are worth given attention here because they are highly cited in CSR studies. His 
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managerial approach to CSR conceptions has semblance with Frederick’s CSR2, which 
privileges managers to identify, analyse and determine the extent they will respond to 
stakeholders’ expectations. Put differently, it is a framework that focuses on the 
management of stakeholders within four broad responsibilities. According to Carroll 
(1979: 500), “[t]he corporate social responsibility of business encompasses the 
economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary expectations that society has of organization 
at a given point of time.” He considers the economic responsibility of the corporation as 
the production of goods and rendering of services to earn profit
10
, while the corporate 
legal responsibility encompasses obeying codified laws and regulations in partial 
fulfilment of social contract with society. As for Carroll, ethical responsibility covers 
ethical or social norms beyond legal requirements, albeit not precisely as laws
11
. Lastly, 
the discretionary responsibility covers those good acts done by corporations out of their 
benevolence as a mark of good citizenship. He argues that the four responsibilities are 
to be fulfilled simultaneously; however, he attributes importance to some than the 
others. For example, he argues that the economic responsibility or profit-seeking 
interest is the most important corporate responsibility without which the corporation 
cannot fulfil the others (see also Ulrich & Thielemann, 1993). So when there is tension 
between economic and ethical (or discretionary/philanthropic) responsibilities the 
former will be privileged because the latter depends on it. This view tends to negate the 
idea of ‘social’ appended to corporate responsibility (see, for classical example, Davis, 
1960). According to Carroll, economic and legal responsibilities are required by 
society, ethical responsibility is expected by society or stakeholders, and philanthropic 
responsibility is desired (but not required or expected) by society. 
Apart from the unresolved conflicts between the various responsibilities, the framework 
overly simplifies citizenship as being philanthropic, which Crane & Matten (2010) 
argue is a limited view of corporate citizenship. Carroll’s framework is to help business 
to manage their stakeholders with reference to the four components of CSR pyramid. 
                                                 
10 Ciepley (2013) argues that the society created corporation to meet the ends of the society. But the 
privileging of shareholder wealth maximization as the focal point of the corporation (Friedman, 1970; 
Jensen, 2002) is usually inconsistent with the expectations of the wider society (Ciepley, 2013; Clarkson, 
1995).   
11
 Ethical rules are embodied in norms and customs which Friedman equally regarded as part of 
corporate social responsibility. But Carroll very well spotted the inconsistency in Friedman’s claim about 
profit as the sole responsibility of business because ethical norms are beyond the invisible hand of the 
market.  
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And to achieve this, Carroll argues for a moral management in the context of 
corporation maintaining relationship with stakeholders. If moral management is defined 
in the context of morality or moral agency (Arnold, 2006; Donaldson & Preston, 1995; 
French, 1979; Goodpaster & Matthews Jr., 1982), the primacy of profit
12
 and 
enlightened self-interest becomes questionable as it apparently contemplates society and 
stakeholders as means to an end. However, the framework contributes to CSR debate in 
its acknowledgement that the responsibility of business transcends the pursuit of 
shareholder wealth maximisation objective.  
2.3.2.3 Further contributions to CSR debate 
CSR discourses have gained prominence across political, business, consultancy and 
academic circles in recent times. Despite the overwhelming attention given to CSR by 
different interest groups, the concept of CSR still remains fuzzy (Blowfield & Frynas, 
2005; Blowfield & Murray, 2008; Brei & Bohm, 2011; Crane & Matten, 2010; Frynas, 
2009; Wan-Jan, 2006). As the literature suggests, managers believe that CSR is useful 
for managing corporate affairs but they do not have a common view of what it actually 
means (Blowfield & Murray, 2008; Matten & Moon, 2008; Nzembe & Downs, 2014; 
O’Dwyer, 2003). However, a common feature of the general notions of CSR is that the 
responsibility of the corporations extends beyond fulfilling legal obligations (Carroll, 
1979, 1999; Davis, 1960; Frynas, 2009; Gray, Adams & Owen, 2014; Sikka, 2010). 
Bondy, Matten & Moon (2008: 295) define CSR as:  
The firm’s consideration of, and response to, issues beyond the narrow economic, 
technical, and legal requirements of the firm. It is the firm’s obligation to evaluate the 
effects of its decision on the external social system in a manner that will accomplish 
social benefits along with the traditional economic gains. 
Although the above definition suggests the concurrent pursuit of economic gains for 
shareholders and social benefits for society, the contemporary CSR practices privilege 
economic gains of shareholders (Amaeshi, 2007; Amaeshi & Amao, 2009; Blowfield, 
2005; Frynas, 2005, 2009; O’Dwyer, 2003; Owen, Swift, Humphrey, & Bowerman, 
2000). According to Blowfield (2005), CSR can also be seen as a tool for corporations 
to rethink their strategies and a form of voluntary regulation to fill the regulatory void 
                                                 
12 Dawson (2009) argues that the primacy of business is not profit maximization but the production of 
goods and rendering of services. To him, profit is only contingent upon exchange with customers and 
that ethics takes pre-eminence over economic consideration. This argument is not different to the 
advocacy that stakeholders should not be treated as ends; however, Sternberg (1997, 2004) and 
Friedman (1970) oppose such advocacy.  
22 
 
created by the state. However, Blowfield argues from a critical CSR perspective that the 
current conceptualisation of CSR by business is short of societal and developmental 
goals as the business case of CSR practically excludes many desirable social goals 
while privileging business goals. Whilst Blowfield accepts that current CSR has some 
merits, he faults it on the ground that CSR determines those things business accepts as 
negotiable and considers some business values as non-negotiable. This suggests, in 
congruence with other literature, that CSR conceptions and practices are managerialist-
oriented (Amaeshi, 2007; Amaeshi & Amao, 2009; Frynas, 2005, 2009; O’Dwyer, 
2003). O’Dwyer (2003) and Owen, et al. (2000) for example, view this managerialist 
orientation of CSR as being means by which management hijacks CSR to 
instrumentally further shareholder wealth maximization. This casts doubt over the virtue 
CSR supposedly promote within society, which makes Moore (2003: 43) to conclude 
that: “where the virtues are employed, they are employed ultimately in the service of 
avarice.”   
However, some scholars have also commented that corporations use CSR as a means to 
forestall state regulation (Frederick, 1986; Mintzberg, 1983; Wan-Jan, 2006). According 
to Bondy, Matten, & Moon (2008), CSR is governed by law and corporate codes of 
conduct, where they regard law as the minimum standard for CSR (see also Dam & 
Scholtens, 2008; Eweje & Wu, 2010; Sikka, 2010). Amao (2008) argues that CSR 
initiatives or codes of conduct of MNCs in the Nigerian oil industry for example cover 
issues such as human rights, transparency, information disclosure, environment, etc. As 
Amao considers these issues as already largely covered by the law (Shinsato, 2005), he 
argues that it is inappropriate to consider such CSR as compliance beyond the law. 
However, he argues that such notion is only important in the context of some gaps in 
Nigerian domestic law and the failure to enforce international legislations governing the 
affairs of MNCs. The literature also argues that whether CSR is regulated by law or 
self-regulations depends on the role of government in a particular country and context 
(Blowfield & Frynas, 2005; Frynas, 2009). Frynas (2009) argues for example that, 
effort by corporations to voluntarily prevent oil spills where the government fails to 
enforce relevant environmental regulations can be regarded as ‘CSR’ while similar 
effort will be regarded as ‘regulatory compliance’ in countries with appropriate 
environmental regulations. Blowfield & Frynas (2005) argue that CSR initiatives are 
only complementary and not alternative to government regulations necessary for 
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business to behave responsibly. Such complementarity of regulated CSR and voluntary 
CSR is what Raufflet, Cruz, & Bres (2014) refer to as CSR ‘hybrid regulatory regime.’ 
It does appear from the literature that the law alone cannot fully produce ethical 
behaviour, which as a matter of necessity requires corporations to employ ethical norms 
in order to behave responsibly. For example, Sikka (2010) argues that the law cannot 
sufficiently promote responsible behaviour as social history shows how law has been 
deployed to promote several unethical behaviours. However, Sikka also doubts the 
extent voluntary CSR initiatives can fill the legal deficit as corporations have equally 
failed to uphold their numerous ethical commitments, thus creating gaps between their 
talks and actions (see also Brei & Bohm, 2011).    
The need for regulation of CSR has been advocated by several commentators as they 
view voluntary CSR as incapable of making corporations behave responsibly (Frynas, 
2012). For example, in exploring the extent regulations or voluntary initiatives help to 
prevent oil spills in 10 OECD and 10 non-OECD oil companies, Frynas (2012) finds 
that regulations played a major role in preventing oil spills while the role of voluntary 
CSR initiatives was not evident. However, the need for regulation of CSR would not 
arise if Mintzberg’s (1983) purest form of CSR were practiced by corporations. 
According to Mintzberg (1983), the purest form of CSR manifests in CSR practices that 
are not deployed to serve self-interest. Another contribution to the CSR debate worth 
mentioning is that of the United Nations principally via the Global Compact (GC) 
which has equally attracted a myriad of commentaries. Based on the information 
available on the UNGC website, the GC is currently based on ten principles in four 
broad areas: human rights (2), labour (4), environment (3) and anti-corruption (1). The 
three principles (7-9) relating to environment are important for the purpose of this 
thesis. According to the GC, principle seven encourages corporations to take proactive 
precautionary approach in attending to environmental concerns in order to prevent 
unhealthy environmental incidents. Principle eight encourages corporations to pursue 
environmental responsibility by incorporating environment into corporate strategy in 
order to achieve social, economic and environmental sustainability. Three broad 
mechanisms/tools identified to achieve these goals are: assessment/audit, management, 
and communication & reporting.  The ninth principle encourages corporations to deploy 
environmentally friendly technologies. However, the downside of GC is that it is 
voluntary and only encourages corporations that signed up to it to comply. Donaldson 
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(2003) and Leisinger (2003) posit that the GC is a social contract but Donaldson (2003) 
argues that it is a stakeholder-oriented rather than shareholders-oriented contract and 
ought to be applied irrespective of how it affects the long-term interests of shareholders. 
Generally, the need for CSR stems from the relationships corporations have with society 
and stakeholders. The next section discusses the relationship MNCs have with the state 
and host communities.  
2.4 The relationship between MNCs, the state and communities  
It was discussed in Section 2.2 that there has been a worldwide rise in the number of 
MNCs, their influence and spread of their subsidiaries and that many developing 
countries have relaxed their regulatory policies to attract foreign direct investments 
(FDIs) from these entities in order to stimulate economic growth. The literature also 
documents that such gestures have attracted many profit-seeking MNCs substantially to 
primary industries (e.g., mining, oil & gas) in these developing economies (Ackah-
Baidoo, 2012; Dam & Scholtens, 2012; Korten, 1995). The presence of MNCs in a 
nation state brings them into a social relationship with that state. In this light, Newell 
(2005) argues that whilst the corporations are to carry on their business activities within 
some prescribed regulatory framework, the state has the responsibility to regulate such 
activities. But Garvey & Newell (2005) and Rwabizambuga (2007) contend that many 
host developing countries pay little or no attention to corporate environmental impacts 
due to greater interest in economic growth. Professor Klaus Leisinger, an appointed 
Special Adviser on UN Global Compact (GC) in 2005, argues that:  
The fact that a company knows what the state and the authorities should do or has 
identified governance deficits does not release it from its own obligation to behave 
responsibly … In concrete terms, if the government of a developing country fails to 
enact or enforce appropriate legislation regulating social and environmental matters, a 
responsible company must not take advantage of these deficits and remain inactive itself 
(Leisinger)
13
 
This suggests that the failure of the state to provide appropriate regulations is not an 
excuse for corporations to behave irresponsibly. Leisinger (2003: 127) also argues in 
respect of corporations participating in GC that: “Where deficits are found that are legal 
but illegitimate in the spirit of the GC, adjustments are necessary, thereby leading to 
increased costs or reduced sales potential.” According to Eweje and Wu (2010), a 
corporation is socially responsible if it takes compliance with the law as its minimum 
                                                 
13 No publication year was stated 
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obligation. This suggests that a lag in law on social and environmental issues (Clarkson, 
1995; Gray, Dey, Owen, Evans, & Zadek, 1997) is not sufficient a reason for 
corporations to do that which is ethically harmful to society and/or stakeholders. Frynas 
(2009) equally argues that corporations are to look beyond local regulations to promote 
environmentally responsible behaviour. It is very unlikely that corporations will 
promote voluntary environmentally responsible behaviour as it has been reported that 
corporations mobilise resources to water down regulations. For example, Bowie (2013: 
138) states that: 
Far too many corporations try to have their cake and eat it too. They argue that it is the 
job of government to correct for market failure and then then use their influence and 
money to defeat or water down regulations designed to conserve and protect the 
environment. 
Bowie’s view is equally supported by Goldenberg (2012), Mackinder (2010) and Romm 
(2010) who show that corporations may openly support regulations but clandestinely 
mobilise resources to prevent stringent regulations of their activities. Regarding 
developing countries, Graham & Woods (2006) and Hilson (2012) point out that the 
states lack the will (and the ability) to regulate and control MNCs in their domain (see 
Shinsato, 2005). However, the willingness of the state to control and hold corporations 
accountable is not sufficient in itself without the power to do so. This was 
acknowledged by Garvey & Newell (2005: 394) who argue that “even where states are 
willing to use sanctions, they may be unable to implement them against more powerful 
TNCs”. Although the state may be willing and able to control the MNCs, it might 
forbear because of seeming priority to national economic security. The states are 
sandwiched between the choice to stringently regulate the MNCs on social and 
environmental issues and the desire to promote economic growth through these 
corporations. As Ackah-Baidoo (2012) and Korten (1995) for example note, profit-
driven MNCs are very likely aware of this dilemma and capitalise on the state’s 
economic growth priority while negotiating deals with the state. Whilst this dilemma 
faced by many developing countries is not trivial, it has been argued that systemic 
corruption partly underpins why they are unable to regulate MNCs and hold them 
accountable. For example, Garvey & Newell (2005: 393) argue that: “state support to 
corporations depends less on this attempt to balance national ‘development’ goals with 
local interests, but rather stems from the direct financial benefit accruing to government 
officials.” Belal & Roberts (2010) also corroborate this by suggesting that poor 
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regulation in developing countries in part derives from the pervasive corruption in the 
state.   
In addition to the relationship between the MNCs and the state, the MNCs are in social 
relationships with communities hosting their operations. Besides the fact that 
communities host MNCs’ operations, they are impacted by those corporate operations 
positively and/or negatively. One of the negative impacts of corporate operations 
(especially natural resource-based corporations) on communities derives from 
environmental pollution. As Post (1991: 36) argues, “Pollution is felt most immediately 
and acutely by local communities.” Corporations have usually acknowledged the 
existence of this relationship in their CSR reports in which they regard their host 
communities as a major stakeholder group. As Newell (2005) argues, the rights and 
privileges underlying this relationship are usually determined by the state. However, the 
findings by Cragg & Greenbaum (2002) suggest that host communities endowed with 
natural resources might want to exercise rights of claim over the MNCs on issues that 
affect communities but the MNCs might only recognise state authority. Conflict 
becomes inevitable in this kind of context, which makes the communities vulnerable 
and powerless in restraining what they perceive as irresponsible corporate behaviours. 
By implication, the communities have the state and MNCs to struggle with in order to 
gain and assert their rights. As Newell (2005) argues, the state plays a significant role in 
the way MNCs practise CSR and discharge accountability to communities because the 
state is responsible for providing the space within which communities can claim and 
secure their rights.  
As the literature suggests, the communities may be close to the MNCs in terms of 
physical proximity and environmental impact, but they are alienated from the MNCs’ 
decisions that affect them (Gilberthorpe & Banks, 2012; Frynas, 2005). In Canada 
Fidler & Hitch (2007) show that several indigenous communities are becoming 
empowered by governments to actively negotiate with mining corporations how the 
negative impacts from mining operations would be addressed. Fidler & Hitch also find 
the implementation of community participation-driven memorandum of understanding 
and environmental impact assessment as vehicles for strengthening relationships 
between mining companies and communities. However, the participation of 
communities in negotiation and dialogue with the MNCs may have several 
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shortcomings. For example, Garvey & Newell (2005) and Newenham-Kahindi (2011) 
argue that communities do not speak with one voice due to ambiguous and conflicting 
interests among them. Neu & Heincke (2004) also note that government as a 
representative of the state might equally undermine the interest of the communities. 
Abrash (2001) notes that in many cases the government backs the MNCs at 
communities’ expense which further creates power imbalance in favour of the MNCs 
over communities, which according to Newell (2005) restricts the available space within 
which the communities can contest their rights and responsibilities. As the literature 
suggests (Section 2.3.1), the responsibility and accountability of corporations need to 
correlate with their power and influence which also make them very visible. 
2.5 MNCs’ visibility and corporate disclosures 
According to Bowen (2000: 93): “Visibility captures the extent to which phenomena 
can be seen or noticed…Organizations are visible when they can be easily seen by 
relevant constituents.” Bowen makes distinction between two types of visibility: issue 
and organisational. As Bowen argues, highly visible organisations face pressures from 
their various stakeholders which prompt organisations to articulate initiatives in 
response to the social (environmental or political) issues they are exposed to in order to 
maintain organisational legitimacy.  On issue visibility, he states that issues are visible 
when internal and external stakeholders can easily notice them due to either the degree 
of publicity given to those issues or stakeholders’ awareness of the organisation’s 
(in)actions towards addressing the issues.  Drawing on organisational theories, Bowen 
argues that both organisational and issue visibilities potentially influence the timing and 
content of responses an organisation provides vis-à-vis its stakeholders’ pressures. 
Visibility can also relate to the strong brand name or logo associated with a corporation 
(Bansal, 1996, cited in Bowen, 2000; Graham & Woods, 2006). Brammer & Millington 
(2005) and Brammer & Pavelin (2006) associate corporate visibility with the media 
coverage on a corporation’s activities. They find a positive relationship between media 
coverage and corporate reputation. Zyglidopoulos & Fleming (2011) suggest that 
corrupt and unethical practices of corporations increasingly make them apparently 
visible as those issues are released to the public through different media by 
stakeholders. 
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Chiu & Sharfman (2009) identify three types of corporate visibility such as industry 
visibility, visibility to multiple stakeholders and slack visibility. To them industry 
visibility derives from the environmental and social risks associated with the industry’s 
activities and the level of opportunities it generates for the society. They suggest that 
industries that produce more risk are subjected to greater scrutiny by stakeholders. 
Visibility to multiple stakeholders suggests that the corporation has many active 
stakeholder groups that put pressure on it. Slack visibility manifests when the 
corporation has surplus resources it could discretionarily allocate to meet higher 
corporate social performance. As the literature suggests, corporate visibility could also 
derive from organisation’s operating size or the impacts of the organisation on society. 
But Bowen (2000) argues that corporate size is too broad to be a good criterion for 
measuring corporate visibility. Corporate visibility that derives from impacts equally 
depends on the nature of the industry which is consistent with Chiu & Sharfman’s 
(2011) industry visibility. This suggests that the more the negative impact of a 
corporation on society or stakeholders the more it is open to public gaze and scrutiny. In 
this regard, Hunter & Bansal (2007) suggest that corporations that are operating in high 
polluting industries tend to make more environmental disclosures than those in less 
polluting industries. Because these high polluting corporations face heavy institutional 
criticisms, Hunter & Bansal (2007) state that they make environmental disclosures of 
their operations in order to gain environmental legitimacy (Bansal & Clelland, 2004; 
Christmann, 2004). Brammer & Pavelin (2006) suggest that the visibility of 
environmental issues can influence the level of public gaze and scrutiny on a 
corporation which potentially triggers increased environmental disclosures. Similarly, 
Tan (2009a) argues that the visibility of corporations raise stakeholders’ expectations 
regarding the corporations’ accountability and transparency. In the literature, the oil and 
mining industries are usually classified as ‘high impact’ or ‘dirty’ industries (Bowen, 
2000) facing increasing stakeholders’ pressures and scrutiny (Buccina, Chene, & 
Gramlich, 2013; Dong, Burritt, & Qian, 2014; Jenkins & Yakovleva, 2006). It has been 
argued, for example, that the high impacts of oil corporations have equally brought 
about greater corporate engagement (Frynas, 2009). Frynas (2009: 68) points out greater 
information disclosure as a key manifestation of such engagement as follows:  
As one of the key signs of environmental engagement, oil companies now provide 
extensive environmental reports. Indeed, several comparative international studies have 
demonstrated that environmental reporting among oil and gas companies is more 
extensive compared with other sectors, including utilities and various branches of 
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manufacturing, although this has partly been a result of the industry’s greater 
environmental impact. 
The above review suggests that more visible corporations apparently make increased 
disclosures based on increased public gaze on their activities and demand for greater 
accountability (see Disu & Gray, 1998). Drawing on this review, it is clear that the oil 
industry and oil companies whose accountability is explored in this study are highly 
visible in relation to their environmental impacts and the attendant pressure from 
multiple stakeholders.  Such impacts have implications for the level of disclosures those 
companies make in response to public pressure and scrutiny. In relation to the MNCs 
operating in the Nigerian oil industry, their environmental impacts are very visible in 
the context of gas flaring and oil spills which have negative impacts on host 
communities (Chapter Four), which have also stirred up stakeholders’ criticisms and 
pressures against these corporations. Consequently, the need for these corporations to be 
held to account for their actions and impacts has been increasingly rehearsed (Belal, et 
al., 2013; Buccina, et al., 2013; Killian, 2010; Unerman & Bennett, 2004).  
2.6 Concluding remarks 
The review in this Chapter suggests that MNCs contribute to their host developing 
countries through FDIs which bring with them many advantages such as employment 
opportunities, increased output, technology transfer, infrastructures and so on. On the 
downside, the presence of MNCs in developing countries also produce several negative 
social consequences in the areas of labour wages, environmental impacts, human rights 
violations, among others (Belal, et al., 2013). Whilst such social ills can be addressed 
through regulations, the above review suggests that the governments of these countries 
lack the will and power to regulate the corporations due to race to the bottom syndrome 
and economic policy choice. For any country to have a comparative advantage to lure 
these profit-driven MNCs, it needs to relax its regulations compared to other ‘national’ 
competitors. Moreover, the review suggests that the economic size and influence of 
these companies give them better bargaining powers over their host developing 
countries. 
However, these corporations have been implementing CSR in reaction to stakeholders’ 
increasing criticisms over their impacts and influence on stakeholders and society 
(Lauwo & Otusanya, 2014). As the literature argues, these MNCs are to assume greater 
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responsibility and accountability to stakeholders because of their influence on 
stakeholders. One of the key areas of corporate impacts on stakeholders in recent times 
is environmental impacts. Corporations in the natural resource-based industries (e.g., oil 
& gas, mining) are known as ‘dirty’ or ‘high impact’ industries due to their high degree 
of environmental pollution. As Post (1991) argues, such environmental impacts are 
borne more by host communities living near the pollution. Furthermore, the high 
environmental impacts of the MNCs have made them largely visible and subjects of 
public pressure and scrutiny towards greater accountability. This is relevant to the 
accountability context of this study as the activities and environmental impacts of the 
MNCs in Nigerian oil industry are visible and profound. The next Chapter provides a 
background theoretical review of accountability as would be relevant in the context of 
this thesis.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
Corporate accountability and conceptual framework 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapters one and two provided a general background of this study and the core issues to 
be explored as well as background reviews of MNCs, CSR and corporate relationships. 
Chapter two also examined MNCs’ visibility which provided one element of the 
normative justifications for their accountability.  This Chapter discusses accountability 
as a theoretical lens of information flows between parties.  As the literature suggests, 
large corporations are complex organisations (Bovens, 1998) with a complex set of 
relationships (Clarkson, 1995; Gray, et al., 1997; Parker, 1991) and defining these 
relationships strictly through the economic agency model is rather simplistic (Gray, et 
al., 1997), which according to Parker (1991) will tend to exclude other relevant 
stakeholders.  This Chapter provides a theoretical review of accountability to serve as a 
‘skeletal’ lens (Laughlin, 1995, 2004) to explore the conceptions of accountability in a 
non-Western context and how corporations manifest and discharge accountability 
within that social context.  Whilst accountability can be a fluid concept with space and 
in time, this review provides a ‘skeletal’ lens through which it could be explored.  
 
The remainder of this Chapter is organised as follows. Following this introduction is 
Section 3.2 which reviews the nature of accountability. Section 3.3 highlights the 
relationship between accountability and CSR, whilst Section 3.4 examines corporate 
social reporting and the extent to which it discharges accountability. As accountability 
is not monologic and corporate social disclosures are considered incomplete, Section 
3.5 examines the relevance of external social audits to the discharge of corporate 
accountability. Furthermore, Section 3.6 discusses accountability in the context of 
Nigeria, whilst Section 3.7 discusses further theoretical/analytical framings that will 
help to explore the nature of accounts rendered by the corporations studied and the 
plausible sense-making embedded in those accounts. Finally, the Chapter concludes 
with Section 3.8.  
3.2 The nature of accountability  
Accountability has become ubiquitous in various circles of our modern society. Studies 
have examined accountability in different sectors of the society. For example, attention 
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has been devoted to: NGO accountability to fund providers and those beneficiaries they 
claim to support (Ebrahim, 2003; Dhanani & Connolly, 2014; Fassin, 2009; Gray, 
Bebbington, & Collison, 2006; Lehman, 2007; O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2007, 2008; 
2010), public accountability (Bovens, 2007; Fox, 2007; Mulgan, 1997, 2000; Parker & 
Gould, 1999; Sinclair, 1995), and corporate accountability (Cooper & Owen, 2007; 
Dillard, 2008; Gray, et al., 1997; Owen, et al., 2000; Roberts, 1991).   Important issues 
relating to accountability are discussed in this section’s sub-sections.  
3.2.1 Accountability as a relational concept 
Shearer (2002: 563) views accountability as an “intersubjective relationship whereby 
one is obligated to demonstrate the reasonableness of one’s actions to those to whom 
one is accountable.” She further argues that corporations have intersubjective 
relationships with others and that those others with whom the corporation relates and is 
accountable are the ones to define the terms on which the accountability outcome 
should be judged (Gray, et al., 1997). Shearer argues that financial reporting fails to 
reflect the full essence of accountability. According to her, accountability is nested on a 
moral responsibility (Gray, et al., 2014; Schweiker, 1993). As accountability derives 
from relationships, Shearer (2002: 545) argues that “accountability always entails and 
enacts intersubjectivity; to be accountable is unavoidably to establish one’s identity as 
‘‘intrinsically interdependent with others’’.” In this she suggests that a moral identity 
has been enacted. But she argues that corporations cannot be held accountable using this 
moral identity logic because economic theory constructs of such moral identity 
obligates the entity to render accounts vis-à-vis its economic self-interest with the 
assumption that such interests meet the needs of other stakeholders. Shearer views such 
accountability as monologic and tragic in that it renders the people, environment and 
nations as slaves to the economic interest of shareholders. According to Shearer, 
accountability based on economic logics is incapable of discharging the accountability 
obligations to other interests beyond economics.  
 
Painter-Morland (2006: 89) argues that “principles such as justice, honesty and 
responsibility require that individuals and corporations “give an account” of their 
decisions and actions.” As she noted, the call for corporate accountability is linked to 
the notion that corporation is a moral agent as it exhibits characteristic behaviours in 
individuals (French, 1979; Goodpaster & Matthew Jr., 1982). To Painter-Morland, 
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moral agency is a relational affair as it finds expression in interactions between an actor 
and others. She argues that accountability should not be viewed from mechanistic 
perspective but rather as a mechanism within complex adaptive systems. By citing 
Butler (2005), Painter-Morland (2006: 93) states that “being in a relationship with 
another and feeling the need to maintain the relationship through narration is central to 
the whole processes of giving an account of oneself.” She argues that the giving of 
account is not necessarily driven by the appropriation of blame or an accountee power 
to apportion punishment. She views accountability from a moral agency perspective 
suggesting that a moral agent is: “someone who is accountable towards others or in 
terms of some shared sense of normative propriety” (p. 93. Emphasis in original). In this 
regard, she argues that accountability is a relational responsiveness towards the dynamic 
interests of stakeholders. However, Painter-Morland appears to believe that the 
corporations can manage their accountability relationships with stakeholders better from 
inside the organisation than from external pressure or coercion
14
. Her thinking that the 
corporations will manage their dynamic relationships in a morally responsible manner 
unaided is rather too simple or at best ambitious given her acknowledgement that 
corporate scandals have increased demand for accountability.  
 
Despite rising demand for greater accountability due to corporate scandals, Messner 
(2009) argues that the accountable self may have difficulty to give account without 
causing ‘ethical violence’. Ethical violence according to him is: 
[A] form of accountability that, in the name of ethics, forces the accountable self to 
account for something which is very difficult or even impossible to justify and which, in 
this respect, does ‘‘violence” to the accountable self. (p. 918) 
 
He argues that accountability may become problematic in certain circumstances where 
it may be impossible or difficult to give an account because managers may not be fully 
conscious of why they take certain decisions. Noting the difficulty managers may face 
when providing account about their actions to multiple stakeholders with conflicting 
interest, Messner argues that it may be ethically questionable to require accountability 
to these conflicting interests. Nevertheless, Messner admits that accountability is a 
“morally significant practice, since to demand an account from someone is to ask this 
                                                 
14
 This kind of logic is consistent with the logic embedded in Frederick’s (1986, 1994) CSR2 (Chapter 
Two).  
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person to enact discursively the responsibility for her behavior.” Stakeholders’ 
suspicion of corporate unethical behaviour arises due to absence of trust. Accountability 
is considered completely desirable in a situation where trust is absent (Gray, et al., 
1997; Swift, 2001) as Dar (2014: 133) defines accountability as “informed relations of 
trust.”  Swift (2001) argues that even accountability based on agency principle derives 
from lack of trust that agents (organisations) will behave in the best interest of their 
principal (society) when their interests conflict. According to her: 
Information is required to give stakeholders the opportunity to make decisions or take 
action concerning organisational behaviour, if they so choose … The issue of 
accountability is about whether stakeholders have sufficient, accurate, understandable 
and timely information on which to act (Swift, 2001: 17) 
 
In Western society, accountability is generally seen to derive from a normative 
relationship between two or more parties (Bovens, 2007; Gray, et al., 2014) which, 
according to the Institute of Social and Ethical Accountability (ISEA, 1999) extends 
beyond contractual obligations. ISEA (1999: 88) defines accountability thus: “to 
account for something is to explain and justify the acts and omissions for which one is 
responsible to people with a legitimate interest.” According to Gray, et al. (1996: 38) 
acccountability is “the duty to provide an account (by no means necessarily a financial 
account) or reckoning of those actions for which one is held responsible” (see Joseph, 
2007). Accountability, as Gray, et al. (1996; 2014) further argue, derives from a 
framework which assumes that actors have responsibility to undertake, or forbear from, 
certain actions and have responsibility to account for those actions. Gray, et al.’s 
definition of accountability has been widely adopted in social and environmental 
accounting (SEA) literature (e.g., Cooper & Owen, 2007; Dillard, 2008; Gray, et al., 
1997; Owen, et al., 2000; Woodward, Edwards, & Birkin, 1996; Swift, 2001). And this 
notion is equally assumed for the purpose of this study to avoid ambiguity of the 
concept as Gray (2001) argues that accountability is a widely misused and 
misunderstood simple concept (see Bovens, 1998, 2007; Fox, 2007, Mulgan, 2000; 
Sinclair, 1995). 
3.2.2  Accountability: normative relevance versus decision-usefulness 
Traditionally, corporate accountability is based on the general principal-agent 
framework (Allen, 2014; Gray, Brennan, & Malpas, 2013; Gray, et al., 1996, 1997; 
Joseph, 2007; Woodward, et al. 1996), which is applicable to the wider society through 
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the lens of social contract that exists between the corporations and society (Gray, et al., 
1996). The literature argues that the relationship between an agent and principal may be 
explicit or implicit (Gray et al., 1996; Hill & Jones, 1992; Swift, 2001), formal or 
informal (Dar, 2014; Gray, et al., 1997; Laughlin, 1990; Woodward, et al., 1996), 
contractual or communal (Woodward, et al., 1996) or based on legitimate interests 
(ISEA, 1999). For example, Woodward, et al. (1996: 329-330) argue that:  
[A] principal-agent relationship may be assumed to exist even in the more fluid state of 
communal accountability, and without the need to specify either the precise nature of the 
relationship, or how the relevant accountability might be evidenced. 
 
Woodward, et al. consider communal expectations as unwritten expectations of the 
society and its stakeholder elements. While the contractual agency or principal-agent 
relationship might derive from law, Power (1991) argues that it can also derive from 
moral and political premises. Gray, et al. (1996, 1997, 2014) also contend that it can 
equally derive from quasi-laws, corporate self-imposed commitments and moral norms. 
However, the Western market ideology practically limits accountability to economic 
relationship between shareholders and corporations (Benston, 1982, 1984; Friedman, 
1970; Heath, 2006; Mansell, 2012, 2013; Stenberg, 1997, 2004).  
 
It is also evident from literature commentaries that conventional accounting is based on 
economic agency logic (Benston, 1982, 1984; Brennan & Solomon, 2008; Gray, 1992, 
2002; Gray, et al., 1997; Schaltegger & Burritt, 2000; Shearer, 2002; Solomon, 2000; 
O’Dwyer, 2000). For example, Benston (1982) identifies three forms of accountability 
namely, accountability to shareholders, stakeholders, and society. But to Benston, being 
accountable to stakeholders and society means a misappropriation of shareholders’ 
resources that does not further shareholders’ interests. He considers the wider 
responsibility of managers as outside the purview of shareholder interest and the use of 
corporate resources to benefit non-shareholders as unintelligible appropriation of 
shareholders’ resources. However, Benston (1984) considers externalities as a 
normative justification for corporate accountability to more stakeholder groups as far as 
such externalities are capable of reliable measurement
15
.  Benston views corporate 
accountability within the context of social responsibility accounting and concludes that 
                                                 
15 Schreuder & Ramanathan (1984a, 1984b) criticise Benston for implicitly ignoring the fact that 
accounting does several subjective estimations (see also Joseph, 2007). 
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“the social responsibility of accountants can be expressed best by their forbearing from 
social responsibility accounting” (p. 102).   
 
However, Schreuder & Ramanathan (1984a, 1984b) question Benston’s normative 
premises and conclusion regarding corporate social accounting and reporting. They 
critique Benston on whether it is ethical for firms to impose external costs on 
stakeholders and society to promote the self-interest and property rights of shareholders. 
They argue that corporate accountability is necessary based on market imperfections. 
But contrary to Benston’s confinement of accountability to the economic interest of 
shareholders, The Corporate Report produced by the UK Accounting Standards 
Steering Committee (ASSC, 1975) articulates accountability in rather normative sense 
as deriving from relationships not necessarily defined by economic or legal contracts. 
The ASSC (1975) argues that corporate reports should go beyond the interests of 
shareholders because of the so many social relationships between the corporation and 
society. The Corporate Report identifies the different users of corporate reports and 
states that those users have reasonable rights to such information. A reasonable right to 
information, according to ASSC (1975: 17), “exists where the activities of an 
organisation impinge or may impinge on the interest of a user group.” This argument is 
commensurate with the normative basis of accountability in that the public has the right 
to information about the impacts.  
 
Gray, et al. (1997) in their seminal work attempt to articulate a conceptual framework 
for social accounting and reporting practices. They emphasise the production of social 
accounts primarily based on normative duty to discharge accountability, albeit not 
ruling out the possibility of information inductance (Prakash & Rappaport, 1977). They 
contend that accounts by nature could be formal or informal depending on the 
complexity of the relationships between the accountor and the accountee which are 
based on the relative ‘closeness’ of these parties.  Viewing accountability as a normative 
neo-pluralist or polyvocal concept, Gray, et al. (1997: 330) argue that:  
In the neo-pluralist accountability framework … the stakeholders are those with rights 
to the account and it is for them that the account is prepared. Whether or not they use it, 
and if so for what, and whether or not other parties see and/or use the account, are 
largely irrelevant. So, beyond the identification, prioritization and needs of stakeholders 
(see below), it is possible to leave any conception of the recipient’s decision making 
about or choice of action implicit in the discussion.  
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As the above and Joseph (2007) suggest, accountability does not necessarily depend on 
the use of the information by the recipient. Whether or not the recipient will act on the 
information is not sufficient to prevent the provision of such information. This resonates 
with Woodward, et al. (1996) who argue by drawing on Pallot (1992) that social 
contract relationship subordinates decision-usefulness to accountability framework. 
Although Likierman (1986) and Gray, et al. (1997) suggest that it is implicit that 
recipients of corporate reports will use the information therein, Likierman (1986) further 
argues that users’ failure to use such information apparently weakens the assertion of 
their rights to the information. Accordingly, Likierman considers it a surprise that users 
are not under obligation to use published accounts the way the accountors are obliged to 
provide them. However, accountability is driven by the rights to know rather the use of 
the information.  
 
Gray, et al. (1997) discuss three perspectives of accountability namely, stakeholder, 
accountability and polyvocal citizenship. Under the stakeholder perspective the 
organisation recognises its relationships with multiple stakeholders but it focuses on 
managing stakeholders. Under this perspective, the accountability is organisation-
centred and such organisations disclose information to stakeholders which apparently 
furthers the organisations’ interests. They consider this perspective as inadequate in 
satisfying the normative demands of accountability in that the organisation determines 
the scope of the accountability they are to discharge. In that regard, the social account 
based on organisational benevolence will compromise the normative expectations of 
stakeholders and society given organisational inclination to self-interest mediated by 
market forces that consider social issues as market-alien values (see Gray, 2013; 
Thielemann, 2000). In recognition of this shortcoming, they explore accountability 
perspective which they portray as society-centred. According to them, accountability is 
“concerned with the relationships between groups, individuals, organizations and the 
rights to information that such relationships entail” because accountability in its 
simplest sense is “the duty to provide an account of the actions for which one is held 
responsible” (p. 334). Unlike the stakeholder perspective where the organisation defines 
the relationships and the attendant rights to information, the society determines these 
under accountability perspective. Moreover, they argue that the information flow from 
the organisation through these relationships derives from factors that might place 
demand for such information namely, the power of the stakeholder, legislative 
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stipulations and organisation’s voluntary initiatives. They further argue that rights to 
information derive from the complementarity of positive/legal and normative/moral 
rights which are also dynamic with time and in space.  
 
Importantly, Gray, et al. also argue that the information an organisation provides should 
descriptively explicate the nature of the various accountability relationships
16
. For 
example, moral rights of stakeholders to demand accountability might derive from 
public concern over the social and environmental impacts of corporate operations on 
stakeholders (O’Dwyer, et al., 2005). Whilst Gray, et al. consider the accountability 
perspective as society-centred, they nonetheless presume it might lag in its 
responsiveness to the dynamic needs of stakeholders. Consequently, they advocate a 
polyvocal citizenship perspective as an ‘ideal’ form of accountability in which the 
stakeholders define the terms of the accountability relationships. They situate this 
within a democratic culture based on ideal speech situation in which the voices of the 
different stakeholders are privileged (Unerman & Bennett, 2004; Lehman, 2007) and 
then collated in conjunction with other information by the organisation to construct 
social accounts. Whilst the polyvocal citizenship form of accountability is 
commendable and appealing, its applicability to the context of corporations will 
nonetheless require radical institutional and administrative reforms (cf. Section 3.2.3).  
3.2.3 Accountability and stakeholder democracy 
It has been generally argued in social accounting literature that accountability is based 
on the principle of democracy (Brown, 2009; Cooper & Owen, 2007; Dillard, 2011; 
Gray, 2000, 2008; Gray, et al., 1996, 1997, 2014; Lehman, 2007; Medawar, 1976; 
O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2007, 2008, 2010; O’Dwyer, et al., 2005; Unerman & Bennett, 
2004). In public administration literature, the democratic nature of accountability is 
reflected in discourses relating to giving voices to the accountees. For example, Bovens 
argues that accountability is not propaganda or a mere giving of information but must 
provide a mechanism for debate and engagement because accountability is beyond a 
monologue.   As Adams (2004) and Unerman & Bennett (2004) argue, engagement is 
not accountability but rather a process to help entrench a mechanism that will promote 
                                                 
16
 Organisations appear to crudely express this in their codes of ethics and social reports how they 
perceive their relationships with their stakeholders. For example, they refer to their host communities 
as neighbourhoods, employees as associates, the corporations as neighbours (la Cour & Kromann, 
2011). 
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accountability. The literature also suggests that dialogue or engagement can only be 
meaningful if all the parties have equal power (Swift, 2001) which is an essential part of 
ideal speech situation (Dillard, 2011; Gray, 2000, 2001; Gray, et al., 1997; Lehman, 
1995; 2001; 2007; O’Dwyer, et al., 2005; Owen, Swift, & Hunt, 2001; Unerman & 
Bennett, 2004). The literature advocates for administrative and institutional reforms in 
order to achieve effective stakeholder accountability. Administrative reform, according 
to O’Dwyer, et al. (2005: 17):  
Focuses on developing accounting mechanisms such as CSD
17
 that promote inclusivity 
in accounting to all stakeholders, particularly less powerful stakeholders. This reform 
ideally involves the development of expanded accountability mechanisms that are 
complete, credible and challenging for organisations committed to their development. 
 
Institutional reform on the other hand is to entrench mechanisms that will allow 
effective and meaningful stakeholder participation in the decision-making process of 
corporations (Owen, Gray, & Bebbington, 1997; Owen, et al., 2000; Stoney & 
Winstanley, 2001). Bowles (1991: 401) equally expresses doubt over whether the 
unethical behaviours of corporations can change without a “fundamental restructuring 
of society and its institutions.” Commentators’ advocacy for reforms arises from their 
doubt over the likelihood that corporate voluntary stakeholder dialogue will promote the 
voices of less economically powerful stakeholders affected by corporate operations 
(Cooper & Owen, 2007; O’Dwyer, 2005; O’Dwyer, et al., 2005; Owen, et al., 2001). 
This suggests that meaningful engagement and stakeholder accountability will be 
unrealistic without administrative and institutional reforms that will not only encourage 
transparency in reporting but also empowers stakeholders to have legitimate voice. 
However, Cooper & Owen (2007) express doubt over whether the government will be 
willing to push for such reforms.  
3.2.4 Accountability and transparency 
Despite the apparent urge toward openness and disclosure, all is not so simple. Human 
life, the daily life of individuals as well as the public life of governments, companies 
and organizations, is full of secrets and ambiguities, of that which can be said and that 
which cannot. Governments and institutions darken certain problematic issues to keep a 
tight hold on power and to hide deficiencies; companies find ever-changing ways to 
evade controls and responsibilities … Revelation is always incomplete; and is open to 
all manner of interpretation and negotiation (Garsten & de Montoya, 2008: 6). 
 
                                                 
17 Corporate social disclosure 
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According to Bovens (2007: 448), accountability has been used in public discourses as 
it “conveys an image of transparency and trustworthiness.” Transparency, according to 
the literature, is the making of things visible. For example, as Gray (1992: 415) argues: 
The development of accountability . . . increases the transparency of organisations. That 
is it increases the number of things that are made visible, increases the number of ways 
in which things are made visible, and, in doing so, encourages a greater openness. The 
inside of the organisation becomes more visible, that is, transparent. 
 
The series of corporate scandals call into question the practice of transparency as 
corporations constantly use the concept in their corporate reports. Nevertheless, the 
literature recognises the opaqueness of corporate transparency (Garsten & de Montoya, 
2008; Roberts, 2009; Zyglidopoulos & Fleming, 2011). One of the likely consequences 
of transparency identified in the literature is that it potentially triggers further public 
scrutiny of the transparent corporation (Guthrie & Parker, 1990; Roberts, 2009). 
Zyglidopoulos & Fleming (2011) argue that globalisation and capitalism as phenomena 
of late modernity have encouraged corporations to be non-transparent and 
unaccountable as these phenomena create distance between corporations (including 
their activities) and stakeholders.
18
   
3.3 Accountability and corporate social responsibility 
As discussed above, accountability is construed as responsibilities to undertake actions 
and provide account of such actions to those with the rights to know, and a process of 
holding actors responsible for their actions (Gray, et al., 1996). Extant literature also 
suggests that  accountability provides “mechanisms through which all those affected by 
an organisation’s actions can demand an  account from the managers of that 
organisation regarding how and why the organisation has acted in the manner it has” 
(Unerman & O'Dwyer, 2006: 351).    Based on the review of CSR literature in Chapter 
two, it is clear that CSR is different to accountability. According to Hamann, Acutt, & 
Paul (2003) and Newell (2005), the notions of ‘responsibility’ tend to confer on 
business the power to set the terms of its own conduct. But Newell (2005: 542) argues 
that the notion of accountability “lays bare the power relations which the seemingly 
benign language of ‘responsibility’ and ‘citizenship’ seeks to deny or obscure.” 
                                                 
18
 For corporate reports to be transparent, as with the discharge of accountability, the process of 
accountability involved or the extent to which stakeholders participate in the process is vital (Adams, 
2004). 
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As Chapter two further suggests, the contemporary CSR focuses on corporate 
responsiveness to stakeholders and not accountability. However, responsiveness is 
another term sometimes used to conceptualise accountability even though their 
meanings are non-identical (see Bovens, 2007; Koppell, 2005; Mulgan, 2000).  
According to Koppell (2005), responsiveness suggests that organisations ‘strive’ to 
meet the needs and demands of the population they serve. However, Koppell argues that 
demand and need approaches to evaluating responsiveness differ slightly. According to 
Koppell, whilst demand focuses on preferences of constituencies
19
, need focuses on 
public policy goals. For example, public policy goals in respect of the environment 
might include such things as rights to clean and healthy environment for all (Ebeku, 
2007; Shinsato, 2005). Corporate responsiveness is deemed to have arisen from external 
social pressures (Frederick, 1986). In dealing with external pressures through the lens of 
responsiveness, the corporate managers have the discretion to determine the needs to be 
addressed. Ironically, responsiveness concerns itself primarily with the impact of 
society on business and not the reverse (O
'
Dwyer, 2003), and allows the promotion of 
the dominant corporate culture and defensive strategies aimed at maintaining the status 
quo (Frederick, 1986). As a result, the current practice of CSR does not satisfy the 
requirement of accountability although corporations increasingly make (albeit 
superficial) CSR disclosures. Whilst such social and environmental disclosures may 
form part of accountability, they are only part of the processes and mechanisms of 
accountability (cf. Section 3.2). Consequently, it is necessary to understand how the 
literature perceives corporate social reporting vis-à-vis the discharge of accountability.   
3.4 Corporate social reporting
20
 and the discharge of accountability  
The need for corporations to disclose the impact of their activities by way of giving 
account is by no means trivial. Zadek (1998) notes it is increasingly insufficient for a 
corporation to change its actions that affect stakeholders, but needs to report how it has 
performed socially, ethically and environmentally. According to Zadek, corporate 
reporting is a communication mechanism that stakeholders use to assess the extent the 
corporations have “listened” to their expectations and responded accordingly in 
practical terms. However, conventional financial reporting is too restricted to meet such 
                                                 
19 These are usually the ‘salient stakeholders’ (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997) 
20 Terms such as accounting, accounts or disclosures could also be used (see Gray, 2000: 252)  
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expectations. Conventional annual report has been criticised of falling short of 
accountability requirement as it focuses on the corporate economic interest (e.g., Gray, 
et al., 1996; O’Dwyer, 2000; Schaltegger & Burritt, 2000; Shearer, 2002). Gray (1992) 
argues that current financial accounting as prepared by the accountants cannot meet the 
demand for accountability as it largely excludes social and environmental issues. Within 
the Western context, annual reports (mandatory and voluntary) are regarded as primary 
and formal means corporations use to communicate to its stakeholders (Dhanani & 
Connolly, 2012). Gray, Collison, & Bebbington (1998) argue that the growing interest 
in social accounting and reporting is in recognition that corporations have numerous 
stakeholders. This suggests that corporate social reporting has a broader stakeholder 
focus than shareholder focus (Schreuder & Maranathan, 1984a). In this regard, social 
accounting and reporting is important as it communicates more than economic 
information and focuses on stakeholders rather than shareholders.  Social accounting 
and reporting, according to Gray, et al. (1998: 204), “relates to the collation and 
communication of data – financial, quantitative and/or qualitative – about an 
organisation’s interactions with society”. Such social and environmental reports are of 
interest to a myriad of stakeholders (Solomon, 2000; Gray, et al., 1996, 1998, 2014; 
Schreuder & Maranathan, 1984a, 1984b). According to Gray, Owen, & Maunders 
(1987: 9), corporate social reporting is “the process of communicating the social and 
environmental effects of organisations’ economic actions to particular interest groups 
within society and to society at large.”    
 
Gray (2000) argues that a useful form of social and environmental accounting emerges 
when organisations systematically prepare and communicate their social and 
environmental information to their stakeholders. He further states that such accounts 
comprise the whole gamut of accounts organisations voluntarily or mandatorily give 
about themselves, not necessarily confined to their formal social, environmental or 
sustainability reports. As the literature suggests, such accounts could be written, 
spoken/verbal and calculative (Bebbington, 1999; Neu & Ocampo, 2007). Neu & 
Ocampo (2007: 83) argue that:  
Written social responsibility disclosures such as those found in annual and 
environmental reports are only one form of account. As … responsibility is often 
accounted for via the complex interplay of written and verbal accounts. 
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Neu & Ocampo also suggest that organisations in sensitive sectors or those that face 
demanding pressures from stakeholders to account are more likely to make social and 
environmental disclosures. They also argue that different forms of account 
(conventional annual reports, stand-alone corporate social responsibility reports, verbal 
accounts) could be used to demonstrate corporate accountability and social 
responsibility. Moreover, they argue that whilst the written account is apparently a 
unidirectional information flow the verbal account allows a more fluid and dynamic 
information flow. However, the literature suggests that corporate social disclosures are 
intended towards several corporate stakeholders as part of corporate legitimation 
process (Buhr, 1998; Cho & Patten, 2007; Cho, Roberts, & Patten, 2010; Cho, Guidry, 
Hageman, & Patten, 2012; Deegan, Rankin,& Voght, 2000; Deegan, et al., 2002; 
Guthrie & Parker, 1990; Neu, Warsame, & Pedwell,  1998; O’Dwyer, 2002) as such 
disclosures apparently exclude the voices of economically less powerful stakeholders 
(Belal, 2002; Cooper & Owen, 2007; O’Dwyer, et al., 2005). When appropriately 
employed, corporate social and environmental reporting (hereafter, SER) is perceived as 
a useful mechanism to hold corporations to account for their actions and the related 
impacts (Belal, 2002; Belal, et al., 2013). Although Belal, et al. (2013), for example, 
acknowledge that SER can potentially make corporations accountable in relation to their 
actions that impact on weak communities in developing countries, they express doubt 
whether accountability can be achieved by this mechanism in the absence of regulation 
(see Dong, Burritt, & Qian, 2014).   
 
Majority of the social and environmental disclosures are voluntary by nature. Whilst 
Gray (2001) acknowledges that the law has increased the volume of social and 
environmental issues reported by corporations, Gray, et al. (1995a) also note that many 
corporations have equally extended their information disclosures beyond the legal 
requirement. Whilst the increase in voluntary information disclosures is commendable 
(Gray, 2001), some commentators have expressed concern over corporate motivation 
for providing such information (Cooper & Owen, 2007; Owen & Swift, 2001; Owen, et 
al., 2000). For example, Owen & Swift (2001) point out that the social reports 
emphasise positive and not negative corporate actions, and focus on issues in general 
rather than in specific terms. As earlier mentioned, social accounting literature argues 
that CSDs are one of those tactics corporations use to manage public perceptions. 
However, O’Dwyer (2002) finds that managerial motives for CSDs transcend 
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legitimation and that CSDs are used to a lesser extent to fulfil corporate accountability 
to the society; nonetheless, O’Dwyer himself expresses doubt over the latter. The 
literature equally suggests that the rise in CSDs in recent times derives from 
stakeholders’ pressures (see Adams, 2004; Buccina, et al., 2013; Buhr, 2002; Disu & 
Gray, 1998; Dong, et al., 2014; Frynas, 2009; Jenkins & Yakovleva, 2006; van Staden, 
Kern, & McGuigan, & Wild, 2011). Thus, corporate reports on policies, strategies and 
social performance projections may not necessarily correlate to actual corporate social 
performance (see Laine, 2005; Rhee & Lee, 2003). This resonates with Zadek’s (1998: 
1427) statement that: 
Companies seek to influence public perceptions as to their social, ethical, and 
environmental performance…. Despite a veritable outpouring of information from 
companies about their social, ethical, and environmental performance, there is ample 
evidence to suggest that stakeholders rarely believe what they are told by companies, 
certainly not beyond basic technical product-related information. 
 
Despite the increase in the volume of CSDs, one of the criticisms levelled against 
corporate social reports is that they are incomplete (Adams, 2004; Gray, 2000). As the 
literature suggests, a report that will satisfy stakeholder accountability is one that 
incorporates the voices of stakeholders based on a meaningful structure that promotes 
unbiased engagement. O’Dwyer, et al. (2005: 16) encourage CSD as “stakeholders have 
a “right to know” about organisational impacts that will directly affect their daily lives.” 
Social accounting scholars consider social accounting reports as important if they are 
articulated to fulfil accountability obligations to stakeholders affected by corporate 
policies and practices irrespective of their economic power (O’Dwyer, et al., 2005). 
 
As discussed above, a useful corporate social reporting is one that discharges 
accountability. Gray (2008: 4) argues that:  “The social account may serve a number of 
purposes but discharge of the organisation's accountability to its stakeholders must be 
the clearly dominant of those reasons and the basis upon which the social account is 
judged.”  The literature also suggests that the discharge of accountability is untenable 
when stakeholders are not meaningfully engaged in the accountability process (Adams, 
2004; Dillard, 2007, 2011; Gray, et al., 1996, 1997, 2014; Lehman, 2007; O’Dwyer, et 
al., 2005; Unerman & Bennett, 2004). As Gray (2000) argues, corporate social 
accounting that is underpinned by the pursuit of accountability gives priority to the 
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society whilst the one that pursues management control puts the organisation first. An 
accountability-driven social reporting, according to Gray (2000: 254), will cover: 
Stakeholders’ rights to information; balancing power with responsibility; empowering 
stakeholders; owning up to eco-justice and ecological footprint failures/impossibilities; 
transparency; openness; demonstrating that one is ‘walking the talk’; describing the 
limits of organisational ability; demonstrating the social and environmental cost of 
economic success; etc.... 
 
Whilst transparency is seen as important in corporate social disclosure, commentators 
contend that corporations are hypocritical in their CSDs (la Cour & Kromann, 2011; 
Fassin & Buelens, 2011; Sikka, 2010; Wagner, Lutz, & Weitz, 2009). For example, 
Sikka (2010: 165) contends that:  
There is a considerable gap between corporate talk, decisions and action culminating in 
organised hypocrisy. Corporations have developed two cultures: one promises ethical 
conduct to external audiences and this is decoupled from the organisational practices.   
 
Woodward, et al. (1996) contend that the corporation must provide enough information 
to enable the society to judge whether the corporation is a ‘good citizen’ or not. 
However, Shearer (2002) argues that the corporation is unlikely to disclose information 
that is at cross with its self-interest. But Gray (2001) argues that effective accountability 
should hurt (see also Dey, 2003; Owen & Swift, 2001). But where the information 
provided by the corporation fails to transparently explain and justify its actions, 
accountability cannot be said to have been discharged
21
. For example, the literature 
recognises that increased voluntary environmental disclosures usually follow adverse 
environmental incidents (Patten, 1992). Consequently, Joseph (2007) argues that such 
disclosures are not intended to discharge accountability as the reports are not holistic in 
that they emphasise the positives and de-emphasise the negatives. Whilst the literature 
suggests that information provided by corporations may not correlate to their actual 
actions or performance (Laine 2005; Rhee and Lee, 2003) or sufficiently discharge 
accountability, Parker & Guthrie (1990) suggests that such corporate disclosures could 
form the basis for further corporate scrutiny.  Information provides the platform for 
stakeholders to engage with corporations. Information, according to Gray (1992) and 
Deegan & Rankin (1999), is useful to provide some lever of power to the recipient. But 
the failure of corporations to be accountable potentially motivates independent 
                                                 
21 Some scholars suggest that accountability is not measured by degree but is dichotomous such that an 
actor or accountor is either accountable or not accountable (see Bovens, 1998; Fox 2007). 
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institutions/organisations (or stakeholders) to provide reports about corporate activities 
as an alternative source of corporate information.  
3.5 External social audits and discharge of accountability 
As social accounting is considered as representing “the universe of all possible 
accountings” (Gray, 2000: 264; Gray, et al., 1997: 328), Gray (2000) contends that the 
focus of social accounting on the organisation limits social accounting potential. Further 
to this argument, Gray (2000: 264) emphasises that “self-reporting by organisations is a 
limited sub-set of all accountings and … a potentially conservative tendency.” Gray, et 
al. (1997) equally acknowledge it would be a bias to restrict social accounts to formal 
accounts organisations prepare given the polyvocal nature of accountability.  This 
argument also in part resonates with stakeholders’ lack of trust that corporations will 
behave responsibly in the absence of mechanisms to hold them to account. Swift (2001) 
argues that accountability derives from lack of trust that an agent will act in the best 
interest of the principal when their interests conflict. Swift’s distinction between trust 
and distrust in relation to accountability resonates with the fact that corporations as 
agents of society cannot be trusted to act in the best interest of society in the absence of 
accountability. Swift (2001: 19) conceptualises trust as one’s “reliance upon the 
predictability of another's behaviour” and distrust as “the belief that the other party will 
pursue self-interest with guile” Her distinction between trust and distrust are insightful 
and potentially commends independent external social accounts (audits) to complement 
accounts provided by corporations.   
 
The activities of external social audits have been prominent since the early 1970s (Gray, 
2001). Gray (2001: 9) describes social audits as “those public analyses of accountable 
entities undertaken (more or less systematically) by bodies independent of the entity, 
and typically without the approval of the entity concerned.” Shadow 
reporting/account(ing) is another concept social accounting literature also uses to 
describe external social audits. According to Dey, Russell, & Thomson (2011: 66): 
Shadow accounts of corporate impacts are drawn up from external sources, such as, 
newspaper articles, direct testaments from workers, ex-employees, individuals living 
near plants, trade unions, suppliers, public pollution registers, NGO reports, scientific 
reports, court prosecutions, and health and safety breaches. 
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As the literature suggests, these external reporters do not need the permission of the 
organisation they are reporting on as they are groups within society that step in to 
discharge organisation’s or corporation’s accountability when the latter fails to do so 
(Dey, 2003, 2007; Gray, 2000, 2001; Gray, et al., 1996, 2014). Put differently, Dey, et 
al. (2011: 64) regards shadow accounts as “accounting for the other, by the other.” In 
the oil industry a number of independent organisations provide reports on the activities 
of major oil MNCs and have dedicated websites for that purpose. For example, 
royaldutchshell.com (social audit on Shell) and True cost of Chevron (social audit on 
Chevron). Dey (2003) suggests that shadow accounts will include stakeholders’ voices 
and relevant information from media and independent organisations. Shadow reporting 
is regarded as forming part of independent external reporting on the activities of 
corporations by NGOs and media (Adams, 2004; Dey, et al., 2011; Ruffing, 2007). The 
literature also suggests that the systematic and holistic nature of such reports determine 
whether those reports can be classified as shadow accounts or counter accounts. Whilst 
counter accounts are deemed selective (which may be bias) and concentrated on specific 
issues or corporations, shadow accounts are considered as more holistic and systematic 
in their compilation (Dey, 2007; Dey & Gibbon, 2014; Gray, et al., 2014)
22
. Such 
contemplation does suggest that counter accounts will be useful when comparing them 
with corporate accounts on specific issues or corporations. Whether such alternative 
accounts by stakeholders are regarded as shadow accounts or counter accounts, they 
produce similar effect of potentially revealing contradictions between corporate 
accounts and external stakeholder accounts.  
 
According to Zadek (1998: 1427), "stakeholders rarely believe what they are told by 
companies, certainly not beyond basic technical product-related information.” As 
corporations can hardly be trusted (Swift, 2001), Adams (2004) emphasises the need to 
examine not only accounts corporations give about themselves but also those that 
external stakeholders provide on them for comparison in order to infer the extent the 
corporations discharge their accountability to stakeholders. Such comparison, according 
                                                 
22 Whilst Gray, et al. (2014) consider the articles by Adams (2004) and Thomson, Dey, & Russell (2010) 
[an earlier version of Dey, et al., 2011] as systematic and holistic shadow accounts, they consider many 
reports by NGOs [and media] as counter accounts (see Fineman, 1997). However, the importance of 
both accounts (irrespective of classification) is to ultimately expose corporate unaccountability to 
potentially promote accountability. Moreover,  Dey (2003) refers to shadow account information as 
counter-information 
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to Adams (2004) and Dey (2003), enables gaps in the corporate reports to be spotted 
vis-à-vis the information the company discloses and suppresses. Dey, et al. (2010: 1) 
also contend that: 
Shadow accounting can be viewed as a technology that measures, creates, makes 
visible, represents and communicates evidence in contested arenas characterised by 
multiple, often contradictory reports, prepared according to different institutional and 
ideological rules. 
 
The conflicting nature of these external accounts with those produced by the 
corporations makes shadow accounts to have emancipatory potential by engendering 
corporate-stakeholder engagement (Dey, et al., 2010). According to Gray (2000), if 
there are any biases or inaccuracies within those accounts it becomes the responsibility 
of the accountable organisation to correct those representations made by the external 
social audits which apparently places a demand on the accountable to account. The 
literature also suggests that shadow accounts are prevalent in corporations operating in 
pollution-intensive industries (Gray, et al., 2014). Nevertheless, as these corporations 
tend to focus on good news and sparsely report bad news until much public pressure 
(Buccina, et al., 2013), Ruffing (2007) suggests that corporate social reports of such 
corporations can be compared over time against CSR guidelines or shadow accounts to 
check for responsiveness, consistency and completeness. She notes that a corporation’s 
compliance with the template of CSR guidelines (e.g. GRI) does not sufficiently suggest 
that the corporation provides material information given that management has control 
over what is (un)reported. In comparing BP’s sustainability reports with shadow 
accounts she extracted from the Financial Times, Ruffing finds that BP’s report was 
silent on many of the material issues on its operations raised by the Financial Times. In 
this regard, the reliance on independent external accounts to compare the accounts 
corporations give on their operations provides a balancing view and a more robust way 
of understanding the extent to which corporations actually discharge their accountability 
to stakeholders and the wider society. The importance of shadow reporting is further 
emphasised by Friedman & Miles (2004) cited in Tregidga, et al. (2012: 224) that:  
We need to view the stakeholder communication practice as ‘decentered’ from the 
organization, and we need to focus on the message reception and counter messages as 
much as on the organizational messages. 
 
The majority of studies and discourses on accountability have tended to focus on the 
West and less on developing countries, which invariably makes only little to be known 
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about accountability conceptions and practices in this latter context. The next section 
therefore provides a brief review of accountability in Nigeria.  
3.6 Accountability in the Nigerian context 
Prior corporate studies on Nigeria mainly focused on CSR rather than accountability or 
corporate social reporting (e,g., Amaeshi & Amao, 2009; Amao, 2008; Eweje, 2006a, 
2006b; Frynas, 2005; Idemudia, 2009, 2011, 2014; Idemudia & Ite, 2006; Ite, 2004, 
2007). Corporate accountability has been sparsely studied in the Nigerian context - as 
far as I am aware – (e.g., Disu & Gray, 1998; Shinsato, 2005).  A few others have also 
studied public sector or political accountability (Iyoha & Oyerinde, 2010; Kifordu, 
2010). Disu & Gray (1998) – as far as I am aware - is the earliest study on corporate 
social disclosure in Nigeria, which explores social disclosures of a number of MNCs 
operating in Nigeria. Their findings reveal evidence of mandatory disclosures and rarity 
of voluntary disclosures. Whilst they equally noted that Shell produced several 
publications and disclosures following public criticisms and pressures, they considered 
such information as insufficient in discharging accountability. But Shinsato (2005) 
focuses her study on accountability of oil MNCs in Nigeria with respect to 
environmental degradation and human rights violation. She makes advocacy for 
international laws with strict penalties capable of making corporations behave 
responsibly in upholding human rights to healthy environment as well as be held to 
account. In order for such laws to be effective, she argues that the enactment and 
enforcement of these laws must be at the international level so that citizens of weak and 
corrupt states cannot be undermined. Shinsato (2005: 208-209) concludes that:  
The link between a healthy environment and human rights is undeniable…. A 
universally recognized right to a healthy environment and increased corporate 
accountability would encourage TNCs to conduct business in less environmentally 
destructive manner and, as a result, protect human rights. 
In relation to public sector accountability, Kifordu (2010) undertakes an analysis of how 
the political elite composition has promoted unaccountability in Nigeria in spite of 
structural and economic changes the country has undergone. He observes that although 
Nigeria has experienced governance under parliamentary, military and presidential 
systems of government, the political landscape is dominated by few elite groups who 
have built authority structure that destroys the liberal-pluralist notion of accountability 
as they privilege their interests over those of the public.  According to Kifordu (2010: 
289): 
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Accountability from the democratic governance perspective is the institutionalized 
process through which political leaders are held responsible for their acts vis-à-vis 
‘public will’… Effective accountability is determined not just by processes but also by 
outcomes that measure the extent to which policy choices substantially cohere with 
public preferences. 
 
He further argues that an effective accountability process requires the citizens’ input and 
that citizens’ capacity to hold the leaders to account does not only depend on those 
citizens’ capacity to do so but also on the willingness of the leaders to submit to the 
rules governing accountability. He also contends that public office holders should be 
accountable with respect to the law as well as for their actions and choices that have 
consequences on the people. Whilst he recognises free and fair election as a mechanism 
of sanctioning underperforming leaders, he equally points out that citizens are denied 
such rights in Nigeria. As Kifordu contends, the elites have enormous political and 
economic powers which create power inequality between them and the larger public, 
which they equally use to hijack and manipulate institutions that are supposed to 
promote accountability.  He also implicates ethnicity, nepotism, corruption, and weak 
institutional structures, as undermining the ability or capacity of the citizens to 
effectively participate in the accountability process and hold those in power to account.   
 
Another study, Iyoha & Oyerinde (2010), assesses the state of accountability in the 
Nigerian public sector by drawing on the role accounting infrastructure could play in 
fostering public accountability vis-à-vis public expenditure. In drawing on 
accountability literature, Iyoha & Oyerinde argue that accountability is a mechanism for 
democratic control and for maintaining checks and balances. They contend that 
accountability can help to prevent public sector corruption and the abuse of official 
position. Nonetheless, they argue that effective accountability over financial 
management practices in Nigerian public sector will require sound financial 
management information system, adequate number of qualified accountants, high 
quality accounting standards and robust legal framework. Whilst they acknowledge that 
Nigerian Government over time has initiated several reforms to promote accountability 
in public expenditure, they argue that such mechanisms have failed to foster 
accountability due to high-level corruption and fiscal indiscipline perpetrated in 
government arena (Agbiboa, 2012). They also argue that the various reforms initiated 
by the government failed to achieve accountability because of failure to reform 
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accounting infrastructure that will ensure information provision to, and accessibility by, 
society.  
 
Recently accountability has been explored in Nigeria in relation to corporations and 
public sector nexus by looking at accountability and transparency in respect of monetary 
payments corporations make to the Nigerian Government such as taxes, royalties, 
penalty fees, etc (Idemudia, 2010; Otusanya, Lauwo, & Bakre, 2014). Accountability is 
brought to the fore in Nigeria through the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI) aimed at promoting transparency by requiring corporations to ‘publish what they 
pay’ to their host governments23. According to Otusanya, et al., the EITI scheme was 
introduced into the extractive industries due to the prevalent secrecy in revenue flows in 
such industries.  Nigeria signed up for EITI which, according to Otusanya, et al. (2014), 
was formed in 2004 as Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI) 
and legislated on in 2007.  Whilst it is an initiative aimed at promoting transparency, 
Otusanya, et al. (2014) argue that MNCs use such initiative to manage stakeholder 
impression as it confers neither enforceable rights on stakeholders nor alter the nature of 
the companies.    
 
The Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) is seen as a mechanism to 
promote accountability and transparency (Corrigan, 2014; Smith, Shepherd, & 
Dorward, 2012). All the MNCs in the Nigerian oil industry also signed up to this 
initiative which obligates them to publicly disclose their payments to the Government. It 
is aimed essentially at promoting the accountability of the Government to its citizenries 
regarding the monies received from corporations (Corrigan, 2014; Hilson & 
Maconachie, 2008, 2010; Smith, et al., 2012). In this regard, EITI could be seen as an 
indirect mechanism stakeholders can also use to demand accountability from their 
government. As noted by Hilson & Maconachie (2008, 2010) , EITI can only be 
effective as a means of holding government accountable where there is good 
governance and commitment to institutional reform. Otusanya, et al. (2014) note that 
EITI initiative will not be effective as the MNCs pursue a neo-liberal privileging of 
capital which apparently makes them circumvent revenue transparency under different 
guises such as transfer pricing, tax avoidance, contract negotiations. On the side of the 
                                                 
23 The origin of EITI and the incidents that heralded it can be found at http://eiti.org/eiti/history  
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state, they contend that corruption in government circles and weakness in governance 
and institutional frameworks also weaken the effectiveness of EITI to deliver 
transparency and accountability. Idemudia (2010) argues that EITI as a Western concept 
requires modification appropriate for local utility. In general, the above reviews suggest 
that accountability in Nigerian public sector and corporate domains is dominated by the 
influence of powerful stakeholders. 
3.7 Further theoretical framing 
3.7.1 Account-giving heuristic 
With accountability being the principal theoretical foundation for this paper, I found it 
increasingly helpful to employ the `account-giving framework’ developed by Bradford 
& Garrett, 1995 (see Eweje & Wu, 2010; Szwajkowski, 1992) as one of the theoretical 
lenses to analyse the different accounts constructed by the oil MNCs in respect of gas 
flaring and oil spill environmental incidents. For example, Everett (2003: 79) argues 
that “[a]n understanding of accountability needs to begin with a look at the notion of the 
“account”, an official form of “story” or “narrative”.” This framework provides the 
platform to organise the accounts into coherent constellations according to their nature. 
The literature suggests that the framework is useful in the analysis of organisational 
responses to adverse social and environmental incidents (see Bradford & Garrett, 1995; 
Eweje and Wu, 2010; Garrett, Bradford, Meyers, & Becker, 1989; Ketola, 2006; 
Szwajkowski, 1992). Such a framework is important to this thesis as it explores the 
accountability of the oil MNCs in Nigeria in relation to their gas flaring and oil spill 
environmental incidents which create adverse social and environmental impacts as the 
literature suggests (see Chapter Four).  
 
Bradford and Garrett (1995) and Eweje & Wu (2010) suggest that stakeholders will 
generally perceive the corporations as directly or indirectly responsible for those 
impacts which makes it essential for the corporations to provide their own accounts 
about those incidents. The account-giving literature articulates four broad categories of 
account-giving heuristic framework that will be essential for organising and analysing 
the accounts the MNCs give on gas flaring and oil spills as adverse environment 
incidents. These four categories of analysis are denials, excuses, justifications and 
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concessions (Bradford & Garrett, 1995; Eweje & Wu, 2010; Garrett, et al., 1989; 
Szwajkowski, 1992).  
 
According to this heuristic, a denial is utilised in reporting by a reporting entity when it 
denies the occurrence or existence of an adverse incident or that it causes the adverse 
incident. However, the failure of a corporation to make disclosures about an adverse 
incident may be difficult to construe as a denial of the incident as all the intervening 
factors surrounding the non-disclosures may not be obvious, although Bebbington, 
Larrinaga, & Moneva (2008) drawing on Benoit (1995) suggest that silence might be a 
variant of denial. An excuse occurs in disclosure when the reporting entity claims it 
lacks control over the adverse incident and so apparently absolves itself of 
responsibility (culpability or liability) for the incident. However, the reporting entity 
might admit (implicitly or explicitly) that such an incident produces harm. A reporting 
entity uses justification in making disclosures about an adverse incident by admitting 
responsibility for the incident but denying the appropriateness of the standards 
stakeholders use to evaluate the incident. The denial of the appropriateness of standards 
for judging the incident might in principle lead to denial of harm caused by the adverse 
incident. Finally, a concession occurs in disclosures when the reporting entity admits 
occurrence of and responsibility for the adverse incident. It might also include the 
reporting entity’s admission that the incident causes harm.  
 
The analysis of the accounts that the corporations give will equally provide a useful data 
to analyse the claims or counter-claims stakeholders provide as alternative narratives
24
. 
A limitation of this framework is that it is useful only in analysing accounts that are 
related to adverse, negative or unethical incidents. Although this framework aims to 
enrich our understanding about MNCs’ constructed accounts on adverse social and 
environmental incidents, it fails to unpick the sense-making underlying such accounts. 
Sense-making theoretical lens will be helpful to unpick the epistemic frame embedded 
in those accounts or the extracted cues on which (in)actions are embedded (O’Leary & 
Chia, 2007; Weick, 1995).  According to Weick (1995) “extracted cues are simple, 
familiar structures that are seeds from which people develop a larger sense of what may 
be occurring” (p. 50) and they are “crucial for their capacity to evoke action” (p. 54). 
                                                 
24 Such narratives could derive from shadow reports and interview data.  
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3.7.2 Sense-making critique of accountability  
The manner in which actors make sense of issues depends on a particular frame of 
reference. In this regard, sensemaking and framing appear to be inseparably related. A 
frame is the lens that a stakeholder uses to make sense of a conflict or situation (B. 
Gray, 2004).  More specifically, Dewulf, Craps, & Dercon (2004: 178) describe issue 
framing as “the different ways in which different actors make sense of specific issues by 
selecting the relevant aspects, connecting them into a sensible whole, delineating its 
boundaries.” Also, by drawing on Weick (1995: 8), Allard-Poesi (2005: 171-172) states 
that:  
Sensemaking activities involve the construction and bracketing of cues to be interpreted, 
linking them to a previous frame of reference that summarizes past experiences (such as 
traditions, ideologies, theories of actions or stories), and revising the interpretation that 
have thus developed as a result of actions, interactions and their consequence. 
 
The main point of emphasis in the context of my thesis is the concept of bracketing of 
cues, which has link with frame of reference or ‘dominant ideology.’ Weick (1995) 
suggests seven properties of sensemaking namely, grounded in identity construction, 
retrospective, enactive of sensible environments, social, ongoing, focused on and by 
extracted cues (also referred to as bracketing cues), and driven by plausibility rather 
than accuracy. He further states that each of these properties is a ‘self-contained 
research question,’ although each is intertwined with the other six. This suggests that 
emphasis can be placed on each, depending on the relevance to a context. Following this 
suggestion, the point of emphasis is on ‘bracketing cues.’ “Extracted cues are simple, 
familiar structures that are seeds from which people develop a larger sense of what may 
be occurring” (Weick, 1995: 50) and they are “crucial for their capacity to evoke 
action” (Weick, 1995: 54).  
 
Taking together the above cited literatures, they suggest that bracketing cues relies on 
frame of reference upon which actions are based. The frame of reference becomes a 
signal for behaviour and such reference then defines what counts or does not count. One 
likely reason for corporate reliance on frame of reference is that the organisations have 
streams of incidents or inputs upon which they try to impose some order or label that 
will then govern corporate behaviour. These corporate labels or orders manifest in 
actions and language and they act as signals to what counts as important to the 
organisation. Weick (1995: 3) recognises that, “organizations also have their own 
55 
 
language and symbols that have important effects on sensemaking.” Bracketing cues 
signals a selecting process by which a corporation excludes and includes things on the 
basis of how it thinks they are important. In bracketing cues, the way the organisation 
defines itself is central. According to Weick (pp. 23-24, emphasis added) identity 
construction is:  
[P]erhaps the most important, the idea that sensemaking is self-referential suggests that 
self, rather than the environment, may be the text in need of interpretation … [I] make 
sense of whatever happens around me by asking, what implications do these events have 
for who I will be? What the situation will have meant to me is dictated by the identity I 
adopt in dealing with it …[I] derive cues as to what the situation means from the self that 
feels most appropriate to deal with it, and much less from what is going on out there. 
 
By implication, the way a corporation respond to, define or conceptualise issues will 
depend on its self-identity, which is influenced by its underlying traditions and 
ideologies. And it does suggest that corporate actions are driven by corporate ideologies 
and embedded traditions. This notion appears to underlie Weick’s (1995: 20) argument 
that: “[D]epending on who I am, my definition of what is “out there” will also change. 
Whenever I define self I define “it,” but to define it is also to define self.” By 
extrapolation, when a corporation conceptualises a literally misused concept such as 
accountability (Bovens, 2007; Fox, 2007; Gray, 2001), its focus will be less on what 
happens in the outside environment but more on what appeals to self-conception, which 
becomes the mirror through which it views all issues. This also implies that in 
interpreting corporate language, there is need to look beyond the literal discourse as the 
language used are intertwined with the self that drives what makes sense to the 
organisation. Ideologies or traditions underlie actions and accounts about incidents, and 
this in part prompts O'Leary & Chia (2007: 393) to argue that:   
For any account of the goings-on in organizational life to be coherent and plausible, or 
even legitimate at all, it has to conform to some underlying, historically shaped structure 
of expectation; there has to be some form of implicit understanding about what 
constitutes an acceptable and justifiable system of values, beliefs, and practices. 
 
As the literature suggests, an important focus of sense-making study is to unpick the 
rationale that underlies how people construct the world around them. As Weick (1995: 
4) argues, the central question of sense-making focuses on “[h]ow people construct 
what they construct, why, and what effects.” Implicit in the above is that organisations 
act based on some underlying assumptions and systems of values and beliefs. This also 
implies that the language of corporations will largely be consistent with their system of 
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beliefs. The belief system corporations identify with plausibly influences how they 
interpret issues they confront. Such beliefs and ideologies are embedded in the 
organisational system and are often lived out with unconscious awareness. These 
ideologies and belief system impose a sort of order and regularity (Burrell & Morgan, 
1979) such that the corporations unconsciously live them out. O’Leary & Chia (2007) 
unpick how these orders, meaning makings and regularity are achieved through sense-
making, which they argue are embedded in rules and established conventions of a socio-
cultural setting.   
 
As O’Leary & Chia (2009: 393) argue, one important question relevant to sense-making 
is “how does a particular scheme of explanation achieve coherence, plausibility, and 
then dominate in the order of things?” In trying to answer this question, they rely on the 
concept of episteme which they describe as the: 
 “[U]nderlying code of a culture or epoch that governs its language, its logic, its schemas 
of perception, its values and its techniques, etc … [T]he process of sensemaking involves 
oftentimes unconscious invoking of a governing epistemes for ordering the world” (pp. 
392- 393).  
 
This suggests that how an organisation conceptualizes and rationalizes an issue derive 
from “unconscious invoking” of a particular dominant paradigm. This is implicitly 
consistent with what Shafer (2006) refers to as the dominant social paradigm (i.e. the 
political, economic and technological worldviews of the western society), which largely 
affects the attitude of organization towards social and environmental issues and 
accountability. Also implicit in Shafer’s argument is the notion of sense-making which 
suggests that issues are framed by relying on a particular frame of reference or 
framework. The framework serves as a governing mechanism for rationalising 
experiences and expectations or a map that guides which direction to go. As O’Leary & 
Chia (2007: 393) argue: 
An episteme organizes our sensorium, educates our attention, and orients our material 
disposition toward the world around us so much so that we are directed to attend to 
certain objects and events that have meaning and significance only within such a 
historical-cultural milieu ... [T]hrough the use of these internalized rules of formation, the 
processes of inclusion/exclusion, the creation of objects of attention, the fixing of key 
reference points, and the setting up of procedures for reading and interpreting sense data 
are systematically internalized as social conventions  
 
In the light of the above, what accountability is or how it should manifest - from 
corporate perspective - will derive from the ideology that most likely resonates with 
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corporate self-image. In a globalised world dominated by capitalist orientation which 
privileges financial property rights, corporations will conceptualise issues (especially 
those issues surrounded by ambiguity) through this dominant lens. As the concept of 
accountability is often misplaced or misused, the potential ambiguity inherent in it 
might be appropriated by corporations rhetorically in order to maintain the dominant 
social paradigm (Koppell, 2005; Stoney & Winstanley, 2001).  Shafer (2006) regards 
this dominant lens as the dominant social paradigm, which have implications for how 
corporations give attention to social and environmental issues. The corporate 
accountability recognised by this capitalist or market paradigm is accountability to 
shareholders, which potentially excludes other stakeholders irrespective of how much 
they are affected by corporate actions. In recognition of the privileging of shareholders 
over other stakeholders, some social accounting commentators have advocated the need 
for corporate governance that considers the interests of multiple stakeholders (cf. 
Section 3.2).  
 
As has been stated earlier, when corporations conceptualise accountability they owe 
stakeholders from the market paradigm perspective, this will exclude the accountability 
rights of non-financial stakeholders. By implication, such accountability conception will 
be most likely different to how those excluded and other non-financial stakeholders will 
conceptualise it. So in assessing corporate social and environmental disclosures on 
issues that have significant impact on non-financial stakeholders, caution has to be 
exercised not to interpret such disclosures at face value. Similar posture is implicit in 
the literature on corporations’ use of discretionary disclosures to manage impression. 
Impression management literature in respect of corporate social and environmental 
disclosures suggests that what the corporations say is not always consistent with their 
actions (Rhee & Lee, 2003). Many of such literatures suggest that corporations use 
impression management to promote its legitimacy, forestall regulation, promote image, 
etc (e.g., Beelitz & Merkl-Davies, 2012; Benoit, 1997; Cho, et al, 2012; Deegan, 2002; 
Deegan, et al., 2000; Ketola, 2006; Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2011; Neu, et al., 1998; 
O’Dwyer, 2002, 2003; Onkila, Joensuu, & Koskela, 2014; Solomon, Solomon, Joseph, 
& Norton, 2013).   
 
The above suggests that the image the corporation will try to promote and sustain is 
most likely the one that will appeal to the market, which is governed by the dominant 
58 
 
social paradigm of shareholder wealth maximisation. Apparently, the social and 
environmental disclosures and ethical claims by corporations will be underpinned by, 
and instrumental to, shareholder wealth maximisation. This also suggests that 
organisational sense-making will be underpinned by the rules, ideologies, culture and 
traditions that have historical linkage to shareholder wealth maximisation. As Kochan 
and Rubinstein (2000: 368, emphasis added ) argue, “[c]ontrary to common belief, the 
shareholder-maximizing perspective is not an immutable law of economics, but in fact 
emerged as the dominant goal for the American corporation out of a particular 
historical context.” O’Leary & Chia’s (2007) episteme of sense-making provides a 
useful guide to unpicking meanings from corporate discourse based on their epistemic 
lens of modern epoch of knowing.  
 
According to them, the modern epoch of knowing is characterised by proliferation of 
different meanings such that a thing is understood not merely by outward appearance 
but by the underlying logic buried within it. Understanding is achieved under this epoch 
through interpretation. Under this epoch different constituents or stakeholders groups 
will appear to define reality from different points of view. As O’Leary & Chia (2007: 
398) argue: 
Meanings are no longer stable, transparent, and self-evident. Instead, actions and 
intentions have become more opaque and subjected to hidden motives and 
understandings. Deeper unconscious forces, historical embeddedness, and ulterior 
motives that are difficult to empirically verify have to be increasingly countenanced as 
legitimate explanations … [P]luralism, relativism, and the emergence of conflicting 
realities became the signature theme of this Modern period. A degree of suspicion, 
cynicism, and disillusionment sets in as regimes of representation compete with each 
other for an ideological foothold in the collective psyche of societies and organizations. 
 
As the above applies to our contemporary era of modernity, it suggests that phenomena 
are unlikely what they appear to be or represent. In this context, corporate 
representations about an issue are very likely to be taken with suspicion
25
 because they 
are influenced by the corporation’s ‘ideological foothold.’ Interpretation is required to 
understand an organisational or social phenomenon rather than mere reliance on its 
literal meaning. How understanding can be achieved through this epochal lens is 
summarised by O’Leary & Chia (2007: 402-403) thus: 
The Modern mentality … is characterized by a situation in which signifiers have become 
loosened and detached from reality itself. Modernity is a reflection of the realization that 
                                                 
25 See Zadek (1998: 1427) cited in sections 3.4 and 3.5  
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signs are problematic and do not straightforwardly represent what they supposedly stand 
for. What is said and what is done are no longer congruent with each other so much so 
that actions and intentions are by no means transparent and unequivocal. Interpretation 
and reading beneath the surface of things is required. One consequence of this 
detachment of the sign from reality is the emergence of suspicion, cynicism, and 
disillusionment because things can no longer be taken as they appear. The truth lies 
hidden from view. What is needed for a full comprehension is the excavating of the 
“historical forces buried within.” 
 
As corporate sense-making is embedded in this market-driven concept, when the 
corporation discusses often misused concepts or practice such as CSR, accountability, 
stakeholder, stakeholder engagement, environmental responsibility, ethical behaviour, 
etc., this dominant social paradigm appear to always hold sway. With this dominant 
socio-cultural ideology of the corporation, it implies that when the corporation discusses 
these seemingly unstable issues, distant stakeholders need to interpret them with 
reference to the logic hidden and embedded within them. Due to the hidden logic or 
‘frame of reference’ that underlies corporate conceptions of social issues or phenomena, 
the distant stakeholders are most likely to be disillusioned and cynical about corporate 
claims. Organizational sense-making of issues shares consistency with this socio-
cultural rules and conventions that have been internalized by corporations or the 
dominant social paradigm. O’Leary & Chia’s argument is that those who act according 
to such rules and conventions become engrossed in them that they are unconsciously 
aware of the particular episteme they invoke in carrying out their routine activities. This 
apparently resonates with Roberts’ (1991) argument of the power of a discipline to 
subject actors to a particular kind of behaviour because the organisational codes have 
become internalized and often taken for granted as objective standard of behaviour. 
Shearer (2002: 545) equally argues that:  
The stories we tell give meaning to our experience of reality, and hence shape and 
constrain what we take reality to be. What we take reality to be in turn influences our 
actions, and in this way further shapes what reality will be. 
 
When a dominant frame of reference is chosen to make sense of phenomena, it implies 
that other frames of reference are bracketed out. According to O’Leary & Chia, “[I]n 
“making sense,” we actively select an aspect of our phenomenal experience and censor 
what we do not wish to attend to. This selected aspect is then “registered” so that it 
subsequently provides a legitimate focus of attention” (p.395). Actors invoke the 
underlying rules of a particular episteme and use them as lens to determine what fit their 
goals.  According to O’Leary & Chia, these underlying rules invoke value into our 
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actions and point of emphasis. So what is emphasized will derive from the value held.  
The epistemic culture a corporation embraces organizes its sensorium which reinforces 
its selective decisions, thereby giving attention to certain issues whilst neglecting others.  
In corroboration to this argument vis-à-vis corporate reporting, Buhr (2001) and 
Rodrigue (2014) contend that corporations select issues to report on and things they 
report about them. Moreover, la Cour and Kromann (2011: 275) provide a caveat on 
corporate disclosures as corporations use euphemism to manage stakeholder impression: 
But the use of euphemisms makes it possible for the corporations to communicate to all 
parties at the same time; on the surface, it simply looks as though the corporations are 
talking about two different things: when the corporations address the shareholders, it is 
all a question of making money, when they address parties with a non-economic 
interest, it is a matter of love. Making it appear as if the corporations are talking of two 
different things, even though it is the same topic that is at stake, enables the 
corporations not to be caught in hypocrisy.  
3.8 Concluding remarks 
This Chapter provided some theoretical background on accountability which revealed 
that accountability derives from a normative framework of general agency relationship 
between parties. As the review in this Chapter suggested, accountability transcends 
economic logic of self-interest and rather privileges the information rights relating to 
stakeholder and society interests. Stakeholders have the right to know of corporate 
actions that have impact on them irrespective of their power and how managers perceive 
their ‘salience’. Essentially, accountors must feel obliged to provide accounts rather 
than being at liberty to provide whatever account they want (Bovens, 2007).  
 
Some basic themes identifiable within the core notion of accountability are that 
accountability: derives from a relationship between parties, relationship is socially or 
morally determined,  confers a responsibility,  and is facilitated by democratic 
engagement mechanism. Whist it was noted that accountability is not identical to CSR, 
it was highlighted that the discharge of accountability is held to be one principal 
function of social accounting
26
 disclosures and the processes followed in producing the 
reports. Effective democratic engagement of relevant stakeholders was considered 
necessary to improve the discharge of accountability, which would be elusive without 
necessary administrative and institutional reforms. Due to the incompleteness of 
corporate reports, the literature emphasised the importance of shadow/counter accounts 
                                                 
26 See Section 3.5 
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to discharge accountability where the corporations failed to do so. Whilst such accounts 
are vital in pollution-intensive industries, they are essential in this study as the Nigerian 
oil industry is not only pollution-intensive but also the industry’s social context is 
highly ‘charged’ and ‘noisy’.  
 
Lastly, whilst this Chapter provided the core notions of accountability to guide the 
exploration of accountability conceptions in this study, it also provided further 
theoretical nuances for exploring the nature of accounts the MNCs in this study render 
and unpicking the plausible sense-making embedded within those narratives.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Background setting and context 
4.1 Introduction 
Whilst the previous Chapters have provided the theoretical background to this study, 
this Chapter provides a brief review of the socio-geographic setting of the study. This 
background Chapter in part buttresses the justifications for the study’s focus on the 
Nigerian oil industry as highlighted in Chapter one. An organisation of this Chapter is 
as follows. Following this introduction is Section 4.2 which briefly discusses the 
Nigerian economy in the context of oil and gas activities. Section 4.3 discusses the 
Niger Delta in the context of corporate negative environmental impacts arising from oil 
operations, whilst Section 4.4 discusses the visibility of MNCs in the Nigerian oil 
industry. Concluding remarks are provided in Section 4.5. 
4.2 The oil and gas economy of Nigeria and the regulatory environment 
According to the World Bank (2012), Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa 
with over 160 million people.  But about 100 million of the population live on less than 
$1/day (DFID, 2011). Nigeria also has the lowest GDP per capita among members of 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries – OPEC - (OPEC, 2011). Prior to the 
discovery of oil in commercial quantity in the late 1950s, agriculture was the mainstay 
of the Nigerian economy. The country has had a phenomenal increase in its income 
since the discovery of oil (CBN, 2010; Idemudia & Ite, 2006; Ite, 2004), which has 
basically transformed the nation from an agrarian economy to one that significantly 
depends on oil production for over 80% of its earnings (CBN, 2010). Ironically, Nigeria 
exports its crude oil and imports refined petrol, diesel and kerosene to meet local 
consumption. Nigeria ranked 10th and 9th respectively in the world in terms of proven 
oil and gas reserves in 2010 (OPEC, 2011).  
 
Based on information on the website of the Nigerian Ministry of Mines and Steel 
Development, Nigeria has 34 solid minerals in commercial quantities such as bitumen, 
zinc, coal, gold, etc. besides oil and gas. The ministry equally claims that the nation has 
been infested by the Dutch Disease
27
 due to its literal oil mono-economy for about four 
                                                 
27 Dutch Disease is an economic term that captures the relationship between rise in wealth from natural 
resources and decrease in manufacturing activities as more resources are channelled towards the 
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decades now. In spite of the diversity of Nigeria’s natural resources, it remains largely 
under-developed. The literature refers to this paradoxical symptom as natural resource 
curse – i.e. being poor despite the rich endowment of natural resources (Kolstad and 
Søreide, 2009, Mikesell, 1997). The Nigerian Disease is apparently driven by the 
pervasive corruption among Nigerian public officials (Agbibao, 2012; Igbinovia, 2003; 
Iyoha & Oyerinde, 2010; Obadina, 1999).  
 
The 1999 Constitution provides the overarching authority on the governance of oil 
resources in Nigeria. The Constitution (and the Petroleum Act, 1969
28
 as amended) 
vested the ownership and control of oil resources on the Federal Government. There are 
a myriad of regulations governing the Nigerian oil industry amongst which are:   
Mineral Oils (safety) Regulations, 1963; Oil in Navigable Waters Act, 1968; Petroleum 
Act, 1969; Petroleum (Drilling & Production) Regulation, 1969; Oil Pipeline Act, 1956; 
Associated Gas Re-injection Act, 1979 (Allen, 2011; Atsegbua, 2012; Fagbohun, 2010). 
These regulations are disjointed and not harmonised (Allen, 2011; Amao, 2008). The 
major regulatory institutions within the industry are the: Ministry of Petroleum 
Resources which regulates and supervises oil operations through the Department of 
Petroleum Resources (DPR); Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) with its 
subsidiaries which carries out oil operations on behalf of the Government  
independently and in partnership with oil MNCs and; Nigerian Oil Spill Detection and 
Response Agency (NOSDRA) which monitors (rather than regulates) the responses of 
oil companies to oil spills.
29
 Only Federal Courts are eligible to adjudicate on oil-related 
litigations (Ogbuikwe, 1999; Ukala, 2011). Weak institutional framework for the 
industry has been blamed for the poor regulation of oil companies and environmental 
pollution. For example, according to the World Bank (1995: 53): 
Oil companies in Nigeria are under Federal jurisdiction. The Federal government is 
both a partner in all oil activities through NNPC, and is required by Federal law to 
enforce environmental compliance of oil operations through the Department of 
Petroleum Resources. This situation has resulted in the government inadequately 
regulating oil pollution while at the same time, being party to much of the oil related 
environmental problems of the Delta... The major constraints impending reduced oil 
pollution are (i) the conflict of interest for the Federal government being both a partner 
in oil activities and the regulatory body. (ii) no requirement for community participation 
                                                                                                                                               
primary sector (Wijnbergen, 1984). But Williams (2011) coined this differently as “Nigerian Disease,” 
implying Nigerian Government’s wastage of revenue windfalls accruing from natural resources.  
28
 It is classified as part of the revised Laws of the Federation of Nigerian 1990 (Ebeku, 2003) 
29 The oil industry is excluded from the control of National Environmental Standards and Regulations 
Enforcement Agency (NESREA) which replaced Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA). 
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in planning and development of oil activities. (iii) very limited ability of regulatory 
institutions to monitor pollution. (iv) low compensation rates for damage to property; 
and (v) lack of enforcement of environmental regulations.                                        
 
Effort has been made recently to develop a coherent and comprehensive regulation for 
the industry resulting in the Nigerian Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) of 2008 (amended 
in 2012). The PIB seeks to harmonise the fragmented legal framework of the Nigerian 
oil industry and to block many loopholes in the extant legal framework, but the MNCs 
have resisted the Bill on grounds of fiscal incentives. Serious lobbying, manoeuvrings 
and intrigues have greeted the Bills leading the National Assembly to surprisingly claim 
that many versions of the PIBs have infiltrated the House that they could not tell the 
original from the counterfeit. Whilst this argument is appalling, such political intrigues 
are allegedly linked to the lobbying of legislators by the MNCs (Thisdaylive. 2 October 
2012). The Bill proposes the creation of 10% nominal equity participation fund for host 
communities to meet social and infrastructural development of the communities; 
however, the Bill clarifies that the fund does not have the right to participate in 
petroleum decision-making process.  
4.3 The Niger Delta communities and the Nigerian oil industry 
4.3.1 An overview 
The Niger Delta is one of the largest wetlands in the world with complex ecosystem 
enriched in biodiversity (Abraham, 2009) . According to Ibeanu (2000: 20), early 
Europeans  called the area “white man’s graveyard” due to the high casualty they 
experienced there, but the discovery of oil has turned the region to the “white man’s 
gold mine.” The definition of Niger Delta has been surrounded by controversies and 
complexities especially in the post-oil discovery era.  According to ERI
30
 (2003), the 
region was previously defined based on an array of ethnographic, cultural and linguistic 
attributes of the communities located in River Niger tributaries. However, the current 
definition of Niger Delta is based on political convenience adopted for grouping nine 
oil-producing states in Nigeria into one region (Ojakorotu, 2009, ERI, 2003). Ojakorotu 
(2009: 3) aptly summarizes this political convenience as: 
The reality is that some states in the Nigerian “federation” are oil-producing but, 
geographically speaking, are not located in the delta area. This raised the question of 
whether one should speak of the “oil-producing states/area” rather than the “Niger 
                                                 
30 Earth Rights Institute 
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Delta” in the analysis of oil activities (exploration and exploitation) and their attendant 
ecological, social, economic, political ramifications.  
 
All the oil-producing states that make up the Niger Delta are contiguous, which 
apparently reduces the confusion of conflating oil-producing states with Niger Delta. 
This suggests that if oil is discovered in non-contiguous states it might create the need 
to set aside the current definition of Niger Delta presently used interchangeably with 
oil-producing states. Nevertheless, as the political definition has been codified in 
Nigerian law it is necessary to accept the definition as authoritative. What is important 
is that the communities in these oil-producing states suffer environmental degradation 
from oil operations to varying degrees. Consequently, UNDP (2006: 25) describes the 
Niger Delta as “a region suffering from administrative neglect, crumbling social 
infrastructure and services, high unemployment, social deprivation, abject poverty, filth 
and squalor, and endemic conflict.”  
4.3.2 Gas flaring and oil spills 
The oil industry is one of the high polluting industries as mentioned in Chapter two. 
Sources of oil pollution are mainly gas flaring, oil spills and waste discharges. In 
Nigeria, greater attention has been given to gas flaring and oil spills than waste 
discharges. Moreover, information in public domain and government agencies mainly 
refers to gas flaring and oil spills. According to OPEC (2011) statistical data on 
production and flaring of natural gas among its member nations, Nigeria represents a 
high gas flaring nation. OPEC statistics also revealed that from 2006 to 2010, Nigeria 
was its highest gas flaring member state. The Group Managing Director of NNPC in 
2011 asserted that Nigeria was consistently the second worst gas flaring country after 
Russia (Thisdaylive, December 2011)
31
. Whilst, for example, Nigeria flared about 76% 
of her gas production in 1991, the home countries of some of the oil MNCs such as 
U.S., Britain and Netherlands flared 0.6%, 4.3% and 0% respectively (Ibeanu, 2000). 
According to the literature, gas flaring in Nigeria produces adverse impacts on Niger 
Delta communities: health, economic, social and environmental (Bassey, 2012; Ekpoh 
& Obia, 2010; Emoyon, Akpoborie, & Akporhonor, 2008; Frynas, 1999). Bassey (2012: 
123) humorously asserts that “at a time when the world is seeking ways to combat 
global warming, oil companies are busy cooking the skies through gas flaring.” Nigeria 
                                                 
31 However, Nigeria flares more gas than Russia based on amount of gas produced relative to gas flared.  
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on average daily flares about 2.5 billion standard cubic feet of gas (Onyeagucha, 2010) 
and it is believed that the amount of gas Nigeria flares can suitably provide stable 
electricity for the country (Bassey, 2012; Hassan & Kouhy, 2013; Obadina, 1999).  
 
On the other hand, oil spills have continued to be a contentious issue in the Nigerian oil 
industry (see European Parliament, 2011). The major controversy surrounding oil spills 
is the contestation of who/what causes the oil spills in the Niger Delta but not the 
environmental degradation caused by oil spills. Arable farmlands and fishing rivers 
have been impacted by oil spills in the Niger Delta since the inception of oil exploration 
in the region (IUCN/CEESP
32
, 2006; UNDP, 2006; UNEP, 2011).  
4.3.3 Negative impacts of oil operations in the Niger Delta 
There are various commentaries that oil operations have created many adverse impacts 
on the communities hosting oil operations in the Niger Delta. One of such impacts is 
threat to livelihood. As the communities largely depend on agriculture for subsistence 
(DFID, 2011), oil pollution has negatively affected the region’s primary means of 
subsistence: farming and fishing (Emoyon, et al., 2008; Idachaba, 2011; IUCN/CEESP, 
2006; Ojakorotu & Olawale, 2009). Emoyon, et al. (2008: 29) state that: 
Oil exploration/exploitation has over the last forty years impacted negatively on the 
socio-physical environment of the Niger Delta oilbearing communities, massively 
threatening the subsistent peasant economy, the environment and hence the entire 
livelihood and basic survival of the people.  
 
Moreover, the communities are also facing resource contradiction of being rich in 
resources but are poor, neglected and adversely impacted by oil pollution (Ite, 2007). 
According to Ebeku (2007) and Okonmah (1997), these communities are deprived of 
their rights to their resources and clean environment which, according to Ogbuigwe 
(1999) and Utuama (2009), have been violated through constitutional and other legal 
instruments in Nigeria. For example, many illnesses have been linked to gas flaring: 
leukaemia, bronchitis, asthma, cancers, etc. (Bassey, 2012). Another identified 
downside of oil operations in Niger Delta is threat to peaceful co-existence as 
commentators argued that there was relative peace in the region prior to oil operations 
(Aghalino, 2009; Ibeano, 2000). Prior to oil discovery the region had enjoyed relative 
                                                 
32 CEESP: Commission on Environmental, Economic and Social Policy; IUCN: International Union for 
Conservation of Nature 
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intra- and inter-communities peace as the people were bonded by trade, culture, religion 
and political affinity (Aghalino, 2009). It has been argued that oil business and its 
environmental pollution, misgivings about allocation of oil revenues and perceived 
marginalization of the people have led to the emergence of various movements seeking 
self-determination over control of oil resources (Aghalino, 2009; Ibeanu, 2000; Ugoh & 
Ukpere, 2010). The oil companies have also been accused of using economic incentives 
to cause divisions within communities (WAC Global Services, 2003).  
4.4 MNCs and the Nigerian oil industry 
The dominance of MNCs in the Nigerian oil industry has been well documented. For 
instance, the National Petroleum Investment Management Services (NAPIMS) states 
that five MNCs (Shell, Mobil, Eni, Chevron and Total) control about 98% of Nigerian 
oil reserves, leaving an insignificant fraction to many other international and indigenous 
corporations
33
. Moreover, most of the production activities of these MNCs are carried 
out in joint ventures (JVs) with the Nigerian Government. Although the Government 
has between 55 and 60% equity interests in those JVs, one partner, an MNC is 
appointed as the operator of the JV (Amao, 2008; NNPC
34
 website; Shell, 2006). 
According to the information contained on the NNPC website, “[t]he operator is the one 
to prepare proposals for programme of work and budget of expenditure joint (sic) on an 
annual basis, which shall be shared on shareholding basis.”  The reasons for focusing 
this study on MNCs are highlighted in Chapters one and five.  
 
Chevron, Eni, ExxonMobil, Shell and Total as the dominant oil multinationals in the 
Nigeria upstream petroleum industry and JV partners of the Government have been 
operating in Nigeria with long history and impacts. Appendices 4A, 4B and 4C 
respectively provide snapshots of when these MNCs started their operations in Nigeria, 
the incidents of oil spills
35
 in Nigeria, and the ratio of gas flared relative to production.  
 
 
                                                 
33 There might be a little variation to this as the MNCs are gradually selling off the onshore oil fields to 
indigenous companies in order to move farther away from communities into offshore oil fields.  
34
 http://www.nnpcgroup.com/nnpcbusiness/upstreamventures.aspx accessed 23 May 2013.  
35 The number of oil spills and volumes are aggregate for the industry as DPR officials claim that data 
analysed according to individual corporations are confidential data. 
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4.5 Concluding remarks 
This Chapter provided a brief review of the Nigerian economy and the significance of 
oil to the country’s mono-economy. It also mentioned the regulatory governance of oil 
operations and how weak institutional structures inhibit the effective regulation of the 
industry. In addition, the Chapter provided an overview of the Niger Delta as the centre 
of oil operations in Nigeria and the adverse environmental impacts of oil operations on 
the communities. It also highlighted the operational visibility of MNCs in the Nigerian 
oil industry. The next Chapter provides the link between the reviews of background 
literature and the empirics by detailing the methodological processes followed in this 
thesis.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Research Methodology and Methods 
5.1 Introduction  
The preceding Chapters reviewed the nature of MNCs and their relationships with 
stakeholders as well as the need for corporate accountability that arises from the social, 
economic and environmental impacts of corporate actions on stakeholders and the wider 
society which emanate from the social interactions between corporations and 
stakeholders within society. Whilst the nature of accountability, corporate social 
reporting and the theoretical lenses of this study have been reviewed in Chapter three, 
and the background context of the study in Chapter four, this Chapter provides a 
discussion of the methodology and methods that provided the empirical guide for this 
thesis. This Chapter thus explains the methods and methodology adopted in this study 
and their choice in connection with the key research questions. This Chapter serves the 
purpose of linking the preceding Chapters on background literature and theoretical 
frameworks to the ensuing empirical Chapters of this thesis. However, this neither 
suggests that this Chapter flows linearly from the preceding ones nor do the ensuing 
Chapters flow linearly from it because the entire research process involved moving back 
and forth making necessary adjustments as situation warranted (Lukka, 2014; Lukka & 
Modell, 2010).  As this Chapter provides the methodological underpinnings for this 
thesis, Section 5.2 and 5.3 highlight the methodological assumptions made with respect 
to ontology, epistemology and their implications for the methods adopted to generate 
data to answer the research questions. Section 5.4 restates the importance of the study 
and research questions and Section 5.5 discusses a case study method. Whilst Section 
5.6 highlights the rationale for mixed methods in this study, Section 5.7 highlights the 
data collection and analytical methods followed by concluding Section.  
5.2 Statement of ontological and epistemological assumptions 
As was stated in Chapter one (see also Section 5.4), this study focuses on the 
understanding and discharge of accountability of MNCs in the Nigerian oil industry vis-
à-vis corporate information disclosures on gas flaring and oil spills environmental 
incidents. It is assumed in this study that oil spills and gas flaring incidents are objective 
phenomena which have some social, economic and environmental implications for the 
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communities hosting the MNCs’36 operations. As this assumption appeals to a realist 
ontology (Burrell & Morgan, 1979; Mattessich, 1995, 2009), gas flaring and oil spills 
are observable phenomena that exist out there independent of the researcher (Burrell & 
Morgan, 1979; Bryman, 2007: 17) and could be captured in ‘hard’ form or in terms of 
figures (Hassan & Kouhy, 2013) or some explicit explanations. However, accountability 
rather than gas flaring and oil spills is the central focus of this thesis, whilst these 
environmental incidents are the issues around which the MNCs’ accountability is 
explored. Accountability is viewed as a socially constructed phenomenon. Day & Klein 
(1987: 2, cited in Ogden, 1995: 197) argue that accountability “is all about the 
construction of an agreed language or currency of discourse about conduct and 
performance, and the criteria that should be used in assessing them.” 
  
Although gas flaring and oil spill incidents are visible in terms of their manifestations 
and impacts, the narratives or accounts on these incidents are subjectively created 
(Hines, 1988; 1992) based on the frame of reference of the narrators or stakeholders 
(O’Leary & Chia, 2007; Shafer, 2006). As discussed in Chapter three, whilst account-
giving framework is used to organise and analyse the accounts (Chapter Seven), sense-
making theoretical lens is used to explore and unpick the subjective narratives (Chapter 
Nine).  According to Burrell & Morgan (1979) and Chua (1986), the assumption that 
reality can be constructed by the narrators relates to ‘nominalist’ ontology.  Whilst it is 
assumed that gas flaring and oil spills are objective realities having implications for 
communities
37
, the narratives about these objectified realities and their implications are 
constructed through some subjective lenses (see Mattessich, 1995, 2009). The latter can 
be understood by “capturing multiple constructed realities” of the social actors (Parker, 
2008: 911-912).  
 
In research, the nature of reality also has implications for how we come to know that 
reality - epistemology (Bryman & Bell, 2007; Chua, 1986; Denzin & Lincoln, 1998; 
                                                 
36 The visibility and reality of gas flaring and oil spills and their impacts on communities are summarised 
in Chapter four. See also Appendices 4B and 4C for the level of pollution resulting from oil spills and gas 
flaring respectively. 
37 Not as though only communities are those affected by these environmental phenomena, but the 
focus on them derive from reasons such as immediate impact and the need to focus the study. First, 
that the communities are those within the immediate locale of these environmental transactions and 
are primarily more affected (Post, 1991), not only because of proximity but also because of poverty and 
threat to their means of subsistence (UNDP, 2006). Second, it is to ensure that this study is focused to 
permit a more in-depth investigation than focusing on many stakeholder issues would permit.  
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Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & Jackson, 2008; Silverman, 2010). The epistemology also 
influences methodology which, according to Denzin & Lincoln (1998: 185), “focuses 
on how we gain knowledge about the world.” According to Chua (1986: 604), 
“[e]pistemological assumptions decide what is to count as acceptable truth by 
specifying the criteria and process of assessing truth claims.” Burrell and Morgan 
(1979) view positivism and anti-positivism (or interpretivism) as an epistemological 
dichotomy associated with realist and nominalist ontology respectively, while Morgan 
and Smircich (1980) view them as the extremes of a continuum. Epistemology of 
positivism focuses on objective empirical analysis of ‘facts’ about the external world 
while interpretive or phenomenological epistemology focuses on understanding from 
the perspective of individual actors (Morgan and Smircich, 1980). None of these 
extreme positions is claimed in this study in order to harness useful insights that could 
be gained from both perspectives since each of these perspectives also influences 
potential research methods. This will make it flexible to make use of any useful data set, 
both quantitative and qualitative. In order to follow a pragmatic approach to gain insight 
into how accountability is understood and discharged (see Gray, 2008), this study 
follows the assumption of middle range thinking methodological perspective (Laughlin, 
1995, 2004) discussed in Section 5.3.  
 
Basically, what counts as truth determines the methods that would be used to collect 
data or evidence about the phenomenon (Chua, 1986).  Any research method adopted in 
a study only produces a partial understanding about the phenomena of interest 
(Laughlin, 1990, 1995, 2004), which makes combination of methods useful in 
complementing one another in the form of triangulation. The choice of methods does 
not only derive from ontological and epistemological assumptions (Bryman, 2007), but 
also from pragmatic necessity (Brannen, 2005; Bryman, 2007; Morgan, 2007). In this 
regard, the methods must be relevant to the research questions and the theoretical 
framings. How the theoretical lenses linked to the research questions and methods are 
briefly highlighted in Section 5.4. 
5.3  Middle range thinking methodological assumption 
According to Laughlin, “all empirical research is partial and incomplete and that 
theoretical and methodological choices are inevitably made whether appreciated or not” 
(1995: 65). He also argues that “looking for universally accepted ‘facts’ is impossible” 
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(2004: 264). Middle range thinking (MRT hereafter) focuses on the continua of theory, 
methodology and change for which the choice for a mid-point
38
 has to be made. These 
choices are influenced by research philosophical assumptions such as ontology (what 
constitute reality), epistemology (what constitute knowledge) and human nature 
(researcher’s influence in the research process). MRT maintains hybridized ontological 
and epistemological assumptions of interpretive and positivist schools of thought. 
Ontologically, it recognises the existence of reality distinct from our interpretations and 
one biased by our perceptual biases, which also influences what counts as knowledge 
(epistemology).  MRT provides a deliberate instrumental choice process which 
encourages the researcher to have some understanding of the underlying methodological 
assumptions of the positivist and interpretive schools of thought and combine their 
features as may be useful to extend our understanding.  Laughlin’s argument for such 
hybridization is that: 
The way to engage with this empirical reality cannot either be left to some seemingly 
abstracted methodological approach, which is intended to be operated with minimal 
intrusion of subjectivity … or should it be left to an inevitably variable and sometimes 
very individualistic set of subjective processes … Middle range thinking sets up 
structures around the subjective processes which recognise and accept the subject in the 
discovery process yet also set some limits on how that subjectivity can be 
operationalised (2004: 268). 
 
Laughlin (1995; 2004) discusses the three areas where middle range choices have to be 
made such as theory, methodology and change.  With respect to theory, Laughlin argues 
that “[t]here are ‘skeletal’ rather than ‘full’ or ‘no’ theories which can explain … any 
empirical phenomena” (2004: 268). MRT allows theories to be used in a ‘skeletal’ 
manner to be later fleshed with empirical details from data. Theory, in relation to MRT, 
                                                 
38 This is one of the criticisms of the middle range thinking (see Lowe, 2004). How exact is the middle 
point to be in may not be easy to determine. Laughlin recognising this difficulty and complexity states 
that the “descriptors “high”, “medium” and “low” are not precise, definable or measurable” (1995: 68). 
However, what is useful about the middle range assumption is the recognition of extreme schools of 
thought and locating one’s work away from such extremes to a middle point which may not necessarily 
be a fixed mid-point which might only precisely be attained if the two extreme points are reducible to 
numeric values. Although Laughlin positions the German Critical Theory within its middle point of 
theory, methodological and change choices (another criticism by Lowe), he appears to clarify the 
possibility of other Theories or schools of thought fitting into the middle point. For example, Laughlin 
states by way of annotation in his reply to Lowe’s (2004) criticism that: “Whilst ‘middle range thinking’ 
has been inextricably linked to German Critical Thinking … it doesn’t have to be so. I am trying to argue 
for characteristics of an approach (‘middle range thinking’) but this does not mean that it is only this set 
of ideas that possess these characteristics” (2004: 269). Laughlin (2004: 274) equally argues that “[a]n 
assumption on structured subjectivity could lead to a number of alternative methodological 
frameworks. Yet in the spirit of trying to maintain consistency with the original framework–which 
positions German Critical Theory in the mid-point—‘critical discursive analysis’ is highlighted.” 
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does not follow positivist or hypothetico-deductive orientation (Chua, 1986), but serves 
as a skeleton upon which the empirical flesh from data will be fitted. This thesis 
employs two principal theoretical lenses (“‘skeletal’ theories”, to borrow Laughlin’s 
term): those of accountability and sense-making and these theories have been explored 
in Chapter three. Theory, as used in this thesis, is a framework upon which the 
empirical data is fleshed. As Laughlin contends: 
[W]here the empirical details do not fit the theoretical ‘skeleton’, the empirical data 
provides a basis for extending and/or reforming this framework. In this sense the 
‘skeletal’ theory guides the discovery process but in such a way that can be reactive to 
the ‘fit’ of the detailed ‘flesh’ that is being added (2004: 268). 
 
In MRT, ‘skeletal’ theories only guide the process of discovery rather than being 
immersed in prior theories to falsify or confirm them (Laughlin, 2004). This is 
necessary because theories and empirical investigation can only help us gain partial 
understanding of phenomena as it is practically difficult to make claim of absolute truth 
(Laughlin, 1995, 2004). Laughlin also suggests that the claim that theory cannot help 
our understanding of phenomena is not absolutely correct. What is necessary is 
balancing the role that theory plays in our understanding reality.  
 
In respect of methodology, the MRT permits the design of a “methodology which sets 
“skeletal” rules for processes of discovery which still allows for variety and diversity in 
observational practice” (1995:82). Such methodological design derives from 
epistemology and observer’s role Laughlin (2004) refers to as ‘structured’ subjectivity.  
According to Laughlin, “‘Structured’… specifies in more precise and abstracted terms 
what is involved in this engagement process whilst, at the same time, not trying to 
squeeze out the intuitive, imaginative properties of individual observers” (2004: 274). 
The nature of the structured subjectivity could lead to alternative methodological 
frameworks (2004: 274) and thus having implications for the data narratives and data 
collection methods
39
. 
 
                                                 
39 Although Laughlin places data narratives and collection methods within what he called ‘qualitative 2’, 
it is not apparent that quantitative data cannot be used within the middle range thinking methodology. 
In his response to Lowe’s (2004) criticism, Laughlin (2004: 269) admitted to have placed the German 
Critical Thinking within the middle point for illustration, which does not foreclose the possibility of other 
schools of thought sitting in the middle point. When such possibilities hold, both qualitative and 
quantitative data might derive from the ‘structured’ subjectivity assumption of MRT.  In my informal 
conversation with Professor Laughlin, he states that MRT does not foreclose the use of questionnaire 
even though it was not part of the research instruments his articles identified with the MRT.  
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In terms of change choice, MRT is open to both maintaining the status quo and 
requiring change (Laughlin, 1995: 84). Laughlin (1995; 2004) recognises the 
complexity associated with change and argues that change can meaningfully be pursued 
in respect of a particular phenomenon when that phenomenon is understood. He equally 
argues:  
[W]e cannot say that our understanding must inevitably lead to change in the 
phenomena being investigated—adopting this position means that everything is ‘wrong’ 
and in need of development. The arguments for a ‘middle position’ is that there needs to 
be mechanisms to judge when change should be pursued (2004: 269). 
 
Researchers may not necessarily seek to make change because they may not have the 
enabling resources to do so (1995: 67-68). Whilst it is possible for the understanding 
gained from this thesis to promote change, it is however not the immediate concern of 
this thesis.  Although change might be incidental to the output of this study, it is not 
pursued as to stand in the way of this thesis as I do not have the ‘resources’ to pursue 
such cause. Essentially, this thesis is primarily concerned with enriching our 
understanding of accountability: its conceptions, manifestations, and underlying logic in 
order to further understand the extent accountability is discharged. This is achieved 
through an articulated research design that clearly defines the cases, respondents and 
research instruments useful for answering the relevant research questions. The 
following sections deal with these issues.  
5.4 Restating the importance of the study and research questions 
In mainstream accounting and finance, accountability is predominantly discussed in 
terms of financial relationship based on agency model (Chapter Three), which also has 
been privileged in accounting education (Collison, 2003). However, as discussed in 
Chapter three, social accounting literature makes advocacy for stakeholder-driven 
accountability. This study explores how accountability is understood and practiced 
(discharged) by the oil MNCs in Nigeria in relation to two major adverse environmental 
incidents having immediate impacts on host communities (Chapters Six and Seven). 
Moreover, the study considers how the stakeholders understand accountability as well 
as their reactions to corporate actions and disclosures (Chapters Six and Eight). The 
focus on MNCs in the Nigerian oil industry is based on the visibility of their activities 
and the environmental pollution-intensity of the industry (Chapters Two and Four).  
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Oil and gas operations are high polluting activities with negative
40
 social, economic and 
environmental impacts on communities hosting corporate operations. In Nigeria, the 
MNCs undertake over 90% of oil production activities and operate either as 
independent operators or JV operators with the Nigerian Government. Although the 
activities of these MNCs have huge social, economic and environmental impacts on the 
Niger Delta communities (Chapter Four), the extent to which they are accountable for 
those impact is underexplored (as far as I am aware). Consequently, this thesis explores 
the conceptions of accountability, how the MNCs manifest accountability as well as the 
embedded logic within their accounts in order to provide a basis for assessing their 
extent of discharging accountability.  In order to encourage a more balanced view of 
accountability conceptions and the manifested corporate accounts/claims, the views, 
reactions and/or supports of stakeholders are also explored.   In order to focus this 
study, the following research questions are developed:  
1. To what extent do MNCs in the Nigerian oil industry and stakeholders 
understand the MNCs’ accountability to stakeholders with especial reference to 
communities? 
2. How do the oil and gas MNCs in Nigeria manifest accountability with respect to 
gas flaring and oil spill environmental incidents? 
3. What is the corporate sense-making underlying the MNCs’ accounts? 
 
An exploratory study approach is used to provide answers to these research questions. 
Exploratory study, according to Saunders and Lewis (2012: 110), is a “research that 
aims to seek new insights, ask new questions and to assess topics in a new light.” As 
stated in Chapter one and earlier in this Chapter, this study seeks new insight into 
accountability conceptions and practices in a non-western geographic locale by large 
Western corporations vis-à-vis adverse environmental incidents having immediate and 
direct impacts on host communities. Whilst information produced by these corporations 
might partly derive from law and voluntary initiatives (Disu & Gray, 1998), literature 
commentaries consider motivation for many corporate voluntary disclosures as ranging 
from social responsibility to impression management (Cho, et al., 2012; Joseph, 2007; 
Patten, 1992, 2002; Neu, et al., 1998). For studies seeking to provide new insights, 
O’Dwyer (2002, 2003) and vanWynsberghe & Khan (2007) suggest that an in-depth 
                                                 
40 Nonetheless, like other MNCs’ operations, they also have some positive outcomes (Chapter Two).  
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inquiry is essential.  Due to the exploratory nature of this study requiring an in-depth 
investigation to answer the stated research questions, this study employs a case study 
method which is discussed in the next section.  
 
Before discussing the choice for a case study in this thesis, it is pertinent to highlight 
how the research questions link with the theoretical lenses and the chosen research 
methods. As noted in Chapter three, accountability can be viewed differently by 
different people depending on their ideological stance. Accountability is the major focus 
and theoretical lens in this study to understand the nature and flow of information from 
the focal corporations to stakeholders regarding gas flaring and oil spills which create 
negative economic, social and environmental consequences for the immediate 
communities. In this regard, whilst the first research question explores corporate and 
stakeholders’ conceptions of accountability in order to understand what corporate 
accountability should entail from these ‘localised’ or ‘contextual’ perspectives (Chapter 
Six), the second question explores how the corporations manifest accountability through 
the accounts they give in respect of the above environmental incidents and the related 
stakeholders’ narratives (Chapters Seven and Eight). As stakeholder-focused 
accountability suggests in the literature, the essence of accountability is to meet the 
normative demands of the ‘right to know’ rather than decision-usefulness (Chapter 
Three). The third research question arises from the need to understand the frame of 
reference and logic embedded within those accounts as meanings inherent in corporate 
accounts are perceived as relative, opaque and non-transparent (Bowles, 1991; la Cour 
& Kromann, 2011; Fassin & Buelens, 2011; O’Leary & Chia, 2007; Sikka, 2010; 
Wagner, et al., 2009). A number of research methods were found useful in providing 
answers to these research questions (cf. Section 5.7): qualitative/quantitative or 
structured/unstructured (cf. Section 5.6).  
5.5 Case study and selection of cases 
5.5.1 A Case study research method 
According to Yin (2009: 18):   
A case study is an empirical inquiry that: 
 investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, 
especially when 
 the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. 
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As this research is an exploratory study, it will be difficult to study the universe of 
corporations in the Nigerian oil industry given the time frame for the research work 
(Scapens, 2004: 263), otherwise depth would be sacrificed (Moll, Major, & Hoque, 
2006) for breadth. As already mentioned, this study focuses on the MNCs in the 
Nigerian oil industry. A case study research strategy is adopted in this study as it 
potentially enriches our knowledge and understanding of a phenomenon or practice by 
an in-depth inquiry (Bryman & Bell, 2007; Eisenhardt, 1989). The choice of a case 
study in this thesis is to permit an in-depth investigation into how the MNCs and 
stakeholders understand accountability, how the MNCs manifest accountability with 
respect to specific environmental incidents, and the assessment of the extent they 
discharge accountability. Many studies in social accounting have also adopted case 
studies to enrich our understanding of certain phenomena (e.g., Adams, 2004; 
Beddewela & Herzig, 2013; Buhr, 1998; Deegan & Blomquist, 2006; Dillard & Layzell, 
2014; Lauwo & Otusanya, 2014; Livesey & Kearins, 2002; O’Dwyer, 2005; O’Dwyer 
& Unerman, 2008; Samkin & Schneider, 2010; Tregidga & Milne, 2006). For example, 
Buhr (1998) uses a single case study of a mining company in Canada to explore and 
provide an in-depth analysis of how legitimacy theory and political economy theory 
could explain corporate disclosure of critical environmental issues. O'Dwyer and 
Unerman (2008) also use a case study to explore and examine the accountability 
mechanisms of a non-governmental organisation (NGO), whilst O'Dwyer (2005) uses it 
to explore in-depth the evolution of social accounting process in a not-for-profit 
organisation. Tregidga and Milne (2006) also applied a case study strategy to explore 
how one New Zealand organisation ‘constructed’ itself over time within the context of 
sustainability. The above cited case studies are distinct from this one as each of those 
focused on a single organisation at a point in time whilst this study focuses on multiple 
entities over a number of years (2006 – 2012). In designing this case study to help 
answer the relevant research questions in the best way possible, a mixed methods 
approach (Section 5.6) is used to gather relevant evidence.  
 
As Adams, Hoque, and McNichols (2006) point out, a case study is important when 
‘how’ or ‘why’ are to be explored (see also Flyvbjerg, 2011; Yin, 2009) or when an 
intensive examination of a phenomenon is to be undertaken (Bryman & Bell, 2007). 
Also important in a case study is the definition of what the case is, which accounting to 
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Yin (2009) represents the main unit of analysis.  According to Yin (2012: 6): “A “case” 
is generally a bounded entity (a person, organization, behavioral condition, event, or 
other social phenomenon), but the boundary between the case and its contextual 
conditions - in both spatial and temporal dimensions - may be blurred.” In defining a 
case, there is need to specify relevant issues or questions to be studied in relation to the 
case(s) (Yin, 2009: 29). It is worth noting that the context of this study focuses on oil 
MNCs’ information provision regarding gas flaring and oil spills incidents vis-à-vis 
host communities in order to situate the study “within feasible limits” (Yin, 2009: 29).   
5.5.2 Selecting the cases  
In a study involving multiple cases, cases are not the same thing as sampling units (Yin, 
2009:38) and so Yin (2009: 39) warns against the use of terms such as “sample of 
cases” or “small sample size of cases,” which are terminologies usually associated with 
positivist studies with the aim of generalising results. Although generalization is not the 
focus of case studies (including this study), Lukka & Kananen (1995) argue that a well 
conducted case studies could permit generalisation. Another muddy issue concerning 
case studies in addition to generalisation is that of sample size and its 
representativeness. These terminologies are often associated with positivism (Mason, 
2002; Silverman, 2010). Following Yin (2009) however, this study applies the terms 
sample and sampling not in the context of statistical logic but to represent the choice of 
the cases and participants/respondents that have the characteristics useful for generating 
answers to the research questions (Scapens, 2004; Teddlie & Yu, 2007).  Some research 
scholars have tagged such sampling as theoretical sampling (Eisendardt, 1989; Mason, 
2002). According to Mason (2002: 124), a theoretical sampling means:  
Selecting groups or categories to study on the basis of their relevance to your research 
questions, your theoretical position and analytical framework, your analytical practice, 
and most importantly the argument or explanation that you are developing. 
 
Essentially, the MNCs in the Nigerian oil industry represent the multiple cases for this 
study, which are but a subset of all corporations in that industry. Since this study’s 
research questions primarily focus on how these MNCs and stakeholders understand 
accountability, the nature of the manifested accounts in the discharge of accountability 
vis-à-vis negative environmental incidents having immediate impacts on communities, 
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the choice
41
 of the MNCs considers the critical nature of the cases to this study 
(Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011; Scapens, 2004; Silverman, 2010). Whilst some scholars 
suggest that choosing ‘polar’ or ‘extreme’ cases is better (Eisendardt, 1989), Scapens’ 
(2004) notion of critical cases is considered useful here. Critical case, according to 
Scapens (2004: 262) is one “in which the issues addressed in the research are brought 
into focus by some critical event which raises those issues to the surface in the 
organisation being studied.” Critical issues as they relate to the choice of cases in this 
study are the operating sizes of the MNCs (defined by their oil production output); level 
of gas flared; degree of criticisms for oil spills and gas flaring; and level of 
collaboration with the government and its agencies and their visibility in terms of social 
and environmental disclosures. As mentioned in Chapters one and four (and earlier in 
this Chapter), five major MNCs dominate oil operations in the Niger Delta: Shell, 
Chevron/Texaco
42
, ExxonMobil, Total/Elf and Eni
43
. As the industry-dominant, these 
MNCs have been criticised for their pollution-intensity having social, economic and 
environmental implications for their host communities (Bassey, 2012; IUCN-CEESP, 
2006; Steiner, 2010; UNDP, 2006).  
 
The empirical analysis of each of these MNCs largely depended on the amount of 
relevant data the researcher could access. Whilst Section 5.7.2 highlights that the 
‘conventional’ annual reports of these companies are inaccessible to the public because 
the companies operate as private limited companies, many of the corporate social 
reports and newsletters of these MNCs are available in downloadable form on their 
corporate website. Although Shell, Total, ExxonMobil and Chevron operate subsidiary-
specific websites for their Nigerian operations, the Mobil subsidiary website 
nevertheless re-directs viewers to the parent company’s global website to access 
information relating to ExxonMobil global. On the other hand, the fifth MNC, Agip 
                                                 
41 The choice made of cases has to be systematically and defensively done. As VanWynsberghe & Khan 
(2007:83) contend, “the researcher does not choose the case; rather, the research process, and 
specifically the interaction between case and unit of analysis, guides a “choice of what is to be 
studied.”” This essentially relates to how well the choice of cases will help us to answer the research 
questions.  
42 Chevron and Texaco merged in 2001 to form ChevronTexaco and in 2005 it changed its post-merger 
name to Chevron; however, the operations of these two companies are still reported separately in NNPC 
statistical bulletin. But in this study, they are considered as one entity and their operating activities are 
consequently classified as one. 
43 Shell operates in Nigeria as Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) and Shell Nigeria 
Exploration and Petroleum Company (SNEPCo) whilst Italian Eni operates as Agip.  
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Nigeria, does not operate a subsidiary-specific website for its Nigerian operations and 
so there is apparently little corporate information which could be accessed. This tends to 
create a disproportionate quantity of information flow from some MNCs, which, 
consequently, only permits in-depth analysis of those companies compared to others
44
. 
This is one of the limitations of this study because the data imbalance does not allow a 
comparative analysis of these cases. However, this study is not a comparative study but 
focuses generally on the MNCs in the Nigerian oil industry as they are all Western 
corporations exhibiting isomorphic tendencies and field cohesion (Bansal & Roth, 2000; 
Dimaggio & Powell, 1983; Hoffman, 1999; de Villiers & Alexander, 2014). In 
deference to Laughlin (1990, 1995, 2004), the available data are capable of providing 
‘skeletal’ or partial understanding because of the impossibility of gaining complete 
understanding about any social phenomena. Moreover, this study is articulated to extend 
our understanding in a given context rather than to generalise its findings.  
5.6 Mixed methods  
A mixed methods (qualitative and quantitative) approach is adopted in this study to 
permit the inclusion of data that will enrich our understanding of accountability and its 
manifestations in a specific geographic context (see Berry & Otley, 2004; Laughlin, 
2004). The mixed methods approach has been contemplated in the literature in different 
ways: as a combination of multiple qualitative methods, or as multiple quantitative 
methods, or both, in a single study as either simultaneous or sequential designs 
(Brannen, 2005; Cresswell & Plano Clark, 2011). The quantitative and qualitative 
methods are not extreme opposite but derive from different ontological and 
epistemological lenses (Bryman & Bell, 2007; Morgan & Smircich, 1980; Silverman, 
2010). The mixed methods used in this study combine research instruments that permit 
the collection of both qualitative and quantitative data in a pragmatic manner. Although 
a mixed methods
45
 approach is used in this study, it is worth specifying here that this 
study depended more on qualitative research methods than quantitative (see Creswell & 
                                                 
44 Nevertheless, more disclosure does not necessarily suggest greater accountability (see Adams, 2004; 
Adams & Larrinaga-Gonzalez, 2007; Joseph, 2007) 
45 Even studies not regarded as using mixed methods, can use both quantitative and qualitative 
methods. For example, as Berry & Otley (2004) point out, qualitative research possibly can combine 
both qualitative and quantitative characteristics. They argue that: “[y]et it is quite possible for 
qualitative research projects to have some hybrid characteristics and combine a naturalistic inquiry with 
some quantitative data and some statistical analysis; there is no need to exclude useful data collection 
and analysis for the sake of purity of approach” (p. 242).  
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Plano Clark, 2011; Teddlie & Yu, 2007, for some nuances of mixed methods) based on 
embedded mixed methods design discussed later in this section. The data used in this 
study are mainly from interviews, and corporate and external documents (O’Dwyer, 
2005), which are largely regarded as qualitative research instruments (Laine, 2005; 
O’Dwyer, 2004; Parker, 2003). Questionnaires usually regarded as quantitative research 
instruments (Bryman, 2008; Parker, 2003) were used to generate data for pragmatic 
purpose when it was impossible to gain interview access to the corporations and 
government agencies. As Brannen (2005) suggests, additional methods of gathering 
evidence could be adopted at any stages of the research, including the fieldwork phase, 
for pragmatic reasons. For example, the exclusion of the use of questionnaires would 
have meant no engagement with corporations (and government agencies) beyond 
corporate documents.  Quantitative and qualitative methods are also said to be useful 
where the phenomenon under investigation might look slippery or controversial 
(Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011).   
Creswell & Plano Clark (2011) point out that different notions of mixed methods 
permeate the literature, but Creswell & Plano Clark view mixed methods as a 
combination of methods, philosophy, and research design orientation. 
Methodologically, this notion largely resonates with Laughlin’s (1995, 2004) ‘middle 
range thinking’ methodological assumptions discussed in section 5.3. The literature 
suggests that the methods a study adopts are usually influenced by the ontological and 
epistemological positions of the researcher (Bryman & Bell, 2007; Silverman, 2010) as 
well as the nature of the research questions and the suitability of the methods for a 
particular purpose (Brannen, 2005). The variant of mixed method design adopted in this 
study is what Creswell & Plano Clark (2011:90) refer to as an embedded design. By 
embedded design they mean a: 
Mixed methods approach where the researcher combines the collection and analysis of 
both quantitative and qualitative data within a traditional quantitative research design or 
qualitative research design. 
 
In the embedded design the collection of qualitative and quantitative data may occur 
simultaneously or one might precede the other. They point out that embedded design 
has two variants: (i) one embedded as supplement to a larger design, and (ii) one 
embedded equally in a larger design. In the first variant, the design may use more of 
quantitative data supplemented or supported by qualitative data, or vice versa. As 
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already stated, questionnaire survey instrument has been strategically and pragmatically 
used in this study to supplement qualitative research instrument where the latter was 
practically impossible. In this regard, the research design of this study is largely 
qualitative or interpretive in design and not in conflict with the MRT assumption (cf. 
section 5.3). As Creswell & Plano Clark (2011) argue, the philosophical assumptions 
that will mainly drive the research in embedded design will be influenced by the larger 
design (i.e. positivist or interpretive orientation). The more quantitative embedded 
design will draw more on positivist philosophical assumptions, while the more 
qualitative embedded design will draw more on interpretive philosophical assumptions.  
The second variant of embedded design combines both quantitative and qualitative data 
on almost equal proportion. This means the researcher is operating equally within 
interpretive and positivist philosophical orientations, which some scholars believe to be 
impracticable (e.g., Burrell & Morgan, 1979). This study draws on qualitative design 
supplemented by quantitative data to pragmatically enrich our understanding. The next 
section examines the research methods or data collection methods and the rationale 
behind their choice. 
5.7 Data collection methods and analytical methods
46
 
Data for this study have been generated from primary sources (questionnaires and 
interviews, and to a lesser extent field notes and informal conversations) and secondary 
sources (documents). The primary data source was initially planned to be limited to 
interview of stakeholder groups such as the oil companies, regulatory agencies, NGOs, 
legal experts, accounting profession and communities. All interview transcripts and 
documents were coded and analysed in Nvivo software according to some: (i) pre-
selected themes or template and (ii) emergent themes (Chapter Seven). The choice of 
methods and the rationale behind them are examined below.  
5.7.1 Semi-structured interviews 
Open-ended or semi-structured interview technique is very relevant when the research 
objective is to elicit deeper understanding of meanings that interviewees ascribe to a 
phenomenon or situation (Moll, et al., 2006) in a flexible manner (Bryman & Bell, 
2007). O
'
Dwyer, et al. (2005) note that the use of semi-structured interviews provides 
an opportunity for an in-depth exploration of how and why certain perceptions are held. 
                                                 
46 See Appendix 5A for a summary of data collected 
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In order to achieve a moderated conversation, interview themes (cf. Appendix 5B) were 
developed to guide the interview process so that core issues will not be missed out 
(Silverman, 2010; Bryman, 2008) while also allowing the participants to express 
themselves naturally (Parker, 2003). Several social responsibility and accountability 
studies have utilised semi-structured interview either as a single research method or in 
conjunction with other methods (e.g., Agyemang, 2009; Beddewela & Herzig, 2013; 
Eweje, 2006b; Idemudia, 2007; O’Dwyer, 2002; Rhee & Lee, 2003) because of the rich 
texts it helps to generate (O'Dwyer, 2004). Tregidga, et al. (2012) also argue that social 
accounting research should adopt interviews as one of the qualitative methods to gain 
new insights into the quality, meaning and accountability associated with corporate 
communications. The following sub-sections highlight the interviews in relation to the 
different participant groups. In all, a total of twenty one interviews were conducted and 
the profile of the interviewees are summarised in Appendices 6A (1) and 6A (2). The 
interviews were conducted over a period of three months from January 2012 to March 
2012. Following the informed consent of the participants, all interviews were tape-
recorded and transcribed.  
5.7.1.1 Interview of corporate employees 
Having identified the MNCs to be studied in-depth as discussed in Section 5.4.2, it was 
thought important to select corporate participants to be interviewed following O
'
Dwyer 
(2003) who interviewed senior executives to explore managerial conceptions of 
corporate social responsibilities due to their strategic organisational understanding, and 
Rhee & Lee (2003) who interviewed middle managers and frontline employees who 
implement corporate strategies because their views could provide some evidence about 
the gap between rhetoric in corporate reports and corporate actions. In deference to 
these authors, this thesis was to interview a mix of senior executives, middle managers 
and frontline employees. However, due to the inability to gain interview access through 
personal and corporate insiders, questionnaires were developed as a pragmatic method 
to collect data from corporate members who were willing to participate because of the 
anonymity associated with questionnaire data. Due to non-participation of and lack of 
approval by management, the middle level corporate staff also refused interview 
participation for risk of threat to job (given the high incidence of unemployment in 
Nigeria). However, some of these employees agreed to participate in completing the 
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questionnaires which were informally administered to them by contact persons in these 
corporations.   Questionnaire method is discussed in Section 5.7.3.  
5.7.1.2 Interview of community stakeholders 
Since this thesis emphasises concern for the accountability of the MNCs vis-à-vis 
environmental incidents creating immediate impacts on communities, the insight from 
communities’ conceptions of accountability and narratives was sought for comparison 
with the MNCs’ accounts and conceptions of accountability. However, as Baker (2010) 
argues, both managers and other stakeholders are likely to be partial in their judgment 
because they are self-interested (see also Rodrigue, 2014). The communities considered 
for this study were those having certain useful characteristics. For example, the 
communities must host oil facilities and have been environmentally impacted by oil 
spills or gas flaring in the recent past. The choice of communities that have been 
impacted by gas flaring and/or oil spills in recent times was to ensure that the 
respondents from these communities will be able to relate to these oil-related 
environmental incidents through experience. The community participants include those 
who volunteered to participate and could potentially offer useful insights based on their 
experiences of the social, economic and environmental impacts of oil operations. A total 
of ten community participants were interviewed from five different communities in 
Rivers and Bayelsa States in the Niger Delta (see Appendix 6A (1)). Although this 
number was not predefined, it was deemed sufficient as virtually all the participants 
were saying the same thing (see Baker & Edwards, 2012).  
5.7.1.3 Interview of non-governmental organisations (NGOs)  
NGOs play vital roles in corporate-community relations in the contemporary society. 
For example, O
'
Dwyer, et al. (2005) mention that NGOs represent the interest of 
powerless groups in society and act as agents of change. Friedman and Miles (2002) 
also point out that some NGOs partner with oil MNCs in delivering CSR programmes. 
Moreover, Rwabizambuga (2007) claims that Shell Nigeria categorizes NGOs into two 
stakeholder groups namely, mandated outsiders (commissioned NGOs) and independent 
outsiders (non-commissioned NGOs). Whilst the mandated NGOs partner with the 
company on its CSR projects, the independent outsiders do not. Both strands of NGOs 
were selected for this study on the assumption that these seemingly dichotomous groups 
might also have dichotomous views based on the likely interests they serve (see Kamat, 
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2003). As Kamat (2003) suggests that ideologies of NGOs might be influenced by the 
corporate institutions they partner with, it was thought prudent to engage with a mix of 
commissioned/partnering and non-commissioned/independent NGOs. The partnering 
NGOs were identified through the assistance of some independent NGOs I interviewed.  
Seven interviews were conducted as follows: independent NGOs (4) and partnering 
NGOs (3).
47
  
5.7.1.4 Interview of government agencies 
The State provides regulatory oversight to the industry and participates as a major JV 
partner with the MNCs (Atsegbua, 2012; Atsegbua, Akpotaire, & Dimowo, 2010; 
Hassan & Kouhy, 2013). How the Government with its agencies as regulator and 
majority shareholder in the MNCs-operated JVs understand accountability will also 
potentially shape the social accountability agenda of corporations. The selected 
Government agencies are NAPIMS (cf. Section 5.4.2), DPR and NOSDRA (Chapter 
Four). National Petroleum Development Corporation (NPDC, a Nigerian Government-
owned company) and upstream petroleum production unit of NNPC was included at the 
second phase of the field work (cf. Section 5.7.3). This company was included not as a 
regulatory agency, but as an indigenous company. However, like the corporations, the 
management of the government agencies refused to participate and approve the 
participation of their employees in the interviews. Like corporate employees, even 
employees I had had rapport with were unwilling to grant interviews likely because of 
job security threat as they were not advised by management to participate. With the 
promise of anonymity, some of them willingly participated in completing questionnaires 
like the corporate employees.  
5.7.1.5 Other interviews 
Other participants interviewed are three legal experts in oil and gas law and 
environmental law and one participant from accounting profession
48
.  The legal experts 
were included in the study because of their understanding of the legal environment of 
the oil sector as well as environmental law. Although this study does not focus on 
                                                 
47 Four interviews were considered enough for independent NGOs as there was theoretical closure 
(Baker & Edwards, 2012) and three for partnering NGOs as I could not access more.   
48
 The interview participant is an executive staff of a leading accounting professional body in Nigeria, but 
the management of Nigeria’s accounting standard-setting body refused to participate claiming that the 
organisation does not engage with students and concluded by referring me to the organisation’s 
website for any useful (albeit unrelated) information. 
86 
 
mainstream accounting disclosures which privilege economic information, it included 
the participation of accounting profession because of accountants’ knowledge of 
information disclosure. These different backgrounds of the participants were expected 
to provide different perspectives to enrich our understanding. 
5.7.2 Documents 
Documents have been a prominent data source in quantitative and qualitative 
accounting studies. Some studies on corporate social reporting or disclosure did 
emphasize (conventional) annual reports as the single most important medium of 
corporate communication compared to other media (Adams & Harte, 1998; Campbell, 
2000; Gray, et al., 1995a), but Zeghal and Ahmed (1990), Guthrie, Cuganesan, & Ward 
(2008), Erusalimsky, Gray, & Spence (2006), and Unerman (2000) suggest that annual 
report is one of the media of corporate communication given the trend in stand-alone 
and web-based reports. However, the MNCs in the Nigerian oil upstream
49
 sector 
operate purely as privately-held corporations making their annual reports inaccessible to 
the public (Hassan & Kouhy, 2013). As a result, this study pragmatically relies on 
sustainability reports, CSR reports, information on corporate websites and other useful 
corporate publications, and corporate media pronouncements used by the companies to 
communicate to stakeholders. These are important sources of corporate information. For 
example, Buhr (1998) notes  that corporate communications are done through several 
channels such as verbal, newsletter, annual reports, advertising and public relations 
brochures. Although Buhr’s study analyses the conventional annual reports, this study 
analyses relevant corporate reports for period 2006 – 2012 for reasons outlined in 
Chapter seven.  
 
                                                 
49 The Nigerian oil industry is segmented into three sub-sectors namely, upstream, midstream and 
downstream. Whilst the upstream sector explores for and produces crude oil and natural gas, the 
downstream sector refines and markets crude oil for domestic and industrial consumption. The 
midstream sector carries out activities such as transportation of crude from production sites via 
pipelines, barges, etc. to flow stations, refineries and export terminals, as well as storage and marketing 
of crude oil. Most of the MNCs operate across these three sectors, but the midstream appears to be 
subsumed in the upstream. However, the downstream is separated from the upstream operations of 
the MNCs in Nigeria. Whilst the downstream operations of these MNCs are listed on the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange as public limited liability companies, their upstream operations are not. These MNCs operate 
in the upstream sector either as independent operators or joint venture operators with the Nigerian 
Government. Due to the companies’ status as private limited companies, they regard their Nigerian 
statutory annual reports as confidential and so are inaccessible to the public. 
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These corporate reports used in this study are also external reports of these companies 
and are expected to convey management representation of reality. As Bebbington (1999: 
197) suggests, corporate documents for external use are texts that “are likely to reflect 
carefully constructed pictures of reality” or represent “‘official’ picture of reality.” Most 
of these social responsibility or sustainability documents usually open with an executive 
message by the companies’ chief executive officers (CEOs), which suggests that their 
content are determined by top management like the conventional annual reports. 
According to Buhr (1998: 164), “[t]he contents of annual reports are largely determined 
by top management and therefore reflect management beliefs … and might also serve as 
a “strategic documents that project selective impressions about a firm’s activities””. 
Although Buhr refers to the traditional annual reports, this is equally applicable to other 
corporate social accounting reports for at least two reasons. First, the CEOs’ messages 
that open the reports appear to convey management authorisation
50
. Second, the social 
and environmental disclosures in the annual reports which Buhr was referring to are 
now largely what corporations report in their stand-alone reports.  
  
In addition, the documentary data include external third party information in public 
domain. Such third party reports (academic, media and NGOs) are relevant for cross-
referencing corporate representations as a form of shadow accounts evidence or external 
social audit (cf. Chapter Three). Shadow account data are important as they are 
available in public domain and may (or not) be in corporate reports (Adams, 2004; 
Ruffing, 2007). One major limitation associated with external party evidence is the 
reliability
51
. However, such reliability limitation is mitigated when such information is 
triangulated against other multiple sources of evidence from, for example, the 
companies, government and the communities. Buhr’s (1998) study collects data from 
three sources such as document in public domain, interviews and annual reports and she 
states that a combination of the three methods for triangulation provides further 
reliability and validity to the qualitative research (see Rhee & Lee, 2003).   
                                                 
50
 Social accounting research attaches importance to CEO reports (see Tregidga, et al., 2012). 
51 Reliability issue is not peculiar to these independent external reports as the literature has also called 
into question the reliability of corporate reports (Chapters Three and Nine).   
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5.7.3 Questionnaires 
The questionnaires used in this study combined both highly structured questions to 
gather data amenable to quantitative and descriptive analysis and open-ended questions 
to loosely generate some useful qualitative data. Scapens (2004) states that 
questionnaires are useful in case studies for the purpose of  gathering consistent and 
comparable large number of data. The access to larger number of respondents compared 
to interviews allows enormous breadth to be covered which partially compensates for 
the loss of in-depth and rich data that could emerge from interviews. A partial but 
relevant information can improve our understanding than no information at all given 
that social science research is to enable us gain partial (rather than perfect) 
understanding about phenomena as Laughlin argues (1995, 2004). The decision to use 
questionnaires in place of interviews emerged during the field work to avoid exclusion 
of useful data (Berry & Otley, 2004; Brannen, 2005) as the corporations and 
government agencies were unwilling to participate in interviews. In order to make the 
questionnaires useful for this study, they were structured based on the general notions of 
accountability found in the literature, initial emergent themes from field interviews, and 
knowledge gained from the initial readings of the corporate reports. 
The questionnaires were administered in two phases. These questionnaires sought to 
find the extent to which the respondents agree that accountability derives from a 
relationship between an accountor and accountee with the former having obligation to 
explain and justify conduct to the latter in a transparent manner (phase one), and 
whether the corporations have moral obligations to be accountable to communities who 
are impacted by corporate environmental pollution (phase two). Both sets of 
questionnaire were administered to MNCs, indigenous companies and regulatory 
agencies, whilst NGOs were included at the second phase. For the purpose of not 
missing useful data from the MNCs, the questionnaires were administered to middle 
level managers who were willing to participate in the process because of the anonymity 
and confidential nature of questionnaires. The views of middle level managers are 
important because they operationalise management policies and know what their 
corporations do. Rhee & Lee (2003) triangulated middle-level managers’ narratives 
with those of management
52
 and discovered that management narratives were rhetoric 
different from actual corporate practices captured by the narratives of the middle-level 
                                                 
52 Rhee & Lee used corporate social responsibility report as a proxy for management narratives.  
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managers. That study produced rich insights as the employees’ narratives conflicted 
with management representations in the corporate reports. These non-managerial 
executives are the ones that implement corporate strategies on daily basis, which 
suggest that their views reflect what they do on the job and in part confirm the corporate 
norms to which they have subscribed. Those employees interviewed by Rhee & Lee 
used the interviews to recount and make sense of their lived experiences on the job. The 
employees’ sense-making apparently resonates with Chatman, Bell, & Staw’s (1986, 
cited in Weick, 1995: 23) argument that: 
... the individual [employee] not only acts as a representative of the organization in an 
agency sense, but he also acts, more subtly, “as the organization” when he embodies the 
values, beliefs and goals of the collectivity. 
 
A limitation of this study is the inability to generate rich text akin to Rhee & Lee’s who 
used interviews to generate data from their research participants whilst this study 
utilised questionnaires. However, this limitation is compensated for as earlier mentioned 
that questionnaires were used for a pragmatic reason to collect useful (rather than no) 
data. By hindsight, another limitation is that the phase one questionnaire contained too 
many questions than were necessary to focus the study. Questionnaires have also been 
used in some social accounting studies to generate analytical data (e.g., Deegan & 
Rankin, 1997, 1999; Dunk, 2002; Elijido-Ten, Kloot, & Clarkson, 2010). For example, 
Deegan and Rankin (1999) use questionnaires to explore how the preparers and users of 
annual reports perceive the usefulness of environmental information. In this thesis the 
data from the questionnaires were subjected to simple descriptive analysis sufficient to 
provide useful understanding. 
5.7.4 Analytical methods 
Content analysis has been regarded as the most adopted method of analysing corporate 
social and environmental disclosures (Belal & Momin, 2009; Gray, et al., 1995b; 
Tregidga, et al., 2012). Whilst different versions of content analysis have been offered 
or utilised in the literature (Beck, Campbell, & Shrives, 2010; Pesci & Costa, 2014), 
they have helped to provide answers to the research questions articulated for such 
studies. However, due to the pervasive use of content analysis in social accounting 
studies and the need to extend our understanding and knowledge of social accounting 
issues in a dynamic social context, Tregidga, et al. (2012) commend the move towards 
90 
 
the adoption of more qualitative and interpretive approaches in social accounting 
research. According to them: 
We argue for a move away from the ‘safety’ of quantitative based content analysis 
toward the more unfamiliar territory of interpretive and qualitative methodologies (e.g., 
narrative, rhetorical, visual and discursive methods) ( p. 223). 
 
Tregidga, et al. (p. 224) further argue that: 
How organizational reporting and communication is constructed and its potential 
consequences (both intended and unintended) is, we argue, an important area of 
accounting research that remains in a state of development. Interestingly, there is little 
known about the messages that these reports and communications entail and the manner 
in which they are crafted and why they are produced and communicated. 
 
The analytical techniques adopted to help us provide answers to the research questions 
depended on the nature of the data and the understanding that was sought. Simple 
frequency distribution and percentage analysis were the descriptive statistics used to 
analyse the questionnaires as the nature of the questions does not require sophisticated 
statistics to gain the needed understanding from the data. Furthermore, the theoretical 
lenses discussed in Chapter three also provided the analytical frame for analysing the 
textual or documentary data. Whilst the account-giving heuristic provided a framework 
for analysing the nature of corporate accounts vis-à-vis gas flaring and oil spills 
environmental incidents or how the corporate narratives manifest (Chapters Three and 
Seven), sense-making lens provided the theoretical frame for analysing the corporate 
sense-making apparently embedded within those accounts (Chapters Three and Nine). 
These analytical frames enable the ‘skeleton’ of accountability to be fleshed from the 
empirical data (cf. Section 5.3).  
5.8 Concluding remarks 
This Chapter examined the methodological assumptions made in this thesis and how 
they have influenced the choice of the different research methods. It also explored how 
the research questions are linked to the theoretical lenses and research methods adopted 
in the study, while it also mentioned how the empirical Chapters would be organised. 
Moreover, this Chapter explored the rationale for adopting a case study research 
strategy and the choice of the cases based on critical cases selection criteria. The 
quantitative and qualitative research methods for generating data were discussed and it 
was highlighted that the combination of both methods was a pragmatic strategy to elicit 
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how the MNCs and some stakeholders understand accountability and its discharge with 
especial reference to community.  
Whilst this Chapter discussed its linkage with the previous ones, it also discussed its 
linkage with the ensuing empirical Chapters. The next five Chapters focus on the 
empirical aspects of this thesis. Whilst Chapter six explores how accountability is 
understood by the MNCs and stakeholders, Chapters seven and eight focus on the 
MNCs’ accounts and stakeholders’ narratives on gas flaring and oil spills environmental 
incidents. Finally, Chapter nine explores the corporate sense-making embedded within 
those accounts so as to assess the extent to which the companies discharge their 
accountability.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
Empirical conceptions of accountability 
6.1 Introduction 
Having discussed the methodological choice and methods of this thesis in Chapter five, 
this empirical Chapter lays the foundation for the subsequent empirical Chapters by first 
exploring how the MNCs and stakeholders understand accountability whilst the 
subsequent Chapters explore the forms in which the MNCs manifest accountability in 
practice (Chapter Seven), how it is reacted to by stakeholders (Chapter Eight) and the 
corporate sense-making underlying those forms of accountability (Chapter Nine). As 
already mentioned in Chapter three, accountability literature recognises that 
accountability could be slippery and understood differently by different parties. 
Consequently, this Chapter explores how the MNCs and influential stakeholders 
articulate their conceptions of accountability. Essentially, it provides answer to the first 
research question of this thesis namely, “To what extent do MNCs in the Nigerian oil 
industry and stakeholders understand the MNCs’ accountability to stakeholders with 
especial reference to communities?” Following this introduction is Section 6.2 that 
restates the data sources and the rationale for their choice (Chapter Five). Section 6.3 
analyses how the corporations and stakeholders conceptualise accountability based on 
questionnaire evidence. Furthermore, the conceptions of accountability drawn from 
interviews and informal conversions are analysed in Section 6.4 whilst the conceptions 
drawn from corporate documents are analysed in Section 6.5. Section 6.6 focuses on the 
accountability expectations of communities and how the MNCs respond to them. 
Finally, Section 6.7 provides summary and concluding remarks for the Chapter.  
6.2 Sources of data  
Questionnaires, interviews and corporate texts were used to gather data to explore how 
the MNCs and influential stakeholders in the Nigerian oil industry articulated their 
conceptions of accountability. Whilst the interviews were used to gain in-depth 
understanding of the participants’ conceptions of accountability through a naturalistic 
conversation (O’Dwyer, 2003; Parker, 2008), the questionnaires were structured based 
on the general notions of accountability found in the literature, initial emergent themes 
from field interviews, and knowledge gained from the initial readings of the corporate 
reports. Interviews of the selected stakeholders were intended to explore multiple views 
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useful for triangulation. Moreover, some ideas of accountability were also excavated 
from corporate texts and informal conversation with regulators. The corporate texts 
were drawn from group and subsidiary CSR or sustainability reports, subsidiary reports 
specific to gas flaring and oil spills, corporate websites and corporate webchat. In 
general, these different sources of data (questionnaires, interviews and documents) have 
been used to ensure that useful data are included for the purpose of data triangulation 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Tan, 2009a; cf. Chapter Five) and to provide different forms of 
evidence to answer the research question.  As discussed in Chapter five, a total of 21 
semi-structured interviews were conducted between January and March 2012 to a mix 
of stakeholder groups comprising communities (10), community and environmental 
NGOs (7), oil & gas and environmental legal experts (3), and accounting profession (1).   
 
As discussed in Chapter five, two sets of questionnaires
53
 were administered in two 
phases capturing varying views on accountability. The decision to use questionnaires in 
place of interviews emerged during the field work to avoid exclusion of useful data 
(Berry & Otley, 2004; Brannen, 2005). It was also discussed in Chapter five that 
questionnaires were used as a pragmatic approach to gather primary data and engage 
with the oil corporations and regulators as they were not willing to participate in 
interviews. The two sets of questionnaires sought to find whether the respondents agree 
that accountability derives from a relationship between an accountor and accountee with 
the former having an obligation to explain and justify conduct to the latter in a 
transparent manner (phase one), and whether the corporations have moral obligations to 
be accountable to communities which are impacted by corporate environmental 
pollution (phase two).  
 
The first phase questionnaires were administered to Shell, Chevron, Total and 
ExxonMobil, whilst the second were administered to Chevron, Total, and ExxonMobil.  
Agip was excluded from the first field work due to the difficulty to gather information 
about its specific operations in Nigeria, whilst Shell could not be accessed during the 
second field work
54
. According to Chapter five, questionnaires were also administered 
                                                 
53 See Appendix 6B 
54
 Although Agip was excluded from the selected MNCs during the first phase, I decided to include it at 
the second phase as some of the community interviewees criticised Agip over environmental 
degradation and poor interaction with their communities. However, like Shell, Agip was not accessible 
for questionnaire administration. The contact member of staff that received and agreed to administer 
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to a pool of indigenous corporations (including a government-owned company in the 
second phase) without necessarily making distinctions between them because they are 
small relative to MNCs and are not the principal focus of this study. In addition, the 
questionnaires were administered to NGOs (second phase only) and three government 
agencies namely, NOSDRA, DPR and NAPIMS (cf. Chapter Five). Table 6A presents a 
summary of the questionnaires retrieved on the two phases of field work.  
 
        Table 6A: Number of questionnaires retrieved from field works 
 
6.3 Conceptions of accountability drawn from questionnaires
55
  
The two sets of questionnaires explored the extent to which the respondents agree with 
the literature and one another on the general conceptions of accountability as well as the 
conceptions of accountability as a moral obligation to provide accounts to those affected 
by the accountor’s actions. One likely limitation of these questionnaires is that they 
provided highly structured notions of accountability. However, they give an idea of how 
stakeholders’ empirical conceptions of accountability broadly (dis)agree with the 
literature.  Basically, the first phase questionnaire was used to explore the general 
notions of accountability
56. The first question was used to obtain stakeholders’ views on 
the essential attributes of accountability. Another question explores whether the 
stakeholders view social and environmental accountability as corporate obligation to 
communities. Lastly, another useful question explores the responsibility of the 
corporations to provide information about their environmental impacts on communities 
                                                                                                                                               
the questionnaires never returned any copy. However, he did not reveal any obstacles he encountered 
that had led to his change of initial enthusiasm to assist with the questionnaire dissemination.  
55 The analysis started with the questionnaires for convenience even though interviews were conducted 
first. This convenience provided useful build-up to the qualitative data analysis. However, this does not 
suggest (neither was assumed) that the analysis was designed to follow this sequence. It could have 
been done the other way round; but I find the adopted approach easier as it developed from the more 
structured to the unstructured data set. More fundamentally, the research was not designed to use 
questionnaires as a follow-up to interviews, or vice versa.  
56 The questions on the questionnaires were mainly in statement form requiring the respondents to 
provide their responses in 5-scale Likert format, dichotomous format, and open-ended format. 
Organisations/Agencies Phase 1 Phase 2 
MNCs 43 57 
Indigenous companies 25 35 
Regulators 28 77 
NGOs Not applicable 37 
Grand total 96 206 
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in a simple language. The results from the analysis of these questions are now presented 
in the following sub-sections.  
6.3.1 Nature of corporate accountability 
Chapter three provided a review of the literature on accountability as a theoretical 
foundation for this thesis with emphasis on information provision. Four attributes drawn 
from the literature are presented in Table 6B below with the number of responses by 
stakeholder groups engaged in the study. In order to gather evidence concerning these 
attributes of accountability, the questions were developed to generate either ‘yes’ or 
‘no’ responses.   A paraphrase of these four questions/issues relating to the nature of 
accountability describes accountability as a framework that derives from a relationship 
between an accountor and accountee resulting in the free flow of information from the 
accountor who has an obligation to explain and justify their conduct to the accountee in 
a transparent manner.   
 
Table 6B: Nature of accountability: responses by all the participants 
The following are 
features of corporate 
accountability: 
MNCs 
(A) 
Indigenous 
companies 
(B) 
Regulators 
(C) 
ALL 
(A to C) 
% 
Yes 
 
Accountability derives 
from a relationship 
between an actor 
(accountor) and its 
stakeholders 
(accountees)   
38 (38) 23 (24) 24 (25) 85 (87) 98 
Accountor is obligated 
to explain and justify 
conduct 
38 (38) 24 (24) 26 (27) 88 (89) 99 
Free flow of 
information between an 
actor and its relevant 
stakeholders  
35 (39) 18 (20) 24 (26) 77 (85) 91 
Transparency in sharing 
information with 
relevant stakeholders 
37 (38) 17 (19) 24 (26) 78 (83) 94 
The above figures represent the number of respondents in agreement with the 
statements and those in parenthesis are the total number of respondents. ‘% Yes’ 
represents the percentage of ‘ALL’ responses to total number of ‘ALL’ responses (in 
parenthesis).  
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Virtually all the respondents agreed that accountability did indeed consist of the 
characteristics that: accountability derives from the relationship between an actor 
(accountor) and its stakeholders (accountees); accountor is obligated to explain and 
justify its conduct; accountability concerns free flow of information between an actor 
and its relevant stakeholders; accountability includes the transparent sharing of 
information with relevant stakeholders. Although the respondents broadly agreed with 
the issues on which their views were sought, one difficult issue that still remains unclear 
is why (only) a few were in disagreement. However, the findings in section 6.3.2.2 in 
which the law was privileged as an authoritative source of accountability partly provides 
some insights. This suggests that accountability is expected within the context of legal 
provisions. 
 
Another issue explored is whether the corporations have obligation to provide 
information to communities. Virtually all the respondents agreed with the statement that 
corporations owe accountability to communities as shown in Table 6C below. It was 
quite unexpected that all the MNCs’ respondents would agree with this statement based 
on the contemporary corporate regulations and codes of governance that privilege 
shareholders’ interest57.  
 
Table 6C: Do oil companies owe accountability to communities? 
 
 
  
 
      
 
 
The above figures represent the number of respondents in agreement with the 
statements and those in parenthesis are the total number of respondents. 
 
With respect to the issue of simplification of communication language, respondents 
across the board were equally in agreement that corporations should keep their language 
                                                 
57 However, this might depend on the issues they think the corporations should be accountable for to 
the communities, which might largely be legal requirements (cf. section 6.3.2.2).  
Organisations/Agencies Respondents % Yes 
MNCs 42 (42) 100 
Indigenous companies 23 (25) 92 
Regulators 26 (28) 93 
Grand total 91 (95) 96 
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of communicating with communities simple and straightforward (non-technical)
58
 as 
shown by Table 6D below.  
 
Table 6D: Use of simple language to communicate environmental impacts 
The corporations are 
supposed to enlighten 
the communities in 
layman language on: 
MNCs 
(A) 
Indigenous 
companies 
(B) 
Regulators 
(C) 
ALL 
(A to C) 
% 
Yes 
  
 
 
 
Content of the 
environmental impact 
assessment report  
38 (42) 22 (24) 22 (28) 82 (94) 87 
 
Opportunities 
environmental impact 
assessment exercise 
holds for them  
39 (42) 22 (24) 26 (28) 87 (94) 93  
Post impact assessment 
feedback 
39 (41) 21 (24) 25 (28) 85 (93) 91 
The above figures represent the number of respondents in agreement with the 
statements and the ones in parenthesis are the total number of respondents. ‘% Yes’ 
represents the percentage of ‘ALL’ responses to total number of ‘ALL’ responses (in 
parenthesis). 
 
Based on the analysis in Tables 6B to 6D, this is reassuring and from the outset it means 
that – superficially at least – the respondents are broadly in agreement with each other 
and broadly in agreement with the literature. But this is slightly different to interview 
data in which stakeholders appear to largely conflate accountability with responsibility 
for actions rather than responsibility for providing information (cf. Section 6.4). The 
next section looks into more nuanced issues of accountability to communities which are 
addressed by the second phase questionnaire.  
6.3.2 Issues of accountability to communities 
Our immediate prior section analysed the views of different respondents on the general 
nature of accountability, whether corporations owe accountability to communities, and 
the need for corporations to communicate in simple and straightforward language with 
their stakeholders. This section explores in detail the obligation of corporations, from a 
moral perspective, to provide information to the communities that are affected by their 
operations. This section comprises three sub-sections addressing some specific 
                                                 
58
 For example, as reported by the Nigerian Guardian 22 August 2012, the World Bank and other 
stakeholders expressed their views that the public is poorly served with information about the 
operations of oil companies in Nigeria because of the “codified” and esoteric language the companies 
allegedly use to communicate to the public (Olayinka, 2012). 
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accountability issues. Basically, the sub-sections draw on data from the second phase 
questionnaire (but in addition use data from first phase questionnaire in sub-section 
6.3.2.3). In order to make the data presented comparable, the number of responses is 
presented in percentages rather than absolute values because of the uneven distribution 
of the respondents for each stakeholder group surveyed. Nevertheless, the summarised 
tables of the corresponding absolute values are in appendix 6C.   
6.3.2.1 Rights to demand information vs. obligation to supply information  
The first three questions on the second questionnaire were used to obtain the views of 
respondents regarding communities’ rights to demand information from the 
corporations and the moral obligation of the corporations to provide information to the 
communities in relation to corporate environmental impacts on communities
59
. These 
data are summarised in Figures 6A, 6B and 6C below.   
 
 
 
              
          Figure 6A: Do communities have rights to demand information? 
 
                                                 
59
 These questions provide some kind of reliability test of internal consistency (Denscombe, 2010). For 
example, the participants who agree with question 1 logically ought to agree with questions 2 and 3. 
That is, if one agrees that communities have rights to receive information from the corporations it 
logically suggests that the corporations have the obligations to supply information to the communities.  
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Figure 6B: Do corporations have a moral obligation to inform communities of         
impacts? 
           
 
 
Figure 6C: Do corporations have a moral obligation to inform communities of impact 
mitigation? 
 
Based on the data above, the respondents broadly agree that the corporate 
environmental impacts that affect communities give rise to corporate-community 
relationship which gives communities the moral rights to demand information from the 
companies and imposes moral obligation on the companies to supply information to 
communities. This seems to agree with the literature that accountability derives not only 
from law but also from quasi-laws, social norms and corporate codes which play 
important roles in defining duties and obligations in social relations (Gray, et al., 1997; 
Gray, et al., 2014).  
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6.3.2.2 Accountability to communities irrespective of legal provisions  
The thesis then undertook a further exploration to find whether the respondents will 
maintain their normative stance (in Section 6.3.2.1) concerning corporate-community 
accountability relationships when they were asked whether the corporations should be 
accountable to communities irrespective of legal provisions. The findings were 
inconsistent with their initial normative stance, albeit that laws and regulation vis-à-vis 
accountability represent the minimum standards of behaviour expected of actors (see 
Ebrahim, 2003; Eweje, 2006a; Gray, et a.l, 1997, 2014). With 54%, 72%, 47% and 41% 
of respondents from MNCs, NGOs, indigenous companies and regulators respectively 
in agreement with such position (Fig. 6D), the results largely differ from their prior near 
unanimous agreement that the corporations have a moral obligation to be accountable to 
communities.  Distinctively, the regulators, followed by the indigenous companies and 
MNCs, disagreed more with this notion.  The large disagreement by the regulators may 
partly be explained by the alleged indifference of the Government to environmental 
impacts of oil operations as well as its interest in JVs which the regulators also tend to 
protect (cf. Section 7.4.3.1; Chapter Eight).  
 
 
  
             
Figure 6D: Should corporations be accountable to communities irrespective of law? 
 
A greater number of NGOs’ respondents agreed with this question compared to other 
groups, although other members of NGOs who disagreed or were undecided appear to 
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be high given the fact that many NGOs
60
 are right-based organisations making 
advocacy for equity and justice toward the weak in societies. However, the greater 
support of the NGOs than the other group of respondents for this question apparently 
corroborates the literature suggesting that NGOs emerge to fill the void left by the 
government in promoting the interest of the society (Dhanani & Connolly, 2012; 
Lehman, 2007: O’Dwyer, et al., 2005). More importantly, the general responses to this 
question apparently suggest law as the privileged source of accountability which will 
also have implications for the practice of accountability. Although the corporations and 
stakeholders have viewed accountability in a particular way and in terms of 
corporations-communities relationship, the form such accountability should take or the 
channels through which it should manifest remains unclear. Such issues inform the 
exploration of the next subsection.  
6.3.2.3 Media/Channels for providing information to communities 
Another issue explored is the elicitation of the channels stakeholders suggest or prefer 
should be used by the MNCs to discharge accountability to communities. This sub-
section draws on question 18 of phase one questionnaire and question 18 of phase two 
questionnaire. Whilst the phase one question seeks respondents’ opinion on whether the 
channels for discharging accountability to communities should be formal or informal, 
phase two question seeks the respondents’ opinion on specific channels the companies 
should use to discharge accountability. Figure 6E shows a summary of responses 
supporting formal or informal channels of accountability (with corresponding absolute 
values presented in appendix 6D). 
 
                                                 
60 A majority of these respondents are affiliated to right-based NGOs. 
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Figure 6E: Formal and informal channels of accountability 
 
All the stakeholders broadly prefer formal channel of accountability to informal as a 
means of corporate communication with communities. However, the specific channels 
through which the companies could provide information to the communities were not 
clear from this data. Consequently, the phase two questionnaire equally designed an 
open-ended question to elicit respondents’ preferred channels for the discharge of 
corporate accountability to communities.  
 
It might be naïve
61
 to seek from corporations those channels they think corporations 
should use to provide information to communities. However, the findings might provide 
insight into other channels that corporations use (perhaps) and/or might prefer to use to 
communicate with the communities different to the formal channels of accountability in 
the literature. Whilst the literature might consider conventional annual reports  (Adams 
& Harte, 1998; Campbell, 2000; Gray, et al., 1995a), stand-alone reports and web-based 
reports (Erusalimsky, et al., 2006; Guthrie, et al., 2008; Unerman, 2000) as a key means 
of communication,  it is apparent from these data that a range of other means of 
communication are offered and/or preferred by the corporations, communities, 
regulators and NGOs (see Table 6E), which might still be emergent and so might merit 
developing in future studies (Parker, 2011: 20). These articulated forms of 
                                                 
61 For example, scholars who are critical of corporate impression management and rhetoric might see 
the approaches chosen by the corporations to be at best superficial or corporate capture of social 
discourse.  
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accountability and their apparent or actual deployment by the MNCs are discussed in 
the latter part of this section and Section 6.6. 
 
Table 6E: Media/channels preferred for providing information to communities 
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1 Engagement  11 13 28 23 75 
(44.12) 
2 Local and other media 10 13 29 13 65 
(38.24) 
3 Website 2 2 9 6 19 
(11.18) 
4 Bulletins, pamphlets and 
newsletters 
2 3 1 - 6 
(3.53) 
5 Annual reports 1 - 3 1 5 
(2.94) 
The figures in parenthesis are the percentages of the aggregate of the total responses 
 
The channels they articulated to meet accountability demands of communities largely 
ignored formal annual reports as shown by Table 6E, which is interesting given the 
focus on annual reports in the SEA literature. From Table 6E, corporations and 
stakeholders preferred engagement, and local and other media as the two major 
accountability channels corporations should use to provide information to the 
communities. The caption engagement includes meeting with community group leaders, 
town hall meeting (which is not restricted to community leaders), consultative forum, 
memorandum of understanding (MOU), and participation in environmental impact 
assessments and post impact assessments.  However, the evidence in the literature 
suggests that the corporations exercise hegemonic influence over dialogue with their 
stakeholders to serve managerial intent (see Archel, Husillos, & Spence, 2011; Brown 
and Dillard, 2013; Onkila, et al., 2014; Spence, 2009). This might explain why the 
corporations and regulators as co-partners are advocating engagement as a mode of 
accountability
62
. Although other stakeholders hold the same view, the literature argues 
that power imbalance between the corporations and stakeholders inhibits meaningful 
                                                 
62 However, the literature argues that engagement is not accountability but rather a process to help 
entrench a mechanism that will promote accountability (Adams, 2004; Unerman & Bennett, 2004). 
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dialogue (Cooper & Owen, 2007; Dillard, 2007, 2011; Gray, et al., 1997; Owen, et al., 
2000).  
 
Local and other media caption includes use of local print and electronic media, town 
criers, and awareness programmes using lectures, seminars, workshops. The majority of 
those who subscribed to local and other media suggested corporate awareness 
programmes as a means to educate communities on the adverse implications of 
sabotage, which implies it is partly a channel to educate and less likely to discharge 
accountability. Whilst the deployment of local and other media by the MNCs is not 
readily discernible from the corporate reports and interview data reviewed, there is 
evidence that the MNCs deploy engagement in communicating with communities over 
corporate social and environmental issues that (potentially) affect communities. This 
evidence is now presented in the remaining part of this section below.  
 
It is interesting to note that besides questionnaire evidence apparently privileging 
engagement as a channel to discharge accountability, the corporate reports also disclose 
how the MNCs deploy engagement in relating with the communities.  For example: 
Constructive engagement and partnerships for sustained development of host 
communities and neighbours constitute the thrust of our new vision on 
Sustainable Development (Total Upstream Nigeria 2009a: 12) 
 
ExxonMobil strives to have a positive impact on the communities where we operate. 
Stakeholder engagement demonstrates our fundamental respect for human rights and 
our belief that strong, informed communities lead to a stable business environment 
(ExxonMobil Corporate Citizenship Report 2012: 60) 
 
MNCs also consider the GMOU (Global Memorandum of Understanding) as a veritable 
means of communicating and engaging with the communities by stating that:  
They [GMOUs] encourage greater participation and create a more open and transparent 
way for SPDC
63
 to communicate with communities and help support social investment 
projects (Shell Nigeria 2010: 1) 
 
[T]he final document [MOU] is balanced and has taken care of the maximum number of 
interests – a really democratic document indeed…. This concept is also enshrined in the 
MOU we are about signing today. …One feature of this MOU is the participatory 
approach in implementation (Total Upstream Nigeria 2009b) 
 
                                                 
63 Shell Petroleum Development Company 
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The MNCs also tend to agree with the literature that MOUs and Environmental Impact 
Assessments (EIAs) are useful for trust and relationship building (Fidler & Hitch, 2007) 
as trust is fundamental to accountability relationship (Swift, 2001).  
Eni informs and involves local communities, promoting preventive, free and informed 
consulting, and considers their claims in relation to new projects, impact evaluations 
and development initiatives. … [E]ni is committed to guarantee the involvement of 
communities via consultations and forums before launching any important business 
project. In 2011 in Nigeria, 3 preventive consultations were held with local 
communities (Environmental Impact Assessment- EIA Public Forum) in advance of the 
start of drilling & exploration in the Bayelsa and Delta States (Eni For 2011: 23) 
 
Through early external stakeholder engagement, we are able to identify community 
concerns and implement mitigation measures during the project planning phase. By 
attempting to address these issues up-front, we are able to minimize community 
concerns throughout the life of the project. Ensuring mutual understanding, trust and 
respect in our stakeholder relationships means that interested parties are represented as 
project agreements are established. Once a project starts, we provide local groups and 
individuals with a communication channel to voice and resolve concerns related to a 
development project without fear of retribution. (ExxonMobil Corporate Citizenship 
Report 2012: 65)
64
 
 
However, what is not discernible from the corporate narratives is the extent to which the 
communities are actually involved in the engagement process given the power 
inequality between them. Consequently, whereas the communities recognise the 
importance of MNCs’ engagements and dialogues with them, they claim that the MNCs 
practically dominate the engagement process (e.g., Spence, 2009) as the narrative below 
suggests:  
It is not actually a dialogue so to speak. But it is just like a discussion between the 
headmaster and the pupils. Yes they determine [everything]. Even when they say they 
are writing MOU, they decide what is to be given to us. So we will make presentations, 
ask for this, ask for that, for many things; but in the end they will decide exactly what is 
to be given. … They decide when next one [MOU] will be written (Personal Interview: 
Community Stakeholder 4) 
  
The communities also believe the MNCs use the GMOU instrumentally because of the 
difficult caveat built into it: 
They [MNCs] used to put a caveat [in the MOUs], a serious caveat [a clause]. As I told 
you earlier, it is a discussion between the weak and the strong. The community has no 
choice than to sign. They will tell you that you have to provide a conducive atmosphere 
[for them to operate. This is similar to Shell’s and Chevron’s FTO – Freedom-To-
Operate]. How are you to do that when the people are angry; the youths are not 
employed? (Personal Interview: Community Stakeholder 4) 
 
                                                 
64 This narrative however relates to ExxonMobil global policies, which I believe is also applicable to its 
Nigerian operations.  
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The FTO clause appeared to have worked very well by restraining the communities 
from breaching peace that would affect the MNCs’ operations. Two of the three 
Partnering NGO participants in this study commended the GMOU model for ensuring 
smooth operations of oil companies in the benefiting communities and they explained 
that such communities had maintained peace so that they would get their next tranche of 
funds payable every four months as breach of peace would make benefiting 
communities forfeit their allocated funds (Personal Interviews: Partnering NGOs 2 and 
3). According to Chevron and Shell, the GMOU is aimed, among other things, to 
prevent conflict:  
The objective is to bring peace, stability and reduced conflict to areas where Chevron 
operates (Chevron Nigeria 2011) 
The model places an emphasis on more transparent and accountable processes, regular 
communication with the grassroots, sustainability and conflict prevention (Shell Nigeria 
2012a: 1)  
 
Whilst this section has explored the conceptions of accountability via questionnaire 
research instrument as well as the analysis of the deployment of engagement by the 
MNCs, sections 6.4 and 6.5 explore the conceptions of accountability via interviews and 
corporate documents respectively.  
6.4. Conceptions of accountability drawn from interviews 
Whilst the foregoing section explored accountability based on some preconceived 
notions of accountability drawn from the literature, early interview themes and 
preliminary review of corporate reports, this section explores accountability from in-
depth stories or narratives given by the stakeholders. From the interviews conducted, a 
number of interviewees view accountability as responsibility in the general sense rather 
than being responsibility to provide information to explain and justify actions. 
According to one NGO interviewee: 
Accountability is an umbrella word to mean a lot of things and basically it means 
acceptance of responsibility as well as remediation for injuries caused. At least that is 
the basic definition (Personal Interviews: Independent NGO 2).  
 
In addition, one legal expert who works with an international sustainability organisation 
has a similar view but provided more details according to the narrative below: 
[E]ssentially when you are talking about accountability of a company to the local 
communities, the overall meaning should be that whatever the company does that 
impact on the local communities the company: one, should take responsibility for their 
action and two, that they [companies] will be the ones to address any negative impacts 
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so that as much as possible they can return the community to the state they were before 
that negative impact … When you are demonstrating accountability to someone, you 
make sure that you prevent the person from harm; and if what you do causes harm to 
the person you should be the one to address it and take responsibility for it.  (Personal 
Interviews: Legal Expert 2). 
 
However, others also view corporate accountability as involving obligation to render 
accounts about impacts of corporate operations or actions as shown by the following 
narratives: 
Accountability is not just giving out money; it is when you present information … If 
money is paid to certain persons in the community, the community should be informed 
of who has received what and the amount involved (Personal Interviews: Community 
Stakeholder 8). 
 
To the extent that impact and the activities of a company are in an area, the company 
remains accountable to that community. If anything happens, the community should be 
able to call you to account for what has happened, what steps you took to manage this 
process and all that (Personal Interviews: Partnering NGO 3) 
 
Furthermore, in an informal conversation with a manager at the Department of 
Petroleum Resources (the main regulatory agency of the Nigerian oil industry), the 
manager argues that accountability relationship does not exist between the MNCs and 
communities. Arguing further, he claims that the MNCs are only accountable to the 
Government for which purpose they periodically submit reports to DPR [presumably to 
discharge that accountability]. Whereas the manager recognises the import of 
information in accountability relationship, he does so within the strict terms of the law. 
A professor of oil & gas and environmental law holds a similar belief that MNCs have 
accountability relationship with the Government but not communities (Personal 
Interview: Legal Expert 3). He further argues that oil companies discharge their 
accountability to Government when they pay their signature bonuses, taxes and fulfil 
other legal requirements.  The accounting profession stakeholder also only linked 
accountability to the requirements of the law albeit he added that accounting standards 
also had a role to play (Personal Interviews: Accounting Professional). Independent NGO 4 
interviewed equally expressed doubt over whether a corporation has accountability 
obligations to communities based on Nigerian law
65
, but he further claimed that an 
                                                 
65 But the Nigerian Environmental Impact Assessment Act for example requires the corporations to 
engage with community stakeholders that will be impacted by corporate operations in order to address 
social and environmental concerns and how they will be mitigated.  However, EIAs in Nigeria are 
regarded in by critics as ceremonial exercises. Moreover, they have not been used in Nigeria (as far as I 
am aware) as a legal basis of enforcing rights. 
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accountability relationship might exist when corporate actions produce negative impacts 
on their health and life. 
I don’t know if the companies have any accountability to render to communities. It is 
very difficult. But if you consider it from the angle of health, because the right to health 
is a constitutional right; the communities are entitled to it. Not only the right to health 
but also the right to life is the primary right; in as much as polluting the environment 
affect the livelihood of the people, it affects their health and safety, that it also affects 
their rights to life. In that case you can even find local laws to buttress that argument. 
The right to health is linked to the right to life. In as much as the right to life stands, the 
right to health cannot be removed from it because you need health to enjoy life 
(Personal Interviews: Independent NGO 4). 
 
Independent NGO 4 appears to tie accountability to responsibility for action and not 
necessarily the duty to explain and justify actions. Still he sees accountability strictly 
through the legal lens by pointing out that the communities could draw on several laws 
to seek redress when their right to health and life is breached
66
.  However, Partnering 
NGO 3 was a bit critical by saying that accountability relationship does not exist 
between oil companies and communities and that the accountability relationship that 
seemingly exists between the companies and the Government only exists in the 
imagination of people – by citing the Government’s claim that it does not know the 
quantum of oil drilled or even exported in Nigeria
67
.  
 
Whilst some of these views, at the surface, apparently contradict the earlier notion in 
Section 6.3.2.1 that communities have right to information and that the corporations 
also have obligations to provide information to the communities, they do not 
emphatically weaken the views of respondents in Section 6.3.2.1. The reason is that 
these interviewees situated their notion of accountability within legal context rather than 
corporate environmental impacts on the communities.   As such, those interviewees that 
contemplated the existence of accountability relationship between the companies and 
communities - whether in the form of responsibility to provide information or perform 
certain actions – did on the basis of corporate negative environmental impacts on 
communities as the questionnaire questions were specifically linked with environmental 
                                                 
66 Similar argument was made by Shinsato (2005: 200) that: “Because environmental injustices cannot 
be addressed directly in international human rights law, fundamental human rights such as the right to 
life, the right to health, and the right to an adequate standard of living can be used instead; increasingly, 
redress for environmental destruction is being sought through substantive human rights.” 
67 Volume of oil accounted for in Nigeria is at the export terminal rather than at the point of production, 
whilst part of the oil produced could be siphoned and exported before the export terminal.  
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impacts. The next section explores corporate conceptions of accountability from their 
annual reports.  
6.5. Conceptions of accountability drawn from corporate documents 
Some notions of accountability were also drawn from corporate texts (cf. Section 6.2) to 
enrich our ideas of how the MNCs understand accountability. Shell in its 1998 
sustainability report, for example, uses the term:  
‘Social Accountability’ to mean the overarching ambition of an organisation to be 
accountable to its stakeholders and society at large. It embraces the need for an 
organisation to act responsibly in contributing to sustainable development, and be 
accountable for its performance through externally verified reporting to predetermined 
standards and performance criteria. It also implies a suitable degree of transparency 
with regard to the basis on which decisions are made (Shell Sustainability Report 1998: 
50) 
 
Even more recently, Shell’s notion of transparency captures an idea of accountability 
which is basically the responsibility to explain and justify actions as shown below: 
We believe transparency in our operations helps build trust. In Nigeria, for example, the 
Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) launched a website in 2011 that 
enables people to track details of oil spills at its facilities, whether from operations or 
due to sabotage or theft, and how it deals with them (Shell Sustainability Report 2011: 
1) 
 
The above is apparently grounded in Shell’s belief that different people (stakeholders) 
have interest in that information (and possibly assuming they have the right-to-know) 
and that they can access the information through the website platform. This apparently 
suggests that corporations provide certain information to meet the information needs of 
stakeholders, which is also evident in Chevron’s claims below:  
We also increased transparency. We responded to the call for information by creating 
public communications platforms, and for the first time in 30 years, we held an open 
house and tour to allow the community to see our operations for themselves. The 
community had the opportunity to engage with us directly, and we could clarify 
misconceptions about our operations (Chevron Corporate Responsibility Report 2010: 
16)
68
. 
 
With these corporate claims, it is apparent that the corporations broadly concur with 
social accounting literature that corporations have obligation to provide information to 
those with the rights to know, not necessarily only financial stakeholders. As the 
examples below suggest, whilst Total was in agreement with Chevron and Shell on this 
                                                 
68 However, this Chevron’s narrative actually relate to Richmond Community in California, USA. It is cited 
here because it is crudely assumed that Chevron applies the same principle to its global operations.  
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issue, it went further to enumerate some stakeholders they have assumed the 
responsibility to feed with information, and Eni claimed to give information to 
communities on issues relevant to them: 
Total practices transparency with respect to pollution, keeping local communities, 
Nigerian authorities and NGOs in the loop [informed] (Total Society and Environment 
2010: 57)   
 
Eni promotes transparency of the information addressed to local communities, with 
particular reference to the topics that they are most interested in. Forms of continuous 
and informed consulting are also promoted, through the relevant Eni structures, in order 
to consider the expectations of local communities in conceiving and conducting 
corporate activities (Eni Sustainability Report 2009: 30)
69
 
 
What could be deduced from these corporate statements is that corporate information 
provision is not necessarily dependent on legal requirement but on its importance to 
stakeholders in order to maintain good corporate-stakeholder relationships, or what 
Shell (as in above) referred to as an enabler to ‘build trust.’ However, this is 
underpinned by pursuit of corporate success. For example, Shell claims its social and 
environmental information reports derive from their importance to stakeholders and 
corporate success (Shell Sustainability Report 2007: 40).  
 
There appears to be a broad consistency regarding what constitutes accountability based 
on data from questionnaires, interviews (including informal conversation) and corporate 
documents. Whilst transparency is found to be recurring in corporate narratives 
portraying it as constitutive of accountability, the extent to which transparency underlies 
corporate reports that give general idea about how corporate accountability manifests is 
opaque (see Roberts, 2009; Zyglidopoulos & Fleming, 2011). Whilst Chapter seven 
explores the forms in which the MNCs manifest accountability in their reports with 
respect to gas flaring and oil spill environmental incidents, the next section explores 
accountability issues based on community expectations.  
6.6 Community expectations: accountability by actions 
The communities are interested in what the companies do and the companies apparently 
produce information about community expectations such as provision of employment, 
infrastructure, tackling of environmental pollution, entrepreneurial initiatives, and so on. 
                                                 
69 This was not particular to any community or country.  
111 
 
The communities, legal experts and NGO stakeholders that participated in this study 
appear to be more interested in community development and mitigation of corporate 
environmental impacts as accountability by actions (cf. Sections 6.4 and 6.6.1 and 
6.6.2). That the MNCs are carrying out some of these actions suggests that the MNCs 
are accountable (albeit superficially) to some degree, at least from communities’ action-
based conceptions of accountability although the communities appear not to be satisfied 
with corporate performance in this regard (Sections 6.6.1 and 6.6.2). Beyond this 
action-based accountability, the MNCs also provide accounts about these actions via 
corporate reports and other reporting channels.  
 
Apparently as the interview analysis in Section 6.4 suggests, the community participants 
scarcely consider formal information in their articulation of what accountability of 
corporations mean to them. It was observed, however, that they privilege accountability 
by action to accountability by reporting and so this commends the further examination 
of action-based accountability.  On the basis of the reviews of interviews with 
communities, communities’ expectations from the oil companies fall into two broad 
narratives namely, community development and mitigation of environmental impacts. 
Community development as one of the two broad community expectations identified 
includes corporate programmes and projects that benefit communities socially and 
economically: employment, capacity building, skills acquisition, social infrastructures 
(cf. Section 6.6.1). By and large, community development expectation falls within the 
business notion of corporate social responsibility (Carroll, 1991; Idemudia, 2007; 
Idemudia & Ite, 2006; Ite, 2007), which comes under corporate obligation Mansell 
(2012, 2013) would refer to as duty of beneficence. Mitigation of environmental impacts 
by corporations is the second narrative of community expectation from the MNCs (cf. 
Section 6.6.2). From the communities’ point of view, the oil companies are deemed to 
be accountable when they meet these expectations which are basically action-based 
rather than report-based. This does not suggest that the communities do not mind access 
to transparent corporate disclosures about these actions (Section 6.4), but this basically 
suggests that information does not seem to be their priority. Whether the oil companies 
understand these community expectations is another thing altogether; but it is certain 
that the companies will know of these expectations when they engage with the 
communities (see Unerman & Bennett, 2004).   
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It was found in Section 6.3.2.3 that the respondents considered ‘engagement’ and ‘local 
media’ as the preferred channels of corporate accountability to communities compared 
to corporate reports and web-based reports. Engagement, for example, would suggest 
that the communities have certain expectations which could be dialogically straightened 
out between them and the corporations. In responding to the question on the 
stakeholders that Shell considered the most influential on its CSR in Nigeria, Nick 
Wood [Shell Vice President on communications, exploration and production] said that:   
The critical stakeholders are the communities close to where we operate and we engage 
to understand what their needs and concerns are (Shell Nigeria 2011a) 
 
Again, this notion importantly draws our gaze to corporations’ apparent 
acknowledgement of their social relationship with communities in which they operate as 
well as how the corporations perceive the communities and their expectations. We shall 
now explore these expectations in the following subsections.  
6.6.1 Community Development 
The issue of community development featured prominently in the reviewed annual 
corporate social reports, other periodic reports and corporate websites, of the oil 
companies (see Appendix 7A). There is evidence from the reviewed data that the oil 
companies in Niger Delta engage in community development projects directly and 
indirectly. For example, they do so indirectly by allocating 3% of their capital budget to 
Niger-Delta Development Commission (NNDC) as required by the NDDC Act 2000, 
which the Commission then uses to carry out development projects across the Niger 
Delta region. Oil companies have also made disclosures about this contribution as 
follows:  
Shell’s economic contribution … $161.1 million: SPDC [Shell Petroleum Development 
Company] and SNEPCo [Shell Nigeria Exploartion and Production Company]70 funds 
to the Niger Delta Development Commission in 2010 (Shell share $59.8 million).  
$71.4 million: 2010 contribution from SPDC and SNEPCo to community development 
projects (Shell share $22.9 million). (Shell Sustainability Report 2010: 18) 
 
Regionally, since 2001 we have allocated 3% of our total annual budget
71
 to the Niger 
Delta Development Commission (NDDC). Locally, our strong commitment to 
communities is expressed through action plans and roadmaps developed (Total 
Environment and Society 2007:  48) 
 
                                                 
70 SPDC and SNEPCo are subsidiaries of Shell Plc.  
71 This might be an exaggeration as the law requires allocation of 3% of ‘capital’, and not ‘total’, budget. 
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Oil MNCs’ direct involvement in community development projects is evident from the 
analysis of interviews with communities and review of corporate reports below. Two 
direct approaches in the implementation of community development projects are 
discernible from the data reviewed. The first approach is that in which the companies 
decide the choice and execution of the projects where the communities only play a 
passive role (see Shell Nigeria 2010, 2012a). As all the companies disclose their 
community development projects in the Niger Delta year on year, a few references are 
thus provided below:   
Chevron Nigeria Ltd. (CNL) provides communities near its operations with power and 
drinking water—in some cases, directly from company facilities. In some communities, 
we have purchased and installed electricity generators as well as provided for fueling 
and servicing the generators. In 2011, Chevron announced we were joining the U.S. 
Agency for International Development in contributing $50 million to the Niger Delta 
Partnership Initiative (NDPI) Foundation, which Chevron established to address the 
socioeconomic challenges facing the area. Chevron's $25 million commitment is drawn 
from a $50 million endowment we created in 2010 to launch the NDPI Foundation 
(Chevron Nigeria 2011) 
 
In Nigeria, generators and transformers were installed, electrical lines were modernized 
and the road system was improved to facilitate connections and improve accessibility 
during the rainy seasons. (Eni Sustainability Report 2007: 55)  
 
Total believes in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), not just to create the right 
business environment, but because it is the right thing to do. …Over the last ten years, it 
has focused on the critical areas of education, healthcare, infrastructure (water supply, 
roads, electricity, skills acquisition, employment, agriculture, micro credit scheme, 
women and youths development, communication and community development 
foundations with a cumulative financial commitment of over sixty million dollars. 
(Total Upstream Nigeria 2010: 62) 
 
Another direct approach the MNCs have adopted is called the GMOU whereby the 
communities are organised into clusters and allocated budgets to manage their own 
development projects (see Shell in Nigeria 2010, 2012a). As earlier noted in Section 
6.3.2.3, the Freedom-To-Operate clause built into the (G)MOUs serves an instrumental 
purpose as it restrains the communities from disrupting corporate operations otherwise 
such communities will not get community development fund from the MNCs.  At the 
moment, only Chevron and Shell have adopted this approach in the Niger Delta, 
although the other MNCs have less co-ordinated and fragmented MOUs with the 
individual communities where they operate.  
In 2005, CNL[Chevron Nigeria Limited] adopted a new approach to community 
engagement in the Niger Delta to improve local participation in determining the needs 
our programs should address. This model, called the Global Memorandum of 
Understanding, gives the communities greater roles in the management of their 
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development through newly created Regional Development Councils (RDCs). … 
Together, the memorandums have generated approximately 200 projects in more than 
400 communities, villages and chiefdoms and benefited some 600,000 community 
members.  (Chevron Nigeria 2011) 
A GMoU is an agreement signed between SPDC and a group – or cluster – of several 
communities. It brings those communities together with representatives of local and 
state governments, SPDC and non-profit organisations (development NGOs) in a 
decision-making committee. These committees – which are not controlled by SPDC – 
give communities greater control and ownership over their own development. … Under 
the terms of GMoUs, SPDC provides the committee … with secure funding for five 
years, ensuring that the communities have stable and reliable finances as they undertake 
their work. … Communities identify their own needs, decide how to spend the money, 
and implement projects by themselves (Shell Nigeria 2010: 1) 
 
In spite of the different community development initiatives implemented by the MNCs, 
the communities believe the oil companies are not doing enough for them. Some of the 
narratives of community stakeholders regarding community development expectations 
are presented below: 
They [MNCs] have not paid a dime to the community and they continue to acquire land 
day in day out. … To speak personally or collectively as a community they have done a 
little for us. They have been trying in the area of road maintenance. But something must 
be in your stomach; the area they are not doing anything is the area of employment 
(Personal Interview: Community Stakeholder 1) 
They [MNCs] should tar all the roads in the community. The second thing is that they 
should provide scholarships to our children. Third, to sustain our lives, they need to 
give us skill acquisition. This third one is necessary because the uneducated adults 
cannot benefit from scholarship because they can’t go to school, but the skill acquisition 
will help them to become productive to themselves as their primary means of livelihood 
has been destroyed by oil pollution. Again we don’t have good town hall, we don’t have 
play centre, and so on. These are some of the things they need to do for us. (Personal 
Interview: Community Stakeholder 6) 
 
Community stakeholders tend to also attribute disharmony between the communities 
and MNCs to the companies’ failure to match the development expectations of the 
communities. For example, one community stakeholder narrated that:  
But in a situation where there is a total harmony between them and the host 
communities, they [MNCs] will be drilling their well and at the same time the host 
community will be happy because they [MNCs] are giving them [communities] water, 
scholarships, building good roads, giving them hospitals, light and other incentives 
(Personal Interview: Community Stakeholder 3) 
 
However, from the corporate narratives below, the companies view these development 
expectations of communities as the primary responsibility of the government which the 
oil companies can only complement rather than assume responsibility for them:  
The oil and gas-rich Niger Delta contributes signiﬁcantly to the national treasury. The 
115 
 
tension that prevails in the region stems from complaints by local communities that 
there are not enough government projects and programs to promote economic 
development and improve living conditions in our host communities. As a result, 
communities are demanding that international oil companies step in and ﬁll this wide 
development gap. The pressure that should be directed at the government to encourage 
it to meet the fundamental needs of the people instead falls on oil companies, including 
EPNL [Elf Petroleum Nigeria Limited], which have only limited resources and leeway. 
(Total Environment and Society 2007: 48) 
 
Provision of infrastructure for citizens is the constitutional responsibility of 
government. Shell can only complement with social investment programmes. (Gloria 
Udoh, Shell Nigeria 2011a) 
  
The community stakeholders tend to put the oil companies in the position of the 
Government and so expect them to perform several roles of the state (see Frynas, 2005, 
2009). See, for example:  
The oil companies must accept that they owe responsibility to the host communities. 
Most times they tell you that it is not their responsibility. … and that they are not 
government. But they are the government that we are seeing because they are the ones 
taking away our God-given resources. Morally, they have an obligation that we should 
benefit from the fruit of what God has given to us. (Personal Interview: Community 
Stakeholder 4) 
 
Apart from the fact that the communities consider the oil companies as more proximate 
to them than the Government, they appear to also lay claim to the ownership of oil 
resources even though the Nigerian Constitution vested the ownership in the Nigerian 
Government. Community stakeholder 4 calls the oil “our God-given resources.” This 
line of argument also underlined the Ogoni Bill of Rights 1990 and The Kaiama 
Declaration 1998 by Ijaw Youth both seeking self-determination and autonomous 
control over Niger Delta oil resources. Apparently, community agitation for control 
over oil resources reinforces the claim that not only corporate environmental 
degradation and community development concerns are responsible for the conflicts 
between the oil companies and Niger Delta communities (Ikelegbe, 2005).   
 
Considering action-based accountability expectations of communities vis-a-vis 
community development projects, the communities believe the corporations are not 
doing enough for them contrary to the corporations’ view. However, this disagreement 
is only a matter of degree: whilst the MNCs believe they were doing enough to 
complement government responsibility, the communities think otherwise and apparently 
expect the MNCs to function in place of the ‘absentee Government.’  However, the 
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environmental expectations of the communities are inextricably linked to the activities 
of the MNCs. The issue is explored in the next subsection.  
6.6.2 Mitigation of environmental impacts 
According to Dillard (2011: 17), “organization should be held accountable for the 
nature, scope, and effectiveness of any programs and practices that have strategic and 
operational impacts on that community.” Whether the community is the immediate or 
larger society
72
, or the impact is environmental or social, it is expected that corporations 
should provide accounts of their impacts on the community. As much as the 
communities have concern over the environmental degradation occasioned by oil 
operations in the Niger Delta, the impact of corporate operations appears to be of 
importance to oil MNCs as discernible from their narratives:  
CNL has made the responsible management of environmental issues an integral part of 
its core business. The company limits environmental impact through continued 
application of superior technology in its drilling and seismic work. Chevron’s 
comprehensive environmental management system underpins higher environmental 
performance… The environmentally sensitive area is home to a number of endangered 
species, and CNL places the region’s environmental protection as a top priority 
(Chevron Nigeria 2010: 23) 
 
[E]ni assigns an important value to the environment explicitly citing it in its corporate 
mission. The protection of the environment is an essential part of its operations and 
goes beyond mere regulatory compliance (Eni For 2011: 35). 
 
We recognize our activities can impact host communities and other stakeholders. We 
strive to identify and avoid or mitigate negative impacts and enhance positive outcomes. 
At the start of major projects, an Environmental, Socioeconomic, and Health Impact 
Assessment (ESHIA) is conducted to assess the potential impacts of our activities 
throughout the project and operations life cycle. (ExxonMobil Corporate Citizenship 
Report 2010: 45) 
 
Shell Nigeria remains committed to minimising the impacts of its operations and 
activities on the environment. As in previous years, we continued efforts aimed at 
improving our environmental performance as part of our contribution to sustainable 
development. We improved our environmental stewardship and programmes in spite of 
the challenging operating environment (Shell Nigeria Annual Report 2006: 12) 
 
In a more distinctive manner, Total Nigeria considers the protection of the environment 
as part of its accountability to the civil society: 
Total is committed to growing its business based on shared values and common 
principles that clearly assert its ethical standards and accountability for all its 
                                                 
72
 It appears Dillard was referring to the society at large. However, it has been argued in the stakeholder 
literature that although the organisations operate in the society, their operations have impacts on 
stakeholders within the society (Clarkson, 1995).  
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businesses. In Particular, Total is accountable to: … The civil society: Total contributes 
to the social and economic development of the countries in which it operates, in 
compliance with local legislation and regulation. It is committed to protecting the 
environment and respecting local cultures. (Total Upstream Nigeria 2009a: 5) 
 
Also, the communities think that the oil companies know communities’ 
environmental expectations while some community members blame corporate 
environmental impacts on the indifference of Nigerian Government. 
They are aware of what the communities are passing through but they are adamant 
[resistant] to this demand because the government of the day doesn’t want to do the 
right thing. For example, in the Gulf of Mexico, when there was a spill, the president of 
America immediately ran to the place … expedited action on possible ways of 
containing the spill and paying adequate compensation to people. (Personal Interview: 
Community Stakeholder CS 3) 
 
Shell is supposed to meet their environmental responsibility to ensure that there is no 
spill and if there is, [there should be] quick intervention. … Shell has destroyed our 
natural resources, has destroyed our environment, they have destroyed us economically, 
socially and politically (Personal Interview: Community Stakeholder 10) 
The most important thing [concern of the communities] is the environmental aspect; 
there has been so much degradation of the environment. Just like what happened in 
Ogoni recently from the UNEP report, the reports says that it will take about thirty years 
to restore Ogoniland, but that is just a tip of the iceberg. … what Ogoni people are 
suffering is not more than what we are also suffering here. The difference is that their 
own has come to the limelight since the death of Ken Saro-Wiwa, so their issues have 
always been at the front burner. (Personal Interview: Community Stakeholder 4) 
6.7 Summary of findings and concluding remarks 
From the questionnaire analysis, it was reassuring that the respondents were broadly in 
agreement with each other and broadly in agreement with the literature on what 
constitutes accountability. This is because accountability is framed very generally. 
However, this slightly differs from the interview data which in some instances appear to 
conflate accountability with responsibility for actions rather than responsibility for 
providing information. Whilst the first questionnaire explored some of the attributes of 
accountability drawn from the literature, personal interviews, and readings of corporate 
reports, there seems to be strong agreement among the respondents from MNCs, 
indigenous corporations and regulatory agencies on these attributes. They almost 
unanimously agreed that accountability derives from a relationship between an 
accountor and accountee necessitating the accountor to provide information to the 
accountee as transparently as possible. Moreover, there was a strong agreement among 
the participants across the different stakeholder groups that the corporations owe social 
and environmental accountability to communities that are impacted by corporate actions 
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and that the engagement process that enables exchange of information between 
corporations and communities should be couched in simple language.  
 
Following the broad agreement of the stakeholders with the literature regarding what 
potentially constitutes accountability, the second questionnaire was used to obtain the 
views of the participating stakeholders on whether the corporations have a moral 
obligation to provide information to communities in order to explain and justify 
corporate actions that affect the communities (see Section 6.3.1 to 6.3.2). Virtually all 
the respondents across the different groups were in agreement that the communities 
have the moral rights to demand information from the corporations in respect of the 
(negative) impacts of corporate activities on communities. On the flip side, a large 
majority of all the respondents also concurred that the corporations have a moral 
obligation to provide information to communities in order to explain and justify 
corporate impact-inducing actions.  
 
Despite the wide agreement among the respondents that the communities have a moral 
right to receive information from corporations and that the corporations have a moral 
obligation to supply information to communities, many of the respondents relaxed those 
initial normative views and apparently privileged the law as the basis for accountability. 
Only the NGOs and MNCs groups recorded responses of 72% and 55% respectively in 
favour of accountability to communities, irrespective legal provisions; but less than 
50% of the regulators and indigenous companies were favourably disposed to this.    
 
Furthermore, the respondents across the four stakeholder groups identified the channels 
the MNCs should use to discharge accountability to the communities. A broad formal 
approach appears to be largely favoured by the respondents over the informal
73
. Whilst 
they also itemized the specific channels of accountability, fitting these individual 
channels into formal-informal continuum is apparently subjective. Engagement and the 
use of local and other media were preferred to corporate communication via annual 
reports and websites. Engagement and local and other media as media of 
communication may have been privileged over annual reports and web-based reports 
                                                 
73
 However, engagement and other local media as preferred channels of accountability are apparently 
more informal than formal (Dar, 2014). This appears to contradict the initial preference of formal forms 
of accountability over the informal.  
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due to the nature of these communities. A large number of the people are probably not 
literate and may not appreciate the more formal means of corporate communication 
such as annual reports and websites. Moreover access to internet
74
 is out of the reach of 
the communities except the large cities which are apparently ‘detached’ from these 
communities.   
 
Interestingly, from the review of corporate documents, the MNCs apparently link their 
conceptions of accountability to the notions of transparency in the provision of 
information, building trust, provision of information that potentially meets the needs of 
stakeholders as well as engagement with stakeholders.   Whilst transparency is found to 
be recurring in corporate narratives portraying it as constitutive of accountability, the 
extent to which transparency underlies corporate reports that give general idea about 
how corporate accountability manifests is unclear (see Roberts, 2009).  
 
In conclusion, based on the questionnaire analysis, this Chapter suggests that the 
stakeholders are broadly in agreement with the literature on what constitutes 
accountability and that the MNCs have moral obligation to be accountable to the 
communities. Although some of the interview participants viewed accountability as the 
provision of information, others apparently conflated accountability with responsibility. 
The latter suggests that the communities would consider the corporations accountable 
when the manifested actions (not necessarily corporate information provision) meet 
community expectations in two broad areas: community development and mitigation of 
environmental impacts. This action-based accountability articulation is the privileging 
of substance over form, where ‘substance’ represents the actual manifestation of 
expected actions and ‘form’ represents reporting about these actions. This suggests that 
form can only be valuable if it is consistent with the substance to which it relates (see 
Christmann & Taylor, 2006).   Evidence from the corporate reports also crudely 
suggests that the MNCs have accountability obligations to the communities, at least in 
respect of pollution that potentially creates negative impacts on communities. Whilst 
this may be consistent with the views of proponents of stakeholder accountability 
(Brown & Fraser, 2006; Gray, et al., 1997; Cooper & Owen, 2007), it is different to the 
                                                 
74
 For example, Unerman & Bennett (2004) reported that Nigerian households’ access to internet in year 
2000 stood at about 0.08%, which makes internet a largely inappropriate medium of stakeholder 
dialogue in such country.   
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views of some other scholars (Heath, 2006; Sternberg, 1997, 2004). Categorically, 
Sternberg’s (2004) view is that corporations can only at best be responsive to non-
shareholder stakeholders and not to be accountable to them.  
 
Having explored the conceptions of accountability by the stakeholders and MNCs vis-à-
vis the oil and gas MNCs’ relationship with communities hosting their operations in 
Nigeria in order to answer research question one, the next Chapter explores how the 
MNCs manifest accountability (transparently) with respect to gas flaring and oil spill 
environmental incidents.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
MNCs’ accounts about environmental incidents 
7.1. Introduction 
The previous Chapter analysed the views of MNCs and stakeholders on their 
conceptions of accountability in general and MNCs’ accountability to communities. All 
the different groups broadly agreed with each other and the accountability literature 
over what constitutes accountability and that accountability derives from moral 
obligation but more subtly the rule of law was apparently a dominant view. It was also 
found that accountability could relate to information provision, engagement with 
stakeholders and actions necessary to meet stakeholders’ expectations. This Chapter 
builds on the conceptions of accountability by exploring how the MNCs manifest 
accountability with respect to gas flaring and oil spill environmental incidents in order 
to answer the second research question of this thesis. Basically, the types of account the 
corporations construct about these incidents are expected to enrich our understanding of 
how accountability manifests in a specific context. Accounts are linked to accountability 
as Messner (2009: 927) eloquently argued that:  
I cannot claim to account and at the same time argue that there is no need to account. 
Once I account, I have entered the logic of accountability, implicitly agreeing there is a 
legitimate need to give an account. 
 
Moreover, Everett (2003: 79) argues that “[a]n understanding of accountability needs to 
begin with a look at the notion of the “account”, an official form of “story” or 
“narrative”.” In this regard, this Chapter provides answer to the research question: 
“How do the oil and gas MNCs in Nigeria manifest accountability with respect to gas 
flaring and oil spill environmental incidents?” Whist this is done by analysing the 
MNCs’ constructed accounts about gas flaring and oil spills environmental incidents, 
Chapter eight will analyse stakeholders’ narratives about these environmental issues. 
Following this introduction is Section 7.2 which briefly outlines the analytical method 
and the sources of data (cf. Chapter Five), whilst Section 7.3 explains the procedures for 
the textual analysis. Sections 7.4 and 7.5 focus on the textual analysis of MNCs’ 
accounts about gas flaring and oil spills respectively based on the account-giving 
heuristic framework outlined in Section 7.2. Finally, Section 7.6 summarises the 
findings and provides concluding remarks.  
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7.2 Analytical method and sources of data   
With accountability being the principal theoretical foundation for this thesis, I found it 
increasingly helpful to employ the `account-giving heuristic framework’ developed by 
Bradford & Garrett, 1995 (see also Eweje & Wu, 2010; Ketola, 2006; Szwajkowski, 
1992) to analyse the different accounts constructed by the oil MNCs in respect of gas 
flaring and oil spill environmental incidents. These MNCs’ accounts form the basis of 
analysing the claims or counter-claims provided by the stakeholders as alternative 
narratives (Chapter Eight). The account-giving framework develops four broad accounts 
(denial, excuse, justification and concession) an organisation could construct in respect 
of any adverse incident allegedly associated with its actions or operations (Chapter 
Three). According to the framework, a denial suggests that such incident does not occur 
or does not arise from the corporation’s operations, whilst excuse suggests that the 
adverse incident is outside the organisation’s control. Furthermore, justification 
suggests that the standards stakeholders use to assess the adverse incident are 
inappropriate whilst concession suggests that the organisation accepts responsibility 
(blameworthiness, culpability) for the adverse incident and consequently apologises for 
such outcome. These analyses are done by utilising texts from corporate documents 
(including websites) and public domains.     
 
The corporate documents comprise annual sustainability or CSR reports - or the like, as 
different companies use different nomenclatures - of the five selected MNCs (Chevron, 
Eni, ExxonMobil, Shell and Total) over a seven-year period covering 2006 – 2012 as 
well as other accessible reports published by any of these MNCs specific to their 
Nigerian operations. This period coincided with the ‘moving’ deadlines to eliminate gas 
flaring and intensity of alleged oil theft/sabotage and Government’s amnesty 
programme targeted to placate Niger Delta militants so that oil production could 
continue unhindered. Appendix 7A provides a summary of the number of corporate 
reports reviewed. These reports and disclosures reflect the MNCs’ explanations and 
justifications vis-à-vis these adverse corporate environmental incidents. In addition to 
the analysis of corporate documents, information the corporations provided online 
(particularly their websites) also formed part of the data analysed. As gas flaring and oil 
spills by their nature create adverse social and environmental impacts resulting in public 
criticisms of these MNCs, it will be germane to explore stakeholders’ alternative views 
vis-à-vis the accounts and apparent defences provided by the MNCs (Chapter Eight). 
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Such cross-referencing is important as organisations could make disclosures to manage 
impression on adverse incidents of this nature or public criticisms (see Bebbington, 
Larrinaga, and Moneva, 2008; Beelitz and Merkl-Davies, 2012; Benoit, 1997; Benoit & 
Czerwinski, 1997; Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2014; Samkin & Schneider, 2010).  
 
Data were also sourced from public or third party independent documents such as 
publications by social and environmental NGOs, news media and other commentators. 
News on gas flaring and oil spills published by news media and other independent 
agencies were obtained principally via Factiva online database and google search (see 
Adams, 2004; Dey, 2007; Gray, et al., 2014). Factiva provides news from both licensed 
and free sources such as Dow Jones, Reuters, Associated Press, All Africa Global 
Media, McGraw-Hill Inc., Wall Street Journal, The Oil and Gas Journal, Business Wire, 
etc. These data from independent sources are used to compare, contrast, or even critique 
the disclosures made by the MNCs regarding these adverse environmental incidents in 
Chapters seven and eight (Adams, 2004). Where necessary, references are also made to 
Government documents such as NNPC statistical bulletin and relevant regulations. 
Fundamentally, the utility of the corporate and public texts hinges on their systematic 
collection, collation, and extraction (cf. Chapter Five). The next section outlines the 
procedures followed for the textual analysis.  
7.3 Procedures for the textual analysis 
A two-layered procedure was followed to analyse the texts evidence using Nvivo 
software for managing the data coding and collation. The first layer was to first code the 
evidence according to the four broad categories of account-giving heuristic framework 
earlier outlined. In order to ensure an in-depth and fine-grained analysis of the 
disclosures under these four broad categories, more nuanced textual themes were 
identified and developed within each category as much as the data permitted. These 
further themes are based on semiotic analysis which assists in using information 
provided by the MNCs to create a snapshot within the account-giving heuristic 
framework categories based on the particular context and nature of the disclosures (see 
Bebbington, 1999). By semiotic analysis we mean “an approach to the analysis of 
documents and other phenomena that emphasizes the importance of seeking out the 
deeper meaning of those phenomena” (Bryman, 2008: 698).  An important advantage of 
semiotic analysis is that it helps in generating rich textual categories as “the process 
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which produced the categories is best described as being interactive and reflexive” 
(Bebbington, 1999: 208). Semiotic analysis enables a reflexive evaluation of texts as 
signs which have link with signifiers and the signified (Bryman, 2008; Chandler, 2007).  
According to Chandler (2007: 14), the signifier and signified respectively represent “the 
form that the sign takes” and “the concept to which it refers”. For example, whilst 
textually constructed accounts are signifiers, what they signified can be explored 
through a reflexive process.  Essentially, things are interpreted “by relating them to 
familiar systems of conventions” (Chandler, 2007: 13). By relating this to the context of 
account-giving heuristic framework, each identifiable theme of the MNCs’ constructed 
accounts represents a signifier and what is signified by each of those themes reflects the 
nature of any of the four categories of denial, excuse, justification and concession. In 
coding the texts, the development of the more nuanced textual themes provided the 
opportunity to read and re-read in detail the evidence coded to the four broad account-
giving categories to avoid mismatches between the evidences and the categories to 
which they were assigned. However, these procedures do not involve the teasing out of 
the MNCs’ sense-making embedded in their accounts about these adverse 
environmental incidents as this will be explored in Chapter nine. 
 
Prior to detailed reading to gather the evidence in support of each category of the 
account-giving heuristic framework and the nuanced themes, the different portions of 
the corporate reports that mentioned gas flaring and oil spills were identified using PDF 
document search tool as the corporate documents are in PDF downloaded format. Laine 
(2005), for example, used similar search tool in his study that explored how Finnish 
listed corporations constructed sustainable development in their annual reports. In order 
to avoid the possibility of missing useful data, the search was done by modifying the 
root words ‘flare’ for gas flaring and ‘spill’ for oil spill. Whilst gas flaring was located 
by words such as ‘flare,’ ‘flares,’ ‘flared,’ ‘flaring,’ ‘emit’ and ‘emissions’ using the 
PDF advanced search tool, oil spill was located by words such as ‘spill,’ ‘spills,’ 
‘spilled,’ ‘spilling,’ ‘spillage’ and ‘spillages.’ Additional words used to locate oil spill  
are ‘leak’, ‘leaks’, ‘leaked’, ‘leakage’, and ‘leakages’. The passages where these texts 
were located were read in context as to identify which relate to Nigeria. Appendices 7B 
and 7C show tables specifying the number of times gas flaring and oil spills were 
mentioned in the corporate social reports vis-à-vis each MNC’s global and Nigerian 
125 
 
operations. The next section analyses the MNCs’ constructed accounts on gas flaring 
based on the account-giving heuristic framework.      
7.4 MNCs’ accounts about gas flaring incident 
As outlined in section 7.2, denials, excuses, justifications and concessions are the four 
broad analytical categorisations adopted in this Chapter to chart the textual analysis 
from which other textual themes are identified and developed. This analytical heuristic 
theoretically suggests that the accountor will likely provide accounts about an adverse 
incident as an attempt to persuade a given audience of the accountor’s point of view 
(Bradford & Gareth, 1995) and to possibly manage impressions (Benoit, 1995; 1997). 
The analyses based on these categories are provided as follows.   
7.4.1 Denials 
All the MNCs for this study – Chevron, Eni, ExxonMobil, Shell and Total – mentioned 
gas flaring in their respective reports, although Shell disclosed gas flaring information 
more than the other MNCs. However, the levels of disclosures do not necessarily 
correlate with the actual incidences of gas flared by each MNC. Despite stakeholders’ 
criticisms of these MNCs over gas flaring in Niger Delta (cf. Chapter Eight), there was 
no evidence found in the reviewed corporate and independent public documents 
suggesting the MNCs’ outright denial of the occurrence of gas flaring incident in the 
region. Moreover, there was no evidence that the MNCs were not the direct or indirect 
cause of gas flaring. The literature suggests that a corporation should use denial when it 
can furnish convincing evidence that it was not the cause of the adverse incident 
(Bradford & Garrett, 1995; Eweje & Wu, 2010; Garrett, et al., 1989).  There are 
basically two apparent reasons the MNCs could not deploy denial account to explain 
and justify gas flaring incident in Nigeria. First, gas flaring occurs solely from the 
operations of oil corporations; second, the MNCs produce over 90% of Nigerian oil and 
gas. Notwithstanding admitting occurrence of gas flaring from their Nigerian 
operations, the MNCs use excuse accounts to deflect responsibility for it. 
7.4.2 Excuses 
In the context of this analysis as earlier highlighted, an excuse occurs in disclosure when 
the reporting entity claims it lacks control over gas flaring incident and seeks to absolve 
itself of the related responsibility. The various excuses used by the MNCs are now 
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presented and analysed below. 
7.4.2.1 Funding shortfalls  
According to a European Parliament sponsored study, one of the major challenges 
facing the effort to stop gas flaring relates to who should bear the costs (European 
Parliament, 2011: 23).  One of the principal arguments the MNCs give for their extant 
gas flaring in Nigeria is the funding shortfalls from Nigerian Government required to 
acquire Associated Gas-Gathering (AGG) technology. This argument is premised on the 
fact that project funding is shared on an equity basis between the partners of the joint 
ventures (JVs) operated by the MNCs (although the Nigerian Government’s75equity is 
between 55 and 60%).  Some accounts the MNCs give regarding the funding shortfalls 
argument are as follows:  
While we have made significant progress in reducing routine flaring and venting from 
our operations, we face many challenges, including … partner funding … In these 
limited circumstances, flaring is currently the safest and most feasible way to manage 
the associated gas in the near term.” (Chevron Corporate Responsibility Report 2008: 
14, 16) 
 
Our operations in Nigeria continue to be the largest source of ﬂaring among our 
operations globally. To eliminate routine gas ﬂaring in Nigeria, we are investing more 
than $4 billion in gas utilization and commercialization projects. Progress on these 
projects is challenged by … partner funding [i.e. NNPC, which holds 60% equity in the 
JV] (ExxonMobil Corporate Citizenship Report 2007: 18) 
 
In 2000 the SPDC joint venture (JV) began an ongoing multi-year program to install 
equipment to capture gas from its facilities. This program has been delayed by events 
outside SPDC’s control, such as funding shortfalls from NNPC (the government-owned 
majority shareholder of the JV). (Shell Nigeria 2011b: 1; see also Shell Sustainability 
Reports 2006 – 2011) 
 
Eni and Total did not make any disclosures with respect to funding shortfalls. 
According to Shell, it had to lend money to the Nigerian Government to meet the 
Government’s counterpart fund in AGG project (Shell Sustainability Report 2009: 12). 
The above narratives signify that the failure to eliminate gas flaring largely lie on the 
Nigerian Government. However, Shell claimed that:   
SPDC and its joint venture partners are committed to ending the routine ﬂaring of gas as 
soon as possible and are working towards that goal (Shell Nigeria 2011b: 1). 
 
Whilst the previous claims apparently cast doubt on Nigerian Government’s 
commitment to ending gas flaring, the MNCs’ narratives in more recent years suggest 
                                                 
75 The Government’s interests on the JVs are represented by NNPC.  
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Government’s renewed financial commitment to ending gas flaring (see Chevron 
Nigeria 2012: 30; Eni for 2012: 17; Shell Sustainability Report 2011: 18; 2012: 23; 
Shell Nigeria 2013). However, it is yet unclear how and when these recent claims will 
ultimately translate into zero-flare in the Niger Delta considering the MNCs’ excuse of 
underdeveloped gas market in Nigeria.  
7.4.2.2 Underdeveloped gas market and gas infrastructure 
All the MNCs disclosed that gas flaring has continued in Nigeria and other African 
countries due to non-availability of developed gas markets. However, the accounts on 
lack of market and infrastructure appear to be in conflict with the funding narrative. 
From a business economic perspective, a lack of market intuitively creates a 
disincentive to project investment.  Some accounts on lack of gas market and 
infrastructure are presented as follows:  
[Gas flaring is] The burning or release of natural gas that is often produced in 
association with crude oil, a process that typically occurs when there is no market or 
onsite use for the gas (Chevron Corporate Responsibility Report, 2010: 44)  
 
Commercial alternatives for associated gas require a business environment with the 
right conditions, including available markets … Gas is ﬂared only when all options to 
utilize the associated gas have been exhausted. (ExxonMobil Corporate Citizenship 
Report 2009:31) 
 
When The Shell Development Company of Nigeria Limited (SPDC) ﬁrst built many of 
its production facilities in the 1950s, there was little demand or market for gas in many 
parts of the world, including Nigeria. So, associated gas (AG) was usually burned off 
safely – a process called ﬂaring (Shell Nigeria 2011b: 1)  
 
However, Eni disclosed how it channelled a large quantity of its hitherto flared gas 
towards electricity generation with a further claim that nearly 100 million Nigerians 
lack access to electricity
76
 (Eni For 2011; 64). While Eni’s account below suggests that 
the Nigerian electricity sector is a potentially untapped market for gas utilisation, it also 
suggests MNCs’ lack of investment interest in it because of short-term economic 
emphasis and partly that it is not their core business
77
:  
Normally oil companies don’t like to produce electricity, because you get paid in local 
currency while oil is paid in dollars and this is a regulated business and the price can be 
                                                 
76 Nigeria’s current electricity generation capacity for its over 160 million people is less than 4,000 
megawatts resulting in a near constant total blackout in the country, while South Africa with a 
population of about 52 million people has, according to South African Department of Energy, electricity 
generation capacity of about 45,000 megawatts.   
77 Whilst core business argument might be logical, it does not relieve the companies from the 
responsibility of eliminating gas flaring.  
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changed overnight … We found that power generation is the most concrete way to 
match the ﬁght against pollution and CO2 emissions, industrial development and, by 
the way, giving also a reasonable return on investment (Eni Sustainability Report 2009: 
V. Emphasis added). 
7.4.2.3 Security challenges and government bureaucracy 
The companies also used security challenges as an excuse account for their routine gas 
flaring in Nigeria to further highlight how routine gas flaring was outside their control. 
However, it is unclear how this challenge affects the companies’ effort to eliminate gas 
flaring having regard to their previous excuses of funding and market constraints.  
To eliminate routine gas ﬂaring in Nigeria, we are investing more than $4 billion in gas 
utilization and commercialization projects. Progress on these projects is challenged by 
… security issues … (ExxonMobil Corporate Citizenship Report 2007: 18) 
 
The reduction in ﬂaring in 2006 and 2007 was due to production being shut in. We 
remain committed to ending continuous ﬂaring. The needed repairs and construction 
work will restart once we have safe access to sites and stable funding (Shell 
Sustainability Report 2007: 25). 
 
Moreover, the MNCs have also blamed persistent gas flaring on Government’s delay in 
contract approval process. For example:  
 While we have made significant progress in reducing routine flaring and venting from 
our operations, we face many challenges, including local security, approval delays … 
(Chevron Corporate Responsibility Report 2008: 14) 
 
This program [installation of gas-gathering equipment] has been delayed by events 
outside SPDC’s control, such as … security concerns which meant it was not safe for 
staff to work in large parts of the delta for long periods of time; and delays in NNPC 
contract approval processes (Shell Nigeria 2011b: 1)  
 
From my experience, although the security situation in the Niger Delta
78
 is worrying, it 
is unclear how it could halt the MNCs’ effort to develop AGG projects as they and the 
Government use the armed forces to monitor and restrain outsiders from oil facilities. 
Moreover, it was not discernible from the corporate reports whether delays in contract 
approval related to all their business contracts or only oil facilities aimed at minimising 
environmental impacts on society. As there was no disclosure evidence in the MNCs’ 
reports that they could not meet their other business obligations due to delays in 
contract approvals, it suggests that the contract approval delays were peculiar to gas 
                                                 
78
 Commentators have alleged that such a challenge stemmed from oil-induced environmental 
degradation in the Niger Delta and the neglect of the region by the government despite the region being 
the cash cow of the Nigerian economy (See Chapter Four). 
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flaring projects. If this claim by the MNCs has substance, it potentially casts doubts 
over whether they and the Government are really committed to eliminating gas flaring.  
7.4.2.4 Community migration 
Among the five MNCs, Shell disclosed that communities migrated to where flare 
facilities were located because of economic opportunities as shown below:  
In general, ﬂares were originally located away from where people were living. 
However, attracted by economic opportunities, communities have since grown around 
some areas of our operations. SPDC ﬂares are designed to be clean (smokeless) and in 
walled environments with no radiation (Shell Nigeria 2011b: 2) 
 
This excuse suggests that oil facilities that cause gas flaring were located far away from 
communities, perhaps, to avoid the potential harm gas flaring might cause people living 
near it. However, it is unclear from the above account whether Shell’s siting of the 
facilities far away from communities is an admission that gas flaring potentially causes 
harm; however, a further claim by the company that its flares are clean, smokeless and 
without radiation suggests otherwise. It is therefore unclear how this ‘clean flare’ 
argument will likely strengthen the MNCs’ commitment to eliminate gas flaring and 
how the accounts on funding, government bureaucracy, insecurity and market excuses 
will be convincing when compared with the ‘clean flare’ argument.  In addition to 
excuse accounts, the MNCs equally deployed justification accounts to explain and 
justify gas flaring incidents.  
7.4.3 Justifications  
With respect to gas flaring environmental pollution, the MNCs not only construct 
accounts of excuses to signify they have no control over the incident, but also used 
justification to signify that stakeholders applied inappropriate criteria to assess 
corporate performance on gas flaring. A justification account does not deny that the 
adverse incident arises from corporate operations, but faults the appropriateness of the 
standards stakeholders use to evaluate the incident. Justification may include, for 
example, appeal to higher authority (e.g., law and institutional norms) and minimization 
of injury (Ketola 2006; Szwajkowski, 1992).  Minimization of injury would suggest that 
the impacts of the adverse incidents are exaggerated by stakeholders. An appeal to 
higher authority might suggest that the corporations comply with certain legal 
regulations or industry best practices (or institutional norms).  On this basis, a critical 
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review of the corporate texts revealed four themes under the justification account-giving 
category: Government authorisation, legal compliance, operational safety measure and 
expert opinion. The MNCs’ use of justification appears to be compelled by criticisms 
from NGOs and Niger Delta communities for allegedly exposing the communities and 
communities’ fragile environment to adverse environmental impacts (cf. Chapter Eight). 
Various themes found under justification account-giving category are now analysed in 
turn.   
7.4.3.1 Government authorisation and indifference 
One form of justification that draws on appeal to authority is the MNCs’ account that 
Government authorisation contributes to routine gas flaring in the Niger Delta. The 
following gas flaring accounts illustrate the Government authorisation and indifference 
justification claim by the MNCs:  
The only way to end ﬂaring at ﬂare sites without AGG equipment would be to stop oil 
production. This decision cannot be made by SPDC without direct support from other 
JV partners, including the government-owned majority partner NNPC. In a letter dated 
31 December 2008, the government directed SPDC and other oil companies to continue 
with production (and therefore ﬂaring) until instructed otherwise (Shell Nigeria 2011b: 
1; See also Shell Sustainability Report 2009: 12)  
 
The above claim contradicts and casts doubt over the MNCs’ accounts about 
Government commitment to ending gas flaring (cf Section 7.4.2.1). As crude oil is the 
mainstay of Nigeria economy, a Nigerian High Court in 1973 relied on this political 
economy factor to throw out a case (Irou v. Shell BP
79
) in which the plaintiff was 
seeking the Court to restrain the company from polluting the environment, farmlands, 
and fish ponds of their communities. The Court ruled that to grant such an injunction 
would mean to stop oil production which is the mainstay of Nigerian economy. Implicit 
in this line of reasoning is Nigerian Government’s complicity in and/or indifference to 
the environmental degradation of Niger Delta
80. This apparently corroborates Eni’s 
claim below that African Governments (Nigeria included) are not sincere about their 
talk to stop gas flaring:  
Flaring is a major issue and Governments all over Africa are trying to set a deadline for 
it. They make declarations about the need to stop ﬂaring by – for example – 2010, but 
they don’t follow through with actions to reduce this practice, so that they are forced to 
postpone the deadline (Eni Sustainability Report, 2009: V)  
                                                 
79
 Suit No W/89/91, Warri High Court 26/11/73.  
80 This contrasts with Ecuadorian Government that supported its people in their fight to hold Chevron 
liable for negative environmental impacts caused by Chevron’s operations (Buccina, et al., 2013). 
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If these claims made by the MNCs about the attitude of the Government towards effort 
to end gas flaring are correct, it suggests that the MNCs and Nigerian Government are 
probably not compatible partners in JVs since the MNCs’ ‘disposition’ contrasts with 
the Government’s ‘indifference’ to stop gas flaring. According to Steiner (2010: 42), the 
Managing Director of Shell Nigeria in 2007 claimed that: “the Nigerian government 
does not share Shell’s commitment to environmental stewardship, and thus has been 
resistant to [m]ost of Shell’s budget requests to upgrade the system [oil facilities]” 
(Emphasis added). However, Shell disclosed it divested from a JV in 2003 because of 
its incompatibility with Shell’s Business Principles (Shell Sustainability Report 2012: 
37)
81
. But it is unclear why the JVs between the MNCs and Nigerian Government 
continue to thrive despite the alleged or implicit incompatibility of these partners vis-à-
vis environmental stewardship. Moreover, as ExxonMobil is one of the major operators 
of JVs that flare gas in Nigeria, it is equally unclear whether such a practice or 
behaviour is compatible with its global ethical policy having claimed that:  
We establish operations only in places where we are able to abide by our Standards 
(ExxonMobil Corporate Citizenship Report 2007: 42).  
 
Another justification account found in the reviewed corporate disclosures is legal 
compliance. By making references to Government authorisation and legal compliance, 
the corporations’ accounts allude to appeals to higher authority which to them should be 
the criteria for judging their actions.  
7.4.3.2 Legal compliance    
Both corporations and stakeholders have also linked gas flaring discourse in the Niger 
Delta to legal provisions. Although Nigerian Associated Gas Re-injection Act of 1979 
abolished gas flaring with effect from 1984, it empowered the Minister of Petroleum 
Resources to grant discretionary licence to oil companies to flare gas at a small penalty 
fee (see also Section 3.8.8.1of EGASPIN
82
 2002). This exception to the law apparently 
appeals more to the economic interest of the oil corporations and has become one of 
their criteria for defending gas flaring.  
                                                 
81
 As Shell did not provide sufficient information as to why it divested from such JV, its divestment might 
be due to more stringent regulations introduced by the country. According to Naughton (2014), MNCs 
divest from host/home countries when environmental regulations are increased. 
82 Environmental Guidelines and Standards for the Petroleum Industry in Nigeria  
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Where SPDC continues to ﬂare, it complies with the law. The Minister for Petroleum 
has the power to permit companies to ﬂare on agreed terms and conditions. The only 
way to end ﬂaring at ﬂare sites without AGG equipment would be to stop oil 
production. This decision cannot be made by SPDC without direct support from other 
JV partners, including the government-owned majority partner NNPC (Shell Nigeria 
2011b: 2) 
 
Whilst only Shell directly disclosed that it flared gas in compliance with the law, Eni 
and Total disclosed gas flaring penalty fees they paid to Nigerian Government (Eni 
Sustainability Report 2006: 96, 2007: 51; Total Nigeria Corporate Social Responsibility 
Report 2008: 20). ExxonMobil and Chevron made no disclosures in this respect. As all 
the MNCs flare gas in Nigeria according to the evidence in NNPC statistical bulletin 
and the companies’ sustainability reports, their payment of penalty fees implies their 
compliance with the gas flaring law. The legal compliance as claimed by Shell (and 
apparently by other MNCs) relates to the exception given under the Associated Gas Re-
Injection Act 1979 that empowers the Minister of Petroleum Resources to grant oil 
companies concession in peculiar circumstances to flare gas, rather than compliance 
with the substantive part of the law which abrogates gas flaring altogether. 
 
Based on legal compliance justification account, the companies signify they are 
conforming to the law which permits them to flare gas under some circumstances. 
However, none of the reports alluding to legal compliance stated whether they complied 
with the circumstances and thresholds permitted by the law. Whilst Shell claimed it 
complied with the law to flare gas, Eni and Total recounted their payment of gas flaring 
penalty fees required by the law. Their argument apparently resonates with Roscoe’s 
(2014: 7) analogy about the economic-driven agent: “once I have paid the charge for 
pollution I am free, and I can pollute as much as I wish, so long as I continue to do so. 
Payment, like caricature of confession, absolves one of all further responsibility.” 
 
However, the issue of compliance with the law is difficult to establish as there are 
several claims by stakeholders (Chapter Eight) that: the law is weak, the law is not 
enforced, MNCs’ threat against enforcement of the law, Government conflict of interest, 
and so on. Moreover, whereas the MNCs claim they transparently disclose their 
payments to Government in respect of gas flaring penalties in compliance with NEITI
83
 
provisions (See Eni Sustainability Report, 2006, 2007), the Government, media, 
                                                 
83 Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
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politicians have alleged that the gas flaring data provided by the MNCs to which the 
penalty fees relate are understated, inaccurate and/or unclear (see, Femi Asu, 
BusinessDay Newspaper, 11 September 2013; European Parliament, 2011: 22; IHS 
Global Insight Daily Analysis, 13 March 2012; Ribadu Report, 2012). Another account 
of justification is that gas flaring is an operational safety measure.  
7.4.3.3 Operational safety measure 
The flaring of gas has also been regarded as one of the safety measures of protecting 
people and environment during oil production.  However, the companies did not 
mention the thresholds where such burning off becomes a threat to people living near 
the flare even though the MNCs  acknowledge in Section 7.4.4.1 that gas flaring causes 
global climate change and [negative] environmental impacts. Examples of accounts 
portraying operational safety as a rationale for flaring gas are as follows:   
In locations where there is no market for the gas, a common historical practice has been 
to flare the gas so that it does not pose a hazard to workers or residents near the 
operations (Chevron Corporate Responsibility Report 2012: 17). 
 
[W]e ﬂare or vent this gas either as a safety measure or as a means of disposal when 
there are no economic means of capturing and using it. (ExxonMobil Corporate 
Citizenship Report, 2012: 30; also 2008: 33) 
 
[I]t is important to distinguish between continuous flaring and the occasional burning of 
small amounts of gas, which will often be necessary for safety during operations … and 
for other operational reasons (Shell Nigeria 2013a: 1) 
 
However, these justification accounts by the MNCs did not give the figures for 
operational (or occasional/unavoidable) flaring and continuous/avoidable flaring. So it 
is difficult to know the amount of, say, avoidable and unavoidable gas flaring, and the 
thresholds for avoidable flaring. However, Shell’s account below at least shows that gas 
flaring as a safety measure is not a global practice:   
By 2008 we had effectively ended continuous flaring everywhere outside Nigeria. Only 
five sites outside Nigeria … still continuously flare for technical or safety reasons. 
(Shell Sustainability Report 2008: 29) 
7.4.3.4 Expert opinions 
Expert opinion was also found as a form of appeal to authority in giving account about 
gas flaring. It is a justification account that relies on expert opinion to dismiss the 
alleged negative impacts of gas flaring, albeit with contradictions. Whereas Shell relied 
on a World Bank report to claim that gas flaring has harmless impacts on people and the 
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immediate environment, Total presented a contrasting account:  
The World Bank published a report in 1995 ‘Deﬁning an Environmental Strategy for 
the Niger Delta’, which found that the environmental and health impact of gas ﬂaring 
was low and that Nigeria’s oil (and therefore gas) has some of the lowest sulphur levels 
in the world. The report concluded that any negative effects of ﬂaring were conﬁned to 
the immediate vicinity of the ﬂare and would have little or no impact on the health of 
the local population (Shell in Nigeria 2011b: 2; [see also Shell Nigeria Annual Report 
2006: 14 for Shell’s reference to witness testimonies and experts’ evidence to dismiss 
communities’ claim in a Court Case that gas flaring was hazardous to their health and a 
violation of their right to life])  
 
Gas flaring in the Oil and Gas operations is one of the major concerns world-wide. 
Climatic change with the attendant human and natural consequences is one of the direct 
effects of Gas flaring (Total Upstream Nigeria 2010: 54). 
 
Shell’s reference to 'witness testimonies, experts’ evidence or cross-examination' in a 
Court Case that ordered Shell to stop gas flaring and its attendant impacts on a group of 
communities in Niger Delta (Shell Nigeria Annual Report 2006: 14) suggests that the 
communities and the Court did not use an appropriate standard to evaluate and judge the 
impact of gas flaring incident. Shell’s recent account still held the above World Bank’s 
view in high authority (see Detheridge & Pepple, 1998; Shell Nigeria 2013a) albeit 
available contrasting scientific findings (see All Africa Global Media, 14 January 2010; 
Ecumenical Council for Corporate Responsibility Bulletin, March 2011; UNDP, 2006: 
185-186).  
 
Shell’s conclusion based on a single World Bank report apparently casts doubt over its 
air quality assessment in the Niger Delta communities hosting its facilities, albeit its 
claims that it meets the regulatory standards and regularly submits air quality reports to 
DPR (Shell Nigeria 2011a; Shell Nigeria 2011b: 2). This apparently suggests that a 
company meets air quality regulatory standards by submitting reports to the regulators. 
However, my observation during my field work in 2012 contrasts this 2011 account as I 
observed the gas flaring sites of Shell (at Obigbo, Rivers State, Nigeria) and Agip 
(Ebocha, Rivers State, Nigeria) with visible fire and thick black smoke. In addition to 
denial, excuse and justification, a corporation could use concession account to provide 
explanations about adverse incidents.  
7.4.4 Concessions 
Despite the pervasive use of excuses and justifications to construct accounts about gas 
flaring incidents, the MNCs also construct accounts of concession. Two concession 
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accounts evident in the reviewed corporate texts are the MNCs’ acceptance that gas 
flaring creates adverse environmental impacts and that they flare gas more in Nigeria 
than elsewhere.  
7.4.4.1 Gas flaring creates adverse impacts 
All the oil MNCs admitted that gas flaring causes negative impacts on the environment 
as presented below:  
When associated with oil production, these resources are burnt in the atmosphere (gas 
ﬂaring), with signiﬁcant impacts on the environment (Eni Sustainability Report 2008: 
23) 
 
Today, most people agree that continuous flaring of associated gas must be reduced      
significantly. It contributes to greenhouse gases that cause climate change (Shell 
Nigeria 2011b: 1) 
 
Gas flaring in the Oil and Gas operations is one of the major concerns worldwide. 
Climatic change with the attendant human and natural consequences is one of the direct 
effects of Gas flaring. (Total Upstream Nigeria 2010: 54) 
7.4.4.2 More gas is flared in Nigerian operations 
Another concession account of the MNCs on gas flaring is in their admission that they 
flare gas more in Nigerian than elsewhere.  
Our operations in Nigeria continue to be the largest source of ﬂaring among our 
operations globally (ExxonMobil Corporate Citizenship Report 2007: 18). 
 
Around 80% of this continuous flaring took place in Nigeria (Shell Sustainability 
Report 2011: 29) 
 
Chevron, Eni and Total did not disclose whether their Nigerian operations accounted for 
their highest flare of gas globally. Even though all the MNCs did not disclose they flare 
gas more in Nigeria than elsewhere, their ratios of gas flared to gas produced in Nigeria 
between 2001 and 2010 according to NNPC Statistical Bulletin are quite significant (see 
Appendix 4C). Although the MNCs admit they flare more gas in Nigeria than elsewhere 
and strive to eliminate it through investment, this, at best, still represents partial 
concession considering their excuses that suggest they are not blameworthy for gas 
flaring (cf. Section 7.4.2). Notwithstanding excuses accounts the MNCs construct to 
absolve themselves of blame for gas flaring, they provide information on their strategies 
and investments to eliminate it (See quote below). Indeed, the data in Appendix 4C 
suggest a downward trend in the amount of gas flared in Nigeria, which appear to 
correlate with the MNCs’ claims about their increasing investment in AGG 
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technologies. For example:   
In 2012, SPDC announced planned additional investment of around $4 billion on 
projects to develop new oil and gas fields that will include gas-gathering facilities. 
These facilities will also help reduce flaring further by processing gas from other SPDC 
fields that is currently flared. Once these projects are completed, SPDC’s flaring 
intensity is expected to be below the current global industry average (Shell 
Sustainability Report 2012: 23; see also Chevron Corporate Responsibility Report 2006: 
30; Eni Sustainability Report 2009: 13, 72; ExxonMobil Corporate Citizenship Report 
2007: 18; Total Society and Environment 2012: 21)  
 
Whilst this claim of increasing investment to eliminate gas flaring is commendable, it 
remains unclear whether that initiative is principally driven by the corporations’ claim 
that gas flaring is a waste of economic resources or their acceptance that it produces 
negative environmental ramifications. For example:  
Today, most people agree that continuous flaring of associated gas must be reduced 
significantly. It contributes to greenhouse gases that cause climate change and it is a 
waste of resources and revenue (Shell Nigeria 2011b: 1) 
 
Flaring of associated gas from oil production needs to be scaled back for two reasons:  
to capture a valuable energy resource whenever possible and to mitigate its 
environmental and climate impact. (Total Environment and Society 2009: 13) 
 
As a general observation, the MNCs’ use of excuses and justifications in accounting for 
gas flaring incidents renders the concession, at best, partial. Partial in the sense that 
concession according to our framework suggests that the entity will accept that its 
operations caused the adverse incident, the incident produces harm, the criteria 
stakeholders use to assess the incident are appropriate and accordingly the entity accepts 
it is blameworthy for the incident. But the MNCs’ constructed accounts of excuses and 
justifications apparently weaken the nuanced concession accounts having semblance of 
concessions. Having analysed accounts on gas flaring, the next section analyses the 
accounts on oil spills.   
7.5. MNCs’ accounts about oil spills incident 
Like gas flaring, oil spills environmental incidents are also dominant in the discourses 
of oil operations in the Niger Delta. There is evidence of the use of denial, excuse, 
justification and concession in the analysis of accounts constructed by the MNCs vis-à-
vis oil spills, which in part suggests a more complexity of oil spills than gas flaring 
incidents. Note that denial account was not observable for gas flaring. However, oil 
spills incidents are more complex than the simple observation that the MNCs 
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constructed accounts across the four account-giving categories. As the European 
Parliament (2011: 18) observed, the Niger Delta “oil spills are much more difficult to 
resolve [than gas flaring], as the issue is fraught with the politics of scams, sabotage, 
theft and genuine grievance.” The analyses of the accounts on oil spills are now 
presented as follows.  
7.5.1 Denials 
Three major contentious issues related to oil spill incidents in Nigeria are identified as 
nuanced themes under denial accounts: occurrence of spills, accuracy of volume of oil 
spills declared, and promptness and adequacy of clean-up. These are now analysed in 
turn.  
7.5.1.1 Occurrence of oil spill 
In some instances, denial manifested in claims about occurrence of oil spill in a given 
period or pockets of sites where oil spills allegedly occurred. Bradford & Garrett’s 
(1995) argument is that reporting entities should use denial when they can furnish 
evidence that the adverse incident did not occur or was not caused by their operations. 
For example, evidence of Total’s denial account vis-à-vis oil spill is presented as 
follows:   
The scale of oil pollution in the Niger Delta is a genuine concern … Total practices 
transparency with respect to pollution, keeping local communities, Nigerian authorities 
and NGOs in the loop. Although we had no pollution incidents to report in 2010, we 
experienced 20 between 2006 and 2009 on our only operated onshore project, OML 58 
(Total Society and Environment 2010: 57. Emphasis added) 
 
Similarly, Shell in its recent online news release denied the occurrence of oil spill from 
its Trans-Niger Pipeline (TNP) at Bodo West claiming that the crude oil that could have 
resulted in spill was consumed by fire.  
Unknown persons continued to reconnect illegal bunkering hoses at Bodo West even as 
our pipeline team were removing crude theft points. It was therefore not surprising that 
the fire occurred from the continuing illegal bunkering even as a previous crude oil theft 
point was being repaired by the team. So far, there is practically no spill from this event 
as the oil is burning off. What is visible in the water is from an earlier oil spill which 
was also as a result of oil theft. (Shell Nigeria 2013b, Emphasis added) 
 
Besides the occurrence of oil spill, another denial in the above narrative relates to the 
cause of an earlier oil spill. In addition, the MNCs’ denial accounts on the occurrence of 
oil spill were also reported in the media:  
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There was no oil spill, and there was no impact on the environment,” said Precious 
Okolobo, spokesman for Shell Petroleum Development Corporation (SPDC) … “The 
pump was immediately shut down. However, some oil escaped from the seal into the 
saver pit in the flowstation, with some sheen observed,” he said. (Reuters, 17 August 
2012) 
 
“Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited (MPN) … confirms that oiling from an ‘unknown 
source’ was sighted on the shoreline, near Ibeno, Akwa Ibom” … “An emergency 
response team was immediately dispatched to the shoreline and samples of the 
substance collected for fingerprinting to determine its source, which remains unknown,” 
the company stated (Sahara Reporters. 16 August 2012; See also, IHS Global Insight 
Daily Analysis. 16 August 2012; Platts Commodity News, 20 August 2012) 
 
Contrary to Shell’s denial account above, Reuters’ observer reported evidence of crude 
oil visibly lapping against mangrove trees. However, Shell reported that fingerprint 
analysis revealed that the oil on the shoreline was from a third party spill (Shell Nigeria 
2012b). One potential implication of this kind of denial is the likelihood of understating 
volume of oil spills.  
7.5.1.2 Understatement of oil spill volumes 
Another contentious issue of oil spills in the Niger Delta relates to the accuracy of the 
reported volume of oil spills. Whilst some stakeholders have accused the MNCs of 
grossly understating the volume of oil spills in the Niger Delta (cf. Chapter Eight), the 
MNCs’ accounts suggest that the volume of oil spills is officially co-determined by the 
companies and relevant stakeholders during Joint Investigation Visits – JIVs- (Eni 
Sustainability Report 2009: 75; Shell Nigeria Annual Report 2006: 33; Shell Nigeria 
2011d: 1-2). JIV is a legally required exercise which brings together a number of 
stakeholders (including the oil companies, representatives of communities, and 
regulators) to determine the causes and volumes of oil spills (EGASPIN, 2002). 
However, the Nigerian regulators depend on the MNCs for the logistics to undertake 
this investigation, which potentially compromises the regulators’ independence. During 
my field work, a staff of NOSDRA confirmed to me that the regulators depend on the 
MNCs for JIV logistics. A credible independent regulator’s report is necessary 
considering BP’s claim of about 1,000 barrels/day oil spill flow rate in Gulf of Mexico 
oil spill different to Government’s independent investigation figure of about 62,000 
barrels/day (Huffington Post, 12 August 2012; PBS NewsHour, 2 August 2010).   The 
flow rate of spills is directly proportional to the volume and impact of spills and the 
longer the delay to contain and clean-up spills the more likely the widespread.  
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7.5.1.3 Delayed response to oil spill and clean-up 
Another contentious issue within the oil spill puzzle in the Niger Delta is the pace with 
which the MNCs contain and clean-up spills. Examples of denial claims in respect of 
delayed response are:   
If an incident [oil spill] does occur, we act swiftly to minimise its impact. We also 
investigate such incidents to learn lessons that can help us improve our safety 
performance (Shell Sustainability Report 2011: 4; see also Shell Sustainability Report 
2009: 22) 
 
“Mobil Producing Nigeria is committed to a speedy and comprehensive cleanup," he 
[Mark Ward, Managing Director of ExxonMobil Nigeria] said (Platts Commodity News, 
20 November 2012) 
 
The above accounts signify that the MNCs handle oil spill incidents and the clean-up 
with urgency irrespective of the cause, although stakeholders believe otherwise 
(Chapter Eight). However, the claims about prompt handling of oil spills are in tension 
with the excuse regarding causes of delays to containment and clean-up of oil spills 
(Section 7.5.2.1). Apart from denial accounts on issues relating to oil spills, excuse 
accounts also emerged from the MNCs’ reports.  
7.5.2 Excuses 
As in the case of gas flaring environmental incident, the MNCs also used excuses to 
account for oil spills incidents.  This section presents the different excuse accounts the 
MNCs give about oil spills to suggest it is largely outside their control.    
7.5.2.1 Causes of delays to oil spill clean-up 
In Section 7.5.1.3, Shell and ExxonMobil expressed how they swiftly clean up oil spills 
contrary to this delay excuse account which attributes the delay to factors outside the 
companies’ control. For example, Shell claimed it was denied access to oil spill sites by 
communities (Shell Nigeria Annual Report 2006: 15) due to their interest to win clean-
up contracts, attract greater compensation and/or anxiety over the perceived impacts of 
the oil spills on their livelihood (Shell Sustainability Report 2009: 22; Shell Nigeria 
2011d: 1).  Although this delay excuse account contradicts the denial of delayed 
response to oil spills earlier analysed, the MNCs use excuse account to signify that such 
delays were outside their control. Nonetheless, the admittance of delays to clean-up 
(albeit as an excuse) apparently raises concern over whether those earlier accounts on 
swift responses to oil spill were policy intents or actual practices (see Fassin & Buelens, 
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2011; Rhee & Lee, 2003).  The apparently most dominant excuse account on oil spills 
incident is the sabotage/theft narrative.  
7.5.2.2 Sabotage and oil theft
84
 
Oil MNCs in Nigeria alleged that majority of the oil spills in the Niger Delta are caused 
by sabotage and so are outside their control. Chevron’s Corporate Responsibility 
Reports for 2007 to 2012 did not mention oil spills in Nigeria. Moreover, Chevron 
Nigeria Limited made no disclosures about oil spills in its 2010 and 2012 CSR reports, 
except in its 2010 CSR report (p. 22) where it mentioned that the company had 
outstanding environmental performance in relation to spill outside sabotage. It was not 
discernible from ExxonMobil's Corporate Citizenship Reports for 2007-2012 that most 
spills resulted from sabotage as it did not make country-specific oil spills disclosures 
attributable to its Nigerian operations. However, in media reports, ExxonMobil 
attributed sabotage as the cause of some oil spills it contained and cleaned up (Platts 
Commodity News, 20 August 2012; Sahara Reporters, 16 August 2012). Pointedly however, 
Eni, Shell and Total disclosed that majority of oil spills from their Niger Delta facilities 
resulted from sabotage as presented below:  
2011 saw a decline in spills due to sabotage (-67%): 99% of events of this type have for 
years been limited to Nigeria while the remaining 1% is restricted to Egypt. In Nigeria, 
in particular, where the subsidiary NAOC
85
 manages around 3,000 km of pipelines, over 
than [sic] 90% of accidental spills are due to sabotage and the residual part to technical 
or operational causes: in comparison with the ﬁrst years of 2000 these types of events 
have increased about 6 times driven by sabotage and oil robbery. (Eni For 2011: 42; see 
also Eni Sustainability Reports: 2006: 96; 2008: 50; 2009: 75)  
 
The great majority of oil spills in Nigeria are the result of sabotage or are caused when 
thieves drill into pipelines or damage wellhead equipment to steal oil … such spills … 
accounting for 98% of total Spdc spills volume during the year and significantly greater 
than sabotage and theft-related spills in 2008. (Shell Sustainability Report 2009: 22; see 
also Shell Sustainability Report 2010: 19, 30; Shell Nigeria 2011a, 2011c)  
 
Although we had no pollution incidents to report in 2010, we experienced 20 between 
2006 and 2009 on our only operated onshore project, OML 58. Fifteen were caused by 
acts of vandalism [sabotage] and five occurred as a result of technical incidents (Total 
Society and Environment 2010: 57) 
 
All the above corporate accounts suggest that sabotage is a critical problem to oil spills 
incident in Niger Delta. Moreover, sabotage excuse accounts are also available in public 
                                                 
84
 Whilst it is a little subtle whether to classify sabotage as an excuse or denial, it is classified here as an 
excuse as sabotage is considered as outside corporate control (cf. see statement by Shell’s Vice 
President in section 7.5.3).  
85 Nigerian Agip Oil Company 
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media (cf. Section 7.2). For example, Shell argued before the Dutch Parliament and 
public that a large majority of oil spills in the Niger Delta are caused by sabotage (All 
Africa Global Media, 27 January 2011; Platts Commodity News, 15 August 2010; 
Thisdaylive, 26 September 2011; Channels Television, 7 November 2013a). According 
to a report by Associated Press (9 July 2012), Eni also blamed sabotage for the spill that 
occurred on its Nembe-Obama Pipeline. However, stakeholders have vehemently 
argued against these sabotage excuse accounts and provided alternative narratives 
(Chapter Eight). These alternative narratives to sabotage, however, add to the 
complexity surrounding the oil spills discourses and raise concern over whether the 
MNCs’ excuse accounts or the stakeholders’ alternative narratives are intended to 
provide useful information to the audience or manipulate the audience to sympathy 
(either towards the companies or communities).  Apart from the MNCs’ deployment of 
excuses to account for oil spills, they have also deployed a variety of justification 
accounts.  
7.5.3 Justifications 
Justification as a way of providing accounts and explanations about an adverse incident 
suggests that the reporting entity may accept that it or its operations may have caused 
the incident except that it rejects the appropriateness of the standards stakeholders use to 
assess or judge the incident. For example, according to Nick Wood (Shell’s Vice 
President Communications, Exploration and Production): 
The fact that most of the pollution in the Niger Delta comes from theft and sabotage 
skews impressions about the company's performance set against factors beyond its 
control” (Shell Nigeria 2011a).   
 
As mentioned in Section 7.4.3, justification accounts might draw on ‘appeal to higher 
authority’ and ‘minimization of injury’.  Whereas ‘minimization of injury’ would 
suggest that the impacts of the adverse incidents are exaggerated by stakeholders, an 
‘appeal to higher authority’ might suggest that the corporations comply with certain 
legal regulations or industry best practices. Five justification accounts identified within 
the reviewed texts are: exaggerated impact, JIV, regulatory compliance and 
certifications, defence of Remediation by Enhanced Natural Attenuation (RENA), and 
no double standards. With regard to ‘appeal to higher authority,’ JIV and regulatory 
compliance and certifications fall within ‘legal compliance,’ whilst the defence of 
RENA as oil industry best practice for oil spill clean-up/remediation and claim of 
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absence of double standards fall under ‘institutional norms.’ These nuanced justification 
accounts are now analysed in turn.  
7.5.3.1 Exaggerated impact  
The Niger Delta is a wetland with a web of creeks and tributaries which 
characteristically increase the widespread of oil spills and their impacts on the natural 
environment and the economies of the community people (see European Parliament, 
2011: 19-20; Legal Oil, 28 August 2010; UNDP, 2006: 180). Although stakeholders 
claim there is a substantial impact of oil spills on communities (Chapter Eight), the 
MNCs argue that the communities exaggerate the impacts of oil spills because they seek 
greater compensation. For example, whereas Shell argued in litigation that the plaintiffs 
exaggerated the impacts of oil spill, it failed to substantiate its claim to convince the 
Trial Judge. Being unconvinced, the Trial Judge awarded a N15.4 billion 
(approximately $100m) judgement against Shell. An excerpt of the judgement as 
reported by the Nigerian Vanguard is presented below:   
The court referred to some of the exhibits, including a letter dated May 20, 1991 by 
Shell to the Paramount Ruler of Ejamah community, offering to acquire the affected 
land to burn the crude oil; another letter dated August 15, 2006, on how Shell intended 
to clean up the 1970 spill at Ejama Ebubu as well as other letters detailing companies 
and phases of the clean up. The judge noted: …I have, upon calm assessment on the 
unchallenged evidence of the plaintiffs, that cases cited and relied upon, which I read 
and come to one and only inevitable conclusion, that the case of the plaintiffs have 
merit and accordingly accept the evidence that is capable of belief. Indeed, from the 
nature of the damages caused, the amount of general damages claimed is not 
exaggerated. I have no doubt whatsoever, that the special damages has been proved, as 
the burden on the plaintiffs is a minimal proof. I also assess and award punitive general 
damages as claimed, having found out that the damages claimed is not exaggerated. 
(Nigerian Vanguard, 6 July 2010; see also Amnesty International, 2013: 20 for Shell v. 
Isaiah)  
 
As a usual practice, Shell vowed to appeal the High Court judgement (Huffington Post, 
2011)
86
. Nevertheless, there is no evidence (as far as I am aware) that this appeal has 
been concluded.  Impact exaggeration argument is also discernible from Martyn Day’s 
(of Leigh Day & Co. Solicitors, UK) narrative and media analysis vis-à-vis oil spills 
litigation brought against Shell in a UK Court by Bodo Community of Niger Delta as 
presented below:  
                                                 
86
 This appears to be a common practice by oil MNCs operating in developing countries as similar 
behaviour was evident in litigations against Chevron/Texaco in Ecuador as they seek technical (rather 
than substantive) grounds  to dismiss litigations brought against them in order to avoid potential 
liabilities (see Buccina, et al., 2013).  
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Our clients need their livelihoods back and their environment restored. Shell is finding 
every excuse under the sun to avoid liability for the full extent of the damage done by 
these spills even blaming our clients who had, before the spills, been recognised by 
Shell as a responsible community. (The Guardian, 5 September 2013. Emphasis added) 
 
Shell admits liability for the spills and, using figures from an official inspection group, 
says that about 4,000 barrels of oil flooded into the mangrove swamps and creeks when 
its pipeline burst. But independent analysis by US oil spill expert Richard Steiner 
suggests it was nearer 500,000 barrels. Equally, the oil company argues that relatively 
few people had their livelihood destroyed while the villagers say the spills affected up 
to 11,000 people. The company is thought to be offering about $20m compensation, but 
the villagers are holding out for $200m. (The Guardian, 5 September 2013) 
 
Although Shell admitted that the oil spills in question emanated from operational failure 
and agreed to settle out of court
87
, it claimed that the impact was exaggerated in two 
respects: exaggeration of barrels of oil spilled (by 496,000 barrels) and the number of 
people affected by the spills. From the above narrative, it is apparent that Shell based its 
oil spill figures on JIV estimates, which leads us to another justification account of the 
MNCs’ reliance on the authority of JIV exercise.  
7.5.3.2 Joint Investigation Visit  
JIV exercise is prescribed by law in the event of oil spills (EGASPIN, 2002) and the law 
provides for a joint investigation within 24 hours of the occurrence of oil spills. Eni 
mentioned joint investigation of oil spills in its statement about working with local 
authorities to promote joint investigation due to the allegedly alarming rate of sabotage 
(Eni Sustainability Report 2006: 96) and Eni determines the causes of oil spills in 
conjunction with local authorities and communities’ representatives (Eni Sustainability 
Report 2009: 75). The other MNCs did not talk about JIV exercise except Shell. Shell’s 
account suggest that JIV is an exercise that enables a number of stakeholders to 
collaboratively assess and determine the nature of oil spills vis-à-vis their causes and 
volumes. It discloses the modalities of JIV and its objective as follows:  
When an oil spill occurs, a joint investigation team visits the site as quickly as possible 
to establish the cause and volume of the spill. The team is led by SPDC, and includes 
representatives of the regulatory bodies and the Ministry of Environment. The police, 
state government ofﬁcials and impacted communities are also invited to attend the visit 
(Shell Nigeria 2011d: 1-2) 
   
The volume of oil spilled is initially estimated based on operational data and an estimate 
of spill area and thickness. The final estimated volume is then agreed by a joint 
investigation team … based on a field visit (Shell Nigeria Annual Report 2006: 33) 
                                                 
87 This was reported by The Guardian, on Shell’s website, and in a letter by Shell Nigeria Managing 
Director, Mutiu Sunmonu, published on 22 March 2012 in the Financial Times.  
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Whilst a credible JIV could eliminate the distrust between the MNCs and communities 
over whether or not sabotage is the major cause of oil spills in the Niger Delta, the JIV 
has its shortcomings.  For example, its bureaucratic nature practically results in a long 
lead time between when oil spill is reported to the oil companies and when the JIV 
exercise is undertaken. The long time it takes to constitute the JIV team and mobilise to 
spill sites cause delay that not only violates the maximum 24 hours lead time stipulated 
by law, but also potentially encourages the widespread of the spill. Although excuse 
account in Section 7.5.2.1 enumerated community-induced factors that delay 
containment and clean-up of oil spills, the JIV bureaucracy also contributes to such 
delays (Chapter Eight). Another apparent weakness of the JIV exercise is the tacit 
assumption that the participation of communities in the exercise will protect their 
interests from being undermined. It is difficult to discern the roles the community 
representatives play in JIV as they lack the requisite technical expertise for the 
investigation. In a rider, the JIV exercise lacks transparency if there is substance in 
stakeholders’ claim that the selection of community representatives is done by the 
MNCs (Chapter Eight). Another justification account on oil spills relates to regulatory 
compliance.  
7.5.3.3 Regulatory compliance and certification 
The two common spill-related issues about which the MNCs claim to comply with 
regulatory requirements are: cleaning/remediation of spill-polluted environment and 
compensation payment. DPR is empowered by law to issue certificates to the oil 
companies upon its satisfaction that oil spill sites have been adequately cleaned up and 
remediated (EGASPIN, 2002). NOSDRA coordinates the JIV exercise to arrive at 
jointly agreed estimates of volumes and causes of oil spills, but DPR certifies 
remediation of spill sites. However, stakeholders view DPR and NOSDRA as lacking 
the capacity to regulate and sanction erring MNCs (Chapter Eight). In respect of 
remediation and compensation compliance respectively, Shell discloses that:  
A joint certification team comprising the federal and state ministries of environment 
inspects and certifies cleaned up sites. In 2006, 715 sites were certified compared to 154 
sites in 2005. The increase in the number of sites certified came from a process 
improvement by the certifying bodies that cleared the backlog of earlier submissions 
(Shell Nigeria Annual Report 2006: 16) 
 
Where the investigation shows that the spill was within SPDC’s control to prevent, 
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SPDC negotiates compensation with the affected landowners. In 2010, SPDC paid more 
than $1.7 million in compensation. Nigerian law does not require payment of 
compensation in cases of sabotage (Shell Nigeria 2011d: 2)  
 
From the second account, the non-payment of compensation to oil spill victims 
constitutes a legal compliance provided the company can successfully (not necessarily 
rightly) defend that oil spills to which any compensation claims relate were caused by 
sabotage or third parties. This legal leverage given to the companies potentially 
incentivises them to attribute majority of oil spills to sabotage (Chapter Eight). 
Moreover, the issuance of certificates by the regulators to the MNCs does not 
sufficiently substantiate that the companies have actually complied with the remediation 
requirements as the recent UNEP (2011) report on Ogoniland revealed. UNEP found 
that about two-third of sampled sites already confirmed by Shell as certified (and 
invariably by the regulators) were not easily distinguishable from sites awaiting clean-
up. The UNEP report apparently casts doubt on the credibility of the remediation 
certificates issued by the regulators
88
 (Chapter Eight), which renders such certificates 
rather symbolic than substantive (Christmann & Taylor, 2006). Nonetheless, the 
narrative on the remediation certificates appears to arrogate credibility to the 
remediation method adopted by the companies.  
7.5.3.4 Defence of Remediation by Enhanced Natural Attenuation (RENA)  
Out of the five MNCs, only Eni and Shell discussed issues relating to method of clean-
up and environmental remediation in the Niger Delta. Both of them provided an 
explanation of the effectiveness of RENA as a method of restoring the environment to 
its natural state as shown below: 
The quality of [oil spill] clean up is very high and it is in accordance with very strict 
government regulations and Shell standards which are comparable to other places in 
Europe and America. We have always achieved our goal of restoring impacted sites to 
their natural state in the fastest possible way and by so doing we are able to minimise 
impact on local livelihoods. (Mutiu Sunmonu, Shell Nigeria 2011c. Emphasis added) 
  
The techniques for restoring land sites impacted by oil spills have been researched and 
can be demonstrated to be effective for the soil and climate conditions in the equatorial 
heat of the Niger Delta. For heavy spills, this may involve the addition of nutrients that 
stimulate the natural microbes in the soil. These feed on the remaining oil and break it 
down to carbon dioxide and water (Shell Nigeria 2011d: 2) 
 
Considering favourable environmental and climate conditions the Remediation 
                                                 
88 The regulators rely on the information supplied by the MNCs rather than carrying out independent 
assessments (Idemudia, 2010) 
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Enhanced Natural Attenuation was deﬁned to improve soil micro-organisms conditions: 
through fertilizers administration of and soil revolving, the concentration of 
hydrocarbons will be reduced by 40 times. (Eni Sustainability Report 2009: 75) 
 
Although both Shell and Eni emphasised the effectiveness of RENA in remediating oil 
spill sites, the following excerpts from UNEP Report provided a contrary scientific 
finding which later generated reactions from both Eni and Shell:   
The implicit assumption in the RENA approach applied by SPDC is that the natural 
process being enhanced is bioremediation. … In an ideal situation this approach is 
scientiﬁcally defendable. However, the reality on the ground in Ogoniland speaks 
otherwise. The RENA process is failing to achieve either environmental clean-up or 
legislative compliance (UNEP, 2011: 145) 
  
It is evident from the UNEP ﬁeld assessment that SPDC’s post-oil spill clean-up of 
contamination does not achieve environmental standards according with Nigerian 
legislation, or indeed with SPDC’s own standards. During its reconnaissance survey, 
UNEP came across dozens of locations where oil spill incidents had occurred in the 
past. The spills may have happened decades ago or weeks ago, with multiple spills at 
some locations. Some of these locations had actually been documented by the operator 
as assessed and cleaned up, while others were still to be cleaned up. The diﬀerence 
between a cleaned-up site and a site awaiting clean-up was not always obvious. 
(UNEP, 2011: 150. Emphasis added) 
 
In a reaction to UNEP’s findings and critique with respect to RENA, Eni and Shell gave 
the following narratives: 
To contribute to the rehabilitation of the areas aﬀected by oil spills in Nigeria, in the 
next few years the activities of characterization and clearing up of contaminated sites 
will continue and alternative methods to those currently used will be employed using 
ﬁeld testing. This activity also responds to a recent report by UNEP which highlights 
the need to set up alternatives to the RENA method, as largely used in Nigeria. (Eni For 
2011: 42) 
 
RENA remains a proven and internationally recognised method to remediate spill sites 
which is widely used in many countries. The report [UNEP] noted that in a few specific 
cases in Ogoniland we did not go deep enough in our pre-clean up assessments and this 
may have impacted the overall effectiveness of remediation in those areas. A review by 
SPDC has confirmed this finding in relation to a few specific sites. Based on this 
finding, SPDC will revisit the sites in Ogoniland investigated by UNEP to determine 
whether clean up and remediation have been adequate, and take action as required 
(Shell Nigeria 2011e)  
 
The temporal change of Eni’s RENA justification account suggests that the company 
was receptive (substantively or symbolically) towards stakeholder engagement to forge 
a change in its environmental performance as it stated its plan to seek alternatives to 
RENA in response to UNEP’s findings and recommendations. In contrast, Shell 
maintained that RENA was effective despite the contrary findings by UNEP. Moreover, 
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whilst Shell claimed that UNEP’s findings only applied to a few specific sites (albeit 
without providing any figures), UNEP reported that 10 out of 15 sites sampled were 
inadequately remediated (UNEP, 2011: 9, 12) while other numerous cleaned-up and 
non-cleaned-up sites were not distinguishable (UNEP, 2011: 150). Unlike Eni that 
expressed its plan to explore alternatives to RENA, Shell appears to take a defiant 
position which potentially closes off stakeholder engagement that might improve its 
environmental performance as it apparently perceives its own narratives as the ‘truth’ 
(see Spence, 2009).  Surprisingly, Shell’s defensive posture contradicts its further claim 
that it was negotiating with reputable international organisations to possibly improve its 
remediation system. Furthermore, Shell’s update to its foregoing RENA justification 
account somehow (or even subtly) suggests defects in its remediation system, hence the 
changes to its remediation system as presented below: 
SPDC has completed a comprehensive review of and made changes to its Remediation 
Management System (RMS) in line with international best practice. The RMS is the 
main set of SPDC procedures which govern how the company conducts remediation. 
SPDC will keep its RMS under periodic review and update it as necessary (Shell 
Nigeria 2012c) 
 
It is also unclear whether Shell’s decision to modify its remediation system and subject 
it to periodic reviews was due to the findings of the independent review of its 
remediation system and practices by Bureau Veritas in March 2012 (Shell Nigeria 
2012d).  
7.5.3.5 Double standard  
This narrative is related to that of Section 7.5.3.4 except that whilst the latter was 
specific about the method used for clean-up the former only used general narrative. 
Double standard suggests that oil companies handle containment and clean-up of oil 
spills in the Niger Delta and developed countries in dissimilar ways. Shell, for example, 
claims it does not apply double standard but internationally recognised standards in 
dealing with Niger Delta oil spills as presented below:  
Shell is a committed and responsible partner in the environmental space. We work 
closely with regulators and host communities in ensuring that we adhere to the highest 
international operational standards in our areas of operation (Godson Njoku, Shell 
Nigeria 2011a) 
  
[W]e are committed to cleaning up the spill related to our facilities … The quality of 
clean up is very high and it is in accordance with very strict government regulations and 
Shell standards which are comparable to other places in Europe and America (Mutiu 
Sunmonu, Shell Nigeria 2011c) 
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Based on the account-giving heuristic, a reporting entity uses concession account where 
the use of denial, excuse and justification accounts is not tenable.   
7.5.4 Concessions 
A reporting entity uses concession in providing accounts about an adverse incident by 
admitting that the incident was within its control and so accepts culpability. Concession 
was equally evident in oil spills accounts constructed by the MNCs in sporadic 
circumstances. Only Eni, Shell and Total used concession accounts in their annual 
reports; however, ExxonMobil’s use of concession was contained in a media report. For 
example, Eni and Shell disclosed that: 
The major oil spills are caused by acts of sabotage or terrorism. Further causes may be 
attributed to operating problems (collisions, seal failure etc.) and corrosion or breaks 
(Eni Sustainability 2006: 54) 
 
In Nigeria, in particular, where the subsidiary NAOC manages around 3,000 km of 
pipelines, over than 90% of accidental spills are due to sabotage and the residual part to 
technical or operational causes (Eni For 2011: 42) 
 
In recent years most spills from SPDC facilities have been caused by sabotage and theft. 
But some are operational spills due to equipment failure or human error. No operational 
spill is acceptable and we recognise that we have to improve our performance in this 
area. (Shell Sustainability Report 2010: 18; see also Shell Sustainability Report 2006: 
17; Shell Nigeria 2011d)  
 
Although we had no pollution incidents to report in 2010, we experienced 20 between 
2006 and 2009 on our only operated onshore project, OML 58. Fifteen were caused by 
acts of vandalism and five occurred as a result of technical incidents (Total Society and 
Environment 2010: 57) 
 
The above narratives suggest that only a little fraction of oil spills resulted from 
operational failures compared to sabotage (cf. Section 7.5.2.2). According to Bradford 
& Garrett (1995) and Szwajkowski (1992), an entity uses concession account when it 
accepts responsibility for the adverse incident and expresses its regrets or apologies as 
manifested in the following narrative:  
Regrettably, the Shell Nigeria Exploration & Production Company (SNEPCo) 
experienced an oil leak during loading operations at the Bonga field 120 km offshore. 
I’m sorry that this leak occurred, but pleased that the swift response efforts of SNEPCo 
staff in co-operation with the Nigerian government meant that most of the resulting spill 
evaporated or was rapidly dispersed at sea (Shell Sustainability Report 2011: 18) 
 
Apart from expression of regrets and apologies, the above account mentioned the 
company’s prompt effort to salvage the untoward situation, with the apparent intention 
to persuade and manage the impression of the audience about the incident and company 
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(Chapter Nine). Media reports also revealed cases of concession accounts by the MNCs. 
For example, ExxonMobil and Shell reportedly used concession narratives regarding 
specific oil spills: 
After a deafening silence to protests over oil spills, Mobil Producing Nigeria, has finally 
responded by apologizing to communities and deploying 480 personnel to mop up oil 
spill at the Atlantic coastline in Akwa Ibom State, APA learns Thursday in a statement. 
Mark Ward, the Managing Director of the company, said on Thursday in statement that 
“Mobil Producing Nigeria regrets this incident. Our teams are being mobilised to clean 
up the area. We apologise for the inconveniences that it has caused.”(Agence de Presse 
Africaine, 15 November 2012; See also: Philippines News Agency, 14 November 2012) 
 
"We do bear some responsibility, but we cannot bear it entirely," Craig told parliament. 
He said about 70 per cent of oil spills were caused by sabotage while the remainder 
could be blamed on SPDC (All Africa Global Media, 27 January 2011) 
 
As has been stated previously, SPDC admitted liability for two spills of about 4,000 
barrels in Bodo caused by operational failures, as soon as their cause had been verified 
in late 2008 and early 2009,"Shell said in the statement (Platts Commodity News. 23 
April 2012; see also All Africa Global Media. 4 August 2011; The Guardian, 5 
September 2013; Thisdaylive, 14 November 2011) 
 
However, like the concession accounts vis-à-vis gas flaring which was at best partial 
(cf. Section 7.4.4), a qualified concession is also evident in the analysis of concession 
accounts about oil spills. For example, whereas Shell admitted liability for only 4,000 
barrels of oil spills in Bodo Community, an independent assessment put the figures at 
approximately 500,000 barrels (Section 7.5.3.1). Such qualified concession apparently 
supports the argument of sabotage excuse account (Section 7.5.2.2) and exaggerated 
impact justification account (Section 7.5.3.1).  
7.6 Summary of findings and concluding remarks 
As Everett (2003) argued, insights into accountability must begin with account (a form 
of story or narrative). This Chapter explored the accounts the MNCs give in respect of 
gas flaring and oil spills in order to understand how the MNCs manifested 
accountability vis-à-vis these environmental incidents. These incidents, by their nature, 
produce adverse social, economic and environmental ramifications.  In this respect, the 
account-giving heuristic was helpfully deployed to organise the nuanced thematic 
accounts into four constellations: denial, excuse, justification and concession. 
Essentially, the multifaceted or complex nature of an incident might give rise to the use 
of diverse accounts to explain and justify the (in)actions relating to the incident in a 
given context. This suggests that, in such a complex context, using one form of account, 
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say, excuse, will unlikely be able to capture the overall aspects of the incident or 
persuade the perceived audience. Arguably, it is important to note that the giving of 
accounts is not only to discharge accountability, but also to persuade the audience (see 
Tetlock, 1983). These articulations are apparently observable in the MNCs’ accounts 
analysed in this Chapter.  
 
There was no observable evidence that the MNCs deployed a denial account with 
respect to gas flaring, but there was evidence of different excuse and justification 
accounts. In assessing the accounts constructed about gas flaring, the evidence of 
multiple excuses and justifications makes the narratives more complex to comprehend 
because of the inherent tensions between the different themes within each account-
giving category (say, of excuse) and between the broad account-giving categories. If 
there is uncertainty, for example, as to how the different excuses individually (or 
collectively interact to) produce cohesive accounts of gas flaring, the tension becomes 
even more complex when the excuses are put side by side with the justifications.  For 
example, there is tension between the excuse account of funding shortfalls and 
justification account of legal compliance as the latter suggests that gas flaring is legally 
a legitimate action, which apparently makes any funding initiative to stop gas flaring 
likely discretionary.  Whereas Government authorisation (justification) may be 
consistent with funding shortfalls (excuse)
89
, it is difficult to articulate the extent to 
which funding shortfalls rather than expert opinion (justification) influences 
Government authorisation. These tensions raise doubt over the commitment of the 
MNCs and Government to end gas flaring as the expert opinion account, for example, 
suggests that gas flaring has little/no human and environmental consequences.  
 
Furthermore, there is a conflict in the MNCs’ accounts about underdeveloped gas 
market as a factor encouraging continuous gas flaring in Nigeria. For example, Eni’s 
claim that the Nigerian power sector has a strong market for the utilisation of gas 
currently flared is no doubt inconsistent with the lack of developed gas market argument 
put forward by the MNCs. Further evidence that Nigerian electricity generation suffered 
setbacks due to shortage of gas to power the electricity generation plants was made by 
                                                 
89
 Government, because of its likely failure to meet its funding obligation, might authorise the MNCs to 
continue oil production irrespective of the consequent gas flaring because Nigerian economy is almost 
solely run on oil and gas revenues.  
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three prominent public officials – Minister of Power, Minister of Petroleum Resources 
and Chairman of Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission (cf. Section 8.3.1.2). 
Both conflicting arguments cannot be true: it is either the market for gas exists or it does 
not exist. Nigerian Government’s affirmation of Eni’s claim that Nigerian electricity 
market has large absorptive capacity utilisation for flared gas confirms the MNCs’ 
failure to exploit all available market options for gas
90
. However, this market requires 
investment in gas-gathering technology to harness gas to be channelled to the power 
sector. In this regard, the narrative that funding shortfalls inhibited investment in gas-
gathering technology might appear sensible here; nonetheless, the argument that oil 
companies lacked interest in the power sector because of low economic returns appear 
to privilege economics over environmental stewardship, which apparently weakens the 
funding shortfalls argument.   
 
In addition to the above apparent contradictions, the justification accounts furnished by 
the MNCs on gas flaring apparently suggest that gas flaring was the right thing to do 
within the Nigerian legal context, JVs’ context and as a permissive industry practice.  It 
was also observed that the concession accounts constructed by the MNCs vis-à-vis gas 
flaring were only at best partial concession. Partial in the sense that concession 
according to ‘account-giving heuristic’ suggests that the entity will accept that its 
operations caused the adverse incident, the incident produces harm, the criteria 
stakeholders use to assess the incident are appropriate and accordingly the entity accepts 
it is blameworthy for the incident. But the MNCs’ constructed accounts of excuses and 
justifications apparently weaken the nuanced concession accounts having semblance of 
concessions.  
 
Like gas flaring, oil spills have also dominated public and corporate discourses on oil 
operations in the Niger Delta. Whilst excuse and justification accounts were 
predominantly observable in the analysis of the MNCs’ accounts on gas flaring, the 
analysis of accounts on oil spills showed evidence of the four broad accounts within the 
account-giving heuristic analytical lens. Evidence of the use of denial, excuse, 
justification and concession in the analysis of accounts constructed by the MNCs vis-à-
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 It is not equally clear why the government that recognised this market option would fail to pay its 
counterpart fund towards investment in gas-gathering technology given the potential benefits such 
investment portends for Nigerian economy.  
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vis oil spills compared to gas flaring which has partial concession and no denial 
accounts roughly suggests that the issues relating to oil spills are more complex than 
those of gas flaring. However, oil spill incidents are apparently far more complex than 
the above simplistic observation. In recognising this complexity, European Parliament 
(2011: 18) noted that the Niger Delta “oil spills are much more difficult to resolve [than 
gas flaring], as the issue is fraught with the politics of scams, sabotage, theft and 
genuine grievance.” The nature of the counter-narratives stakeholders give on oil spills 
incidents further alludes to this complexity (Chapter Eight). 
 
These complexities, by and large, were also observable in the contradictions between 
the manifested accounts about oil spills. For example, the MNCs’ claim of promptness 
and adequacy of clean-up is consistent with their justification accounts regarding clean-
up/remediation method and no double standards in handling oil spills, which according 
to them conform to international best practices and regulatory standards.  Although this 
consistency stands when the accounts of the MNCs alone are considered, it nonetheless 
disappears when stakeholders’ narratives are considered. For example, the narratives of 
UNEP (2011), Steiner (2010) and other stakeholders (Chapter Eight) suggest that the 
standards adopted by the MNCs are both inadequate and comparably below 
international standards. Whilst the MNCs denied delayed responses to containment and 
clean-up of oil spills, they seemingly contradicted such claims by highlighting causes of 
delays to clean-up (excuses) to suggest that the delays were outside the companies’ 
control. Categorically, the companies linked those causes of delays to the actions of 
community members pursuing a range of interests.  An affirmation of this claim was 
also made by some community stakeholders who also provided some defences for those 
actions (Section 8.4.1.2). Although the delays were linked to the communities, further 
evidence also implicated the JIV bureaucratic process for such delays (Section 8.4.1.2).  
 
Another issue observed in the accounts on oil spills is the attribution of what cause(s) 
oil spills. Unlike gas flaring whose cause
91
 is solely attributable to the oil companies, 
the cause of oil spills could potentially be attributed to persons other than the oil 
companies from whose facilities the oil is spilled. Consequently, differently causes of 
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 This suggests that gas flaring is not caused by the interference of third parties but solely from 
operational actions of the oil companies and so cannot be attributed to sabotage. Oil spills can arise 
from the facilities of oil companies without it necessarily being caused by the companies but by the 
actions of third parties.  
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oil spills are discernible from the narratives articulated by the MNCs and stakeholders 
over time. Basically, the causes of oil spills identified in the analysed accounts are 
equipment failures, corrosions, human errors, natural disasters and sabotage, but 
sabotage remains highly controvertible. Whilst both stakeholders and MNCs agree that 
oil spills are caused by sabotage, they disagree over the proportion of oil spills caused 
by sabotage (Chapter Eight). It has been argued by the MNCs that majority of oil spills 
derived from the activities of third parties (sabotage) for purposes of stealing oil, 
inducing compensation, or registering their grievances against the MNCs.   However, 
there are apparent internal inconsistencies in the claim that communities perpetrate 
sabotage to induce compensation. Such inconsistencies discernible from the narratives 
(Cf. Chapter Seven and Eight) are: (i) the law does not permit payment of compensation 
for sabotage-induced oil spills (ii) communities appear to be aware of this legal 
provision (iii) existing evidence suggests that oil companies hardly pay compensation to 
oil spill victims. An important interrogation of this compensation-seeking argument for 
sabotage is: “Why would communities engage in sabotage when compensation payment 
is almost always elusive?” Whilst the MNCs argued that communities engaged in 
sabotage to induce compensation, stakeholders have equally alleged that the MNCs use 
sabotage as a matter of convenience to evade paying compensation (Section 8.4.4.3). 
 
An analysis of the sabotage narrative also call into question the level of security the 
MNCs and Government (senior JVs partner) have put in place to protect their oil 
facilities from sabotage (Section 8.4.4.4). Inadequate security over oil facilities 
increases the likelihood of theft-driven sabotage likely carried out by third parties that 
may not necessarily be the communities impacted by the oil spills. In this context, 
inadequate policing of oil facilities apparently makes the communities potentially 
vulnerable victims of oil spills with the additional risk of forfeiture of compensation 
rights when the spills are attributable to sabotage. This somehow suggests that it costs 
the oil companies less both ways. That is, less cost on security and no payment of 
compensation in the event of spills attributable to sabotage. Whilst the law exempts 
companies from paying compensation to oil spill victims for spills ostensibly caused by 
third parties, it does not explicate the level of security measures the companies must put 
in place to enjoy this compensation exemption clause, which appear to confer too large 
a protection on the corporations from potential liability. Vaguely however, Petroleum 
(Drilling and Production) Regulation 1969 as cited by the Coalitions for Change (2010: 
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2) “imposes obligation on the licensee and lessee to take necessary precautions to 
prevent pollution, control and end it when it occurs.” Given the nature of law and 
judicial precedents, the precautionary clause - ‘to take necessary precautions to prevent 
pollution’ - is opened to diverse legal interpretations (Atsegbua 2012; Fagbohun, 2010).  
 
As was also noted in the analysis, the justification accounts of exaggerated impacts and 
JIV appear to reinforce each other. Two types of impact exaggeration were discernible 
from the analysed accounts: exaggeration of volume of oil spills and number of people 
impacted by oil spills. Intuitively, the number of people impacted by oil spills is likely 
directly proportional to the volume of oil spills or the pervasive impacts of the spills.   
Consequently, the over- or under-estimation of oil spill volumes might consequently 
lead to over- or-under-estimation of impacts or those impacted.  In lending credibility to 
the exaggerated impact account, the MNCs draw on the authority of the JIV exercise. 
The JIV exercise suggests that the causes and volumes of oil spills are co-determined by 
representatives of the MNCs, regulators, ministries and communities. Whilst the report 
of the JIV is deemed unbiased and independent by the MNCs, stakeholders have 
strongly discredited the JIV exercise as they alleged it is largely controlled by the 
MNCs on grounds of the regulators’ lack of independence/power and communities’ 
superficial representation on the exercise (Sections 8.4.2 and 8.4.3).  The alleged 
incredibility of the JIV exercise apparently makes the MNCs’ exaggerated impact and 
sabotage accounts even more controvertible. Insofar as the credibility of the regulators 
are put in doubt, this also has implications for the credibility of the MNCs’ oil spills 
clean-up and remediation certified by the regulators. For example, whilst the MNCs’ 
justified their clean-up and remediation of oil spill sites as conforming with 
international and local regulatory standards, independent scientific evidence has 
suggested otherwise. Such contrasting evidence further raises doubt over the credibility 
(or perhaps competence) of those regulators.  
 
In conclusion, the prevalence of accounts of denial, excuse and justification is 
consistent with Konovsky & Jaster (1989) who find that managers, students and others 
mainly use these forms of account when they are called upon to account for an alleged 
wrongdoing.  However, the analysis of the MNCs’ accounts in relation to gas flaring 
and oil spills environmental incidents apparently paints a picture of complex 
institutions, geographic setting and negative environmental incidents. Such complexities 
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will be rendered too simplistic if only the accounts provided by the corporations linked 
with these negative environmental incidents are examined in the context of seeking to 
understand how accountable they are. In this regard, the narratives of stakeholders will 
be germane to providing alternative and/or additional insights into this accountability 
maze or jigsaw. The analysis of these alternative narratives will be the focus of the next 
Chapter. Also, whilst the account-giving heuristic has enabled us to articulate the 
nature, forms and constellations of accounts constructed by the MNCs on gas flaring 
and oil spill environmental incidents, it fails to unpick the sense-making underlying 
such accounts. Unpicking the sense-making embedded in those accounts connects this 
Chapter to Chapter nine which explores such sense-making dynamics. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Stakeholders’ narratives on gas flaring and oil spills environmental incidents 
8.1 Introduction 
The preceding Chapter analysed how the MNCs manifested accountability through their 
constructed accounts on gas flaring and oil spills which were organised into four 
constellations based on ‘account-giving heuristic’. It was stated in Chapter seven that 
those accounts given by the MNCs vis-à-vis gas flaring and oil spills would form the 
basis of exploring alternative narratives given by stakeholders about these adverse 
environmental incidents. As gas flaring and oil spills by their nature create adverse 
social and environmental impacts resulting in public criticisms of these MNCs, it will 
be germane to explore stakeholders’ alternative narratives vis-à-vis the accounts and 
apparent defences the MNCs articulated around these incidents by drawing on the 
‘view-balancing’ potential of shadow/counter accounts (Chapter Three). Such cross-
referencing is important given the social-historical context of the Nigerian oil industry 
with notoriety for secrecy (see Olayinka, 2012). 
 
In order to answer the second research question on how the MNCs manifest 
accountability vis-à-vis gas flaring and oil spills incidents, Chapter seven analysed the 
MNCs’ accounts while Chapter eight will analyse stakeholders’ alternative narratives. 
Such alternative narratives are likely to confirm/disconfirm or strength/weaken the 
MNCs’ accounts.  As noted in Chapters one and seven, this analysis does not however 
attempt to privilege the narratives of the stakeholders over the accounts of the MNCs 
earlier analysed as to which one is (more) credible. But it provides an opportunity to see 
two distinct alternative narratives (i.e., of the MNCs and stakeholders) that could 
potentially confirm and/or contradict each other. Chapter eight is organised as follows. 
Section 8.2 briefly restates the nature of the data and the stakeholders whose narratives 
were considered for this analysis.  Whilst Section 8.3 analyses stakeholders’ narratives 
on gas flaring incidents, Section 8.4 analyses those relating to oil spills. Lastly, Section 
8.5 provides the summary of findings and conclusion.  
8.2 Nature and sources of the stakeholders’ narratives 
The stakeholders whose narratives are considered in this Chapter and the rationale for 
the stakeholders’ choice have been earlier mentioned and/or discussed (Chapters Five 
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and Six). Those stakeholders identified for this study are communities hosting the 
facilities of the MNCs (and consequently affected by negative corporate environmental 
impacts)
92
, the regulators, NGOs, environmental legal experts, accountancy profession. 
Basically, the narratives of these stakeholders were drawn from field interviews, 
informal conversation with regulators, media, NGOs and other publications related to 
the environmental incidents of gas flaring and oil spills in the Niger Delta. Generally, 
public documents and interviews were used to harness evidence which might confirm or 
contradict the explanations or accounts provided by the MNCs (see Rodrigue, 2014). 
Apart from interviews, some narratives given by both the MNCs and stakeholders were 
obtained from media publications.  Although this Chapter focuses on stakeholders’ 
narratives, it nonetheless draws our attention to earlier themes that emerged from the 
MNCs’ accounts on gas flaring and oil spills and reiterates some of those accounts in 
order to keep trail of the issues under analysis.     
 
Importantly, it must be stated here that this Chapter does not use the account-giving 
heuristic framework to organise the stakeholders’ narratives into four broad 
constellations as was done vis-à-vis the MNCs’ accounts in Chapter seven. 
Theoretically, the framework applies to the accountors rather than the accountees or 
those who form opinions on the accountors’ accounts and the issues to which those 
accounts relate. In order to ensure stakeholders’ narratives are in similar contexts with 
those to which the MNCs’ accounts relate, only those issues articulated within the 
MNCs’ account in Chapter seven are included in this Chapter subject to available 
stakeholders’ narratives. In this regard, the stakeholders narratives are chosen on the 
basis of their relevance to the contexts of the MNCs’ accounts and not because they are 
antagonistic or confirmatory to the MNCs’ accounts. As there were some apparent 
contradictions in the MNCs’ accounts in Chapter seven, the stakeholders’ narratives 
also revealed few instances of contradictions between the stakeholders’ narratives 
themselves. The whole essence of these comparisons is not to malign or justify either 
the MNCs or communities vis-à-vis the social, economic and environmental 
ramifications of gas flaring and oil spills on communities. But it is an opportunity to 
assess the narratives from both sides of the ‘divide’ (MNCs and stakeholders) to gain 
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 The relationships created by corporate-community interactions with especial reference to the 
environmental impacts of corporate activities on the communities focus our gaze in this study on the 
accountability relationship between the MNCs and community stakeholder group.  
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insight into the extent to which the stories from both are consistent with each other in 
respect of contentious environmental (and perhaps social) issues. Sections 8.3 and 8.4 
will now analyse the stakeholders’ narratives vis-à-vis the MNCs accounts on gas 
flaring and oil spills incidents respectively.  
8.3 Stakeholders’ narratives about gas flaring 
Gas flaring incident in Nigeria has a myriad of contentious issues such as the associated 
environmental impacts (e.g., health hazards, acid rain, impact on agriculture), who is 
responsible or to blame for such impacts, commitment to eliminate gas flaring, among 
others. These contentious issues are apparently connected to the high level of gas flaring 
in relation to gas produced in Nigeria compared to other countries
93
. However, there is 
one issue on which there is consensus between the MNCs and stakeholders: that gas 
flaring is caused by the operations of the MNCs. Consequently, there was no observable 
evidence of denial in the MNCs’ accounts on gas flaring (Chapter Seven). Why then 
would there be any contentions about who is responsible for gas flaring and its impacts? 
Notwithstanding the absence of denial of gas flaring, the contentious issues essentially 
revolve around factors influencing gas flaring, the legal environment of gas flaring and 
the impacts of gas flaring. These are now analysed in turn.  
8.3.1 Factors influencing gas flaring 
We found in Chapter seven that the MNCs offered various accounts of excuses and 
justifications to apparently suggest where the blame for continuous gas flaring in the 
Niger Delta should be channelled. Those accounts set the tones to absolve the 
companies of culpability for gas flaring and its consequences by apparently either 
shifting blame for gas flaring or drawing on certain authorities to persuade the audience 
that gas flaring was an appropriate action in the given circumstances. Flowing from the 
contexts of the MNCs’ accounts, stakeholders’ narratives on factors influencing gas 
flaring are analysed around three nuanced themes: (i) funding shortfalls, (ii) local gas 
market and (iii) Government bureaucracy, authorisation and indifference.  
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 Only Russia surpassed Nigeria in terms of absolute units of gas flared; however, in terms of the 
relative gas flared compared to gas produced, Nigeria practically flares more gas globally (See Section 
4.2).  
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8.3.1.1 Funding shortfalls 
According to Section 7.4.2.1, the MNCs attributed the continuous gas flaring in Nigeria 
to the failure of the Nigerian Government to provide its counterpart funds required by 
the JVs to invest in infrastructure to eliminate gas flaring. In relation to the funding 
claims made by the MNCs, two independent NGO interviewees argued that such claims 
were mere excuses by the MNCs (Personal Interviews: Independent NGO 1 and 
Independent NGO 4). Whilst Independent NGO 4 argued that the MNCs were free to 
divest from the JVs to protect their corporate image if they felt the Government was not 
complementing their commitment to ending gas flaring, Independent NGO 1 argued 
that such investment costs should be internalised as capital expenditure and spread over 
a number of years.  These NGOs considered the attitude of the MNCs towards making 
investment outlay for the elimination of gas flaring as lukewarm because it is not their 
priority.   
8.3.1.2 State of the local gas market and infrastructure 
One of the excuse accounts given by the MNCs for continuous gas flaring in Nigeria in 
Chapter seven was lack of developed gas market, which would apparently portend a 
potential gas glut if technologies were installed to gather gas rather than flare it. 
Implicitly, this excess supply argument renders investment in gas-gathering 
technologies economically unviable. Arguably, such thinking creates a tension between 
lack of gas market and lack of gas-gathering infrastructure and it becomes unclear 
whether the pulling factor for continuous gas flaring is the lack of market or lack of 
infrastructure. Stakeholders also have varied opinions about gas market-infrastructure 
discourses. According to Ernst & Young’s Head of Oil & Gas Advisory for Africa, 
Claire Lawrie, cited by Femi Asu: 
[T]he challenge facing Nigeria is the current lack of infrastructure to trap, capture and 
pipe flared gas (BusinessDay Newspaper, 11 September 2013). 
 
The absence of such infrastructure has stalled the meeting of various deadlines set by 
the Nigerian Government for oil companies to end gas flaring. According to All Africa 
Global Media (9 August 2011), both industry experts and oil companies had no faith in 
the companies meeting those deadlines due to inadequate infrastructure. The Nigerian 
National House of Representatives Chairman of Committee on Gas hinted that the delay 
to end gas flaring was predicated on inadequate domestic use of gas in Nigeria (All 
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Africa Global Media, 18 November, 2009). Although this assertion appears to affirm 
the MNCs’ claim about underdeveloped gas market in Nigeria, several commentators 
have criticised the Government and MNCs for not utilising the flared gas to meet 
Nigeria’s electricity need (Bassey, 2012; Hassan & Kouhy, 2013; Obadina, 1999). As 
one media report argued: 
There is strong potential to monetise gas reserves by utilising gas in domestic industrial 
processes such as electricity generation, fertilisers, petrochemicals, and methanol (IHS 
Global Insight Daily Analysis, 30 November 2011). 
 
Stakeholders’ claims of existence of gas market to utilise currently flared gas are further 
supported by similar claims by the Nigerian Minister of Power as well as the Chairman 
of Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission (NERC) asserting the shortage of gas to 
run the different National Integrated Power Projects (NIPPs) in Nigeria (see 
Punchng.com, 25 June 2014; Thisdaylive, 10 February 2014, 24 June 2014; 
Vanguardngr.com, 25 June 2014). Furthermore, the Minister of Petroleum Resources 
states in August 2014 that gas shortage has been a problem in Nigeria for about two 
decades or so (Channels Television, 2 August, 2014). In Chapter seven, Eni also 
categorically stated that the electricity sector was a fertile ground for the utilisation of 
currently flared gas. However, Eni went further to state that oil companies are not 
interested in making such investment because of perceived low economic returns 
(Section 7. 4.2.2). These contrasting narratives by the stakeholders and MNCs appear to 
complicate the discourse because of the conflicting issues at the heart of gas flaring 
discourse viz. funding shortfalls, lack of infrastructure, underdeveloped market and 
economic returns. It is likely inconsistent to allude to lack of market, lack of 
infrastructure and funding shortfalls at the same time. For example, funding shortfall 
narrative by the MNCs implicitly suggests their intention to invest in gas infrastructure 
but for insufficient fund; but if there is substance in this argument then the availability 
of gas infrastructure raises another tension between harnessed gas and lack of gas 
market. But the MNCs’ failure to exploit the electricity market to utilise harnessed gas 
via gas infrastructure affirms Eni’s claim that oil companies’ put economic returns at 
the forefront of that decision.   In this regard, the commitment of the MNCs and 
Nigerian Government towards achieving a zero-flare is apparently questionable.  
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8.3.1.3 Government bureaucracy, authorisation and indifference 
As we saw in Chapter seven, the MNCs alleged that the attitude of the Nigeria 
Government was pro continuous gas flaring. Apparently, any substance in this argument 
would suggest that the JVs between the MNCs and Nigerian Government thrive because 
they both have a common attitude (see Section 7.4.3.1). The narratives by two 
community stakeholders appear to corroborate the MNCs’ claim regarding Government 
authorisation of the MNCs to continue oil and gas production with the attendant gas 
flaring. They argued that the Nigerian Government would do anything to keep oil 
production going because Nigerian (oil) mono-economy cannot run without it (Personal 
Interviews: Community Stakeholders 4 and 10). Nonetheless, the MNCs continue their 
JVs with the Nigerian Government albeit JVs’ apparent conflict with their acclaimed 
business and ethical principles (cf. Section 7.4.3.1). Another contentious issue found in 
the reviewed texts is the legal environment of gas flaring in Nigeria.  
8.3.2 Legal environment of gas flaring 
One of the findings of Chapter seven was the MNCs’ claim that they flare gas in 
compliance with Nigerian Law. Nevertheless, stakeholders have alleged that the law 
and its enforcement are not only weak, but also incentivises the MNCs to continue gas 
flaring due to the small penalty fee required by law (Personal Interviews: Independent 
NGO 3). UNDP (2006: 185) made a similar assertion that: “[a]lthough appropriate laws 
have defined flaring standards, the financial penalties have been so low that they hardly 
constitute a deterrent.” Corroborating this further, The True Cost of Chevron (2010: 
45)
94
 asserts that:  
“Although gas ﬂaring has been illegal in Nigeria for decades, Chevron and other oil 
companies repeatedly ﬂout Nigerian legislative deadlines, paying nominal ﬁnes for 
breaking the law.”    
 
In addition to the relatively small penalty fee for flaring gas, a legal expert also alleged 
that the existing laws are not enforced and the MNCs lobby to change the zero-flare 
deadlines on the excuse that the dates are not feasible (Personal Interviews: Legal 
Expert 2). However, Eni claims that the changes to the deadlines are due to lack of 
Government will to complement oil companies’ efforts (Eni Sustainability Report 
2009:V). Also, one NGO participant claims that the Nigerian laws are weak and so the 
                                                 
94 True Cost of Chevron is a coalition of a number of NGOs and interest groups which provides counter 
accounts on Chevron’s operations by country.   
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MNCs exploit the small penalty fee to maximise profit (Personal Interviews: Partnering 
NGO 1). As Bovens, (1998: 58) argues, the size of a penalty determines whether it will 
deter a corporation from a socially undesirable behaviour that maximizes corporate 
profit at others’ expense. Although the Government increased the penalty fee to 
discourage indiscriminate gas flaring effectively in August 2011 from $0.065 to $3.50 
per 1000 standard cubic feet, it was alleged according to the following narrative that the 
MNCs resisted compliance by threatening to shut down operations:    
International oil companies (IOCs), the major perpetrators of gas flaring in the country, 
and other oil producing companies, have continued to ignore the $3.5 per standard cubic 
feet (scf) penalty put in place by the government to discourage flaring from which the 
country loses about $74 million daily. Government on its part has not been able to 
enforce the regulation because of threats of shutdowns by operators (Femi Asu, 
BusinessDay Newspaper, 11 September 2013) 
 
As Femi Asu further alleged, a DPR source confirmed that the Government is not 
willing to press for enforcement for fear of losing revenue following the MNCs’ threats 
to shut down operations (Shinsato, 2005).  Besides Government losing revenue if the 
companies shut down operations, the Chairman of Nigerian Senate Committee on Gas, 
Nkechi Nwaogu, also argues that Government as the majority equity partner in the JVs 
will be liable for more of the penalty fees than the MNCs if the new rate is enforced 
(Femi Asu, BusinessDay Newspaper, 11 September 2013). This might be implicit in 
Government lack of will to enact and enforce law with high punitive fees that could 
serve as deterrent to indiscriminate gas flaring.  
 
However, the issue of compliance with the law is difficult to establish from the above 
narratives on the basis of the several claims that: the law is weak, the law is not 
enforced, MNCs’ threat against enforcement of the law and Government conflict of 
interest. Moreover, whilst the MNCs claim they transparently disclose their payments to 
Government in respect of gas flaring penalties in compliance with NEITI provisions (cf. 
Section 7.4.3.2), the Government, media, politicians have alleged that the gas flaring 
data provided by the MNCs are understated, inaccurate and/or unclear (European 
Parliament, 2011: 22; Femi Asu, 2013; IHS Global Insight Daily Analysis, 13 March 
2012). For example, a Special Investigation Committee set up by the Nigerian Minister 
of Petroleum Resources in 2012 found that the oil MNCs were not complying with gas 
flaring regulations (Ribadu Report, 2012). The Committee also alleged inaccuracies in 
the gas flaring data claiming that DPR mainly depended on the data provided by the oil 
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companies and that the companies were also paying the old penalty fee. An 
extrapolation from the above analysis will suggest that neither the MNCs nor 
Government is committed to a zero-flare in Nigeria, even though gas flaring creates 
negative consequences for the global and immediate environment and people living near 
flare sites.  
8.3.3 Impacts of gas flaring 
Chapter seven showed mixed accounts on the impacts of gas flaring. Whilst the MNCs 
stated that gas flaring causes climate change (Section 7.4.4.1), Shell nonetheless argued 
that it has little or no health consequences and other environmental impacts such as acid 
rain or acidification of soil and waterways (Ecumenical Council for Corporate 
Responsibility Bulletin, March 2011, p. 11; cf. Section 7.4.3.4). Although Shell 
maintained this argument, Total acknowledged as shown in Chapter seven that gas 
flaring creates environmental impacts and has some human consequences. 
Communities, NGOs, academic and institutional commentators have also argued that 
gas flaring causes health hazards and other environmental imbalance (ECCR Bulletin, 
March 2011; Emoyon, et al., 2008; Frynas 1998; Nkwocha & Pat-Ebano, 2010). 
Whereas Shell claimed there was absence of information linking air pollution to health 
hazards in the Niger Delta through its correspondence with the Ecumenical Council for 
Corporate Responsibility (ECCR), it nonetheless attributed respiratory health problem 
in the region to other factors.  See below the ECCR excerpt on Shell’s claims: 
The World Bank report claims that flaring is very low in toxicity, especially in Nigeria 
where oil is low in sulphur. It [Shell] acknowledges a lack of information on air 
pollution and health in the Niger Delta yet ascribes respiratory problems there to 
vehicle emissions and industry. As to communities’ claims that respiratory ailments are 
linked to gas flaring, it states that ‘no studies are available’. (ECCR Bulletin, March 
2011: 11. Emphasis added).  
 
Additional views of stakeholders on the effects of gas flaring on community people and 
environment are as follows: 
When you are talking about the impact [of gas flaring], the impact is visible. The kind 
of corrosion we have down here in oil bearing communities is not seen in other areas 
[non-oil regions in Nigeria]. If this [acid rain believed to be caused by gas flaring] could 
be falling on the zinc and the zinc is reacting this way it then means that man is also 
inhaling these things … [I]f you look at the sicknesses that are on now or you look at 
the life expectancy in the Niger Delta region, it [life expectancy] has reduced. It didn’t 
reduce because there is economic prison, but because of the health hazard from some of 
these oil substances we are seen (Personal Interview: Community Stakeholder 7) 
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Gas ﬂaring in Nigeria has contributed more greenhouse gases than all other sources in 
sub-Saharan Africa combined. And the ﬂares contain a cocktail of toxins that affect the 
health and livelihood of local communities, exposing Niger Delta residents to an 
increased risk of premature deaths, child respiratory illnesses, asthma and cancer (The 
True Cost of Chevron 2011: 45)   
It is established that poisonous chemicals from gas flares have harmful effects on 
health. By-products of flaring include nitrogen dioxide, sulphur dioxide, volatile organic 
compounds, like benzene, toluene, xylene and hydrogen sulphide, as well as 
carcinogens, like benzapyrene and dioxin. They cause respiratory problems already 
reported in many children in the Niger Delta (All Africa Global Media, 22 June 2010). 
 
Moreover, the Nigerian Senate and House of Representatives stated that they passed 
two separate Bills abolishing gas flaring due to the impact of gas flaring on Niger Delta 
and the health of its people (All Africa Global Media, 14 January 2010; see Social 
Action website citing Sun News, 4 July 2009). UNDP (2006: 185-186) also linked gas 
flaring in Nigeria to harm on the environment, humans and biodiversity. Other expert 
opinions by US Environmental Protection Agency, Canadian IntrAmericas Centre for 
Environment and Health, and Nigerian academics also claim that gas flaring causes 
health hazards, acid rain and other environmental hazards as reported in ECCR March 
Bulletin (2011). From the above analysis, the World Bank evidence Shell relied on to 
denounce the environmental consequences of gas flaring contradicts other independent 
findings. Consequently, ECCR concluded that: “[f]rom such evidence, it appears 
unreasonable and unwise to maintain that gas flaring is harmless” (ECCR Bulletin, 
March 2011: 14). If it is true that gas flaring has less impact on people and the 
environment as Shell claimed, it becomes difficult to accept its claim of commitment to 
eliminate it, unless such commitment largely relates to Shell’s economic argument that 
gas flaring is a waste of resources. Like gas flaring environmental incident, oil spills 
also have several contentious issues on which the MNCs and stakeholders provided 
several narratives. These issues are now discussed in the next session.  
8.4 Stakeholders’ narratives about oil spills 
An insight into how the MNCs manifested accountability based on account-giving 
heuristic analysis revealed nuanced themes under accounts of denial, excuse, 
justification, and concession vis-à-vis oil spills environmental incident.  Stakeholders 
also provided narratives on oil spills in the Niger Delta around these nuanced themes 
which will be analysed under four broad subheadings: double standard narrative, 
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understatement of oil spills volume, credibility of regulators, and sabotage or oil theft 
alternative narratives.   
8.4.1 Double standard narrative 
Stakeholders have basically criticised the oil MNCs in Nigeria of double standards in 
the following areas: substandard clean-up and remediation method, and prompt 
containment/clean-up of oil spills. These are now analysed in turn.  
8.4.1.1 Substandard clean-up and remediation method 
Chapter seven highlighted the MNCs’ disclosures that their clean-up and remediation 
methods conformed to international best practice, their in-house standards and standards 
stipulated by Nigeria regulators. Stakeholders’ narratives conflict with those accounts as 
stakeholders criticised the MNCs of failing to employ modern technology and best 
practices.   NGOs have actively criticised these MNCs for allegedly applying standards 
different to what they adopt in their developed countries’ operations. Examples of 
narratives from non-community stakeholders alluding to this claim are as follows:  
So the technology used in Nigeria is spade and bucket to dig, put the oil in a pit and set 
fire on it. Cleaner technologies are available but they are not willing to invest, but they 
are only interested in their profit. (Personal Interview: Independent NGO 2) 
 
…[T]he control, maintenance and decommissioning of oilfield infrastructure in 
Ogoniland are inadequate. Industry best practices and SPDC’s own procedures have not 
been applied, creating public safety issues. Remediation by enhanced natural 
attenuation (RENA) – so far the only remediation method observed by UNEP in 
Ogoniland – has not proven to be effective … Ten out of the 15 investigated sites which 
SPDC records show as having completed remediation, still have pollution exceeding the 
SPDC (and government) remediation closure values (UNEP, 2011: 12) 
 
A scientific study commissioned by Amnesty International also concluded that Shell 
performed below the operating and safety standards set by Nigerian regulatory 
framework and Shell’s standards in developed countries (Steiner, 2010). Community 
members also criticised the MNCs for poor clean-up and remediation of oil spills 
contrary to the MNCs’ claim of compliance with best practice. Examples of such 
narratives are: 
What they called clean-up [is] …they set fire on the crude to burn the whole place and 
after burning they will just remove the earth and bury it somewhere. And that is what is 
clean-up, there is no remediation. (Personal Interview: Community Stakeholder 4) 
 
The contractors Shell uses to do clean-up are from the community and they are assigned 
the job through bidding process. They give the job to the lowest bidder. After the 
166 
 
burning they do remediation which is to dig the ground and bury the burnt crude inside 
[interviewee’s lay understanding of remediation]. They now bring another soil to refill 
the area. (Personal Interview: Community Stakeholder 9) 
 
They [MNCs’ contractors] will come and dig the ground and push the [spilled] oil 
underground and cover it. And for this they use local boys. They bury the oil 
underneath and plant trees [grasses] on top and they go away. (Personal Interview: 
Independent NGO 4)  
 
The stakeholders’ narratives are apparently corroborated by the UNEP’s findings in 
Ogoniland regarding clean-up and remediation.  
8.4.1.2 Prompt containment/clean-up of oil spills 
The main narratives here relate to the causes of delays to oil spill containment or clean-
up which could be linked to three sources: nonchalance of the MNCs, JIV bureaucracy 
and blocking of access by communities. An example of stakeholders’ narratives 
concerning the nonchalance of the MNCs towards prompt handling of oil spills is 
presented below:  
The Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) has said that the 
response [quick intervention] by Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) to the 
Bonga oil spill fell short of international and national standards in handling 20 
December oil spill in Nigeria’s oil-rich Niger Delta region. NIMASA Director General, 
Patrick Akpobolokemi, told journalists on Tuesday in Lagos that Shell had not behaved 
responsibly in handling the matter (Agence de Presse Africaine, 2 January 2012)  
 
Other narratives alluding to the nonchalance of the MNCs are as follows: 
Shell says it was informed of the first leak in early October 2008. The community says 
the leak by then had already been pumping oil for some six weeks. Even then it took 
Shell over a month to repair the weld defect in one of its pipelines, which had resulted 
in oil pumping out of the pipeline into the local community at an estimated rate of 2,000 
barrels per day. (All Africa Global Media, 4 August 2011) 
  
[C]lean-up of oil pollution in the Niger Delta is frequently both slow and inadequate, 
leaving people to cope with the ongoing impacts of the pollution on their livelihoods 
and health. For example, at Ogbodo, where a massive oil spill occurred in 2001 … 
clean-up of the site was delayed for months, and even then was inadequate. When 
Amnesty International visited in October 2003, oil residue clearly remained on the 
water and the land (Amnesty International, June 2009: 19) 
 
Whilst the MNCs claim they clean up oil spills irrespective of the cause, the above 
counter narratives allege that the corporations delay response to oil spills and do poor 
clean-up. JIV bureaucracy has also been blamed for the delays to containment and 
clean-up of oil spills according to the narrative below:  
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When there is pollution and the oil company receives the call that there is pollution, the 
oil company will call the ministry [of environment], call DPR, call NOSDRA, and call 
the community representatives, they will now form a joint team and now go and inspect, 
see the place where the pollution has occurred. When they finished seeing it to 
determine whether it was [caused by] sabotage or equipment failure or whatever … 
After they do their report then they now start mobilizing to go [clean up]. With these 
activities … from the day an occurrence is reported, it takes about 5 to 10 days before 
containment actually begins. And you know, depending on the volume of discharge or 
whatever, you know the impact of these for this number of days (Personal Interviews: 
Partnering NGO 3) 
 
This kind of delay is created by official regulation which appears to be outside the 
control of both the companies and communities. From the analysis of the causes of 
delays to containment and clean-up of oil spills in Chapter seven, the MNCs identified 
only the communities as the source of these delays due to communities blocking MNCs’ 
access to spill sites.  Some stakeholders’ narratives equally confirm that communities 
deny the MNCs access to spill sites because the communities want to receive 
compensation first before allowing clean-up due to their mistrust that the companies 
will fail to pay compensation once they have done clean-up and repairs to their 
pipelines. Examples of these narratives are as follows: 
For a variety of reasons community members may not allow spill clean-up teams or 
government regulators to access a spill site. This could be from historical mistrust of 
authorities and companies, or to hide community-level refining activities 
(Oilspillwatch.org, 2013) 
  
… [b]ut Shell is saying that it should be clean-up and remediation first before 
compensation, but we say no because we don’t trust them. (Personal Interview: 
Community Stakeholder 10) 
 
These narratives compared to those of the MNCs suggest that they emanate from a tense 
and confused social context (see Allen, 2011) in which different parties offer differing 
accounts.  
8.4.2 Understatement of volume of oil spills 
Two broad issues identified within the purview of oil spill understatement narrative are 
impact exaggeration and the credibility of JIV. Impact exaggeration as we saw in 
Chapter seven was basically of two folds: exaggeration of the volume of spill and 
exaggeration of the impact or number of people affected by the spill. For example, Shell 
argued in the case of Bodo Community that there were many claimants of compensation 
than were the actual victims of the oil spills and that the volume of the spills was also 
inflated (Sections 7.5.1.1 and 7.5.3.1). In my interaction with some community people, 
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it was apparent that they generally consider a spill on any land in their community as 
affecting everybody in that community and so they expect every community member to 
be compensated. Another complexity within this narrative is that all the community 
members interviewed claimed that the communities were getting low harvest from 
fishing and farming activities due to oil spills. There are at least three likely problems 
associated with this communities’ argument. First, not all those who claim their fishing 
or farming activities are affected actually engage in such activities. Second, continuous 
fishing over the years could also be a factor affecting fish harvest. Lastly, low farm 
yields could be due to continuous cultivation without allowing the soil enough time to 
regenerate. Whilst these are caveats that plausibly weaken the communities’ argument, 
the negative impacts of oil spills are well documented (cf. Chapter Four).  
 
Another issue that has linkage with the understatement narrative is the mechanism used 
to determine the cause and volume of the oil spills: JIV. Whilst the MNCs attached 
credibility to the volumes of oil spills as being co-determined by the companies, 
regulators and communities affected, stakeholders have alternative narratives 
concerning the JIV credibility. Stakeholders have criticised the JIV exercise as largely 
controlled by the MNCs as the regulators overseeing the exercise depend on the 
companies for JIV logistics. For example, I gathered from an informal conversation 
with a senior field officer of NOSDRA that the agency depends on the MNCs for the 
provision of logistics (including accommodation and stipend for NOSDRA staff) 
required for oil spill joint investigation exercise. Stakeholders perceive this lack of 
independence as inappropriate (UNEP, 2011) and a compromise on the credibility of the 
investigation as the process risked being largely controlled by the MNCs (Amnesty 
International, 2009, 2013; ECCR, February 2010). Moreover, stakeholders have at least 
two concerns over the effective participation of the communities in JIV. First, the 
uncertainty of the role community representatives will play without the expertise to 
understand how volume of spill is estimated. As one community member (Personal 
Interview: Community Stakeholder 4) argues, unless the communities engage experts to 
represent them during JIV their participation would be marred by ignorance. Whereas 
Partnering NGO 1 (Personal Interview) argues that the communities by right should be 
enabled to do their independent assessment [engage expert services], the communities 
unlikely have the resources to engage such experts. Second, stakeholders also accused 
the MNCs of hijacking the JIV process by allegedly choosing their cronies as 
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community representatives on the JIV team in order to manipulate the JIV report to the 
MNCs’ advantage. See, for example, the allegations below: 
What Agip does sometimes is that when spill occurs, they will always call them 
sabotage. There was a case of a spill … in 2006, two spills occurred at the same time, 
they came with the JIV and they gave their report as equipment failure. The community 
people, Government and Agip representatives were there.  They said it was equipment 
failure, but they later claimed it was sabotage. And no compensation was paid even till 
today. (Personal Interview: Community Stakeholder 5) 
What they do is that they will just bring a plain paper and ask you to sign and they will 
tell you that they can’t fill their report in the field and that when they get to the office 
they will collate [complete] the report.  … Some [community] boys who are not 
grounded [ignorant], when they [MNCs] find [give] them a little thing [incentive] they 
will sign it. (Personal Interviews: Community Stakeholder 3; Also, Independent NGO 
3; see also Amnesty International, 2013) 
 
My informal conversation with another NOSDRA field investigation officer provides 
further information on the above stakeholders’ allegations.  The officer showed me a 
copy of JIV form and stated that the form was always completed and signed on site. He 
denied the allegation that communities were made to sign unfilled form. But in relation 
to whether the persons representing communities on JIV teams were actually from the 
community, he said he would not know as NOSDRA accepts in good faith those 
persons the oil companies identified as representatives of the communities.  
Furthermore, the following narratives suggest that the MNCs use money to induce the 
outcome of the JIV reports:  
Igbapike, a lawyer and community representative in some oil spill and related issues 
negotiations, told our correspondent that oil companies’ data are grossly unreliable and 
‘tilted towards achieving their own selfish end, which is to perpetually shortchange the 
oil producing communities in the region. You have oil companies going to site to alter 
the evidence before the arrival of JIV team; sometimes even when their equipment fail 
they give ignorant community youths stipends to go and tamper with the spill spot in 
order to arrive at 3rd party interference as cause (Legal Oil, 28 August 2010) 
 
Amnesty International also claimed to have secretly filmed video of an investigation 
showing how officials from Shell and the regulator tried to subvert the evidence by 
persuading community members on the investigation team not to attribute the cause to 
equipment failure. (Channels Television, 7 November 2013) 
 
A number of studies also suggest that the figures of oil spills in the Niger Delta are 
uncertain (Amnesty International, 2009: 15-16; European Parliament, 2011; UNEP, 
2011: 88). For example, the European Parliament study explained that only major oil 
spills are reported and minor ones are excluded even though the collective effects of the 
latter can be very profound. An independent media investigation affirms this assertion 
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(see Legal Oil, 28 August 2010). 
8.4.3 Credibility of regulators  
As we saw in Section 8.4.2, one of the grounds for questioning the credibility of JIV 
exercise was the independence of the regulators. Stakeholders’ narratives about the 
credibility of the regulators are apparently as important as the oil spill issues their 
regulatory functions cover on one hand, and the importance the MNCs attached to the 
regulatory outcomes of estimates of  volumes and causes oil spills as well as spill clean-
up certifications on the other hand. Whilst Section 8.4.2 dealt with narratives on the 
credibility of estimates of oil spill volumes, this section focuses on narratives on the 
credibility of clean-up and remediation certifications issued by the regulators to the 
MNCs. Section 8.4.4 will focus more on the more nuanced stakeholders’ alternative 
narratives on sabotage as a source of oil spills.  
 
The companies consider themselves as meeting regulatory standards when DPR 
certifies their oil spill clean-up and remediation work (cf. Section 7.5.3.3). However, 
stakeholders are in doubt over the credibility of the regulators because they perceive the 
regulators as furthering the interests of the Government who is a major JV partner with 
the MNCs thus engendering conflict of interest (Personal Interview: Community 
Stakeholder 10). Doubts over regulators’ credibility apparently weaken stakeholders’ 
confidence on the clean-up and remediation certificates the regulators issue to the 
MNCs. Several stakeholders have expressed doubts over the independence and 
credibility of these agencies in carrying out their oversight functions. For example, the 
following media report on litigation regarding oil environmental pollution in the Niger 
Delta presented the lack of faith the Court of Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) had on Nigerian oil regulators:  
It clearly shows that the said agencies or ministry established by the federal government 
exist on papers (Thisdaylive, 17 December 2012) 
 
A confirmation of stakeholders’ doubts over the credibility of these regulatory agencies 
finds expression in the United Nations report on Ogoniland (UNEP, 2011). The UNEP 
team found several poorly remediated oil spill sites in Ogoniland, albeit those sites had 
already been certified by the regulators and confirmed by the MNCs as fully cleaned up 
and remediated. Even the regulators are aware of their weakness in carrying out their 
oversight functions. For example, the Director-General of NOSDRA (one of the 
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regulators) asserted on two distinct occasions that the agency lacked the legislative 
framework to enforce the laws on oil spills and environmental remediation against the 
oil companies (Channels Television, 16 February 2012; Channels Television, 10 
January 2014). When regulators lack the power to perform their functions, their 
independence becomes inevitably questionable as they are apparently susceptible to the 
influences of more powerful institutions they oversee. This situation apparently 
privileges these powerful institutions (the MNCs in this context) to enjoy the space to 
control discourses relating to contentious issues within the industry. One of such 
profound contentious issues identified in Chapter seven was sabotage or oil theft 
argument.  
8.4.4 Sabotage and oil theft alternative narratives 
Some of the spills in Niger Delta were due to sabotage by community members, but our 
field assessments also showed that most were caused by aging equipment. The oil 
companies are not saying the truth about oil spills because when NOSDRA workers get 
to the sites of spill the first thing the oil workers tell them is that the spill was caused by 
sabotage. But we normally confront the oil workers that it was as a result of their old 
equipment (Fieldwork Informal Conversation: NOSDRA staff) 
 
One of the MNCs’ excuse accounts on oil spill environmental incident is sabotage and 
oil theft thesis (cf. Section 7.5.2.2) which claimed that majority of the oil spills in the 
Niger Delta were caused by the activities of third parties (i.e., sabotage/theft). In 
contrast, stakeholders have considered the MNCs’ sabotage narrative as both 
exaggerated and suspicious. For example, the following two narratives by a group of 
NGOs
95
 and Chairman of Nigerian Senate Committee on Environment point in this 
direction: 
Shell looks to blame others based on investigation reports that, in some cases, amount 
to nothing more than dodgy dossiers … Shell has made some improvements to its 
investigation reports since 2011, including the addition of images of oil spills on its 
corporate website. But serious flaws remain, including weaknesses in the underlying 
evidence used to attribute spills to sabotage. (Channels Television, 7 November 2013b) 
 
In a statement signed by the Chairman Senate Committee on Environment Senator 
Bukola Saraki, it stated that within the last six weeks, there have been media reports of 
two oil spills within the precincts of Exxon Mobil Nigeria operations in Akwa Ibom 
state. He said there is a growing impression today that majority of the spills are the 
result of sabotage. However, with the recent spills happening deep offshore, it is 
becoming evident that there is more to this than meets the eye. (Legal Oil, 24 December 
2012; see also, Channels Television, 24 December 2012) 
                                                 
95 Amnesty International and Centre for Environment, Human Rights and Development (CEHRD) made 
public their allegations against Shell via Channels TV.  
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Senator Saraki’s argument was apparently based on his doubts over whether deep 
offshore oil spills could result from sabotage as ExxonMobil’s oil explorations are 
mainly offshore-based. Furthermore, one interviewee argued (in a closely related 
manner to Senator Saraki’s doubt) that the oil companies usually attribute only onshore 
(but not offshore) oil spills to sabotage because of the apparent difficulty of defending 
sabotage as the cause of offshore spills (Personal Interview: Legal Expert 3). Whilst 
some stakeholders viewed the MNCs’ sabotage argument as untenable, other 
stakeholders believed that sabotage has increased based on the numerous illegal 
refineries that depended on stolen crude oil in Niger Delta (Personal Interviews: 
Community Stakeholder 7; Partnering NGO 3). Generally, whereas the MNCs and 
stakeholders believe sabotage causes oil spills in the Niger Delta, they disagree 
concerning the proportion of oil spills attributable to sabotage. For example, Amnesty 
International (2009: 15), which is very critical of the oil MNCs operating in the Niger 
Delta stated that:  
There is no doubt that sabotage, vandalism of oil infrastructure and theft of oil are 
serious problems in the Niger Delta, although the scale of the problem is unclear  
 
As the notion of sabotage potentially charges up the discourses surrounding oil spill 
incident, stakeholders provide competing counter narratives to MNCs’ sabotage 
argument. Stakeholders’ alternative narratives identified from interviews and other 
pubic texts are: corrosion thesis, collusion thesis, compensation avoidance thesis, and 
security/surveillance thesis. However, the verity of these alternative narratives is likely 
as contentious as the sabotage narrative itself because of the complexity surrounding the 
Niger Delta oil spills (see European Parliament, 2011). Although the companies 
recognise the issues underpinned by the alternative narratives, they still consider 
sabotage as the major cause of oil spills in Niger Delta. These alternative narratives to 
sabotage are now analysed in the following sub-sections.  
8.4.4.1 Corrosion thesis 
Stakeholders’ narratives under this thesis are that most oil spills result from corrosion of 
oil pipelines due to their aged nature. This contrasts with claims by Eni and Shell that 
corrosion of pipelines contributes less to oil spill than sabotage does (cf. Section 
7.5.2.2).  Although Chevron and ExxonMobil did not discuss corrosion-related oil spills 
in their reports, ExxonMobil claimed to have a mechanism in place to easily detect 
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corrosion on its pipelines (ExxonMobil Citizenship Report 2012: 21). However, it is not 
discernible from the report whether such mechanism extends to its Nigerian operations. 
The emergence of corrosion narrative derives from stakeholders’ doubt over the 
sabotage thesis held by the MNCs. For example, there are instances where stakeholders 
attributed specific spills to corrosion but the companies attributed them to sabotage as 
evident in the following narratives:  
The military joint task force (JTF) operating in Nigeria said it discovered a leak on a 
pipeline near Adamakiri in Rivers State while looking for illegal oil refiners. "An 
assessment of the spot revealed that a brownish liquid substance was observed jetting 
out from an opening on the pipeline," a statement from the JTF said. "The Commanding 
Officer ... attributed the leakage to corrosion on the pipeline." A spokesman for Shell's 
Nigeria unit said on Friday that "oil spill containment" had been put in place after the 
leak was found but it was too early to determine the cause (Reuters, 23 August 2013) 
 
What Agip does sometimes is that when spills occur, they will always call them 
sabotage. There was a case of a spill … in 2006, two spills occurred at the same time, 
they did a JIV and JIV report claimed the spills occurred from equipment failure. The 
community people, Government and Agip representatives were there.  They said it was 
equipment failure, but they later claimed it was sabotage. And no compensation was 
paid even till today (Personal Interview: Community Stakeholder 5) 
 
Further to the above narratives, an independent investigation done by a Nigerian leading 
newspaper, The Nations, suggests that not less than 50% of oil spills are caused by 
corrosion due to the aged pipelines (Legal Oil, 28 August 2010). Community 
Stakeholder 9 (Personal Interview) also alleged that oil companies will always attribute 
oil spills to sabotage even if they were caused by corrosion. Whilst Partnering and 
Independent NGOs believed that corrosion generally contributed to oil spills, 
Independent NGOs were rather more assertive that it contributed the most to oil spills. 
For example:   
I don’t see why anybody should think that each time company says there is a sabotage 
to immediately think they are lying … The issue is that there are several cases of 
sabotage. Then another thing is that a lot of the facilities of some of these companies 
have been around for a long time [old] … But sabotage is real, otherwise where would 
they [illegal refineries] be getting the crude oil they are refining (Personal Interview: 
Partnering NGO 3) 
You see, under pipeline integrity, a pipeline ought not to be more than 25 or 30 years 
old, but most of our pipelines are over 50 years old. So what do you think about that? 
Are they not breaking up by themselves? They are breaking up by themselves because 
the pressure inside is much. They cannot say spills are caused by sabotage, but what 
they say is a cooked up excuse (Personal Interview: Independent NGO 3) 
You know the pipeline that conveys oil to the Trans-Niger [terminal] is steadily 
flowing. And look at the age of the pipeline … it is over-aged and when it spills it just 
spills like that (Personal Interview: Community Stakeholder 3) 
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There is sabotage, normally there is sabotage. All oil spills are not sabotage. They also 
arise as a result of negligence of these oil companies because some of these pipes have 
been on the ground for a period of 50, 60 years. They are now corrosive. (Personal 
Interview: Legal Expert 3)  
 
The following independent report also cited Shell’s internal document alluding to the 
company’s ageing facilities in the Niger Delta:  
By 1994 Shell privately admitted that SPDC had ageing and polluting infrastructure that 
was “unacceptable.” One document noted, “Key aspects of the past environmental 
practices of the SPDC operation also fall short of current standards and leave a 
significant legacy of problems to be resolved.” (Stockman, Rowell and Kretzmann, 
2009: 17)  
 
The moot point from the sabotage-corrosion narratives is the uncertainty as to what 
proportion of oil spills is caused by either sabotage or corrosion. This controversy is 
unlikely to be resolved sooner as long as sabotage is perpetrated by third parties 
independently or in collusion.  
8.4.4.2 Collusion thesis 
The sabotage narratives have been one rife with accusations and counter-accusations. 
Whereas the MNCs accuse communities of involvement in sabotage of oil pipelines 
leading to oil spills in Niger Delta, stakeholders allege that oil spills caused by sabotage 
result from collusion between the MNCs’ staff and oil spill clean-up contractors who 
allegedly use some community boys to carry out sabotage. This partly suggests that the 
communities are in the know that some community members participate in the act of 
sabotage. Intuitively, collusion thesis apparently weakens the corrosion thesis and 
strengthens the sabotage thesis in the likelihood that collusion leads to pervasive 
sabotage and oil spills. However, it is not that straightforward as the oil companies 
themselves have also been allegedly implicated in the collusion. Recently, both the 
MNCs and Nigerian Government have affirmed the collusion thesis as the MNCs 
accused the Government and vice versa of collusion in the perpetration of sabotage. For 
example, a Media statement ascribed to the Speaker of the Nigerian House of 
Representatives, Honourable Aminu Tanbuwal, reads:  
He urged his colleagues [legislators] that “this is a very complicated and very 
sophisticated business [oil sabotage/bunkering] and it will be foolish to think of the 
culprits in terms of area boys who break pipelines. “We must realise that without the 
protection of highly-placed people, without the connivance of officials and experts in 
the sector, the activity of illegal bunkering would have been curtailed long ago 
(Pointblanknews.com,  December 2013) 
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Moreover, the Chairman of Shell Nigeria alleged at the 2013 Nigerian Oil and Gas 
Exhibition and Conference that ‘principalities and powers in high places’ were behind 
oil sabotage and theft. According to him:  
The truth is that the small (criminals) in the creeks of Niger Delta bursting pipelines and 
stealing crude oil are not working for themselves. Like the drug cartels around the 
world, they are being sponsored by big principalities and powers in high places, which 
the government should go against if the fight against crude oil theft is to be won.  
(Pointblanknews.com, 2 August 2013) 
 
As the Nigerian Government felt indicted by the above statement, the Presidency 
responded through Mr. Kingsley Kuku that: 
… the process of stealing crude oil from pipelines in the coastal areas requires highly 
technical and mechanical expertise, which ordinary Nigerians or residents of the oil-
producing communities do not have. He absolved Niger Delta governors of complicity 
in crude theft, saying there was no evidence of their involvement … He said: “The best 
you can find among Niger Delta people or some merchants of this trade are those doing 
menial jobs in it. … “I know of one thing and this is the bombshell that there are 
workers in the oil and gas industry who have the expertise, the technical know-how and 
knows about the ways and means of sabotaging the oil and gas industry, who are likely 
to be involved.  “This is critical and I know that a lot of multinationals will be angered 
by this, but their being angry is not a bother to me. “So you have a situation where some 
pipeline protection contractors empowered by the oil companies participate in the theft. 
…  “The same people who are meant to be securing these pipelines participate in oil 
theft. So the oil multinationals must look inwards at their contracting process, their 
procurement process, look at the status of some of their vendors and security 
contractors, x-ray them, review their processes very well and deal with the issue of oil 
theft as it affects participation in-house in the oil and gas industry.” (Leadership, 27 
July 2013; See also Pointblanknews.com, 2 August 2013) 
 
In analysing these public discourses between the MNCs and Presidency, Ifeanyi Izeze, 
an oil industry expert, stated that:  
And from the exchange between the Presidency and the multinational oil companies, 
both sides agree that there is a problem which is purely criminal and bothers on 
economic sabotage … Also, both sides agree that highly placed individuals and groups 
(both in government and the oil companies) sponsor those stealing the nation’s crude 
oil. (pointblanknews.com, 2 August 2013) 
 
Shell also claims that whereas a large amount of oil is stolen by sabotage/theft, the 
minor ones stolen for running illegal makeshift (artisanal) refineries are responsible for 
enormous environmental pollution in the Niger Delta (Shell Sustainability Report 2012: 
3, 22; See also Shell Sustainability Report 2010: 18). However, the extent to which 
these illegal refineries have contributed to oil spill is unknown. But stakeholders have 
also expressed their concern over the large number of these artisanal refineries and their 
devastating impacts on the environment (e.g., UNEP, 2011; Personal Interviews: 
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Community Stakeholder 7; Partnering NGO 3). Another collusion mentioned by the 
stakeholders regarding sabotage is collusion between contractors/oil companies’ 
workers and some community people (e.g., Amnesty International, 2009: 15; Legal Oil, 
28 August 2010; Personal Interviews: Community Stakeholders 1, 2, 4, 8, 9 and 10). 
For example, Community stakeholder 10 argues that sabotage is a pure business for the 
contractors who collude to break pipelines so they can get contract to replace them. 
Another collusion thesis found in the reviewed texts is one between the oil thieves, 
Government security people and pipeline surveillance contractors in charge of guarding 
the oil facilities (Legal Oil, 28 August 2010; Personal Interviews: Community 
Stakeholder 10; See also Nigerian Presidency’s earlier statement). One conclusion that 
can be drawn from the collusion discourses is that they are all claims that are difficult to 
verify or undermine given the complexities surrounding the Niger Delta oil spills, which 
European Parliament (2011: 31) eloquently articulated as follows:  
Although oil bunkering on this scale requires sophisticated organization, and the 
complicity of state officials up to a very high level, it flourishes amid the poverty and 
sense of injustice in the Delta area. Given the extent of the wealth involved, and the 
degree to which such activities have international connections, the issue deserves 
further attention.  
8.4.4.3 Compensation avoidance thesis 
As discussed under regulatory compliance (cf. Section 7.5.3.3), Shell stated that it only 
paid compensation to victims of oil spills not caused by sabotage (third parties) in 
compliance with Nigerian law.  Whilst such argument is justifiable within the context of 
the Nigerian law, stakeholders allege that this legal provision underlies why the MNCs 
usually attribute the cause of most oil spills to sabotage.  For example: 
So when corporations talk of sabotage, they are hiding certain facts. One, they are 
unable to police their oil facilities and as a result they are blaming third parties. So the 
action of the third party cannot be made as the action of the main victim. In other 
words, if oil is spilled on a farm by a third party, what relationship has that to do with 
the victim? The victim is not the third party. You can see that it is a matter of 
convenience for the oil companies to claim sabotage in order to evade responsibility and 
accountability … But they choose to hide under the claim of sabotage to evade payment 
of compensation and clean up (Personal Interview: Independent NGO 2; See also 
Amnesty International, 2009: 17).  
 
Stakeholders hold the view that evasion of compensation payment underlies the MNCs’ 
claims of sabotage to take advantage of loopholes in the law.  Whilst the law exempts 
companies from paying compensation to oil spill victims for spills caused by third 
parties, it does not explicate the level of security measures the companies must put in 
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place to enjoy this compensation exemption clause, which apparently gives the 
corporations too large a protection from potential liability. Vaguely however, Petroleum 
(Drilling and Production) Regulation 1969 as cited by the Coalitions for Change (2010: 
2) “imposes obligation on the licensee and lessee to take necessary precautions to 
prevent pollution, control and end it when it occurs.” Further to sabotage narrative by 
MNCs and compensation avoidance thesis, stakeholders argue that oil companies have 
the responsibility to adequately protect their pipelines from sabotage both in terms of 
security surveillance and layout of pipelines.  
8.4.4.4 Security/surveillance thesis 
Underpinning the security/surveillance thesis as an alternative to MNCs’ sabotage 
argument is stakeholders’ claim that sabotage occurs due to the inadequate security 
measures put in place by the MNCs to protect their oil facilities from being sabotaged.  
Contrastingly, the MNCs claimed to have deployed people and technologies to monitor 
and secure pipelines against potential vandalism (see, e.g., Eni Sustainability Report 
2009: 75; Eni For 2012: 51; ExxonMobil 2012: 21; Shell Nigeria 2011d)
96
. Although 
Eni’s and Shell’s claims were specific to their Nigerian operations, it was not clear 
whether ExxonMobil’s claims apply to its Nigerian operations as its claims were rather 
generic. Whereas the MNCs considered their deployment of technology as part of 
efforts to prevent sabotage, they equally argued that the Government has the 
responsibility to complement those efforts by providing physical security over oil 
facilities (Godson Njoku, Shell Nigeria 2011c; Total Upstream Nigeria 2009c). An 
excerpt from a media report ascribed to the Managing Director of Shell Nigeria – Mr 
Mutiu Sunmonu – blamed the Nigerian Government for security lapses permitting the 
perpetration of sabotage:  
Mr. Sunmonu said Shell and other International Oil Companies operating in Nigeria 
have had their pipelines sabotaged by crude oil dealers on several occasions. The oil 
companies have privately and publicly blamed the government for its failure to provide 
security for the pipelines despite the fact that they pay all the charges and taxes the 
government asks of them. (News Nest, 20 February, 2013) 
 
                                                 
96 Whilst Eni claimed its deployment of technology was at piloted stage, Shell was considering deploying 
technology to detect pipelines intrusion (Mutiu Sunmonu, Shell Nigeria 2011a). Thisdaylive (25 
November 2013) reported that government and NNPC (majority equity partner with the MNCs) failed to 
implement Schlumberger’s recommendations on the installations of remote sensing technologies for 
monitoring oil pipelines against third party intrusions. This narrative apparently casts doubt over the 
commitment of the JVs to obliterate sabotage since NNPC as the majority partner appears unwilling (at 
least from the MNCs’ funding claims) to make such capital investment.  
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But stakeholders have also blamed the MNCs for encouraging sabotage by the way they 
lay pipelines on ground surface (instead of underground) which, as a poor security 
measure, facilitates the susceptibility of pipelines to sabotage.  
The facilities in the Niger Delta are not well protected. Pipelines, on no account should 
be on ground surface ... So when corporations talk of sabotage, they are hiding certain 
facts. (Personal Interview: Independent NGO 2) 
 
Intuitively, the on-the-surface pipelines layout argument is apparently logical given the 
likely high risk of oil theft in the Niger Delta. The substance of this argument is 
apparently supported by the media narrative attributed to the Managing Director of 
Shell Nigeria as follows:   
He also advised the federal government to look for ways to make it more difficult to the 
oil thieves to access the pipelines. For instance he said Shell was presently laying 
pipelines at 13.5ft below the ground just to make sure it is harder for vandals to reach 
(Leadership, 23 May 2013)  
 
However, another narrative of the security/surveillance thesis by stakeholders 
(especially community group) is that a better approach to secure and provide 
surveillance over pipelines is to engage the services of the communities. One downside 
of the community interest in the surveillance contracts is the presence of conflicting 
interest groups within each community, which potentially makes those who feel left out 
to engage in pipeline sabotage to express their grievances (see IHS Global Insight Daily 
Analysis, 14 November 2011). Some examples of security/surveillance narrative are:   
Now the question that will be thrown at them [oil companies] also is: “how can you 
have your investment without a security [surveillance]?” If you had employed the 
services of the host communities as securities, who would touch your property 
(Personal Interview: Community Stakeholder 3)  
If the pipeline passed through my house or my land I am in a better position to secure 
the pipeline because I know that if there is a spill my land will be the first victim, and 
that [land] is the source of my livelihood (Personal Interview: Community Stakeholder 
4)  
 
However, it is unclear which community members should be offered this surveillance 
contracts when those who are disgruntled for not being offered the job engage in 
sabotage of pipelines. Some community members are disgruntled because of the lack of 
transparency in the surveillance contract awarding process. For example, whereas Shell 
claims it engages community people as surveillance contractors (Shell Nigeria 2011d: 
1), some community members are aggrieved as the MNCs allegedly give such contracts 
to their cronies whom they use to undermine the interest of the communities (Personal 
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Interview: Community Stakeholder 10).  
8.5 Summary of findings and conclusion 
This Chapter has explored the stakeholders’ narratives relating to gas flaring and oil 
spills in the Niger Delta which basically manifested in the form of counter-narratives to 
the MNCs’ accounts in Chapter seven. As stated in Chapters one and seven, the 
exploration of both the stakeholders’ and MNCs’ narratives was to give insights into the 
nature of accounts the MNCs give concerning the prevalent gas flaring and oil spills 
environmental incidents in the Niger Delta and how the stakeholders also view the 
issues addressed by those accounts. As these incidents to which the MNCs’ and 
stakeholders’ narratives relate are negative incidents, the theoretical underpinning of 
account-giving heuristic suggests that the companies will more likely utilise defensive 
accounts to persuade their audience about the incidents because of the likely attendant 
negative impacts on corporate image.  
 
With respect to the narratives about gas flaring environmental incident, both the MNCs 
and stakeholders concurred on the magnitude of gas flaring in Nigeria compared to 
other countries. Essentially, they disagreed over the MNCs’ alleged factors promoting 
continuous gas flaring, the legality of gas flaring as well as the impacts of gas flaring. 
Although stakeholders disagreed with the MNCs’ accounts on the impacts of gas 
flaring, the MNCs furnished a number of excuses (cf. Section 7.4.2 and Section 8.3) to 
persuade stakeholders that they have yet to eliminate continuous gas flaring in Nigeria 
because it was outside their control. For example, the MNCs’ claim that funding 
shortfalls led to their inability to invest in gas-gathering technology required to stop 
flaring run in conflict with their claim that the Nigerian underdeveloped gas market 
constrained their investment in gas-gathering technology. This apparent conflict was 
spotted by stakeholders who alleged the lack of commitment of the MNCs to stop gas 
flaring given the extant power generation market which has the potential to absorb the 
gas currently flared by oil companies in Nigeria. Importantly, Eni corroborated this 
stakeholders’ narrative on available market for gas by its claim that Nigerian electricity 
sector/market holds the key to gas utilisation in Nigeria (cf. Section 7.4.2.2). Ironically, 
Eni further claimed that oil companies are unwilling to invest in that sector because of 
the potential low returns. This latter argument appears to strengthen stakeholders’ 
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allegation that the companies and Government were not committed to eliminating gas 
flaring.   
 
For example, whilst the stakeholders perceive the funding shortfalls excuse by the 
MNCs as untenable, they equally blame the Government for its poor attention to gas 
flaring because of Government conflict of interests as a regulator and JV partner. 
Consequently, stakeholders attributed the unwillingness of Government to impose strict 
liability on the companies for the impacts of gas flaring due to this regulation-
partnership conflict. The substance of this argument lies in the fact that Government 
will inevitably bear the larger share of the attendant liability based on its majority equity 
holding in its JVs with the MNCs. An important observation on the gas flaring 
narratives is that the critical conflict between the stakeholders’ narratives and those of 
the MNCs lies in the urgency of eliminating gas flaring. The tone of urgency to 
eliminate gas flaring apparently underlies both the stakeholders’ criticisms of the 
Government and MNCs as well as the MNCs’ alleged commitment to end gas flaring; 
however, the various excuse and justification accounts provided by the MNCs (Chapter 
Seven) arguably contrast with the urgency imperative and suggest why gas flaring will 
potentially linger into the future.   
 
In addition, the narratives on oil spills environmental incident are not any less 
contentious than those of gas flaring as the issues surrounding oil spills are deemed 
more complex than those of gas flaring (cf. Section 7.5).  Whilst both the MNCs and 
stakeholders agreed on the pervasiveness of oil spills in the Niger Delta, they differ on 
several contentious issues: double standards in handling oil spills, understatement of oil 
spill volume, the credibility of regulators, and issue of sabotage. According to the 
corporate narratives, the MNCs adopt best practices and international standards in 
handling containment/clean-up of oil spills (cf. Section 7.5.3.5). However, the 
stakeholders have accused the MNCs of using lower standards in handling oil spills 
compared to what obtain in developed countries. As the community and NGO 
stakeholders alleged, what the MNCs regarded as clean-up was to gather the oil spills 
together, and set it on fire and refill the land with new soil, leaving the ground 
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uncultivable
97
. Independent scientific assessments of clean-ups in Ogoniland and other 
parts of the Niger Delta appear to contradict the MNCs’ claim of no double standard 
(Steiner, 2010; UNEP, 2011). These apparently credible independent scientific studies 
signal a credibility gap in the related claims made by the MNCs, which might further 
suggest the need to treat the MNCs’ other accounts with caution. However, delays to the 
prompt containment/clean-up of oil spills have implications for the widespread of spills 
and their impacts and the MNCs have indicted the communities as being responsible for 
such delays.  
  
Whilst the MNCs have blamed such delays on the communities due to the latter denying 
the former access to spill sites for reasons ranging from selfish interest to anxieties over 
how spills will affect communities (cf. Sections 7.4.1.4 and 7.5.2.1), stakeholders 
berated the MNCs’ lack of urgency in handling oil spills incidents. However, some 
community members have also contradicted their lack of urgency allegation as they 
acknowledged that their communities prevented oil companies from doing clean-up 
until the companies paid compensation because of their mistrust that the companies will 
fail to pay compensation after doing clean-up.  The lead time between the occurrence of 
oil spills and payment of compensation could be quite long due to the time it will take to 
resolve the many complex factors associated with compensation payment. For example, 
as noted in Chapter seven, those claiming compensation may be more than those 
actually impacted by the spills. Secondly, a JIV needed to be done first to ascertain 
whether the spills resulted from operational failure or sabotage (Sections 7.5.3.3 and 
8.4.1.2). With these complexities, it is difficult to blame the delays to clean-ups wholly 
on the MNCs as such delays are partly induced by the law (JIV bureaucracy), 
communities, and insensitivity of the MNCs and Government.    
 
A major contentious issue within the oil spill narratives is sabotage. Whilst the oil 
companies claim that majority of oil spills are caused by sabotage, several counter-
narratives by stakeholders suggest otherwise. Although both MNCs and stakeholders 
agree that sabotage causes oil spills in addition to equipment failures and pipeline 
corrosion, they only apparently disagree in regard to what proportion of oil spills is 
caused by sabotage. Whilst corrosion thesis suggests that majority of oil spills are due to 
                                                 
97 My visit to one of the cleaned up oil spill sites in the Niger Delta confirmed this allegation by 
stakeholders. 
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corrosion of aged pipelines, collusion thesis suggests that sabotage exists because of 
collusion between the MNCs’ workers and some community members (including 
contractors). Much recently however, both the MNCs have accused Government people 
as the principalities and powers in high places behind sabotage leading to a counter-
allegation from the Government that the MNCs are responsible for sabotage and oil 
theft arguing that only the companies could possibly have the technical know-how to 
undertake those acts. However, whether or not these allegations of who causes sabotage 
is correct, the Nigerian law exempts the oil companies from paying compensation to 
victims of oil spills caused by sabotage. Consequently, communities and NGOs have 
strongly alleged that the oil companies hide under the garb of the law to use sabotage as 
an excuse to avoid paying compensation (compensation avoidance thesis).  
 
These claims about compensation payment avoidance and principalities in high places 
appear to conflict with corporate claims that communities engage in sabotage to induce 
compensation. However, MNCs’ claims that communities cause sabotage to induce 
compensation conflict with the unanimous claims by community interviewees that the 
oil companies do not pay compensation. Other sources of evidence also suggest that oil 
companies pay little or no compensation to victims of oil spills in the Niger Delta (see 
Amnesty International, 2009; 2013; UNDP, 2006). If there is substance in the 
stakeholders’ claims that compensations are rarely paid to victims of oil spills, the 
claims that communities sabotage oil pipelines to get compensations become apparently 
counter-intuitive. However, the allegation linking (surveillance and clean-up) 
contractors, MNCs’ workers, Government institutions/agents to sabotage appears more 
plausible than the compensation-inducement argument. For example, the MNCs’ claim 
that ‘principalities in high places’ are behind sabotage/theft and the counter-claims by 
Nigerian Presidency that the MNCs and their contractors are partly involved in sabotage 
are very profound. These accusations and counter-accusations between the Government 
and MNCs produce some parallels. One, that highly placed and connected people are 
behind sabotage. Two, these people are known by the MNCs and Government
98
. Three, 
                                                 
98 A former Governor of Bayelsa State (in Niger Delta) Diepreye Alamieyesieha, told the National 
Conference Committee on Public Finance and Revenue on 23 April 2014 that Government officials and 
expatriates were involved in oil thefts.  He further alleged and concluded that those oil thieves were 
aided by former President Olusegun Obasanjo (during his presidential regime) as Obasanjo could name 
all those involved in oil sabotages but deliberately brought no action against them (Thisdaylive, 29 April 
2014).  
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community members engage in sabotage as employees of these barons. Four, 
community people only do menial jobs vis-à-vis crude oil theft. Generally, as Katsouris 
& Sayne (2013) noted, politicians, militants, military, oil dealers, communities and oil 
workers are believed to be benefiting from oil thefts in Nigeria.  
 
However, the evidence used by the MNCs to justify whether oil spills are caused by 
sabotage or equipment failure is based on the reports by joint investigators comprising 
community, government agencies and ministries, and the MNCs. Nonetheless, local and 
international stakeholders have alleged the incredibility of such investigation on several 
grounds such as: it is funded and controlled by the MNCs (as the government agencies 
depend on the MNCs for investigation logistics), the regulators are weak and not 
independent, the MNCs’ influence over the selection of community representatives, and 
communities’ lack of technical know-how to participate in the exercise. Another 
observation from the stakeholders’ narratives is the lack of cohesion among the 
community members as personal interests of some override community interests. For 
example, the local clean-up contractors (whom community stakeholders alleged were 
some chiefs and influential people in the communities) were accused of colluding with 
workers of oil companies not only in sponsoring sabotage but also in doing shoddy 
clean-ups. If these allegations have substance, it appears that the internal dynamics 
within communities undermine their common interest (see Garvey & Newell, 2005; 
Newenham-Kahindi, 2011).  With the divided allegiances in the communities – either to 
the MNCs or communities – the MNCs could exploit such loopholes of a divided house 
to undermine the power and interest of the communities. However, some community 
interviewees argued that the MNCs use strategies of ‘divide and rule’ by which they 
empower some persons within the communities to work against the common interests of 
the communities so that the community people do not have a single voice.  
 
Nevertheless, the narratives offered by the stakeholders manifested essentially in the 
form of counter-claims to the accounts the corporations claim to give. Stakeholders’ 
counter-narratives to corporate claims are not peculiar to this study (e.g., Killian, 2010) 
and especially in the context of negative environmental incidents. A caution from 
Rodrigue (2014) recognises that the information that emerges from interactions between 
corporations and their stakeholders has the tendency to produce skewed biases of each 
group providing such information. Baker (2010) equally argues that both managers and 
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stakeholders pursue self-interested objectives.  However, the importance of these claims 
and counter-claims is that they open up a potential vista of engagement that could 
possibly make corporations improve their environmental performance (see, e.g. Higgins 
& Walker, 2012; Livesey, 2001; O’Dwyer, et al., 2005) no matter how incremental. 
Moreover, the nature of the narratives that manifested from the stakeholders apparently 
lends credence to one of the accountability articulations by the communities namely, 
accountability by actions: mitigation of environmental impacts (cf. Section 6.6.2). The 
important notion underpinning accountability by actions is that the actions should 
correlate with the reports about such actions. Whether the actions are different to the 
reports about them depends on how one might view the issue. For example, the 
stakeholders’ narratives suggest that the actions of the MNCs necessary to mitigate the 
impacts of gas flaring and oil spills environmental incidents were different to the 
accounts provided by the companies about those actions. However, since accountability 
is concerned with providing explanations and justifications for actions or inactions, the 
accounts the MNCs gave helped with insights (clearly or wrongly) into some 
intervening factors that apparently brought about those discrepancies.   
 
This Chapter has examined stakeholders’ narratives vis-à-vis core issues highlighted in 
the MNCs’ accounts in Chapter seven. Whilst Chapter seven essentially analysed the 
accounts provided by the MNCs concerning gas flaring and oil spills environmental 
incidents in the Niger Delta using an ‘account-giving heuristic framework, it was also 
noted in Chapters three and seven that such heuristic would only help us to understand 
the nature and forms in which the MNCs manifested their accounts on these 
environmental incidents but not sufficient to explore the sense-making underlying those 
accounts. The exploration of the sense-making embedded in those accounts will be 
undertaken by reflexively interrogating the accounts vis-à-vis the particular social, 
organisational, institutional, relational and temporal contexts of the business. In this 
regard, Chapter nine shall analyse the MNCs’ sense-making embedded within their 
constructed accounts about gas flaring and oil spills drawing essentially on Chapters 
seven and eight as well as accounting and social science literature.  
 
  
185 
 
CHAPTER NINE 
Sense-making of MNCs’ accounts on gas flaring and oil spills 
9.1 Introduction 
The previous empirical Chapters have explored the conceptions of accountability by the 
oil MNCs and stakeholders in the Nigerian oil industry (Chapter Six), and the forms of 
MNCs’ accounts on gas flaring and oil spills environmental incidents (Chapter Seven) 
and stakeholders’ narratives on these negative environmental incidents (Chapter Eight). 
As stated in Chapter one, this thesis seeks to answer three research questions on: how 
the MNCs understand accountability, how they manifest accountability and their sense-
making embedded within those accounts. Whilst the previous empirical Chapters have 
been used to answer the first two research questions, this Chapter is articulated to 
answer the third research question which is formally stated as: “What is the corporate 
sense-making underlying the MNCs’ accounts?” This Chapter draws more on the 
findings of Chapter seven to explore the sense-making embedded within the MNCs 
accounts on gas flaring and oil spills environmental incidents which manifested in the 
form of denials, excuses, justifications, and concessions based on account-giving 
heuristic framework. Although this framework aimed to enrich our understanding of 
how the MNCs constructed accounts on these adverse environmental incidents, it failed 
to unpick the sense-making underlying those accounts. In deference to Laughlin’s 
middle range thinking (Chapter Five), this Chapter draws not only on the empirical data 
(flesh) of the preceding empirical Chapters, but also on relevant material from social 
science and social accounting literature. Those issues that have been found relevant 
from the literature vis-à-vis unpicking the corporate sense-making embedded in the data 
(MNCs’ accounts) are impression management, reputation risk, corporate rhetoric, and 
dominant economic paradigm. The material in the literature provides the leverage to 
reflexively explore the empirical data to unpick the apparent logic embedded within 
those accounts.   
 
This Chapter is organised as follows. Following this introduction is Section 9.2 
recapitulating the linkage between corporate accountability and sense-making within the 
social context of this study. Section 9.3 explores the apparent corporate sense-making 
embedded within the MNCs’ constructed accounts on gas flaring and oil spills 
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environmental incidents which will allow us to assess the extent to which the 
corporations discharge their accountability in respect of these environmental incidents 
as they affect communities. Essentially, the sense-making underlying those accounts 
will be explored within the social contexts in which business actions and discourses 
gain prominence. Furthermore, Section 9.4 assesses the extent to which the constructed 
accounts discharged accountability and how the degree of accountability are likely 
shaped by some complex factors permeating the social and geographic contexts in 
which these corporations operate. The last section provides a few concluding remarks.  
9.2 Corporate accountability and sense-making 
The empirical findings in Chapter six suggest that corporations and stakeholders 
understand accountability largely as the giving of accounts, stakeholder engagements 
and actions necessary to meet stakeholders’ expectations. Such notions apparently 
furnish two broad kinds of accountability namely, information-based accountability or 
the provision of information/accounts and action-based accountability. Action-based 
accountability in the light of community interests was used to suggest those corporate 
actions that meet the expectations of communities such as the mitigation of 
environmental impacts of corporate operations, provision of social infrastructures and 
stakeholder engagement. However, stakeholders expect the accounts the corporations 
provide on gas flaring and oil spills incidents to bear correspondence to the actual 
manifestations and impacts of these incidents. As the literature suggests, stakeholders 
expect the organisations to be held accountable for the social and environmental impacts 
of their actions or operations (Coetzee & van Staden, 2011; Deegan, et al., 2000; 
Dillard, 2011; Gray & Bebbington, 2001; Rolland & Bazzoni, 2009). Gas flaring and oil 
spills are sensitive environmental incidents having severe social, economic and 
environmental impacts on people living within the vicinity of these incidents, and those 
impacts have increasingly instigated stakeholders’ criticisms against the corporations 
whose operations are linked to the pollution. Both these incidents and the related 
stakeholder criticisms potentially stimulate greater corporate disclosures.  
 
Neu & Ocampo (2007) note that corporations tend to render more accounts in sensitive 
settings where the social responsibility of the organisation has been called into question. 
Corporate social and environmental disclosures are perceived by managers as a “useful 
device to reduce the effects upon a corporation of events that are perceived to be 
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unfavourable to a corporation's image” (Deegan, et al., 2000: 127). This view is 
consistent with other literature that suggests that corporate reports serve other purposes 
beyond the discharge of accountability (Bebbington, et al., 2008; Beelitz & Merkl-
Davies, 2012; Gray, 2000; 2008; 2013; Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2007, 2011; van 
Standen, et al., 2011). For example, Beelitz & Merkl-Davies’ (2012: 101) findings were 
consistent with other literature viewing “corporate narrative reporting as a means of 
consolidating the private interests of corporations, rather than increasing transparency 
and accountability.” It also resonates with Tetlock (1983: 75) who argues by drawing on 
the work of Zajonic (1960) that:  “accountability can therefore be interpreted as a 
special type of transmission set in which one anticipates the need not only to 
communicate one's opinions, but also to defend those opinions against possible 
counterarguments.” Furthermore, Brennan & Merkl-Davies (2014: 607) argue that: 
The underlying assumption … of corporate narrative reporting and communication is to 
achieve specific communicative or political goals, … persuading organisational 
audiences of the company’s environmental credentials ... reinforcing capitalist ideology, 
or securing hegemony. 
 
Given these arguments, it will be too simple to claim that corporate reports are solely 
used to satisfy accountability demands of stakeholders, and also too simple to interpret 
the reports according to the letters  or outward appearance of the narrative accounts.  
Based on  O’Leary & Chia’s (2007) notion of sense-making primarily used to articulate 
the analysis of this Chapter, the embedded notions of corporate sense within the 
accounts are not in the surface but are to be unpicked or excavated in the light of the 
historical cultural contexts of modern corporations. Chapter seven empirically explored 
the numerous accounts the MNCs constructed on gas flaring and oil spills 
environmental incidents in the Niger Delta which were empirically organised into four 
broad constellations based on account-giving heuristic. In essence, the corporate sense-
making embedded within those narratives does need unpicking.  
 
As already mentioned, this Chapter draws on sense-making theoretical lens to unpick 
the epistemic frame embedded in those corporate accounts, or the extracted cues on 
which (in)actions are embedded (O’Leary & Chia, 2007; Weick, 1995; see Chapter 
Three for a detailed conceptual discussion of this theoretical lens).  According to Weick 
(1995) “extracted cues are simple, familiar structures that are seeds from which people 
develop a larger sense of what may be occurring” (p. 50) and they are “crucial for their 
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capacity to evoke action” (p. 54). Episteme, according to O’Leary & Chia (2007: 392-
393), is the “underlying code of a culture or epoch that governs its language, its logic, 
its schemas of perception, its values and its techniques, etc … [T]he process of 
sensemaking involves oftentimes unconscious invoking of a governing epistemes for 
ordering the world”. As stated earlier and in Chapters three and seven, the giving of 
accounts extends beyond the discharge of accountability to stakeholder persuasion (see 
Benoit, 1997; Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997; Beelitz & Merkl-Davies, 2012; Brennan & 
Merkl-Davies, 2014; Tetlock, 1983). Several claims and counter-claims have been made 
by the oil MNCs in Nigeria and stakeholders regarding environmental incidents of gas 
flaring and oil spills. As Brennan & Merkl-Davies (2014) argue, claims and counter-
claims have underlying assumptions embedded within them. Whilst our emphasis is on 
those accounts constructed by the MNCs regarding these environmental incidents 
having direct link to their operations in the Niger Delta (Chapter Seven), the alternative 
narratives given by stakeholders (Chapter Eight) also serve as useful empirical material. 
The apparent sense-making that underlie the MNCs’ constructed accounts are assessed 
within the dominant social worldview shaping, and shaped by, modern business 
(Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2014; Makela and Laine, 2011; Neu & Ocampo, 2007; 
Shafer, 2006).  
 
Based on O’Leary & Chia’s (2007: 398) articulation of sense-making shaped by the 
modern social historical contexts in which business is situated: 
Meanings are no longer stable, transparent, and self-evident. Instead, actions and 
intentions have become more opaque and subjected to hidden motives and 
understandings. Deeper unconscious forces, historical embeddedness, and ulterior 
motives that are difficult to empirically verify have to be increasingly countenanced as 
legitimate explanations … [P]luralism, relativism, and the emergence of conflicting 
realities became the signature theme of this Modern period. A degree of suspicion, 
cynicism, and disillusionment sets in as regimes of representation compete with each 
other for an ideological foothold in the collective psyche of societies and organizations 
(Emphasis added). 
 
When a dominant frame of reference is chosen to make sense of phenomena, it implies 
that other frames of reference are bracketed out. According to O’Leary & Chia (2007: 
395), in making sense, “we actively select an aspect of our phenomenal experience and 
censor what we do not wish to attend to.”  This selected aspect is then “registered” so 
that it subsequently provides a legitimate focus of attention.  Actors invoke the 
underlying rules of a particular episteme and use them as lenses to determine what fit 
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their goals.  According to O’Leary & Chia, these underlying rules invoke value into our 
actions and point of emphasis. So what is emphasized will derive from the value held.  
The epistemic culture a corporation embraces organizes its sensorium [localised 
impression/interpretation] which reinforces its selective decisions, thereby giving 
attention to certain issues whilst neglecting others. This is in part consistent with Buhr 
(2001) and Rodrigue (2014) who contend that corporations select issues to report on and 
things they report about them.  
 
Essentially, how an organization rationalizes an issue, according to O’Leary & Chia, 
derives from “unconscious invoking” of a particular dominant paradigm. This is 
implicitly consistent with the use of corporate social reports to further the dominant 
social ideology (i.e. the political, economic and technological worldviews of the 
western society) which invariably affects the attitude of organizations towards social 
and environmental issues and accountability (Makela & Laine, 2011; Shafer, 2006). 
With the ideological foothold of capitalism holding sway over business actions and 
language, it becomes more important to unpick corporate social accounts even though 
corporations claim that such accounts are stakeholder- rather than shareholder-driven. 
According to Brennan & Merkl-Davies (2014: 609), “ideologies are social beliefs 
shared by a group of people which are used to further their interests. The basic beliefs of 
an ideology organise specific attitudes … about an issue, such as … pollution”. Having 
conceptually looked at the linkage between accountability and sense-making, the next 
section unpicks the sense-making embedded within the accounts of gas flaring and oil 
spills constructed by the MNCs.  
9.3 Empirical analysis of corporate sense-making embedded in the MNCs’ 
accounts 
It has been argued in the previous section that corporate accounts needed to be unpicked 
to excavate the sense-making embedded within their construction. With the actions of 
corporations and their reports about those actions being influenced by capitalist 
ideology, it suggests that corporate actions and accounts will primarily be to further the 
interests of shareholders (see Heath, 2006; Mansell 2012, 2013; Stenberg, 1997, 2004). 
Nonetheless, modern corporations have learned to adopt the language of stakeholders 
within SER. A caution by O’Leary & Chia (2007) that “meanings are no longer stable, 
transparent, and self-evident” is worth heeding especially when corporate SERs are 
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furnished as meeting the accountability needs of stakeholders whereas they are meant to 
further the interest of shareholders. A reflexive review of the data in Chapter seven (i.e., 
MNCs’ accounts on gas flaring and oil spills incidents); stakeholders’ narratives in 
Chapter eight; and relevant social accounting, social science and management literature; 
unpicked a number of sense-making themes embedded within those constructed 
accounts. Three identifiable sense-making themes embedded within those accounts are: 
managing corporate image, privileging economics and the rules of the game.  
9.3.1 Managing corporate image 
"When a face has been threatened, face-work must be done" (Goffman ,1967: 27, cited 
in Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997: 38)  
 
Corporate social reporting has been implicated as a device corporations use to manage 
reputation risk (Bebbington, et al., 2008) and corporate legitimacy (Beelitz & Merkl-
Davies, 2012; Cho, et al., 2012; Deegan, 2002; Deegan, et al., 2000; Neu, et al., 1998; 
O’Dwyer, 2002, 2003; Onkila, et al., 2014). Hess (2008) and Samkin & Schneider 
(2010) also suggest that organisations provide accounts to manage stakeholder 
impression. Corporations operating in industries that experience adverse incidents tend 
to provide greater social and environmental disclosures by way of reactively or 
proactively managing legitimacy threats that result from the adverse incidents of their 
operations or those of other corporations within similar industry (Cho & Patten 2007; 
Cho, et al., 2012; Coetzee & van Staden, 2011; Deegan, et al., 2000; Patten, 1992). 
Such positive disclosure reactions to the adverse incidents, as Deegan, et al. (2000) 
found, are equally positively related to the level of public coverage given to the 
incidents. Given the degree of publicity surrounding gas flaring and oil spills incidents 
in the Niger Delta, the potential use of corporate disclosures to manage legitimacy threat 
is apparently not trivial. The reputation of a corporation is potentially at stake when 
stakeholders attribute negative social and environmental acts to its operations. Such 
attributions weave through the fabric of the empirical data of stakeholders’ narratives in 
Chapter eight. As Benoit (1997) notes, an organisation’s image is at threat when 
stakeholders hold it responsible for acts attributed to it or its operations which they 
(stakeholders) considered as offensive or having negative consequences. Unfavourable 
impressions are reasonably formed about a company when the stakeholders believe that 
the company is responsible for “acts that it performed, ordered, encouraged, facilitated, 
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or permitted to occur (or for acts of omission or poorly performed acts that it appears 
responsible for)” (Benoit 1997: 178).  
 
With the potential that negative incidents attributed to a company could smear its 
reputation, organisation theories suggest that such a company will adopt impression 
management strategies and persuasive rhetoric to restore or manage its 
threatened/dinted corporate image (Benoit, 1997; Ketola, 2006; Merkl-Davies & 
Brennan, 2011; Solomon, et al., 2013). But this apparently stimulates an important 
question: “Whose impression counts?” The logic of stakeholder analysis would suggest 
that corporations articulate impressions that appeal most to salient stakeholders (see 
Coetzee & van Staden, 2011; Mitchell, et al., 1997). It is apparent from corporate 
reports that shareholders’ interests are given overriding considerations over those of 
other stakeholders and so corporate accounts are apparently constructed to appeal to 
shareholders’ interests. Similarly, Benoit (1997) argues that companies facing the crisis 
of an alleged offensive act are to tailor their accounts to appeal most to their significant 
audience.  
 
In managing impression to restore image over negative incidents, corporations may 
announce commitment to policy change (Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2014). This was 
evident in the MNCs’ claims following UNEP’s (2011) findings which called into 
question Shell’s remediation of oil spills sites in Ogoniland. In a reaction to that report, 
some of the accounts given by the MNCs mentioned change in policy to apparently 
signal commitment to a more responsible behaviour (Section 7.5.3.4). For example: 
To contribute to the rehabilitation of the areas aﬀected by oil spills in Nigeria, in the 
next few years the activities of characterization and clearing up of contaminated sites 
will continue and alternative methods to those currently used will be employed using 
ﬁeld testing. This activity also responds to a recent report by UNEP which highlights 
the need to set up alternatives to the RENA method, as largely used in Nigeria (Eni For 
2011: 42) 
 
SPDC has completed a comprehensive review of and made changes to its Remediation 
Management System (RMS) in line with international best practice. The RMS is the 
main set of SPDC procedures which govern how the company conducts remediation. 
SPDC will keep its RMS under periodic review and update it as necessary (Shell 
Nigeria 2012c) 
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According to Benoit & Czerwinski (1997), companies attempting to restore image over 
attributed negative behaviour will talk about appointment of experts to oversee or audit 
the process causing public criticisms. The account below resonates with this argument: 
SPDC issued contract tenders at the beginning of 2011 inviting internationally 
respected organisations such as the British Standards Institute (BSI) and Det Norske 
Veritas (DNV) to provide independent review and assurance of SPDC’s oil spill 
response and management practices (Shell Nigeria 2012d) 
 
In managing corporate image through impression management, the literature suggests 
that corporations articulate their impression management by use of rhetoric disclosures. 
The corporations enmeshed in negative issues that could potentially tarnish their image 
engage in impression management to prevent embarrassment by projecting a face they 
perceive will appeal to their audience (Solomon, et al., 2013). This is consistent with 
the proposition of Tetlock (1983) that accountors try to present their opinions or 
accounts in such a way that appeals to the political or moral beliefs/expectations of the 
target audience. For example, the MNCs use various excuses to exonerate or distance 
themselves from continuous gas flaring in the Niger Delta by claiming that continuous 
gas flaring incident was caused by factors outside their control such as Government 
underfunding and bureaucracy, lack of market for harnessed gas, lack of infrastructure 
to harness gas flared, and insecurity in the Niger Delta. However, there were tensions
99
 
between these thematic narratives: between themes within excuse category of account-
giving heuristic, between themes within justification category, and between themes in 
excuse and justification categories (see excuses and justification accounts in Chapter 
Seven). Excuses surrounding gas flaring, for example, suggest that gas flaring was never 
intended by the MNCs but for factors beyond their control. To corporations the negative 
incidents and their impacts, as Roberts (2003: 259) puts it, are “morally excused as 
‘unintended.’” Moreover, Solomon, et al. (2013: 199) drawing on Bettman & Weitz 
(1983) and Aerts (2005) argue that “[m]anagers tend to attribute positive organisational 
outcomes to their own efforts and negative organisational outcomes to uncontrollable 
factors”  
                                                 
99 The possibility of constructing accounts that conflict with each other may not be unconnected with 
the complexity surrounding attempts to strategically use accounts to speak to the ideological beliefs and 
expectations of multiple stakeholders. This is consistent with the proposition of Tetlock (1983) that 
accountors try to present their opinions or accounts in such a way that appeals to the political or moral 
beliefs/expectations of the target audience. But where the audience groups vary as well as their 
expectations, the accountor faces a complexity and tries to give accounts that balance (in some ways) 
those potentially conflicting expectations. Such attempts to produce accounts that will appeal to those 
who have divergent beliefs or expectations potentially leads to contradictions. 
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Rhetoric impression is also found to be embedded within the accounts of denials, 
excuses and justification vis-à-vis oil spills. For example, the MNCs denounced double 
standards
100
 in handling oil spills in the Niger Delta suggesting that they tackle oil spills 
swiftly and apply internationally recognised method of clean-up/remediation contrary to 
the general views held by stakeholders. Our empirical analysis highlighted how 
stakeholders (communities, NGOs, UNEP, media) have discredited such claims by the 
companies (Chapter Eight). Whereas the companies have also created an impression 
that they objectively determined the volume and causes of oil spills in collaboration 
with relevant stakeholders (communities, regulators, ministry), our empirical data 
suggest that the joint investigation process has credibility concern (Chapters Seven and 
Eight). The credibility of the process has been called into question because the process 
is believed to be largely controlled by the MNCs which fund it, the participation of the 
communities is superficial, and the regulators having the oversight function lack 
independence and credibility.  With these credibility issues, it is almost certain that 
corporate choice of actions and disclosures will be economically motivated.  
9.3.2 Economic logic   
As highlighted in Section 9.2, corporations apparently make social and environmental 
disclosures with a view to promoting the dominant social paradigm. As Shearer (2002) 
contends, accountability that is confined to the economic logic of shareholder interest 
cannot discharge accountability to stakeholders. The use of corporate social and 
sustainability reports to further the interests of shareholders and privilege economics 
over sustainability has been highlighted by SEA literature (see Dillard & Layzell, 2014; 
Gray, 2006b, 2010). Gas flaring and oil spills are environmental incidents which 
practically undermine the environmental safety of humans and biodiversity (Chapter 
Four). However, corporate attention to social and environmental issues is done through 
the economic lens which is generally conceptualised in the literature as promoting the 
business case (Gray, 2006a, 2006b; Shafer, 2006; Spence & Gray, 2007; Rasche & 
Esser, 2006). Apparently, corporations find cost minimisation more appealing than 
promoting safety-driven policies when such policies have high cost implication (Bakan, 
2004; Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997; Dillard & Ruchala, 2005; see also Ruffing’s (2007) 
                                                 
100 Tan (2009a, 2009b) finds support for MNCs’ adoption of double standards in their implementation of 
ethical corporate social responsibility obligations in western and non-western countries.   
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case study on BP Plc). Essentially, this argument has correspondence with stakeholders’ 
claims that oil companies in the Niger Delta have been unwilling to implement policies 
favouring high cost outlay to replace their aged pipelines which stakeholders equally 
alleged as the major cause of oil spills (Chapter Eight). Moreover, the MNCs’ economic 
incentive of gas flaring has been blamed for their slow investment in gas-gathering 
technology to eliminate continuous gas flaring in Nigeria. The empirical findings 
suggest that the MNCs admit that gas flaring has negative impacts
101
 and that the 
Nigerian electricity market is a large potential market for gas utilisation. Nonetheless, 
the MNCs have attributed continuous gas flaring in Nigeria to lack of gas market 
despite the excess demand for gas in the power sector (Chapters Seven and Eight).  An 
insight from Eni’s account suggests that the MNCs undermine the absorptive capacity 
of the power sector market to utilise gas flared when harnessed due to perceived low 
economic returns (cf. Section 7.4.2.2). 
 
The above account raises doubt over the excuses marshalled out by the MNCs for 
continuously flaring gas. The lack of market and gas-gathering infrastructure arguments 
are weakened by the above narrative by Eni. Moreover, the above argument also calls 
into question the MNCs’ claims that they are unable to invest in gas-gathering 
technology because of Government funding shortfalls. Whilst such funding shortfalls 
have implications for gas infrastructure as argued in Chapter Seven, it raises curiosity as 
to what extent either (or both) the funding shortfalls or the market returns actually affect 
the investment in gas infrastructure. Moreover, insignificantly low penalty fees the 
MNCs pay for flaring gas is considered as an economic incentive for them to continue 
to flare gas (Chapter Eight), which apparently suggests their failure to discharge 
accountability obligation of mitigating negative environmental impacts (Chapter Six). 
Whereas the companies justify their flaring of gas by claiming they pay penalty fees to 
the Government in compliance with the law, they fail to state the inconsequential nature 
of such amount. According to the empirical data in Chapter eight and the media 
narrative below, the MNCs allegedly threatened to shut down their operations over the 
implementation of a higher penalty fee (from $0.065 to $3.50 per 1000 standard cubic 
feet) introduced by the government to discourage indiscriminate gas flaring:  
International oil companies (IOCs), the major perpetrators of gas flaring in the country, 
and other oil producing companies, have continued to ignore the $3.5 per standard cubic 
                                                 
101 Albeit with contradictions that it does not produce harm as Shell argued.  
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feet (scf) penalty put in place by the government to discourage flaring from which the 
country loses about $74 million daily. Government on its part has not been able to 
enforce the regulation because of threats of shutdowns by operators (Femi Asu, 
BusinessDay Newspaper. 11 September 2013) 
 
A threat to divest or shut down operations is a potent strategy MNCs use to weaken the 
regulatory muscles of their host developing countries and bargaining powers of weak 
stakeholders. For example, Belal, et al. (2013: 83) state that “the threat of divestment is 
a real and frightening prospect for many vulnerable communities.” Whilst the increased 
penalty fee by the Government was to discourage environmentally unsustainable 
behaviour (see Bovens 1998:58) of gas flaring and to possibly compel corporations to 
articulate roadmaps to harness gas instead of flaring it, it has the potential to reduce 
corporate profit because stricter regulation potentially increases production costs 
(Leisinger, 2003; Naughton, 2014; Rezza, 2013). The MNCs’ privileging of economics 
over environmental stewardship has also been linked to their delay of replacing aged 
pipelines in the Niger Delta.  Based on the empirical data, stakeholders strongly linked 
the cause of the majority of oil spills in the Niger Delta to corrosion due to aged 
pipelines (Chapter Eight) as against the MNCs’ excuse that majority of oil spills in the 
region were caused by sabotage
102
 (Chapter Seven). Both sides of those arguments 
appear compelling and difficult to carelessly disregard due to the “noise” and 
complexities surrounding oil spills incident in the Niger Delta (Chapters Seven and 
Eight). However, the fact that the oil pipelines in the region have outlived their useful 
life based on pipeline integrity best practice (see Christian Aid, 2004; Steiner, 2010) 
suggests that economic incentive of cost minimization underpinned such delays. One of 
the fundamental neo-liberal rationalities that underlie the privileging of economics over 
social responsible behaviours is the “rules of the game” argument (Friedman, 1970), 
which the ensuing section discusses as a sense-making embedded in the constructed 
accounts.    
                                                 
102 Such claim of sabotage by MNCs is not peculiar to the Nigerian oil industry. For example, as Matilal & 
Hopfl (2009) reported on the Bhopal gas explosion incident, Union Carbide (the MNC) attributed the gas 
explosion to sabotage in order to avoid legal liability. They also cited studies in which the employees of 
Union Carbide claimed that it was a case of negligence as the company failed to correct the defects that 
were long detected as pointing to an imminent disaster.  
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9.3.3 Rules of the game    
As Friedman (1970) argues, the responsibility of a corporation is profit maximization 
provided it observes the rules of the game
103
 by adhering to societal basic rules and 
ethical norms.  The sense-making embedded in the empirical data vis-à-vis the rules of 
the game suggests that the actions or activities of the MNCs, whether in relation to gas 
flaring or oil spills, are socially acceptable behaviours inasmuch as they conform to law 
and institutional practices. In essence, legal compliance and institutional conformity are 
two broad strands of the rules of the game invoked by the MNCs within their 
constructed accounts on gas flaring and oil spills.    
9.3.3.1 Legal compliance  
Compliance, according to Dillard and Layzell (2014: 4-5), 
[R]eflects the institutionalized societal evaluation criteria and refers to the demand 
placed on the corporations by government and regulators. … These parameters specify 
the minimum standards of responsible actions necessary in maintaining an entity’s 
license to operate.  
 
Organisations making reference to compliance are mobilizing symbolic resources of 
regulations and regulators to support their actions or signify how they have responsibly 
behaved (Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2014), albeit being means to further achieve 
corporate persuasion goals (Bayou & Panitz, 1993).  The appeal to the authority of the 
law was evident in the MNCs’ accounts on gas flaring and oil spills. The MNCs 
apparently rationalise gas flaring by claiming that they flare gas and pay penalty fees in 
compliance with the law. For example: 
Where SPDC continues to ﬂare, it complies with the law. The Minister for Petroleum 
has the power to permit companies to ﬂare on agreed terms and conditions (Shell 
Nigeria 2011b: 2) 
 
The disclosure that a company flares gas on agreed terms and conditions appears vague 
as there is no disclosure to indicate whether the concessionary thresholds and 
permissible circumstances for gas flaring were achieved as well as whether such 
                                                 
103 While the law aspect of Friedman’s rules of the game can easily be contemplated as the legal codes 
institutionalised by the government to govern corporate actions and behaviours, it is not clear how 
ethical norms (which is supposedly the norms that is generally shared by the society – Clarkson, 1995; 
Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975) can be articulated without conferring  CSR 
obligations on the corporations, in the minimum (at least) that corporations should act in ways that do 
not harm others or make them susceptible to harm. Social and ethical norms do not usually coincide 
with the law (Clarkson, 1995). Invoking ethical norms into the context of responsibility obligations of 
corporations would literally suggest that complying with the law is the minimum required standard of 
behaviour (Bebbington & Gray, 1993; Eweje, 2006; Gray, et al., 2014).  
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exemptions apply to all the oil fields that flare gas.  Unfortunately, this discretionary 
power granted by law to the Minister of Petroleum Resources will be almost inevitably 
abused given the endemic nature of corruption in Nigeria (Agbiboa, 2012; Igbinovia, 
2003; Iyoha & Ayorinde, 2010) as corruption is alleged as not only being part of the 
Nigerian Government but also “the object of government” (Agbiboa, 2012: 330). Whilst 
it remains invisible to the public how the Minister certifies the gas flaring thresholds, 
stakeholders have accused the MNCs of choosing to flare gas because of the attendant 
paltry penalty fees as earlier mentioned in Section 9.3.2. Eni and Total equally disclosed 
the penalty fees they paid for gas flaring without disclosing whether they actually flared 
gas in conformity with the terms and conditions stipulated by the law (Chapter Seven). 
The notion embedded in the MNCs’ account of gas flaring tax suggests that making 
such payments has absolved them of further obligations (Roscoe, 2014), which in 
essence rationalises their gas flaring behaviour.  
 
In terms of oil spill environmental incident, the MNCs also mobilise the instrumentality 
of the law to rationalise their behaviour concerning payment of compensation to victims 
of oil spills. As the Nigerian law exempts oil companies from any liability to victims of 
oil spills if the spills are attributable to sabotage, the oil companies have drawn on this 
law to avoid compensation payment to victims of oil spills allegedly attributed to 
sabotage. However, stakeholders have accused the MNCs of pretentiously using this 
law to avoid compensation payment to oil spill victims by attributing majority of oil 
spills to sabotage (Chapters Seven and Eight). Literally, the attribution of oil spills to 
sabotage is inversely related to the amount of compensation payment and number of 
victims that will receive compensation. Although both MNCs and stakeholders agree 
that some oil spills are caused by sabotage, they are in disagreement over what 
proportion of the spills is caused by sabotage or operational failures. In order to justify 
the claims that majority of oil spills are caused by sabotage, the MNCs argue that the 
causes and volumes of oil spills are co-determined by them and other relevant 
stakeholders as prescribed by the law (Chapters Seven). However, the credibility of this 
process has been called into question on various grounds as earlier highlighted in 
Section 9.3.1 (see Chapter Eight). Beyond the credibility concern over attribution of oil 
spills to operational failures or sabotage, stakeholders have also called into question the 
security measures the companies put in place to thwart sabotage. Whilst the MNCs 
claim that insecurity in the Niger Delta is alarming, they appear not to have exploited all 
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possible avenues to stamp out this security challenge, which is a ‘high risk’ facilitating 
sabotage. For instance, whilst the MNCs acknowledge that their oil facilities need 
adequate security, they consider such security measure as the responsibility of the 
Government according to the narrative below: 
Mr. Sunmonu  (Chairman of Shell Nigeria) said Shell and other International Oil 
Companies operating in Nigeria have had their pipelines sabotaged by crude oil dealers 
on several occasions. The oil companies have privately and publicly blamed the 
government for its failure to provide security for the pipelines despite the fact that they 
pay all the charges and taxes the government asks of them. (News Nest, 20 February, 
2013) 
 
In essence, the MNCs’ claims about legal compliance vis-à-vis gas flaring and non-
payment of compensation to oil spill victims for spills attributable to sabotage are 
persuasive disclosures apparently suggesting the neutrality of law and regulations. 
Although regulations could be considered as a means of environmental protection, they 
can be used to promote capitalist hegemony (Everett & Neu, 2000) as companies can 
also influence laws
104
 and regulations governing their activities. The literature 
recognises the enormous influence wielded by business in the contemporary legislative 
and regulatory milieu (Archel, et al., 2011; Bakan, 2004; Buccina, et al., 2013; Cave & 
Rowell, 2014; Dillard & Layzell, 2014; Goldenberg, 2012; Laufer, 2003; Mackinder, 
2010; Romm, 2010). It has also been well documented that whereas the corporations 
claim to support regulations in the open, they nevertheless clandestinely mobilise 
resources to prevent stringent regulations of their activities (Allen, 2009; Bowie, 2013; 
Goldenberg, 2012; Mackinder, 2010; Romm, 2010). In a developing country like 
Nigeria where the regulatory apparatus is porous both in terms of the stringency of 
environmental regulations and enforceability of the available laws (Chapters Two and 
Eight)
105
, it is difficult to comprehend how claims of legal compliance by corporations 
is in the service of public interest. Nevertheless, it is even more difficult to reconcile the 
                                                 
104 For example, the Nigerian Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) was drafted in 2008 to harmonise the 
fragmented legal framework of the Nigerian oil industry and to block many loopholes in the extant legal 
framework, but the MNCs have resisted the Bill on grounds of fiscal incentives. Serious lobbying, 
manoeuvrings and intrigues have greeted the Bills leading the National Assembly to shamelessly claim 
that many versions of the PIBs have infiltrated the House that they could not tell the original from the 
counterfeit. Whilst this argument is appalling, such political intrigues are not unconnected with lobbying 
of the corrupt legislators by the MNCs.  
105
 For example, Iyoha & Oyerinde (2010) report how Julius Berger Plc (a German construction MNC) 
breached Nigerian Constitutional provision by donating N200m to the ruling political party with 
impunity. And they argued that “laws in Nigeria are observed more in breach than in compliance” (p. 
369) 
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claim of legal compliance to pollute the environment with Eni’s claim that its corporate 
environmental protection policy transcends regulatory compliance: 
[E]ni assigns an important value to the environment explicitly citing it in its corporate 
mission. The protection of the environment is an essential part of its operations and 
goes beyond mere regulatory compliance (Eni For 2011: 35). 
 
Also closely related to the MNCs’ persuasion of appeal to legal authority is their 
persuasion on conformity with industry practices.  
9.3.3.2 Institutional conformity  
Organisations within the same field act in isomorphic manner in adopting similar rules 
and structures, which invariably reflect their beliefs (Bansal & Roth, 2000; Dimaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Hoffman, 1999; de Villiers & Alexander, 2014). Corporations invoke 
structures and rules to legitimize their activities, where “rules and structures are the 
observable manifestations of taken-for-granted belief systems” (de Villiers & 
Alexander, 2014: 207). In relation to clean-up and remediation of oil spill sites, the 
companies have alluded to the use of Remediation by Enhanced Natural Attenuation 
(RENA) method as a good industry practice. For instance, Shell claims that RENA is an 
internationally recognised method of remediating oil spill sites and Eni claims that it is 
a common method used by oil companies in Nigeria. Both accounts of Shell and Eni 
apparently legitimise RENA method as a good industry practice. However, the findings 
by UNEP (2011) and Steiner (2010) contradict the MNCs’ claims about RENA. In 
reaction to UNEP’s findings, for example, Eni disclosed it was seeking alternative 
methods to RENA but Shell arrogantly maintained that RENA was an internationally 
recognised method of remediation. However, Shell subtly admitted to its poor 
remediation management system by reference to the review of the system and 
recruitment of internationally recognised experts that will review and provide assurance 
services to its remediation and oil spill response system and policies (cf. Section 9.3.1). 
 
With the conflict between MNCs’ denial of inadequate clean-up/remediation of oil 
spills albeit the evidence available from independent scientific studies or physical 
verifications, the MNCs nonetheless use justification of appeal to authority (of the law 
and regulatory certifications of the remediated sites) to apparently privilege form over 
substance (Brennan & Merkl Davies, 2014). Such apparent privileging of form over 
substance has correspondence with Rhee & Lee’s (2003) findings that corporations 
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make claims about regulatory certifications with little or no substantive evidence to 
support such claims (see Buccina, et al., 2013). Corporations draw on the symbolic 
authority of the regulatory institutions that certify their actions as conforming to 
regulatory standards or expectations. According to Christmann & Taylor (2006: 865), 
“certifiable standards are effective only if certification improves firm performance with 
respect to the certified issue.”  Therefore the claim over compliance with regulatory 
standards is consistent with the literature that organisation giving accounts about 
incidents perceived to have negative consequences on others draw on experts’ claims 
and/or regulators’ certifications to validate their claims (Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997).   
 
Moreover, the MNCs equally draw on the symbolic authority of the World Bank to 
potentially mask their indiscriminate gas flaring in the Niger Delta by claiming 
solidarity with the World Bank Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership (GGFR) 
whether or not there is any compelling parallel evidence that they incorporate best 
practices into their routine environmental management system (Christmann & Taylor, 
2006). Also closely linked to corporations’ solidarity with powerful institutions is 
corporations’ solidarity with experts. The MNCs have mobilised expert evidence to 
dominate the discourse of what represents appropriate criteria for assessing the 
environmental impacts of oil and gas operations. For example, expert opinions and 
witness were alluded to by the oil companies in litigation brought by some communities 
against SPDC (Shell), Total, Agip (Eni), Chevron and the Attorney-General of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria over the adverse impact of gas flaring on their livelihood 
(Shell Nigeria Annual Report 2006: 14). Expert opinions have also been used to 
attribute oil spills to sabotage and to argue the extent of impacts of oil spills during 
litigations (Chapter Seven). But experts (lawyers, environmentalists and accountants) as 
professionals have the tendency to use their professionally constructed evidence to 
legitimise the ‘evils’ corporations do (Dillard & Ruchala, 2005). MNCs’ mobilisation of 
experts and expert information to reduce/avoid potential liabilities arising from gas 
flaring and oil spills invariably increases corporate profits, while the constructed 
accounts around these incidents are apparently used to further shareholders’ economic 
interest.  However, the extent to which the accounts provided by the MNCs to explain 
and justify their (in)actions meet the remit of discharging accountability is doubtful 
(Cooper & Owen, 2007; Gray, 2006a; Owen, et al., 2000).  
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9.4 Accountability discharge vis-à-vis gas flaring and oil spills incidents 
As already mentioned, it is apparent that the accounts crafted by the MNCs in respect of 
gas flaring and oil spills could not be said to have discharged their accountability. 
However, this does not in any way suggest that the accounts might not be useful for the 
purpose of information, engagement with the companies and to appreciate the complex 
milieu in which the operations of these corporations are situated. For this study, at least, 
the rendering of those accounts gives the opportunity to analyse the accounts and unpick 
the sense-making embedded within them which would otherwise not be possible in their 
absence. Gas flaring and oil spills incidents, to which the MNCs’ constructed accounts 
relate, remain the most visible pollution associated with oil operations in the Niger 
Delta (Chapter Four) and for which the MNCs have been inevitably criticised by 
stakeholders. As our findings suggest, despite conceding that their operations generated 
gas flaring which have some negative environmental ramifications, the MNCs remained 
brazenly unapologetic contrary to Benoit & Czerwinski’s (1997: 53) argument that “a 
company at fault is most persuasive when it admits that fault and apologizes.” This is no 
surprise because the accounts of excuses and justifications the companies constructed 
vis-à-vis gas flaring event nonetheless speak volumes about their unapologetic 
behaviour. For instance, excuse accounts portrayed the MNCs as having no control over 
continuous gas flaring whilst justification accounts portrayed them to have behaved 
responsibly in conformity with regulatory standards and industry practices. 
Consequently, it is inevitably apparent that the accounts of concession constructed by 
the companies were only to suggest their awareness that gas flaring creates adverse 
environmental impacts given their accounts of excuses and justifications to absolve 
themselves of blame for gas flaring incident and the potential liability to those 
negatively impacted by this pollution.   
 
Concession is logically followed with apologies to those impacted, but apologies have a 
downside of potential litigations (Benoit, 1997). Unlike oil spills which the MNCs 
could attribute to sabotage in order to shift blame, gas flaring cannot be intelligibly 
attributed to sabotage or actions of third parties. With respect to oil spills, the empirical 
findings showed that the MNCs constructed accounts of denials, excuses, justifications, 
and concessions. According to the analyses regarding oil spills in Chapters seven and 
eight as well as Sections 9.3.1 to 9.3.3, the themes of accounts within each account-
giving category and between account-giving categories apparently conflict with each 
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other. For example, there is tension within the sabotage excuse as to whether the 
sabotage was caused by the communities that are negatively impacted by the oil spills 
or masterminded by ‘principalities and powers in high places’(MNCs’ claim), or even 
by collusion between the oil workers and other collaborators (claim by Government, 
NGOs and communities). However, the MNCs invoke the authority of JIV reports to 
lend credibility to their justification for the causes and volumes of oil spills.  A contrary 
argument by the Media, NGOs and communities suggest that the JIV exercise is fraught 
with flaws as it is funded and controlled by the MNCs. The oil companies give accounts 
of concession to generally acknowledge that some oil spills are caused by operational 
failures. Nonetheless, on few specific occasions they accepted responsibility for oil 
spills and consequently tendered apologies (cf. Section 7.5.4). Given the public 
evidence (without the need for JIV reports) that those spills were due to operational 
failures, the MNCs’ concessions to the specific oil spills and the ensuing apologies 
came as the only intelligible options. Whilst Shell apologised for the “unexpected and 
unintended” oil spills in its sustainability report, ExxonMobil apologised to the National 
Assembly over its initial denial and underestimation of the specific oil spill and its 
impacts (cf. Section 7.5.4).   
 
Arguably, as the accounts are apparently opaque based on contradictions and 
unsubstantiated claims, transparency which is a constitutive part of accountability is 
apparently absent. Things that are not revealed are as important as those revealed 
(Adams, 2004; Garsten & de Montoya, 2008; Zyglidopoulos & Fleming, 2011). 
Arguably, the corporate accounts regarding gas flaring and oil spills were rather more 
managerialist-oriented than being orientated to discharging accountability. As discussed 
in Section 9.2, accounts are mobilised by corporations to partly discharge 
accountability, persuade audience and consolidate corporate interests. Nevertheless, one 
of the emphasised concepts within the MNCs’ conceptions of accountability in Chapter 
six is transparency, which tend to suggest the absence of impression management in 
corporate disclosures. However, transparency appeared to have lost its meaning in the 
context of its usage by corporations given that transparency connotes making things 
bare (Gray, 1992). Transparency implicitly gives credibility to accountability (Bovens, 
2007), which in turn strengthens trust in a relationship (Swift, 2001). Apparently this 
suggests that transparency would “cast light upon what would otherwise remain obscure 
or invisible, and to do so in order to provide the basis for confidence for distant others” 
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(Roberts, 2009: 957).  With the link between transparency and accountability, the extent 
to which the accounts constructed by the MNCs cast light on their actions and the 
consequent responsibility is undiscernible from the empirical data. Nothing seems to be 
made bare given the conflicting accounts of denials, excuses, justifications, and 
concessions. If transparency is constitutive of accountability (Bovens, 2007; Koppell, 
2005), it could be argued that the accounts provided by the MNCs do not sufficiently 
discharge accountability
106
 based on the notions of sense-making embedded within 
those accounts as earlier discussed. However, the complexity of the Nigerian social 
context which influences and is influenced by the operations of the MNCs apparently 
has implications for the MNCs’ discharge of accountability.  
 
For example, Tregidga, et al. (2012) suggest the need to consider the relationship 
between corporate text/communication and the macro context in order to gain insights 
into the effects of the context on the text, and vice versa (see also Beelitz & Merkl-
Davies, 2012). The Nigerian oil industry is situated in a complex milieu vis-à-vis the 
industry stakeholders, pollution associated with oil operations, the legal environment, 
and the industry’s institutional configurations. Whilst these elements interact with one 
another or exert pressure on one another to differing degrees, they have implications for 
the manifestations, and discharge, of corporate accountability in the industry. For 
example, whilst the corporations and Government regard the communities as a major 
stakeholder group, the constitution’s vesting of oil ownership in the Government has 
implications for the power of the communities over resource control and the attention 
the corporations give to them (Cragg & Greenbaum, 2002). This ownership  
arrangement and the less attention given to the communities by the MNCs despite the 
negative corporate environmental impacts on communities apparently create tensions 
between the MNCs and communities (Chapter Six). Despite the adverse environmental 
impacts of oil operations pitting the communities against the MNCs, the agitation of the 
communities to control their resources also pits them against the MNCs and 
Government (Ikelegbe, 2005). With the ‘powerlessness’ of the communities to confront 
and hold the MNCs to account over environmental degradation caused by gas flaring 
and oil spills, the influence of the NGOs (for example, Amnesty International, Friends 
of the Earth International, Greenpeace, Christian Aid) to hold the MNCs to account has 
                                                 
106 However, some scholars have argued that accountability is dichotomous – i.e. accountor is either 
accountable or not accountable – and not in degrees (Bovens, 1998; Fox, 2007).   
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been profound. To a greater or lesser extent, the NGOs’ actions of publicising the poor 
environmental stewardship of the MNCs have arguably had some positive influence on 
corporate disclosures regarding these environmental incidents.  
 
Although the NGOs’ influence has been profound in the Nigerian oil industry, the legal 
environment and institutional configurations within the industry tend to encourage high-
level secrecy which breeds and reinforces corrupt practices (Olayinka, 2012). One of the 
industry’s ‘abnormal’ institutional configurations acting as an albatross to corporate 
accountability is the joint venture (JV) arrangement between the Nigerian Government 
and MNCs.  Whilst the Government owns 55-60% equity interests in the JVs, the JVs 
are routinely operated by the MNCs. As discussed in Chapter Four, the JV institution 
runs in conflict with the regulatory institutions both of which are supposedly controlled 
by the Government. This suggests that the Government does self-regulation, which 
invariably grants additional power and protection to the MNCs. The apparent power and 
protection the MNCs enjoy from the JVs arrangement have implications for their 
accountability in respect of environmental issues that create potential environmental 
liability for both the Government and MNCs (cf. Section 8.3.2)
107
. Consequently, the 
Government as the majority equity holder might prefer disclosures that will less likely 
implicate the JVs in high potential environmental liabilities. Moreover, it appears the 
Government mobilises the instruments of the law to reduce the risk of potential liability; 
for example, the law that exempts oil companies from compensating victims of oil spills 
if the spills are attributable to sabotage. With the weak judicial system in Nigeria, oil 
                                                 
107 The implication of the JVs arrangement is that the Government will bear higher liabilities based on 
the percentage of its JV equity interest in the event that the liabilities crystallise. Like the MNCs, the 
Government may not be willing to bear high liabilities. For example, the findings by UNEP (2011) 
revealed that the restoration of Ogoniland (a small unit of the Niger Delta region) degraded by oil 
operations would gulp about $30b and $1b in the long-term and short-term respectively. The 
implication is that the Government is liable for $550m of the $1b cost ($16.5b of the $30b), which the 
Government is not ready to spend. It is very likely that many recommendations of the UNEP report will 
not be implemented as the Nigerian Government (senior JV partner as the MNCs call it) has been setting 
up endless committees to review the report since the report was released in August 2011 apparently as 
a political gimmick to buy time. Unfortunately, the potential liability of $30b will very unlikely crystallise 
due to the laissez-faire attitude of the present Government towards it and the likelihood that the report 
will be completely abandoned by succeeding Governments as the usual practice is in Nigerian polity. In 
this regard, the JVs framework literally provides enormous economic incentive to the MNCs and it is 
unlikely that they will prefer another form of operational mode in Nigeria.  While the level of gas flaring 
and oil spills pollution in Nigeria calls into question the operational existence of these oil companies, the 
backing of the Government is enough for them to perpetuate environmental desecration and remain at 
large. For example, Shell claimed that the Government wrote the oil companies to continue oil 
production irrespective of the environmental pollution (Section 7.4.3.1).  
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companies almost always win in litigations contesting the attribution of oil spills to 
sabotage (UNDP, 2006). Another way the JV arrangement might have implications for 
accountability in the industry is that external disclosures might be restricted (or even 
manipulated) while detailed disclosures could be restricted to the Government as the 
controlling partner
108
 (see Hassan & Kouhy, 2013). As one DPR manager argues 
(Chapter Six), the oil companies only owe accountability to the Government which is 
apparently discharged when they submit statutory reports to the regulators. By and 
large, with the JV institutional arrangement and poor regulatory environment, it is very 
unlikely that the MNCs will be accountable to non-investors or that their accounts 
available to the public will sufficiently discharge accountability. The relationship 
between the corporate texts and macro context suggests that the latter encourages 
unaccountability whilst the former focus on shareholder accountability rather than 
stakeholder accountability. According to la Cour & Kromann (2011), whilst such 
corporate texts portray a concern for stakeholder interests, they are nonetheless guided 
by hypocrisy (see also Crane, 2000; Fineman, 1996, 1997).  
9.5 Concluding remarks 
The general conclusion that could be drawn from the analysis of this Chapter is that the 
management of impression, economic logic, and rules of the game notions embedded 
within those accounts constructed by the MNCs are the “unconscious invoking” 
(O’Leary & Chia, 2007: 93) of the capitalist dominant social paradigm in which modern 
corporation is embedded (Bakan, 2004; Makela & Laine 2011; Shafer, 2006). While the 
companies appear to show they are green and caring
109
 (see Adams, 2004; Crane, 2000; 
Fineman, 1996, 1997; Livesey & Kearins, 2002) and not intending the negative 
incidents of gas flaring and oil spills (Roberts, 2003) by articulating excuses and 
justifications for these environmental incidents, their operations and profits have 
remained unaffected and increasingly appealing to their shareholders (Shell 
Accountability Coalition, 2007). It appears that the MNCs care much about making 
their disclosures appeal to their shareholders who would usually accept those 
disclosures as long as the bottom line is impressive irrespective of the shareholders’ 
                                                 
108
 Remember, as mentioned in Chapter Four, the MNCs operate the JVs as private companies and so 
are not under obligation of the Nigerian law to make their information public.  
109 For example, Shell claims that: “No operational spill is acceptable and we recognise that we have to 
improve our performance in this area” (Shell Sustainability Report 2010: 18) 
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inkling about impression management embedded within those corporate performance 
narratives. This resonates with Solomon, et al.’s (2013: 202) findings that: 
The investors viewed impression management as acceptable behaviour for their 
investees with many viewing impression management as an innocent by-product of 
professional performance. 
 
Solomon et al.’s work also showed that institutional investors are apparently passive 
towards the social and environmental performance of their investees which 
tendentiously privileges economic considerations over environmental stewardship. 
Shareholders’ less perturbation about environmental performance apparently suggests 
that they are socially and psychologically detached from the environmental impacts 
caused by their investee companies, whereas the communities living within the vicinity 
of those environmental impacts live with those impacts.  It was also observable from the 
discussion in this Chapter that the MNCs have several factors which potentially 
incentivise them to be unaccountable, make minimal disclosures, or at worst 
misrepresent information. Those factors include the JVs institutional arrangement, laws 
that further the interest of the MNCs (likely connected with Government interest in the 
JVs), lack of power and independence of the regulators, and lack of power on the part of 
the communities negatively impacted by gas flaring and oil spill environmental 
incidents.  
 
Given that the MNCs use their corporate social reports to communicate to 
heterogeneous stakeholders, the apparent tensions and contradictions within and 
between those accounts they construct are likely unavoidable when as a matter of 
primacy the corporations strategically privilege the interest of shareholders which is 
inconsistent with the interests of some other stakeholders in this context. The 
privileging of shareholders’ interest over those of other stakeholders commends the 
need to unpick the sense-making embedded within those accounts albeit the MNCs’ 
claims that their corporate social reports are stakeholder-driven. Having examined the 
conceptions of accountability by the MNCs and other stakeholders (Chapter Six), how 
the MNCs manifested accountability through a constellation of accounts of denial, 
excuse, justification, and concession (Chapter Seven), stakeholders’ alternative 
narratives or reactions to the MNCs’ accounts (Chapter Eight) and, plausible corporate 
sense-making embedded within the MNCs’ accounts on gas flaring and oil spills 
environmental incidents (Chapter Nine), the next Chapter (Chapter Ten) will provide 
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summary of conclusions to synthesise these empirical findings in relation to the 
articulated research questions and background literature.    
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CHAPTER TEN 
Summary of findings and conclusions 
10.1 Introduction 
This Chapter summarises the empirical findings of this study and provides some 
conclusions. It is organised as follows. Following this introduction is Section 10.2 
which provides a summary of findings on the conceptions of accountability explored in 
Chapter six. Key findings relating to the accounts provided by the MNCs (moderated by 
stakeholders’ alternative narratives) and the underlying sense-making are highlighted in 
Section 10.3. Whilst Section 10.4 discusses some contributions of the study to the SEA 
and accountability literature, Section 10.5 highlights some limitations of the study. 
Possible areas of future research are provided in Section 10.6, whilst a few concluding 
remarks are highlighted in Section 10.7.  
10.2 Conceptions of accountability 
As the findings in Chapter six showed, the respondents largely agreed with the literature 
how accountability is generally understood. Virtually all the respondents agreed that 
accountability did indeed consist of the characteristics that: accountability derives from 
the relationship between an actor (accountor) and its stakeholders (accountees); that the 
accountor is obligated to explain and justify its conduct; that accountability concerns 
free flow of information between an actor and its relevant stakeholders; and that 
accountability includes the transparent sharing of information with relevant 
stakeholders. There was a tension between law and morality in the manner in which the 
respondents articulated accountability. Whilst the conceptions of accountability by both 
stakeholders and the MNCs consider accountability as a moral obligation to render 
accounts (to communities in respect of corporate adverse environmental impacts 
affecting communities), these respondents largely understood this obligation as a 
function of the law. Although the respondents apparently privileged the law in 
articulating accountability obligation, the literature considers the law as the minimum 
standard of behaviour (Dam & Scholtens, 2008; Eweje & Wu, 2010; Gray, et al., 1997; 
Sikka, 2010).  
 
A novel finding in respect of the conceptions of accountability is that of accountability 
by action. The stakeholders (especially communities) consider accountability within the 
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lens of manifesting actions rather than providing reports about those actions. The 
communities considered two strands of action as necessary in meeting the remit of 
accountability. These actions are: engaging in community development
110
 and the 
mitigation of negative environmental impacts.  
 
Another interesting finding is the preference of engagement as a channel of 
accountability far and above formal annual reports given the focus of the SEA literature 
on these reports. The issues falling under the umbrella of engagement are: meetings 
with community group leaders, town hall meetings (which are not restricted to 
community leaders), consultative forum, memorandum of understanding (MOU), and 
participation in environmental impact assessments and post impact assessments. Zadek 
& Hummel (1998: 1375), for example, consider stakeholder dialogue as a means of 
accounting as follows:  
Central to the emerging field
111
 is “stakeholder dialogue”, understood as both a 
means of “accounting” for an organisation’s performance, but also a route for 
deepening shared values between the organisation and key stakeholder groups.  
 
Dar (2014), for example, finds that whereas local Indian NGOs prefer informal mode of 
accounting such as stakeholder meetings, their (western) international donors prefer 
formal written reports. Both the stakeholders and MNCs in this study largely preferred 
engagement as a channel of accountability compared to corporate annual reports, 
disclosures on websites and the use of other written documents. It was also found in the 
MNCs’ annual reports that the MNCs use engagement in keeping community 
stakeholders informed about corporate actions affecting them. Although the MNCs 
commonly referred to this as part of corporate practices, some community stakeholders 
argued it was a perfunctory practice. For example, one community stakeholder likened 
the corporate-community engagement to that between a head teacher and pupils. The 
MNCs’ perfunctory engagement with communities apparently derives from the MNCs 
non-recognition of the communities as salient stakeholders because the ownership of oil 
resources is vested in the Government (Cragg & Greenbaum, 2002). Moreover, the JV 
alliance between the Government and MNCs provides immense protection to the MNCs 
(Idemudia, 2010) as the power of the Government is apparently actively behind any 
choice of the MNCs to engage perfunctorily with the communities. Further protection is 
                                                 
110 This is basically the philanthropy perspective of CSR (Carroll, 1979, 1991, 1999).  
111 Social and ethical accounting, auditing and reporting  
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given to the corporations even in the proposed Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) which 
allocates 10% equity interest to host communities but precludes the communities from 
participating in decision-making in spite of such equity. Whilst Environmental Impact 
Assessments (EIAs) are dialogic engagement opportunities between communities and 
MNCs (Fildler & Hitch, 2007)
112
, stakeholders considered such activities as a tick-box 
exercise to fulfil legal requirement.  
 
It was found that the MNCs also use strategic tools to manage engagement with 
communities in order to encourage community loyalty to the corporations. The use of 
GMOU model is a vital instrumentation that corporations use to make communities not 
to resist corporate actions despite corporate negative environmental impacts on 
communities. As discussed in Chapter six, the GMOU model for community 
development has a built-in Freedom-To-Operate clause which guarantees communities 
access to development funds from the companies if and only if the communities do not 
obstruct corporate operations over a given period of time. A community member 
considered such a clause as difficult to keep given how the operations of the 
corporations are adversely affecting them, but concluded that the communities have no 
choice but to comply.   
 
On the part of the MNCs, the linking of transparency to the provision of information to 
stakeholders was quite recurring in their annual reports. However, what is not obvious 
from those narratives is what transparency actually means or what it purports to serve in 
those narratives as transparency in practice apparently hides as much facts as/than 
revealed (Garsten & de Montoya, 2008; Zyglidopoulos & Fleming, 2011) whilst such 
discourses are used to create distance between the corporation and its stakeholders 
(Zyglidopoulos & Fleming, 2011). As Garsten & de Montoya (2008: 283-284) argue: 
Transparency may come with a bundle of good intentions, and with a set of instruments 
that render visible, record, differentiate and communicate. But transparency hides as 
much as it reveals. The many negotiations around what is to be revealed and what is to 
be kept secret, what is to be made transparent and what is to remain or be made opaque, 
bring to mind shadow  puppetry in which opaque, articulated figures create the illusion 
of moving, differentiated images that proceed to tell a tale.  
                                                 
112 One Partnering NGO also made this observation but concluded regrettably that the exercise was 
largely done as a compliance ritual. 
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Another problematic of the usage of transparency in corporate discourses was captured 
by Zyglidopoulos & Fleming (2011: 702, citing Gabriel, 2005: 180) who use the 
metaphor of glass to unpack transparency as follows: 
Glass is a hard and fragile medium, providing an invisible barrier, allowing the insider 
to see outside and the outsider to see inside. It is also a distorting medium, in which 
light is reflected and refracted, creating illusions and false images. Looking into glass it 
is sometimes easy to mistake your own reflection as the image facing from behind. 
Finally, glass is a framing medium—its mere presence defines that which lies behind it 
as something worthy of attention, protection and display 
 
But what constitutes transparency, according to the literature, is the making of things 
visible (Chapter Three). For example, as Gray (1992: 415) argues: 
The development of accountability . . . increases the transparency of organisations. That 
is it increases the number of things that are made visible, increases the number of ways 
in which things are made visible, and, in doing so, encourages a greater openness. The 
inside of the organisation becomes more visible, that is, transparent. 
 
However, the alternative narratives and counter-claims by stakeholders do at least 
suggest the absence of transparency. Therefore, meanings drawn from the corporate 
disclosures are unlikely to be at face value and so require unpacking through the lens of 
the social-historical context and capitalist artefacts that shape (or are shaped by) the 
modern corporation (O’Leary & Chia, 2007).  For example, the sense-making 
underlying the corporate accounts discussed in Chapter nine suggests that transparency 
in the context of corporate disclosures is elusive and opaque.  
10.3 MNCs’ accounts and the discharge of accountability 
Between gas flaring and oil spills environmental incidents, the MNCs’ accounts were 
understood as coalescing around denials, excuses, justifications and (partial) concession 
based on the account-giving heuristic framework. Several excuses and justifications 
were offered by the MNCs as to why they have continued to flare gas in Nigeria 
(Chapter Seven), whereas stakeholders argued that gas flared in Nigeria could be fully 
utilised by the electricity sector. Moreover, Eni’s statement suggests that economic 
incentive was the motivation for the continued gas flaring in Nigeria. Eni stated that the 
electricity sector was a fertile ground for the utilisation of currently flared gas, but it 
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further stated that oil companies are not interested in making such investment because 
of the perceived low economic returns
113
.  
 
In relation to gas flaring and oil spills, the MNCs mobilised technical discourses to 
project their actions regarding these environmental incidents as responsible. For 
example, they claimed that gas flaring was for reasons of operational safety measure 
without explicating the necessary thresholds of such a safety measure. Technical 
discourses around oil spills were evident in accounts on how sabotage was determined, 
the volume of oil spilled, the use of fingerprint to determine whether a particular oil 
spill emanated from a company’s oil facility, and the justification of the methods used 
for clean-up and remediation of oil spill sites.   Technical discourses apparently 
rendered transparency opaque and was further reinforced by the MNCs’ allusion to 
expert knowledge, which potentially creates a distance between the corporation and 
stakeholders (Zyglidopoulos & Fleming, 2011). As Zyglidopoulos & Fleming further 
argue, even when stakeholders have the expertise to contribute to the technical 
discourses, they are alienated and their views are ignored. In the Nigerian oil industry, 
the legitimate expert opinions that the MNCs consider relevant are those that are in line 
with corporate disposition. For example, despite the different findings in developed and 
developing countries on the harmful effects of gas flaring on human health and the 
natural environment (Chapters Four and Eight), Shell has consistently maintained since 
1999 to 2013 (and probably still does) the legitimacy of the World Bank technical 
discourse on the impact of gas flaring while ignoring the countervailing discourses by 
other experts (Chapters Seven and Eight).  Corporate experts apparently pursuing their 
self-interest and those of the corporation in the context of maintaining the capitalist 
agenda use their skills to perpetrate, encourage or endorse unethical behaviours (see 
Dillard & Ruchala, 2005; Zyglidopoulos & Fleming, 2011).  
 
The claims that sabotage was the main cause of oil spills were recurring in the corporate 
narratives but the alternative narratives by stakeholders suggest the degree of tension 
between those claims and counter-claims. Moreover, the narrative by a senior staff of 
                                                 
113 An alternative argument might be that electricity business is not their area of core competence. 
However, the companies’ allusions to harnessing hitherto flared gas to generate electricity for their host 
communities coupled with the claims by the Nigerian Government regarding inadequate gas supply to 
run the electricity/power plants in the country suggest that they have yet to exploit available options for 
gas utilisation.  
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NOSDRA that the corporations usually prejudge oil spills by attributing its cause to 
sabotage prior to the outcome of investigation is insightful. Apart from community 
stakeholders and NGOs that strongly hold this view, the NOSDRA staff corroborated 
this by saying that during oil spill joint investigation the oil companies were wont to 
claiming that the oil spills were caused by sabotage before the start of the investigation 
even though such spills were evidently caused by equipment failure. One critical issue 
vis-à-vis oil-spills-sabotage-narratives (including the counter-narratives) is the 
problematic or politics of the legitimate voice.  
 
As the empirical findings further suggest, the MNCs’ accounts portrayed them in good 
light as environmentally responsible organisations that complied with local 
environmental regulations and internal corporate environmental safety policies, except 
for isolated cases of operational failures. Moreover, they considered the occurrence and 
persistence of gas flaring and oil spills as unintended incidents which were 
predominantly caused by factors beyond their control. However, alternative accounts 
from stakeholders suggest otherwise. Such alternative accounts are not peculiar to the 
Nigerian oil industry. For example, Ruffing (2007) finds evidence of discrepancy 
between what BP reported in its CSR reports and evidence from shadow accounts. What 
was equally profound in Ruffing’s study is the role of the US Government in controlling 
and sanctioning the company when found culpable. Nigeria is apparently different to the 
US as the former apparently has an absentee Government (Adujie, 2012).    
 
Moreover, the sense-making identified as underlying those corporate accounts within 
the capitalist social-historical context are economic logic, managing corporate image in 
the face of image-threatening environmental incidents and stakeholders’ 
discourses/criticisms, and leaning on the rules of the game even though they fall short of 
what constitute responsible behaviours. The Nigerian institutional environment also 
encourages corporate un-accountability whilst the JVs arrangements further provide 
support and protection to the MNCs to behave unethically with impunity. Despite the 
upsurge in social and environmental disclosures by these companies, those accounts are 
largely rendered for purposes other than to discharge accountability (Bebbington, et al., 
2008; Beelitz & Merkl-Davies, 2012; Gray, 2000, 2008, 2013; Merkl-Davies & 
Brennan, 2007, 2011; van Standen,  et al., 2011). In fact, the literature recognises the 
upsurge in voluntary environmental disclosures following adverse incidents (see Patten, 
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1992). Joseph (2007) argues that such disclosures are not intended to discharge 
accountability as the reports are not holistic in that they emphasise the positives and de-
emphasise the negatives (see Bansal & Clelland, 2004; Hess, 2008).  
 
In conclusion, the findings suggest that the MNCs’ accounts on gas flaring and oil spill 
environmental incidents are not so much about absence of reports on these issues but 
the manner in which these incidents are portrayed when analysed against stakeholders’ 
alternative accounts (Adams, 2004).  The divergence between the MNCs’ accounts and 
those of external stakeholders on these negative environmental incidents also suggests 
poor (or absence of) involvement of stakeholders in the accountability process (Adams, 
2004). As Adams (2004: 749) noted, corporate social disclosures are incomplete when 
the issues that are material to stakeholders, for example, the omission of “details of 
impacts on communities” are excluded.  
10.4 Contribution of this study to the literature 
Many studies have focused on CSR of the oil MNCs in Nigeria without emphasis on 
accountability (Eweje, 2006b; Frynas, 2005; Idemudia, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2014; 
Idemudia & Ite, 2006; Ite, 2004, 2007). Moreover, studies that have been examining 
CSR in the Niger Delta have mainly beamed their focus on Shell as though Shell were 
the only MNCs whose operations have negative impacts on the Niger Delta 
environment and people. But this study holistically looked at two environmental issues 
of gas flaring and oil spills whereas previous studies have looked at either of these 
(Hassan & Kouhy, 2013; Odumugbo, 2010; Onojake & Frank, 2012; Osuji & Onojake, 
2004; Sonibare & Akeredolu, 2006)
114
.  
 
It has also contributed to the small literature of corporate social reporting and 
accountability in emerging economies and in terms of theoretical contribution. For 
example, this study adopted theoretical lenses different to those commonly used by 
prior studies on emerging economies such as legitimacy and/or stakeholder theories (see 
Beddewela & Herzig, 2013; Belal & Owen, 2007; Belal & Roberts, 2010; Buccina, et 
al., 2013; Lauwo & Otusanya, 2014; Mahadeo, Oogarah-Hanuman, & Soobaroyen, 
2011) and institutional theory (Momin & Parker, 2013). This study also contributed in 
                                                 
114 Apart from Hassan & Kouhy (2013), as far as I am aware, most of the studies on gas flaring are based 
in engineering and sciences.  
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terms of method as many SEA studies have majorly employed content analysis (see 
Beck, et al., 2010; Belal & Momin, 2009; Milne & Adler, 1999; Pesci & Costa, 2014; 
Tregidga, et al., 2012; Unerman, 2000). Also, this study in part responded to the call by 
Tregidga, et al. (2012) that more social accounting and sustainability studies should 
utilize less familiar qualitative methods or lenses to deepen our understanding of the 
social accounting and sustainability project rather than the use of content analysis.   
 
The use of account-giving heuristic helped to organise accounts into constellations, 
which did not only allow us to see these nuances but also exposed apparent tensions and 
contradictions between themes within each account-giving category and between 
account-giving categories. This framework was useful in classifying the accounts given 
by the corporations and identifying the form those accounts took. Moreover, whilst 
many prior studies have examined either the perspective of managers or stakeholders, 
this study examined both managerial and stakeholder perspectives. The accounts of 
stakeholders and corporations were compared in order to put forward a ‘balancing 
view.’ A further contribution made in this study is in the area of theorising which 
adopted sense-making lens to unpick the accounts corporations provided on negative 
environmental incidents as the corporations have the incentive to favourably manage 
these image-threatening incidents through narratives. The relevance of unpicking the 
corporate sense-making embedded in the corporations’ accounts derived from the 
apparent failure of capitalism-driven transparency to make things visible as they should 
be (Bowles, 1991; Garsten & de Montoya, 2008; O’Leary & Chia, 2007; Zyglidopoulos 
& Fleming, 2011).  
10.5 Limitation of the study  
The focusing of this study on only gas flaring and oil spills environmental incidents to 
understand accountability practices within the Nigerian oil industry is rather 
reductionist by nature like virtually other research. The focus of this thesis on only these 
environmental incidents, which are negative incidents by nature, potentially (or even 
intentionally) ignored areas of positive interactions between the MNCs and 
communities hosting their operations, especially in respect of corporate philanthropy
115
. 
                                                 
115 Among these are: community development projects, capacity building, employment, scholarships, 
and small-scale business financing. These issues are favourable news the MNCs eloquently made 
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However, various CSR studies have examined these issues in terms of corporate 
community development initiatives and corporate-community relations (Eweje, 2006; 
Frynas, 2005; Idemudia, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2014; Idemudia & Ite, 2006; Ite, 2004, 
2007). Nevertheless, this reductionism has enhanced our ability to explore in-depth 
narratives on these negative environmental incidents to find nuances in the corporate 
accounts. But the focus on these negative incidents is important as corporations tend to 
make more disclosures when negative incidents are linked to their operations (Joseph, 
2007; Patten, 1992). Some material facts of these environmental incidents are akin to 
what Bowles (1991: 387) would refer to as organisation shadows, which according to 
him refers to: “facts which organizations wish to deny about themselves, due to the 
threat poses to self-image and self-understanding and, more generally, the need to be 
viewed in a favourable light by others.”   
 
Another likely limitation of the study is that it explored the MNCs’ accountability on a 
combined basis rather than comparing and contrasting the accounts of the individual 
corporations
116
 on the premise that these MNCs operate within an institutional field 
(Bansal & Roth, 2000; Dimaggio & Powell, 1983; Hoffman, 1999; de Villiers & 
Alexander, 2014). Such decision derived from the assumption that these corporations 
are operating within the same institutional field and will very likely behave in a mimetic 
way to gain and further their legitimacy (Aerts, Cormier, & Magnan, 2006). Therefore, I 
suspected that the individual MNCs would not vary their actions or narratives 
significantly from those of the others. This assumption was largely supported by the 
empirical data as the narratives given by each of the MNCs on common issues 
manifested along the same systems of beliefs (de Villiers & Alexander, 2014) thus 
lending support to the literature that organisations in concentrated industries are likely 
to be more mimicry than those in less concentrated ones (Aerts, et al., 2006).   
Moreover, this study did not draw upon the full scope of shadow/counter accounts in 
that the shadow accounts drew upon were those that focused on the contentious issues 
contained in the accounts provided by the MNCs and not issues not covered by 
                                                                                                                                               
disclosures about in their CSR reports. Nevertheless, such issues have been extensively studied under 
the guise of MNCs’ CSR in the Niger Delta.   
116 However, the non-comparative nature of this study helps us to overcome the problem associated 
with the largely uneven information disclosures by these corporations that would permit reasonable 
comparison. For example, Shell provided more disclosures in relation to gas flaring and oil spills than the 
other corporations.  
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corporate narratives. This study adopted that approach as its concern was not so much 
about counter accounting but utilised counter accounts as enablers to compare MNCs-
stakeholders’ narratives about the same issues.  
 
One other limitation of the study which was also highlighted in Chapter five in relation 
to data collection is the inability to conduct interviews in the corporations and 
regulatory agencies which would have provided richer texts and data than those derived 
from questionnaires. Although this study initially set off as a purely qualitative 
interpretive study, it pragmatically used additional research method (questionnaire) to 
gain useful insights. The literature commends such pragmatic approach when an 
initially intended method (interview) is impracticable or where the use of the former can 
richly complement the latter to further our understanding of a phenomenon (Berry & 
Otley, 2004; Brannen, 2005).   
10.6 Suggested areas of future research 
Whilst this study was not designed to compare and/or contrast the accountability 
practices of the different corporations, future studies might consider this area in order to 
provide insights into the nuances of how the accountability of these MNCs differs. 
Furthermore, the study might also want to consider the comparisons on the basis of the 
MNCs’ countries of origin in order to ascertain the extent to which factors in their home 
countries might have contributed to such accountability practices.  
 
Moreover, as these MNCs in the Nigerian oil industry are gradually realising their 
onshore oil fields in the Niger Delta to indigenous corporations, future research could 
focus solely on the accountability practices of these indigenous corporations in relation 
to their interactions with communities, or a comparative study of these indigenous 
corporations and the MNCs.  Institutional theory might frame the study to explore 
whether similar institutional factors operate within the indigenous corporations and 
MNCs divide or whether there is evidence of indigenous corporations’ mimicry of the 
MNCs vis-à-vis accountability and CSR practices.      
10.7 Concluding remarks  
With many dynamics and secrecy at play in the Nigerian oil industry, the claims and 
counter-claims by corporations and stakeholders are not strange and will likely continue 
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unless fundamental changes are made to the way the industry is currently run and 
regulated (Idemudia, 2010). However, the will of the Government to do it is remote 
being the regulator and majority equity holder in JVs with the MNCs, which have 
invariably led stakeholders to allege that what the Government currently does is self-
regulation. The extent to which this status quo in Nigeria will promote transparency and 
the discharge of accountability to non-financial stakeholders environmentally impacted 
by oil operations is doubtful. However, the series of accounts provided by the MNCs, 
which they perceive as discharging their accountability, have provided a terrain to 
engage in some sorts of dialogue (no matter how distant or shallow) between the 
powerful MNCs (aided by the Government) and stakeholders. But the information 
provided by the MNCs cannot be said to have discharged their accountability. However,  
the information in the public domain appear to have created room for differing levels of 
engagement, and to a lesser extent incremental changes to social and environmental 
performance of the MNCs. For example, the level of gas flaring over the last decade has 
substantially improved based on government statistics. Nevertheless, similar success 
stories are lacking concerning oil spills; but the publicly available accounts and counter-
accounts on oil spills have apparently led to the recent public ‘dialogue’ between the 
MNCs and the Government (Chapter Eight). Whilst both Government and the MNCs 
have publicly traded blames over their roles in sabotage and oil theft which allegedly 
cause most of the oil spills in Niger Delta, such discourses apparently strengthened the 
allegations that issues of oil spills in Nigeria are inundated by politics (European 
Parliament, 2011).   
 
The various excuses the MNCs give that implicate the Government cannot be 
undermined, but they apparently raise doubt over the compatibility of these companies 
with the Government. However, stakeholders have doused this incompatibility 
argument by alleging that the MNCs and Government have the same economic 
orientation which has encouraged them to privilege the status quo.  
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Appendix 4A: Major oil MNCs in Nigeria 
 Oil MNCs in Nigeria National Origin Year commencing 
operations in Nigeria 
1 Chevron (Texaco) American 1963 
2 Eni Italian 1962 
3 ExxonMobil American 1955 
4 Shell British/Dutch 1937 
5 Total (Elf) French 1962 
Sources: Corporate sources 
 
 
Appendix 4B: Oil spill data from 2001 – 2011 
Year No of spill 
incidents 
Quantity spilled (barrels) 
2001 412 120,976.16 
2002 446 241,617.55 
2003 609 35,284.43 
2004 543 17,104.00 
2005 496 10,734.59 
2006 461 13,772.92 
2007 482 10,848.00 
2008 740 49,524.80 
2009 849 43,648.82 
2010 537 17,658.10 
2011 673 66,906.84 
  Source: Data provided by Department of Petroleum Resources, Lagos (16 Feb. 2012) 
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Appendix 4C: A summary of gas flared to gas   produce by Nigerian oil MNCs 
 
Gas Production Vs Flare By Companies (mscf): 2001 - 2010(NNPC ASB BULLETIN 2010, ADAPTED FROM P.40
COMPANY 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
JOINT VENTURE COMPANIES (JV):
SPDC
GAS PRODUCED 593,587,893 527,922,606 703,097,857 740,302,238 671,326,319 735,315,476 763,905,871 800,689,383 455,894,266 777,170,431
GAS FLARED 321,866,427 212,456,424 262,661,338 275,248,361 216,876,732 163,405,866 96,967,320 97,879,670 77,819,939 103,477,380
% OF GAS FLARED 54.22 40.24 37.36 37.18 32.31 22.22 12.69 12.22 17.07 13.31
MOBIL
GAS PRODUCED 431,631,620 378,350,669 320,757,623 392,065,111 446,743,226 491,110,702 464,537,142 427,115,491 427,919,671 479,251,266
GAS FLARED 135,229,930 123,981,525 181,228,300 174,859,914 179,534,640 201,026,922 183,528,046 130,586,764 122,567,197 122,745,744
% OF GAS FLARED 31.33 32.77 56.50 44.60 40.19 40.93 39.51 30.57 28.64 25.61
CHEVRON
GAS PRODUCED 216,161,767 197,133,906 207,250,100 209,897,271 238,352,653 235,249,063 191,186,784 243,040,550 166,573,783 194,327,349
GAS FLARED 148,239,311 102,960,919 128,284,853 125,087,325 136,523,011 192,602,299 162,780,356 142,625,580 112,931,552 118,309,010
% OF GAS FLARED 68.58 52.23 61.90 59.59 57.28 81.87 85.14 58.68 67.80 60.88
TOTAL E & P
GAS PRODUCED 111,953,117 122,444,099 138,676,284 209,208,860 207,893,532 218,968,851 289,817,162 320,372,686 302,772,348 277,253,720
GAS FLARED 42,134,124 44,002,030 49,644,800 47,752,399 29,840,233 64,224,402 33,842,081 35,758,806 26,825,119 30,475,487
% OF GAS FLARED 37.64 35.94 35.80 22.83 14.35 29.33 11.68 11.16 8.86 10.99
NAOC
GAS PRODUCED 410,613,099 375,748,053 381,206,202 433,997,252 429,003,689 423,716,209 320,927,714 293,668,636 272,334,581 441,864,139
GAS FLARED 216,151,951 212,203,266 156,210,687 178,670,250 161,837,476 109,926,431 108,696,157 96,353,534 71,103,491 102,888,514
% OF GAS FLARED 52.64 56.47 40.98 41.17 37.72 25.94 33.87 32.81 26.11 23.29
TEXACO
GAS PRODUCED 33,390,760 20,215,464 15,938,409 13,721,063 7,366,467 5,941,278 2,479,303 4,803,727 7,085,828 7,683,657
GAS FLARED 33,210,246 20,084,262 15,796,986 13,605,041 7,251,079 5,828,277 2,421,926 4,746,874 6,999,689 7,553,166
% OF GAS FLARED 99.46 99.35 99.11 99.15 98.43 98.10 97.69 98.82 98.78 98.30
PAN-OCEAN
GAS PRODUCED 23,319,037 22,156,600 20,184,097 27,265,601 27,067,500 3,944,139 0 21,752,432 207,473 8,082,809
GAS FLARED 22,212,576 20,997,851 19,222,841 25,967,694 25,779,438 3,756,324 0 21,211,546 201,909 6,796,633
% OF GAS FLARED 95.26 94.77 95.24 95.24 95.24 95.24 0.00 97.51 97.32 84.09
JVC SUB-TOTAL
GAS PRODUCED 1,820,657,293 1,643,971,397 1,787,110,572 2,026,457,396 2,027,753,386 2,114,245,717 2,032,853,975 2,111,442,905 1,632,787,949 2,185,633,371
GAS FLARED 919,044,565 736,686,277 813,049,805 841,190,984 757,642,609 740,770,521 588,235,886 529,162,773 418,448,895 492,245,933
% OF GAS FLARED 50.48 44.81 45.50 41.51 37.36 35.04 28.94 25.06 25.63 22.52
PRODUCTION SHARING COMPANIES:
ADDAX
GAS PRODUCED N/A N/A 40,723,887 38,036,721 46,481,560 54,580,697 68,093,192 83,876,751 72,678,580 84,989,027
GAS FLARED N/A N/A 32,261,507 28,204,432 36,112,453 46,268,969 58,549,342 73,028,019 58,614,336 64,920,466
% OF GAS FLARED 0.00 0.00 79.22 74.15 77.69 84.77 85.98 87.07 80.65 76.39
ESSO 
GAS PRODUCED N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 28,310,626 75,260,666 110,648,124 104,990,025
GAS FLARED N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2,070,036 3,865,012 11,537,590 7,379,772
% OF GAS FLARED 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.31 5.14 10.43 7.03
GRAND TOTAL
GAS PRODUCED 1,822,922,111 1,651,591,488 1,830,302,769 2,082,283,189 2,093,628,859 2,182,432,084 2,140,274,706 2,282,440,395 1,837,278,307 2,392,838,898
GAS FLARED 920,905,671 744,108,036 847,614,682 886,070,555 812,332,777 799,998,369 659,368,435 617,618,876 509,351,905 581,568,354
% OF GAS FLARED 50.52 45.05 46.31 42.55 38.80 36.66 30.81 27.06 27.72 24.30
Sources: NNPC Statistical Bulletins 
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Appendix 5A: A summary of data collected 
 DOCUMENTARY SOURCES 
STAKEHOLDERS Semi-
Structured 
Interviews 
Questionnaire 
1 
Questionnaire  
2 
Documents 
MNCs (managers) N/A 43 57 56* 
Indigenous 
companies’ 
managers 
N/A 25 35 N/A 
Community leaders 10 N/A N/A N/A 
NGOs: 
- Independent NGOs 
- Partnering NGOs 
 
4 
3 
N/A 37 N/A 
Regulators N/A 28 77 N/A 
Legal experts 3 N/A N/A N/A 
Accountants 1 N/A N/A N/A 
AGGREGATE 21 96 206 56 
* See Appendix 7A for a breakdown. 
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Appendix 5B: Interview guide 
1. Elicitation of how the stakeholders understand accountability especially within 
the context of the relationship between the oil companies and communities and 
how the companies should be accountable. 
2. The perception of the relationship between the oil MNCs and Niger Delta 
communities. 
3. The expectations of the communities from the oil corporations and the means of 
corporate engagement with communities. 
4. Interrogation on the impacts of gas flaring and oil spills on communities. 
5. Causes of oil spills and corporate remedial actions as well as the role of 
communities in oil sabotage. 
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Appendix 6A (1): Profile of community interviewees 
Niger Delta States Interviewee 
Code 
Sex Interviewee Profile 
Rivers State Community 
stakeholder 1 
M Former youth secretary and trader 
Community 
stakeholder 3 
M Community chief and entrepreneur 
Community 
stakeholder 4 
M Elder and community activist 
Community 
stakeholder 7 
M Community member but resides in the 
city 
Community 
stakeholder 10 
M A member of community council of 
chief 
Bayelsa State Community 
stakeholder 2 
M Community leader and contractor to a 
major oil MNC 
Community 
stakeholder 5 
M Community member and former 
community development committee 
chairman 
Community 
stakeholder 6 
F Community woman and farmer 
Community 
stakeholder 8 
M High school teacher and deputy head 
of school 
Community 
stakeholder 9 
F Community women leader 
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Appendix 6A (2): Profile of interviewees (excluding community interviewees) 
  Interview 
code 
Nature of organisation Role of interviewee 
Accounting 
profession 
1  Accounting 
Professional 
One of the leading accountancy bodies in Nigeria and member of 
International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) 
 Director 
 
Partnering 
NGOs 
 
 
2 Partnering 
NGO 3 
Environmental and community-based NGOs and assist oil MNCs in 
community projects and engagements 
Director and founder 
3 Partnering 
NGO 2 
Environmental and community-based NGOs and assist oil MNCs in 
community projects and engagements 
Community project 
manager 
4 Partnering 
NGO 1 
Environmental and community-based NGOs and assist oil MNCs in 
community projects and engagements 
Director and founder 
Independent 
NGOs 
5 Independent  
NGO 1 
Resource governance, community and right-based NGO  Assistant Director 
6 Independent 
NGO 2 
Environmental and right-based NGO with international affiliation Director and co-
founder 
7 Independent 
NGO 3 
Environment, community and right-based NGO Director and founder 
8 Independent 
NGO 4 
Environment, community and right-based NGO Director  
Legal 
experts 
 
 
9 Legal 
Expert 1 
Oil & gas and environmental law practitioner and educationist  
10 Legal 
Expert 2 
An  expert in environmental law and sustainability practitioner with an 
international sustainability agency 
 
11 Legal 
Expert 3 
Professor of Oil & gas and environmental law and legal consultant & 
practitioner 
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Appendix 6B 
Appendix 6B (1): The questionnaire for first field work  
SECTION A 
Please tick as you think appropriate (SA = Strongly agree; A = Agree; U = Undecided; D = Disagree; SD = Strongly Disagree) 
1 
 
Your organization recognizes the following stakeholder groups in the Nigerian oil 
industry.             . 
SA A U D SD 
(a) Local and International Oil Companies      
(b) Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC)     
(c) Department for Petroleum Resources (DPR)     
(d) National Oil Spills and Detections Regulation Agency (NOSDRA)      
(e) Host communities      
(f) Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs)      
2 Your organization actively interacts with the following stakeholder groups in the 
Nigerian oil industry. 
SA A U D SD 
(a) Local and International Oil Companies      
(b) Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC)      
(c) Department for Petroleum Resources (DPR)      
(d) National Oil Spills and Detections Regulation Agency (NOSDRA)       
(e) Host communities       
(f) Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs)       
3 The following stakeholders influence the social and environmental policies of oil 
companies operating in Nigeria. 
SA A U D SD 
(a) Local and International Oil Companies       
(b) Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC)      
(c) Department for Petroleum Resources (DPR)      
(d) National Oil Spills and Detections Regulation Agency (NOSDRA)       
(e) Host communities       
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(f) Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs)       
4 Your organization relies on these factors to identify its stakeholder?  SA A U D SD 
(a) One having power to affect corporate goals       
(b) One being affected by corporate activities, e.g., community       
(c) One having regulatory capacity       
(d) One representing the interests of the affected weak, e.g., NGO       
 
SECTION B 
  Please tick the options you think appropriate; and for questions that require elaborate or additional information, please provide  
  brief answers on spaces provided.  
1 The following are features of corporate accountability: Yes No 
 (a) Accountability derives from a relationship between an actor (accountor) and its stakeholders (accountees)   
(b) Accountor is obligated to explain and justify conduct   
(c) The accountee can pose questions or demand answers   
(d) Accountee has access to seek corrective measures for accountability deficit    
(e) The accountor may face some consequences (reward and/or punishment) for its conduct   
(f) Free flow of information between an actor and its relevant stakeholders    
(g) Transparency in sharing information with relevant stakeholders   
2 The following are stakeholders  the oil corporations in Nigeria owe social and environmental 
accountability: 
Yes No 
(a) Government/Regulatory Agencies.    
(b) Overseas parents of the oil companies.     
 (c) Joint venture partners.      
 (d) Investors.       
 (e) NGOs.        
 (f) Host communities.      
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3 
If you ticked “NO” for any options (a) to (f) in question (2) above, please briefly state below your reason(s) for each group 
for which you ticked “NO”. 
  
 
 
S/No Questions/Issues SA A U D SD 
4 To what extent do you agree that Global Memorandum of Understanding (GMoU) is 
part of the accountability framework of corporations to oil bearing communities?  
     
5 Please briefly state below your reason(s) for opinion in question (4): 
 
  
 
S/No Questions/Issues SA A U D SD 
6 Environmental impact on communities is a primary and not discretionary responsibility 
of oil corporations. 
     
7 Potentially impacted communities are signatories to environmental impact assessment 
reports in respect of oil exploration and production activities. 
     
8 The corporations are supposed to enlighten the communities in layman language 
on: 
SA A U D SD 
(a) Content of the environmental impact assessment report       
(b) Opportunities environmental impact assessment exercise holds  for them       
(c) Post impact assessment feedback      
9 Most of the demands by Niger Delta communities from oil corporations are very likely 
outside the responsibilities of the oil corporations. 
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  10 If your opinion in (9) above is ‘strongly agree’ (SA) or ‘agree’ (A), please state a few of these demands:        
 
 
 
  
11 Who should be responsible for the items you identified in question (10) above and why? 
 
 
 
12 
 
To what extent do you agree that oil companies in Nigeria have adopted the 
following international best practices: 
SA A U D SD 
(a) Investment in cleaner technology       
(b) Effective environmental impact assessment      
(c) Post impact assessment       
(d) Continuous asset integrity assessment       
(e) Effective monitoring and surveillance of oil facilities (including pipelines)      
(f) Computerized detection devices to track spill occurrences      
13 
 
 
To what extent do you agree with these as best practices in the event of oil spills?  SA A U D SD 
(a) Prompt containment of oil spills       
(b) Provision of relief materials to the affected people       
(c) Pre-clean up assessment surveys       
(d) Joint Investigation (JIV) and reports       
(e) Clean up and environmental remediation      
(f)  Adequate compensations to the affected victims            
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14 Some of the likely challenges why oil companies have not achieved zero gas flaring 
in Nigeria are: 
SA A U D SD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) Cost outweighs benefit       
(b) No alternative source to utilize flared gas       
(c) Not feasible at the moment       
(d) Delay by NNPC to pay its JVC counterpart fund needed to acquire cleaner 
technology    
     
(e) No scientific proofs that it affects human health and  environment       
(f) The cost to stop gas flaring is too high compared to the penalty to flare gas        
(g) Poor economic incentives from the government       
15 What, in your opinion, is the basis for determining adequate compensation to 
communities for the corporate environmental impacts on their social, economic 
and environmental wellbeing? 
SA A U D SD 
(a) Reliance on existing local legal framework       
(b) Reliance on international legal framework       
(c) Expert judgement initiated by the oil corporation      
(d) Expert judgement jointly initiated by oil corporations and   
      communities (or their representatives)       
     
16 Oil companies are supposed to provide information on environmental liabilities to the 
environmentally impacted communities  
     
17 Which of the factors below do you consider relevant in determining corporate 
environmental liabilities in connection with oil and gas pollution that affect host 
communities? 
SA A U D SD 
(a) Potential health hazards faced by communities affected       
(b) Potential psychological trauma faced by the people impacted       
(c) Potential loss of future income and means of livelihood      
(d) Potential costs of relocating impacted victims       
(e) Cost-benefit analysis      
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  18. Corporate social and environmental accountability to communities should be (a) formal [ ] (b) informal [ ]   (c) none [ ] 
  
  19. Please give a brief reason for your opinion in question (18) above.      
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
  20. Please tick one of the ways you think the communities are involved by oil companies in environmental impact assessment review or   
       deliberation? 
       (a) Participate with an opportunity to contribute useful ideas that could modify the report  [ ] 
       (b) Consultation to be informed about the environmental impact assessment rather than to contribute  ideas  [ ] 
       (c) Observing delegates [ ] 
       (d) Non-participants [ ] 
 
21. If the communities participate in environmental impact assessment deliberations, do you agree they understand the technical language of the  
      report on those issues that affect them?        Yes [ ] No [ ] 
 
22. Please state the reason for your opinion in (21) above.  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
23. From your experience, what do you think are the most likely causes of oil spills in Nigeria? Please give a rough percentage estimate. 
      (a) Equipment failure/Aging equipment [ ]    Percentage_____ % 
      (b) Sabotage by communities [ ]   Percentage ____% 
      (c) Sabotage by oil bunkers [ ]    Percentage ____% 
      (d) Others (please specify) ___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix 6B (2): The questionnaire for second field work 
Questionnaire 
Please tick your answers to questions 1 to 15 and write your responses to questions 16 to 19. 
S/no Questions/Issues 
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 
a
g
r
e
e 
A
g
r
e
e 
N
o
t 
su
r
e
 
D
is
a
g
r
e
e 
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 
D
is
a
g
r
e
e 
1 Host communities have the rights to demand information from oil companies on corporate 
environmental impacts that affect them  
    
2 Oil companies owe host communities moral obligations to provide them with transparent 
information about  corporate environmental impacts on them   
    
3 Oil companies have moral obligations to inform host communities of things they did or 
would do to reduce or eliminate environmental impacts  
    
4 Host communities’ stakes in the oil companies are as important as those of shareholders and 
government  
    
5 Oil companies should be accountable to host communities irrespective of the provision of 
the law   
    
6 Oil companies are to be accountable to only government and not to host communities      
7 Most oil spills in Niger Delta are caused by the  activities of third parties (e.g. oil 
bunkering/theft)  
    
8 Oil companies should be liable to host communities for the impact of oil spills caused by 
third parties because they owe the duty of care to provide surveillance over their oil 
installations  
    
9 Gas flaring have little or no negative impacts on host communities      
10 Oil companies’ investment of large amount of money to stop gas flaring is not in the best 
interest of shareholders     
    
11 Oil companies should eradicate their environmental impacts on host communities 
irrespective of how this affects corporate profit target  
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12 Oil companies’ philanthropy is more important than their reduction of corporate 
environmental impacts on host communities  
    
13 The solution to the oil-induced environmental problems confronting host communities are 
the primary responsibilities of the oil companies  
    
14 Oil companies should make environmental liabilities relating to host communities 
accessible to affected communities  
    
15 The protests, confrontations, and (alleged) sabotage against oil companies are used by host 
communities to make oil companies take responsibility for and change their  actions   
    
 
16. Please state the appropriate approach(es) you think the host communities should adopt to   
      demand provision of information and good behaviour from the oil companies? 
 
 
 
 
17. What factors should the oil companies consider in determining their environmental          
       liabilities to host communities? 
 
 
 
18. What method do you think oil companies should use to provide accessible documentary  
      social and environmental information to host communities? 
 
 
 
19. Please briefly state or expand on any issues you think are relevant but not covered by your answers above. 
276 
 
Appendix 6C: Tables of responses presented in absolute values 
Table 1: Do communities have rights to demand information?  
Stakeholders Agree Not sure Disagree Total 
MNCs 54 2 1 57 
Indigenous companies 33 1 1 35 
Regulators 75 1 0 76 
NGOs 35 1 1 37 
COMBINED 197 5 3 205 
 
Table 2: Do corporations have moral obligation to inform communities of impacts? 
Stakeholders Agree Not sure Disagree Total 
MNCs 57 0 0 57 
Indigenous companies 32 2 0 34 
Regulators 71 3 2 76 
NGOs 35 1 1 37 
COMBINED 195 6 3 204 
 
Table 3: Do corporations have moral obligation to inform communities of impact 
mitigation? 
Stakeholders Agree Not sure Disagree Total 
MNCs 56 0 0 56 
Indigenous companies 33 0 1 34 
Regulators 74 0 1 75 
NGOs 34 2 1 37 
COMBINED 197 2 3 202 
 
Table 4: Do corporations owe accountability to communities irrespective of law? 
Stakeholders Agree Not sure Disagree Total 
MNCs 30 9 16 55 
Indigenous companies 16 10 8 34 
Regulators 31 12 32 75 
NGOs 26 5 5 36 
COMBINED 103 36 61 200 
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Appendix 6D: Formal and informal forms of accountability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Appendix 7A: A summary of oil MNCs published reports for this study  
 Global CSR Subsidiary 
CSR & others 
Aggregate 
 
Chevron 7 2 9 
Eni 6 0 6 
ExxonMobil 7 0 7 
Shell 7 14 21 
Total 6 7 13 
Aggregate 33 23 56 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Organisations/Agencies Formal 
(a) 
Informal 
(b) 
Both 
(c) 
MNCs 35 (85.4) 4 (9.8) 2 (4.9) 
Indigenous companies 20 (87) 2 (8.7) 1 (4.3) 
Regulators 22 (81.5) 4 (14.8) 1 (3.7) 
NGOs - - - 
Grand Total  77 (84.6) 10 (11) 4 (4.4) 
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    Appendix 7B: Number of times gas flaring was mentioned in global CSR and Sustainability Reports 
  Chevron Eni Mobil Shell Total 
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2006 17 4 20 22 14 45 18 6 30 25 13 52 N N N 
2007 14 5 14 35 15 51 21 5 24 25 18 30 8 2 24 
2008 23 5 37 25 6 35 33 16 27 24 18 41 16 0 27 
2009 38 8 33 5 1 44 15 5 13 33 21 42 11 3 13 
2010 20 7 19 N* N* N* 17 8 8 40 20 57 13 8 43 
2011 15 4 15 33 12 54 10 7 15 32 22 56 2 0 13 
2012 45 8 22 13 6 28 21 10 14 26 11 68 12 3 10 
Group: Represents the number of times gas flaring was mentioned in the annual reports 
Nigeria: Represents the number of times gas flaring was mentioned in relation to Nigerian operations in the annual reports 
Nigeria stated: Represents the number of times Nigeria was mentioned in the annual reports 
N: No report accessed for this period. N*: No sustainability report except sustainability performance report which contains no 
relevant data to this study.  
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   Appendix 7C: Number of times oil spill was mentioned in global CSR and Sustainability Reports 
 
Chevron Eni ExxonMobil Shell Total 
Y
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r 
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2006 16 0 20 30 7 45 32 0 30 25 14 52 N N N 
2007 16 0 14 30 0 51 29 0 24 27 9 30 12 0 24 
2008 19 0 37 24 5 35 31 0 27 28 16 41 20 0 27 
2009 16 0 33 43 22 44 32 0 13 48 27 42 13 0 13 
2010 13 0 19 N N N 57 0 8 49 16 57 10 0 43 
2011 15 0 15 19 5 54 48 0 15 79 56 56 9 0 13 
2012 35 0 22 16 4 28 57 0 14 52 28 68 1 0 10 
Group:  Represents the number of times oil spill was mentioned in the annual reports 
Nigeria: Represents the number of times oil spill was mentioned in relation to Nigerian operations in the annual reports 
Nigeria stated: Represents the number of times Nigeria was mentioned in the annual reports 
                N: No report accessed for this period 
